[Cite as State v. Blanton,
2025-Ohio-237.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAWRENCE COUNTY
State of Ohio, : Case No. 23CA35
Plaintiff-Appellee, : DECISION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
v. :
Shane C. Blanton, : RELEASED 1/24/2025
Defendant-Appellant. :
______________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Angela Miller, Jupiter, Florida, for appellant.
Brigham M. Anderson, Lawrence County Prosecuting Attorney, Ironton, Ohio, for
appellee.
______________________________________________________________________
Hess, J.
{¶1} Shane C. Blanton appeals his conviction following a guilty plea to four
counts of attempted murder and four counts of felonious assault. He raises three
assignments of error. First, he contends that his guilty plea was not made voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently because the trial court did not strictly comply with Crim.R. 11
and inform him that he was waiving his right to a jury trial. Second, he contends that the
record does not clearly and convincingly support the trial court’s imposition of consecutive
sentences. Last, he contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when
it advised him to plead guilty to four counts of attempted murder and four counts of
felonious assault when the crime of strangulation is applicable to his actions and imposes
lesser penalties. He also contends his counsel was deficient for failing to demand a bill of
particulars.
Lawrence App. No. 23CA35 2
{¶2} We find that the trial court strictly complied with Crim.R. 11 (C)(2)(c) when
it discussed his waiver of a right to a jury trial before it accepted his guilty plea, even
though the review of the jury trial constitutional right came several moments before the
trial court reviewed the remaining constitutional rights he was waiving. We find that the
record in this case does not clearly and convincingly fail to support the trial court’s
consecutive-sentence findings. Last, we find that Blanton has failed to show that his trial
counsel was deficient or that any alleged deficiencies resulted in prejudice to his defense.
{¶3} We overrule the assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶4} The Lawrence County grand jury indicted Blanton on a total of 38 counts: 8
counts of attempted murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A) and R.C. 2923.02(A), first-
degree felonies; 12 counts of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), second-
degree felonies; 14 counts of endangering children in violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(2),
third-degree felonies; 2 counts of pandering obscenity involving a minor in violation of
R.C. 2907.321(A)(1), second-degree felonies; 1 count of resisting arrest in violation of
R.C. 2921.33(B)(C), a fourth-degree felony; and 1 count of violating a protection order in
violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1), a fifth-degree felony. He pleaded not guilty and not guilty
by reason of insanity and requested a court-ordered competency evaluation. The court
ordered a competency evaluation and Blanton was determined to be competent. Blanton
requested a second competency evaluation, which the court ordered, and Blanton again
was found to be competent. Blanton and the State stipulated to the conclusions of the
competency evaluations.
Lawrence App. No. 23CA35 3
{¶5} Blanton and the State entered into a negotiated plea agreement without a
recommended sentence in which Blanton pleaded guilty to four counts of attempted
murder and four counts of felonious assault. The State agreed to dismiss the remaining
30 counts: 4 counts of attempted murder, 8 counts of felonious assault, 14 counts of
endangering children, 2 counts of pandering obscenity involving a minor, 1 count of
resisting arrest, and 1 count of violating a protection order. Blanton signed a written guilty
plea in which he affirmed, among other things, that he understood the charges and the
constitutional rights he was waiving, that he was not induced or threatened to enter into
the plea agreement, and that he had confidence in his trial counsel.
{¶6} At the change of plea hearing, the trial court reviewed the change of plea
form that Blanton signed, and he acknowledged that it was his signature on the form. The
trial court then proceeded to review the right to a jury trial Blanton was waiving.
COURT: Okay. The next form that I need to review with you is a form entitled
“Waiver of Jury Trial”. That is the form that I’m holding in my hand now.
There does appear to be your signature on the form. Is that your signature,
sir?
DEFENDANT: Yes ma’am.
COURT: And prior to executing that form, did your attorney explain to you
that you do have a right to a trial by jury in this matter, but that by executing
the form you are waiving that right?
DEFENDANT: He did.
COURT: Did anyone force you to sign the form?
