[Cite as State v. Fields,
2025-Ohio-2248.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240505
TRIAL NO. 24/CRB/790
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
JUDGMENT ENTRY
HYDEIA FIELDS, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, the briefs, and arguments.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the
cause is remanded for the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date.
Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal,
allows no penalty, and orders that costs are taxed 100% to defendant-appellant Fields.
The court further orders that 1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the
Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and 2) the mandate be sent to the trial
court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk:
Enter upon the journal of the court on 6/27/2025 per order of the court.
By:_______________________
Administrative Judge
[Cite as State v. Fields, 2025-Ohio-2248.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240505
TRIAL NO. 24/CRB/790
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
OPINION
HYDEIA FIELDS, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Cause Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 27, 2025
Emily Smart Woerner, City Solicitor, William T. Horsley, Chief Prosecuting Attorney,
and Dahkota Parish, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and David Hoffmann,
Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
KINSLEY, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Hydeia Fields appeals her conviction for domestic
violence, raising two assignments of error. First, she argues that the manifest weight
of the evidence presented at trial established that she acted in self-defense when she
dispensed pepper spray toward the father of her child during a confrontation at an
apartment building. Second, Fields contends that the trial court erred in prohibiting
her from testifying as to her awareness of the father’s behavior in previous romantic
relationships. But because the manifest weight of the evidence demonstrated that
Fields acted offensively rather than defensively, and because any error the trial court
might have made in excluding Fields’s testimony was harmless, we reject Fields’s
arguments and affirm her conviction.
{¶2} Nonetheless, an error did occur with respect to Fields’s sentence. The
trial court imposed a fine in its sentencing entry that it remitted at the sentencing
hearing. We therefore sua sponte reverse the imposition of the fine and remand the
matter to the trial court to correct its sentencing entry.
Factual and Procedural History
{¶3} On January 15, 2024, Fields was charged with one count of domestic
violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a misdemeanor of the first degree. The charge
alleged that she assaulted E.A., the father of her child. Fields timely submitted a notice
of self-defense in advance of trial. See Crim.R. 12.2. The notice indicated that Fields
planned to pursue a self-defense defense at trial. It did not set forth any prior incidents
of conduct by E.A. that would be introduced in support of Fields’s planned self-defense
case.
{¶4} Fields tried her case to the trial court. The evidence at trial established
that Fields and E.A. were previously in a romantic relationship. They had one child
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
together, and Fields retained sole legal custody after the split. On January 15, 2024,
Fields dropped her daughter, age ten, off at E.A.’s mother’s apartment for a visit.
{¶5} E.A. testified that he and his girlfriend B.H. went to his mother’s
apartment around 3:00 p.m. to bring his daughter belated Christmas gifts. Fields later
began texting him. They argued and sent threatening messages to one another. At his
mother’s request, E.A. agreed to leave before Fields picked up their daughter to avoid
a confrontation. He and B.H. were on their way out when they encountered Fields in
a vestibule at the front of the apartment building.
{¶6} According to E.A., he attempted to walk around Fields, but she
confronted him, saying “What’s up[, E.]? What’s that shit you was talking?” Fields
then maced E.A. on the left side of his face and neck, causing irritation and a burning
sensation. E.A. estimated that about two seconds elapsed between when he and Fields
simultaneously entered the vestibule and when Fields sprayed the mace.
{¶7} E.A. testified that he went outside and called 9-1-1. When Fields
emerged from the building with their daughter about five minutes later, the two adults
shouted at one another. According to E.A., Fields began breaking the Christmas gifts
he had just given their daughter and throwing the gifts on the ground. Fields then got
into an Uber with their daughter and left. E.A. remained on the scene and received
medical treatment from emergency medical personnel.
{¶8} B.H. also testified. She confirmed E.A.’s testimony regarding the
confrontation with Fields in the vestibule. Like E.A., she indicated that Fields said
“What’s up[, E.]? What’s that shit you was talking?” before spraying him with mace.
{¶9} Fields’s version of events was only slightly different from E.A.’s.
Testifying in her defense, Fields explained that she received a call from her daughter
after dropping her off at the grandmother’s apartment. The daughter shared that E.A.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
had delivered Christmas gifts. This angered Fields, both because the gifts were late
and because Fields felt that E.A. relegated his visits with their daughter to his mother’s
residence. Fields texted E.A., and the two exchanged heated messages in which they
hurled threats at one another. Fields decided she would pick her daughter up from
the apartment and told E.A. she would not be coming back.