DEFENDANT: No ma’am.
{¶7} The trial court reviewed each of the eight counts to which Blanton pleaded
guilty and asked him if he understood the nature of the charges and that the sentence for
each count could be imposed consecutively to one another and Blanton stated that he
Lawrence App. No. 23CA35 4
understood the charges and the penalties and that he was not under any mind-altering
substances. The trial court then reviewed the constitutional rights Blanton was waiving in
addition to the right to a jury trial the trial court had previously addressed:
COURT: All right. Despite your understanding in this matter, I am required
to address with you some of your constitutional rights that you’re going to
be waiving as a result of entering pleas of guilty today. The first one is, sir,
do you understand that you do have the right to confront witnesses who
may testify against you at trial and that by proceeding today you are waiving
that right?
DEFENDANT: Yes ma’am.
COURT: Do you understand that by entering your guilty plea that you’re
waiving your right to force the State to prove your guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt as to each element of the crimes of which you’ve been charged?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
COURT: Do you understand that by entering your guilty pleas that you’re
waiving your right to compel and demand the attendance of witnesses at
trial who may testify in your favor?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
COURT: Do you understand that you cannot be forced or compelled to
testify against yourself at trial?
DEFENDANT: I do.
COURT: Do you understand that if you went to trial and decided not to testify
that your silence cannot be used against you in attempt to prove your guilt?
DEFENDANT: Yes ma’am.
{¶8} The trial court then reviewed a number of sentencing, community control,
and postrelease control matters, as well as whether Blanton was threatened or enticed
by promises to enter the guilty pleas. Blanton then entered his guilty pleas and affirmed
that the pleas were made of his free will. The trial court accepted his pleas, set the matter
for a sentencing hearing, and ordered a presentence investigative (PSI) report.
Lawrence App. No. 23CA35 5
{¶9} At the sentencing hearing, the State and Blanton stipulated to the
presentation of certain evidence that would have been offered at trial. The trial court also
reviewed the PSI report. Blanton raised two issues with the risk assessment evaluation
contained in the PSI report: (1) Blanton’s employment status at the time of his arrest and
(2) whether he resided in a high-crime area. The trial court confirmed that if these 2 issues
were resolved in Blanton’s favor, the risk score would be brought down to a 23 (moderate
risk) from the existing score of 25 (high risk).
{¶10} The State called Brian Chaffins, an investigator with the Lawrence County
Drug and Major Crimes Unit, who testified that he became involved in the case because
he has experience in retrieving evidence from digital devices. Investigator Chaffins
executed a search warrant on Blanton’s cell phone. The victim’s mother’s cell phone was
also searched because the mother had informed law enforcement that she had taken
pictures from Blanton’s device and sent them to her cell phone so she would have proof
of what was going on. Investigator Chaffins testified that he retrieved a lot of evidence of
child abuse and that evidence was pared down to the eight videos that supported the four
attempted murder and four felonious assault counts to which Blanton pleaded guilty.
STATE: Briefly describe that evidence to the Court, please.
CHAFFINS: The first four videos are all of the child being strangled to the
point of loss of consciousness. The second four videos are variations of . .
. punches and more choking, may or may not have resulted in loss of
consciousness.
{¶11} Investigator Chaffins testified that he had compiled the eight videos to a
flash drive which was entered as an exhibit and was played for the trial court. The eight
videos depict Blanton video recording himself with a two-year-old toddler. The multiple
recordings show Blanton calmly setting up his cell phone camera, and then going up
Lawrence App. No. 23CA35 6
behind the toddler, who appears initially to be calm, content, or at play in many of the
videos. Multiple videos show Blanton suddenly grab the toddler and place him in a
chokehold, with the toddler desperately kicking and helplessly dangling in the air. During
the strangulation, the toddler initially struggles and makes audible gasping and vocal
squeaking noises, but eventually the toddler’s body goes limp and the audio goes quiet
except for the sound of Blanton’s heavy breathing as he continues to exert force against
the toddler’s throat. After reviewing the eight videos, the State explained that the first four
counts of attempted murder to which Blanton pleaded guilty were based on the videos in
which Blanton strangled the toddler until there was a loss of consciousness, which could
have resulted in death. The State also explained that there were additional videos that
were retrieved from Blanton’s phone that were not shown to the trial court, which would
have been played for the jury had the matter proceeded to trial on all 38 counts.
{¶12} Due to the nature of the offenses, the State requested the maximum penalty
on each count and for the sentences to run consecutively. The State argued:
Your Honor, this is not only the worst form of the offense, but it was
completed in a situation where the defendant was in loco parentis of this
child. This is a two-year old little boy. . . . I don’t know if there is a worse
form of attempted murder that exists. I don’t believe there is. I’ve been doing
this nineteen years. I’ve never seen multiple counts of attempted murder on
the same person. These obviously occurred in different places. They
occurred at different times. They occurred each and every time while he
was in authority over this child. . . . Not only were these horrendous acts
performed by the defendant, they were videoed by the defendant, they were
saved by the defendant, . . . . And this victim has suffered serious physical
harm. He was treated at Children’s Hospital. . . . During that treatment it
was found that he also had methamphetamine . . . the two-year-old had
methamphetamine in his system.
{¶13} Blanton’s attorney discussed Blanton’s educational background and work
history, which showed that Blanton was a high school graduate and was employed as a
Lawrence App. No. 23CA35 7
certified welder, but he started using methamphetamine four years ago and had “been on
a downward spiral since.” He argued that what the court saw on the videos “is a snippet
in time” and that, but for the drugs, Blanton would not be before the court. Blanton’s
attorney asked “for something in the lower end of the sentencing guidelines.”
{¶14} The trial court stated that it had considered the evidence, the PSI report, the
parties’ statements, and weighed the purposes and principals of sentencing in R.C.
2929.11, the seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12, and followed the
guidance of R.C. 2929.13. It sentenced Blanton to 11 years on each of the 4 counts of
attempted murder and 8 years on each of the 4 counts of felonious assault and ran the
sentences consecutively for a total minimum prison term of 76 years, with an
indeterminate sentence of up to an additional 5.5 years for a range up to 81.5 years in
prison. The trial court stated:
[T]he Court finds that consecutive sentences are necessary to punish the
offender. Consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the
seriousness of the offender[’]s conduct and to the danger the defendant
poses to the public, and the defendant’s history of criminal conduct
demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the
public from future crimes of the defendant.
{¶15} Blanton appealed.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶16} Blanton presents three assignments of error:
1. Appellant Blanton’s guilty plea was obtained in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution and Crim.R. 11(C).
2. The record does not clearly and convincingly support the trial court’s
imposition of consecutive sentences for an aggregate prison term of 76-
81.5 years, which is tantamount to a life sentence for Blanton. R.C.
2929.14(C)(4).
Lawrence App. No. 23CA35 8
3. Trial counsel was ineffective in advising his client to plead guilty to four
counts of attempted murder and four counts of felonious assault when Ohio
enacted R.C. 2903.18, the strangulation of [sic] suffocation statute, which is
applicable to this case and imposes lesser penalties. Further, counsel failed
to demand a bill of particulars, which also caused Blanton to enter an
unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary plea. Blanton was deprived of his
rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, and Article I, Sections 10 and 16 of the Ohio
Constitution.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Voluntary, Knowing, and Intelligent Guilty Plea
{¶17} In his first assignment of error, Blanton contends that his guilty pleas were
not made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently because the trial court failed to inform
him that he was waiving his constitutional right to a jury trial. He argues that under Civ.R.
11(C)(2)(c), the trial court must inform him that he is waiving the right to a jury trial and
here the trial court did not strictly comply with that requirement. He argues, “Here there
was a complete failure to advise Blanton that he was relinquishing his right to a jury trial.”
He acknowledges that the trial court did address his waiver of his right to a jury trial during
the change of plea hearing, but contends that it was not made “during the plea colloquy”
(emphasis in original) and that the State’s contention that the jury trial waiver was explicitly
addressed lacks merit because the State “reaches back to a brief discussion” during
which the trial court discusses Blanton’s understanding of the jury waiver form he signed.