{¶10} According to Fields, she arrived at the apartment complex about 45 to
60 minutes later. E.A. and B.H. happened to be on their way out of the building just
as Fields was walking in. The three came face to face in the vestibule.
{¶11} Fields, who was eight to nine months pregnant at the time, testified to
being startled when she looked up from her phone because she did not expect E.A. to
be there. She recalled E.A.’s earlier text message that she “was going to get her ass
beat.” She reached for her pepper spray and dispensed the chemical in E.A.’s
direction. Fields then continued past E.A. and B.H. into the building. She retrieved
her daughter from the apartment and came back down. E.A. was on the phone with
the 9-1-1 dispatcher at the time. Fields continued to verbally engage with E.A. while
she and the child got into an Uber and left.
{¶12} The trial court found Fields guilty. It imposed a sentence of 180 days in
jail, suspended 179 days, and afforded credit for one day served. The court additionally
imposed one year of community control. The sentence was stayed pending appeal,
conditioned upon Fields staying away from E.A.
Analysis
{¶13} Fields raises two assignments of error on appeal. In the first, she
contests the weight of the evidence supporting her conviction and insists the State
failed to disprove her affirmative defense of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the second, she challenges the trial court’s exclusion of evidence regarding her
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
knowledge of prior instances of violent conduct allegedly perpetrated by E.A. against
other romantic partners.
A. Self-Defense
{¶14} In her first assignment of error, Fields maintains that the manifest
weight of the evidence established that she acted in self-defense, thereby negating her
criminal liability for domestic violence.
{¶15} The offense of domestic violence is proscribed by R.C. 2919.25. The
statute provides in pertinent part that “[n]o person shall knowingly cause or attempt
to cause physical harm to a family or household member.” R.C. 2919.25(A). On
appeal, Fields does not dispute that she knowingly caused physical harm to E.A. by
spraying him with pepper spray. Nor does she dispute that E.A. qualifies as a family
member because they share a child. Rather, she maintains that the trial court’s
rejection of her affirmative defense of self-defense contravened the manifest weight of
the evidence.
1. Standard of Review
{¶16} In reviewing a self-defense claim, we conduct a manifest weight analysis
to determine whether the State met its burden of persuasion. State v. Messenger,
2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 26. Distinct from sufficiency review, a manifest weight inquiry
requires us to assess whether the trier of fact created a manifest miscarriage of justice
in resolving conflicts in the evidence. State v. Yeban,
2024-Ohio-2545, ¶ 57 (1st Dist.),
citing State v. Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386-387 (1997). We afford substantial
deference to the credibility determinations of the trier of fact because the trier directly
observes the witnesses who testify in the courtroom. See State v. Glover, 2019-Ohio-
5211, ¶ 30 (1st Dist.), quoting Barberton v. Jenney,
2010-Ohio-2420, ¶ 20.
Accordingly, reversal on manifest weight grounds is warranted “only in the exceptional
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case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” State v. Martin, 20
Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).
2. The Law on Self-Defense in a Nondeadly Force Case
{¶17} The elements of a self-defense claim in a nondeadly force case are “(1)
the defendant was not at fault in creating the altercation; (2) the defendant had
reasonable grounds to believe that she was in imminent danger of bodily harm; and
(3) the only way to protect herself from the danger was using force and she did not use
more force than was reasonably necessary to defend herself against the imminent
danger of bodily harm.” State v. Ridley, 2022-Ohio-2561, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.). If any one
of these cumulative elements is not met, the proponent’s self-defense claim fails.
Id.
{¶18} Under Ohio’s current burden-shifting scheme, the defendant must first
produce evidence that tends to support that she acted in self-defense. R.C.
2901.05(B)(1). Once the defendant satisfies this initial burden, the burden shifts to
the State to disprove at least one of the elements of self-defense beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id.; State v. Smith, 2020-Ohio-4976, ¶ 49 (1st Dist.).
3. Analysis of the Evidence Concerning Fields’s Self-Defense Claim
{¶19} In announcing its decision, the trial court found that Fields was at fault
in creating the situation and rejected the notion that Fields had a bona fide belief that
she was in imminent danger. The trial court credited the testimony that Fields
initiated a confrontation with E.A. by goading, “What’s up with that shit you were
talking,” and macing him. The trial court accordingly rejected Fields’s claim of self-
defense. We scrutinize whether the weight of the evidence supports that conclusion.
{¶20} Of note, nearly all of the facts that emerged at trial were not in dispute.