1. Standard of Review
{¶18} Appellate courts apply a de novo standard of review when evaluating a
plea's compliance with Crim.R. 11(C). State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108-109 (1990);
State v. Clark,
2024-Ohio-4930, ¶ 8 (4th Dist.).
Lawrence App. No. 23CA35 9
2. Legal Analysis
{¶19} Crim.R. 11(C)(2) governs the acceptance of guilty pleas by the trial court in
felony cases and provides that a trial court should not accept a guilty plea without first
addressing the defendant personally and making sure the defendant understands the
constitutional rights the defendant is waiving:
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands
that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront
witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in the defendant's favor, and to require the state to prove the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant
cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
“In addition to these constitutional rights, the trial court must determine that the defendant
understands the nature of the charge, the maximum penalty involved, and the effect of
the plea” which are set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b). State v. Montgomery, 2016-
Ohio-5487, ¶ 41.
{¶20} When reviewing a defendant's constitutional rights (right to a jury trial, right
to call witnesses, etc.), a trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). State v.
Veney, 2008-Ohio-5200, ¶ 18. However, “strict compliance does not mean literal
compliance.” State v. Adams,
2016-Ohio-2757, ¶ 11 (4th Dist.). A court does not need to
engage in “a word-for-word recitation of the criminal rule, so long as the trial court actually
explains the rights to the defendant.” Id. at ¶ 12, citing
Veney at ¶ 27.
{¶21} In contrast, when reviewing a defendant's non-constitutional rights
(maximum penalty involved, understanding effect of plea, etc.), a trial court must
substantially comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b). Veney ¶ 18. “ ‘[S]ubstantial
compliance’ means that ‘under the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively
Lawrence App. No. 23CA35 10
understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving.’ ” State v. Morrison,
2008-Ohio-4913, ¶ 9 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Puckett,
2005-Ohio-1640, ¶ 10 (4th
Dist.); State v. Tolle,
2022-Ohio-2839, ¶ 8-11 (4th Dist.).
{¶22} Blanton challenges the trial court’s strict compliance with Crim.R.
11(C)(2)(c) when it addressed his constitutional right to a jury trial. Blanton argues that
the trial court failed because, although the trial court addressed the jury trial waiver with
him, this was done during an earlier part of the hearing, prior to Blanton’s guilty plea and
several moments before the trial court addressed the other constitutional rights he was
waiving.
{¶23} The record from the change of plea hearing shows that the trial court first
had Blanton sworn in, then the court reviewed Blanton’s right to a jury trial by reviewing
the form with him, confirming his signature, and asking him if he understands that he is
waiving the right to a jury trial, which he answers affirmatively.
COURT: And prior to executing the form, did your attorney explain to you
that you do have the right to a trial by jury in this matter, but that by executing
the form you are waiving that right?
DEFENDANT: He did.
{¶24} After this exchange, the trial court reviews the counts to which he has
agreed to plead guilty and confirms that he understands the charges and penalties. Then
the trial court reviews the remaining constitutional rights set out in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c).
Blanton contends that the trial court’s explanation of his jury trial right waiver is insufficient
because, even though it was provided before the trial court accepted his guilty plea, it
was not provided when the other rights in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) were addressed. He cites
State v. Brinkman, 2021-Ohio-2473 in support.
Lawrence App. No. 23CA35 11
{¶25} In Brinkman, a capital murder case, the trial court did not advise the
defendant that he was waiving his constitutional rights to confront the witnesses against
him and to have the state prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before the trial court
accepted his guilty plea. However, four days later the trial court recognized its error after
reviewing the hearing transcript and held a second plea hearing. At the second plea
colloquy, the trial court advised the defendant of all the constitutional rights he was
waving, but did not have him reenter his guilty plea. The Supreme Court of Ohio
determined that this did not satisfy the strict compliance required when addressing the
constitutional rights under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c):
The trial court did not advise Brinkman of his constitutional rights to confront
the witnesses against him and to have the state prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt until November 9, four days after he had entered and the
court had accepted his guilty plea and after the state had presented
evidence of Brinkman's guilt. The state contends that vacating the guilty
plea would ignore the purpose of Crim.R. 11(C) and that holding that the
trial court did not strictly comply here “would elevate form over substance,”
because nothing in the record indicates that Brinkman's plea was not
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. But the purpose of Crim.R.