The parties agree that Fields willingly brought their daughter to E.A.’s mother’s
apartment for a visit and that E.A. and B.H. arrived without Fields’s advance
7
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knowledge to bring belated Christmas gifts. They agree that E.A. and Fields exchanged
contentious text messages that day in which both threatened physical harm against
one another. It is undisputed that E.A., B.H., and Fields unintentionally crossed paths
in the vestibule. It is further undisputed that E.A. did not take any aggressive or
threatening action towards Fields in the vestibule, nor did he make any comments to
Fields before she deployed the pepper spray.
{¶21} Regarding the first element of her self-defense claim, Fields argues the
State failed to disprove that she was not at fault in creating the situation. See Ridley,
2022-Ohio-2561, at ¶ 15 (1st Dist.). “[A] person may not provoke an assault or
voluntarily enter an encounter and then claim a right of self-defense.” State v.
Jackson,
2024-Ohio-2728, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.), quoting Smith,
2020-Ohio-4976, at ¶ 53
(1st Dist.). Moreover, one who “willingly advance[s] toward a volatile situation” is
deemed at fault for a resultant physical altercation.
Id., quoting State v. Sekic, 2011-
Ohio-3978, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.).
{¶22} In arguing that the manifest weight of the evidence disproves her
responsibility for the confrontation, Fields suggests that she had a right to pick up her
daughter from the apartment and that her encounter with E.A. and B.H. in the
vestibule occurred by happenstance. Both of these observations are true. But neither
addresses the question of who was at fault for creating the affray.
{¶23} The initial element of self-defense asks whether the defendant was the
initial aggressor or whether she acted to provoke violence by creating the
circumstances leading up to the alleged self-defense. See, e.g., State v. Gardner, 2022-
Ohio-381, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.) (assessing whether defendant was the initial aggressor in
determining the at-fault element of self-defense); State v. Elam, 2022-Ohio-1895, ¶ 14
(12th Dist.) (holding that a defendant “must not be at fault in creating the situation
8
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
that gave rise to the affray” because “[a] person may not provoke an assault or
voluntarily enter an encounter and then claim a right of self-defense”). At most,
Fields’s arguments demonstrate that she did not provoke a confrontation simply by
retrieving her daughter. But this says nothing of whether she was the initial aggressor.
{¶24} The manifest weight of the evidence, and even Fields’s own testimony,
indicates that Fields acted offensively rather than defensively in spraying E.A. with
mace. Merely a few seconds after entering the vestibule, she verbally confronted E.A.
and deployed the pepper spray without E.A. having taken any action, verbal or
otherwise, towards her. Fields herself admitted to spraying E.A. moments after
encountering him.
{¶25} On this record, E.A.’s text messages earlier in the day are not weighty
enough to justify Fields’s preemptive use of force upon entering the vestibule. For one
thing, as this court and others have observed, “words alone ‘will not constitute
sufficient provocation to incite the use of force in most situations.’” Jackson, 2024-
Ohio-2728, at ¶ 13 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Murray, 2019-Ohio-5459, ¶ 32 (7th
Dist.). Fields points to no other provocation outside of E.A.’s text messages to justify
her decision to spray him with mace. The law generally discounts mere words as
forming the lawful basis for retaliating with violence. See
id.
{¶26} Even if we thought it appropriate to consider the earlier text messages
in weighing whether Fields was at fault for the confrontation, doing so does not
disprove Fields’s responsibility. The text messages between Fields and E.A. were not
introduced into the record, and as such we are unable to ascertain which person—E.A.
or Fields—made the initial threat. Thus, even if the text messages are taken into
account, the manifest weight of the evidence does not undermine the trial court’s
conclusion. Moreover, the evidence presented at trial demonstrated that Fields
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
initiated a physical confrontation with E.A. by spraying him with mace. The record
thus supports the trial court’s determination that Fields was at fault for the affray.
{¶27} The State need only disprove one element of a self-defense claim to
carry its burden. State v. Knuff, 2024-Ohio-902, ¶ 191. Because the trial court’s
determination that Fields was at fault was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence, the State met its burden in this case. We therefore need not address whether
the trial court’s conclusion that Fields lacked a bona fide belief that she was in danger
was supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶28} Weighing the evidence and all reasonable inferences and considering
the credibility of the witnesses, we hold that the trial court did not clearly lose its way
and create a manifest miscarriage of justice in rejecting Fields’s self-defense claim.
Accordingly, we overrule Fields’s first assignment of error.
B. Admission of Evidence
{¶29} In her second assignment of error, Fields contends that the trial court
erred in preventing her from testifying to her knowledge of violent acts ostensibly
perpetrated by E.A. upon his past romantic partners. She argues that this knowledge
informed her state of mind when she encountered E.A. in the vestibule.
{¶30} At trial, Fields testified that she and E.A. had known one another for
over ten years and that E.A. had had other romantic partners in that time. Defense
counsel asked Fields whether E.A. had been violent with any of his past partners,
prompting an objection by the State. The prosecutor argued that the defense was
precluded from introducing other acts evidence under Evid.R. 404(B) because they
had not provided advance notice. Defense counsel countered that the evidence was
admissible to show Fields’s state of mind relevant to the self-defense argument. The
trial court sustained the objection.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶31} Shortly thereafter, Fields testified that she was eight to nine months
pregnant and very emotional in her interactions with E.A. on the day in question.
Fields attempted to revisit the excluded testimony by stating she was emotional during
prior incidents with E.A. as well, prompting the State to renew its other-acts objection.
Defense counsel reiterated that she was delving into the topic to show Fields’s state of
mind on the day in question. The prosecutor replied that Fields could testify to her
state of mind, but not to alleged prior incidents of domestic violence involving E.A.
The trial court agreed and sustained the objection. Fields now challenges the trial
court’s evidentiary rulings.
{¶32} A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Morris, 2012-Ohio-2407, ¶ 19. An abuse of discretion
connotes a judgment that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore
v. Blakemore,
5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). “[A]s the [Ohio] Supreme Court recently
clarified, ‘courts lack the discretion to make errors of law.’” State v. Austin, 2021-
Ohio-3608, ¶ 5 (1st Dist.), quoting Johnson v. Abdullah,
2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 39. But
an error in an evidentiary ruling does not warrant reversal of the trial court’s judgment
unless the ruling affected the substantial rights of the complaining party. Evid.R.
103(A); State v. Terry,
2023-Ohio-3131, ¶ 6 (1st Dist.).
{¶33} Under Evid.R. 404(A), character evidence is generally inadmissible to
prove action in conformity, subject to three exceptions. Relative to the victim, Evid.R.
404(A)(2) provides that “[e]vidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of
the crime offered by an accused . . . is admissible[.]” When character evidence is
permitted, Evid.R. 405 delineates the means by which a party may prove the subject’s
character or trait:
(A) Reputation or opinion[.] In all cases in which evidence of
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be
made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an
opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant
specific instances of conduct.
(B) Specific instances of conduct[.] In cases in which character
or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge,
claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of his
conduct.
{¶34} In a self-defense case, character evidence about the victim tends to
comprise two categories: “(1) testimony concerning the victim [ ] offered to
demonstrate defendant’s state of mind at the time of the incident, and (2) testimony
about the victim’s character offered to prove that the victim was more likely the
aggressor.” State v. Williamson, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 4207, *11 (4th Dist. Sept. 12,
1996).
{¶35} In State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 24 (2002), the Ohio Supreme
Court held that Evid.R. 405(B) precludes a defendant from introducing specific
instances of the victim’s conduct to prove that the victim was the initial aggressor. But
Barnes expressly refrained from addressing the first category, however, as that issue
was not before the Court. Id. at fn. 3 (“We express no opinion here as to whether
evidence of specific instances of a victim’s conduct is admissible for other purposes in
a self-defense case.”).
{¶36} Nonetheless, numerous Ohio appellate courts have held that a criminal
defendant may testify about specific instances of the victim’s prior conduct to
establish the defendant’s state of mind. See State v. Steinhauer, 2014-Ohio-1981, ¶ 30
(4th Dist.) (collecting cases); State v. Rice,
2022-Ohio-3291, ¶ 70 (7th Dist.) (same).
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
This court is among them. In State v. Wetherall, 2002-Ohio-1613 (1st Dist.), we held
that testimony offered by the accused relaying specific instances of violent conduct by
the victim was properly admitted to inform the accused’s state of mind at the time of
the offense. Id. at *23-24. We subsequently reaffirmed this principle in State v. Roth,
2004-Ohio-374 (1st Dist.), holding that “a defendant must be allowed to present
evidence of a victim’s propensity for violence when the defendant is putting forth the
affirmative defense of self-defense.” Id. at ¶ 14. Of note, the defendant must know of
the specific incidents at the time of the confrontation to render such testimony
admissible.