11(C)(2) is to require the trial court to “convey to the defendant certain
information so that he can make a voluntary and intelligent decision whether
to plead guilty” in the first place. Veney at ¶ 18. Informing the defendant of
his constitutional rights after he has already pleaded guilty does not support
that interest. That is because when a defendant enters a plea of guilty, he
“simultaneously waives” his constitutional rights. McCarthy v. United States,
394 U.S. 459, 466,
89 S.Ct. 1166,
22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969); see also Class v.
United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 798, 805,
200 L.Ed.2d 37 (2018);
Ballard at 478, 423 N.E.2d 115 (“a guilty plea is constitutionally infirm when
the defendant is not informed in a reasonable manner at the time of entering
his guilty plea” of his constitutional rights [emphasis added]). Here, the trial
court accepted the guilty plea following an incomplete colloquy that omitted
important warnings to Brinkman regarding his waiver of his constitutional
rights. Additionally, the trial court never asked Brinkman during the second
colloquy whether he still wished to plead guilty. As we emphasized in Miller,
strict compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) is required when informing a
defendant of his constitutional rights; substantial compliance will not do. 159
Ohio St.3d 447,
2020-Ohio-1420,
151 N.E.3d 617, at ¶ 16. We therefore
reject the state's “form over substance” argument.
Lawrence App. No. 23CA35 12
(Brackets in original). Brinkman at ¶ 17.
{¶26} Brinkman is distinguishable. Here the trial court advised Blanton of his jury
trial right before accepting his guilty plea. Brinkman does not require that the trial court
inform Blanton of the constitutional rights he is waiving all together at the same time, one
immediately after the other, in the plea colloquy. The trial court advised Blanton of the
jury trial waiver earlier in the plea colloquy while it reviewed the “Waiver of Jury Trial”
form, which made it logical and natural for the trial court to address the jury waiver with
Blanton at that time. The trial court ensured that Blanton understood his right to a jury trial
and that he was waiving it before accepting his guilty plea, which is all that the Brinkman
holding requires.
{¶27} Blanton also cites State v. Hermes, 2023-Ohio-2011 (6th Dist.) for support.
Hermes is likewise distinguishable. In Hermes, the trial court failed to comply with
Crim.R.11(C)(2)(c) when it did not advise the defendant that he was waiving the right to
a “jury” trial. The trial court used the term “trial” and never referred to a “jury trial” at any
stage of the colloquy. Id. at ¶ 7; see also State v. Thomas,
2018-Ohio-2815, ¶ 13-15 (7th
Dist.). However, here the trial court used the term “jury” to describe the trial Blanton was
waiving when it stated, “you do have the right to a trial by jury in this matter.”
{¶28} We find that the trial court strictly complied with the Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c)
requirement that it explain that Blanton has a right to a jury trial and that he was waiving
that right by pleading guilty. We overrule the first assignment of error.
B. Consecutive Sentences
{¶29} There is no dispute that the trial court made each of the findings required
by the consecutive-sentencing statute. However, Blanton contends that the record does
Lawrence App. No. 23CA35 13
not support the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences for an aggregate prison
term of 76 to 81.5 years. Specifically, he argues that the record does not support the trial
court’s findings involving the proportionality of the sentence to the seriousness of his
conduct or the danger he poses to the public under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)
1. Standard of Review
{¶30} An appellate court should give broad deference to a trial court’s sentencing
decision and not serve as a “second-tier sentencing court.”
Ordinarily, appellate courts defer to the broad discretion trial courts have in
making sentencing decisions, and R.C. 2953.08(G) reflects that
deference. That makes sense: the trial judge presided over the trial and
heard the witnesses testify, the defendant made his allocution to the
sentencing judge directly, and the trial judge will often have heard directly
from the victims at sentencing. Thus, an appellate court's role is not to be a
“second-tier sentencing court.” Appellate courts possess no inherent right
to review a felony sentence. Indeed, “[e]xcept to the extent specifically
directed by statute, ‘it is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its
judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a
particular sentence.’ ”
(Citations omitted.) State v. Glover, 2024-Ohio-5195, ¶ 39.
{¶31} R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides the sole basis for the appellate court’s review
of consecutive sentences:
The court hearing an appeal [of a felony sentence that includes consecutive
sentences] . . . shall review the record, including the findings underlying the
sentence or modification given by the sentencing court.
The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence
that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand
the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate court's
standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its
discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized by this
division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's findings under .
. . (C)(4) of section 2929.14 . . . ;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
Lawrence App. No. 23CA35 14
This statute does not allow an appellate court to reverse or modify a sentence on the
basis that the trial court abused its discretion. Glover at ¶ 45.
{¶32} An appellate court can increase, decrease, or otherwise modify consecutive
sentences only if it clearly and convincingly finds that the record does not support the trial
court’s findings or it clearly and convincingly finds that the sentence is contrary to law.
Glover at ¶ 42. “ ‘[C]lear and convincing evidence’ is a degree of proof that is greater than
preponderance of the evidence but less than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard
used in criminal cases.” Id. at ¶ 46. “Nowhere does the appellate-review statute direct an
appellate court to consider the defendant’s aggregate sentence.” Instead, we limit our
review to the trial court’s consecutive-sentencing findings under R.C. 2929.14(C). Id. at ¶
43. Nor does the statute allow an appellate court to reverse or modify a sentence on the
basis that the trial court abused its discretion. Id. at ¶ 45.
2. Legal Analysis
{¶33} Blanton’s first argument focuses on the types of sentences given to other
criminal defendants in other cases and argues that his sentence was disproportion in
comparison to their crimes. He argues that “a selection of Ohio cases reveal[s] long
sentences for attempted murder and felonious assault but none as lengthy as Blanton’s
prison term.” Our focus is not on whether his sentence is disproportion to someone else’s
crimes, but whether his sentence is disproportionate to his crimes. We reject this
consistency-in-sentencing argument because Blanton did not preserve it by placing any
evidence of it on the record at the sentencing hearing for the trial court’s consideration.
State v. Pierce, 2024-Ohio-82, ¶ 64 (4th Dist.).
Lawrence App. No. 23CA35 15
{¶34} In Pierce we explained, “the defendant must raise this issue before the trial
court and present some evidence, however minimal, to provide a starting point for
analysis and to preserve the [consistency] issue for appeal.” Id. at ¶ 61, citing State v.
Jones, 2013-Ohio-3141, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.); State v. Watson,
2024-Ohio-4992, ¶ 20-21 (4th
Dist.). The plain language of the criminal sentencing review statute limits us to a review
of the trial court record. We can modify Blanton’s sentence only if we clearly and
convincingly find the record does not support the trial court’s findings.
{¶35} Blanton also argues that murder is a more serious crime than attempted
murder or felonious assault and that a murderer “may have the opportunity to be paroled
after 15 years. Blanton, who did not take a life, will have no chance of parole at . . . even
50 years.” While it is true that some who murder may be paroled, many others receive
the death penalty or life in prison without parole. But these other criminal cases are not
part of the record we review when determining the proportionality of the sentence to
Blanton’s crimes. “[T]he appellate-review statute asks a court of appeals to review
whether the record clearly and convincing does not support the trial court’s findings, . . .
it does not ask the court of appeals to engage in a comparative analysis of other cases.”
State v. Glover, 2024-Ohio-5195, ¶ 59 (the court of appeals strays from its role when it
compares a defendant’s sentence to the sentences imposed in other cases).