Steinhauer at ¶ 29.
{¶37} Viewed against this backdrop, the trial court seemingly abused its
discretion in precluding Fields from testifying about prior violent conduct allegedly
perpetrated by E.A. If Fields in fact intended to testify to prior incidents of conduct by
E.A. that informed her state of mind as to his propensity for violence, case law would
generally support the admissibility of that testimony. But the record is unclear as to
what specifically Fields intended to present, because defense counsel did not proffer
the excluded evidence into the record. As a result, it is difficult to definitively conclude
that the excluded evidence was in fact relevant to Fields’s state of mind or that she had
the requisite knowledge at the time of the incident at the apartment. On the record
before us, we are therefore unsure if Fields’s testimony would have supported her
conclusion, given that Fields did not file a Crim.R. 12.2 notice identifying the prior
instances of conduct that allegedly supported her self-defense argument, nor did she
proffer them into the record when the trial court sustained the State’s objections.
{¶38} But even if E.A.’s prior conduct was relevant and Fields had knowledge
of it at the time, this does not end our inquiry. We must assess whether the trial court’s
evidentiary error, assuming one was made, had a harmful effect on Fields’s trial. See
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
State v. Green, 2023-Ohio-4360, ¶ 36 (3d Dist.) (directing, “a trial court’s Evid.R.
405(B) ruling is subject to harmless error analysis”).
{¶39} Under Crim.R. 52(A), “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” In order to assess
whether an error was harmless, we consider (1) whether the defendant was prejudiced
by the error, i.e., whether the error impacted the verdict; (2) whether the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) whether the remaining evidence
established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Yeban, 2024-Ohio-
2545, at ¶ 52 (1st Dist.), citing State v. Harris, 2015-Ohio-166, ¶ 37.
{¶40} Here, any error made by the trial court in excluding evidence of prior
conduct by E.A. was harmless, as there was overwhelming evidence contravening
Fields’s self-defense claim. See Green at ¶ 36. Despite exchanging threatening text
messages with E.A., Fields voluntarily went to the apartment, not knowing whether
E.A. was still there. When she happened to encounter E.A. in the vestibule, she acted
first by taunting him, saying “What’s up[, E.]? What’s that shit you was talking?” and
then immediately spraying him with mace. She acted offensively, not defensively.
{¶41} Even had Fields been permitted to testify about allegations of prior
instances of violent conduct on E.A.’s part, the outcome of trial would have been the
same. Fields was at fault for initiating the affray, regardless of her state of mind.
{¶42} We conclude that the trial court did not err to the prejudice of Fields in
excluding testimony concerning prior acts ostensibly perpetrated by E.A. Fields’s
second assignment of error is overruled.
C. Financial Sanctions
{¶43} Although not addressed by the parties, we sua sponte address an error
in the judgment entry memorializing Fields’s sentence. The trial court imposed
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
sentence as follows at the August 22, 2024 sentencing hearing:
THE COURT: . . . All right, so 180 days, suspend 179. Credit for
one. No fine. Court costs --
...
THE COURT: So it’s going to be 180 days, 179 days suspended,
credit one. No fine, court costs. Going to be one year Community
Control, pay through. It’s going to be a no contact, 10(G) stay away
order. It’s going to be treatment as recommended by probation
department and there’s no restitution.
(Emphasis added.) But in its sentencing entry, the trial court did impose a fine against
Fields. This was clearly a clerical error.
{¶44} A defendant is entitled to know the sentence at the sentencing hearing.
State v. Bryan, 2019-Ohio-2980, ¶ 12 (5th Dist.), quoting State v. Santiago, 2015-
Ohio-1824, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.). As such, the sentence announced in open court and the
sentence in the judgment entry must match. State v. Sullivan,
2015-Ohio-4845, ¶ 6
(1st Dist.). Here, they do not. We accordingly reverse the portion of the sentencing
entry that imposes a fine and remand the cause to the trial court with instructions to
issue a nunc pro tunc entry correcting the error.
Conclusion
{¶45} Because the record contains credible evidence to support that Fields did
not act in self-defense, and because the trial court’s error in limiting Fields’s
testimony, if any, was harmless, we overrule her first and second assignments of error
and affirm her conviction. However, because the judgment entry contains a clerical
error regarding Fields’s sentence, we sua sponte reverse the trial court’s imposition of
a fine and remand the cause to the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc entry.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Judgment accordingly.
ZAYAS and BOCK, JJ., concur.
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