{¶36} Next Blanton argues that the record clearly and convincingly does not
support the trial court’s finding that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the
seriousness of his conduct and the danger he poses to the public. He argues that his
criminal history consisted mostly of misdemeanors, with only one prior felony conviction.
However, the record shows that, except for his drug-related misdemeanors, his criminal
Lawrence App. No. 23CA35 16
record shows a long history of misdemeanors that put the public in danger: operating a
vehicle under the influence; leaving the scene of an accident; domestic violence; improper
handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle; aggravated menacing; and violation of a
protection order. Blanton argues, “Removing Blanton’s acts in this case, his history or
past conduct does not indicate that he poses a danger to the public.” However, Blanton’s
acts in this case are the reason he is being sentenced. “The proportionality prong . . .
focuses on the defendant’s current conduct . . . .” (emphasis added) Glover at ¶ 53. As
we explain below, we do not clearly and convincingly find that the record does not support
the trial court’s findings on consecutive sentences.
{¶37} The trial court reviewed the eight videotapes that recorded the crimes
Blanton perpetrated multiple times against an innocent, vulnerable, two-year-old toddler.
Blanton took the time to carefully set up his cell phone camera so he could capture his
strangulation of the toddler and the noises those crimes made on the audio. Each time
he did this calmly, without even the slightest provocation. The investigator testified that
there were multiple videos he procured from Blanton’s phone and that only 8 were being
presented because they matched up to 8 of the 38 counts to which Blanton had pleaded
guilty. At the sentencing hearing Blanton’s own trial counsel acknowledged, “looking at
these, these are horrific videos . . . .”
{¶38} In discussing the videos, the trial court found:
The videos revealed that the defendant took time to set up and adjust his
camera prior to beginning to commit acts of violence against the child. The
acts committed against the very small child were premediated and
unprovoked. Further the multiple recordings are not indicative of a
temporary lapse in judgment, moment of rage or loss of control. Instead, the
recordings are evidence of the crimes of which the defendant stands
charged but also acts that can only be described as disturbingly revolting,
vile and depraved. The Court intentionally imposed the maximum penalty
Lawrence App. No. 23CA35 17
permitted by law as to each and every count after considering the statutory
factors and considering the likelihood of recidivism, the danger to the public
and the need to protect the public from future crimes of the defendant as
well as the Court’s desire to appropriately punish the defendant. To impose
any lesser of a sentence would be unjust, insufficient and inappropriate as
it would demean the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct and would
potentially place the public in danger of the defendant in the future.
{¶39} We have reviewed the entire record, including the video recordings,
Blanton’s criminal history, the PSI report, and the testimony presented at the hearings.
The trial court found that consecutive sentences were necessary to punish Blanton, were
not disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct or the danger he poses to the public
and that Blanton’s criminal history demonstrated that consecutive sentences are
necessary to protect the public from future crimes by Blanton. We find that the record in
this case does not clearly and convincingly fail to support the trial court’s imposition of
consecutive sentences.
{¶40} We overrule the second assignment of error.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶41} For his final assignment of error, Blanton contends that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to advise his client, the State, and the court about the strangulation
statute, R.C. 2903.18. He contends that the strangulation statute targets domestic
violence, and the felony level of charges range from second-degree felony to fifth-degree
felony. Blanton also contends that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to ask for a bill
of particulars so that he can understand what he is defending against. Blanton argues
that he was prejudiced because there was “a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s
erroneous advice Blanton would not have entered a guilty plea but would have proceeded
Lawrence App. No. 23CA35 18
to trial.” He contends that he was unable to argue a lesser more applicable strangulation
charge to a jury and receive a lesser penalty.
1. Standard of Review
{¶42} “Upon direct appeal, appellate courts generally review claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel on a de novo basis, simply because the issue
originates at the appellate level; no trial court has ruled on the issue. Appellate courts
review the trial record and are left to judge from the bare record whether the assistance
was effective.” State v. Gondor, 2006-Ohio-6679, ¶ 53. “To establish constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that his counsel's
performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense
and deprived him of a fair trial.” State v. Jenkins,
2014-Ohio-3123, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.),
citing Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Failure to satisfy either part of
the test is fatal to the claim. See
Strickland at 697. The defendant “has the burden of proof
because in Ohio, a properly licensed attorney is presumed competent.”
Gondor at ¶ 62.
{¶43} “ ‘In order to show deficient performance, the defendant must prove that
counsel's performance fell below an objective level of reasonable representation.’ ” State
v. Adams, 2016-Ohio-7772, ¶ 89 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Conway,
2006-Ohio-2815,
¶ 95. When considering counsel's performance, “a court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’
”
Strickland at 689, quoting Michel v. Louisiana,
350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955). “ ‘To show
prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors,
Lawrence App. No. 23CA35 19
the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” Adams at ¶ 89,
quoting
Conway at ¶ 95. “Generally, a guilty plea waives all appealable errors, including
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, except to the extent that the alleged errors
precluded [the defendant] from knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entering [the] guilty
plea.” State v. Tingler,
2022-Ohio-3792, ¶ 11 (4th Dist.); State v. Freeman, 2023-Ohio-
3835, ¶ 6-7 (4th Dist.).
2. Legal Analysis
{¶44} “[A] defendant who claims ineffective assistance of counsel related to the
decision to plead guilty must show that a reasonable probability exists that, but for
counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and insisted on going to
trial.” State v. Jackson, 2023-Ohio-3895, ¶ 29 (4th Dist.). Blanton “must do more than
present ‘post hoc assertions . . . about how he would have pleaded but for his attorney's
deficiencies.’ ” State v. Romero,
2019-Ohio-1839, ¶ 28, quoting Lee v. United States,
582 U.S. 357, 368 (2017). “In assessing whether it would be rational for a defendant to
go to trial instead of pleading guilty, the court should consider the totality of
circumstances.”
Romero at ¶ 29.
{¶45} The strangulation statute, R.C. 2903.18 became effective April 4, 2023. The
indictment states that the crimes Blanton committed occurred from November 1, 2022 to
April 5, 2023, with the crime of resisting arrest by striking a law enforcement officer
occurring on April 5, 2023. Blanton has made no argument that the strangulation statute
had retroactive application to his acts or that any of his violent acts against the toddler
occurred during a 24-hour period on April 4, 2023, the single day that the strangulation
statute overlaid his criminal activity. Therefore, Blanton has not shown that his attorney
Lawrence App. No. 23CA35 20
was deficient for failing to raise this statute where it has questionable applicability to his
case. Additionally, it is speculative to believe that Blanton was prejudiced in any way by
his attorney’s failure to raise the strangulation statute. It is speculative to believe that the
State would have modified its plea offer in a manner that would have reduced Blanton’s
possible maximum prison term. Blanton was indicted on 38 counts, 8 counts were first-
degree felonies, 14 counts were second-degree felonies, 14 counts were third-degree
felonies, and 1 count was a fourth-degree felony and 1 a fifth-degree felony. And there is
no reason to believe that had Blanton proceeded with a jury trial, the State would not have
tried all 38 felony counts and introduced at trial, not just the 8 videos shown at sentencing,
but the multitude of videos the investigator testified were procured from Blanton’s phone.
Again, it is pure speculation to believe that Blanton would not have entered into a plea
agreement or that he would have believed there was a reasonable probability that a jury
trial outcome on 38 felony counts (with the video evidence the jury would view) would
have resulted in a more favorable outcome for Blanton then entering a guilty plea to 8
felony counts.
{¶46} Blanton has likewise failed to show his attorney was deficient in failing to
ask for a bill of particulars. “A bill of particulars has a limited purpose—to elucidate or
particularize the conduct of the accused alleged to constitute the charged offense.” State
v. Haynes, 2022-Ohio-4473, ¶ 23. “A bill of particulars is not designed to provide the
accused with specifications of evidence or to serve as a substitute for discovery.”
Id.
{¶47} The record shows that although Blanton’s counsel did not request a bill of
particulars, trial counsel made several discovery requests. One discovery request was
made very early in the proceedings when trial counsel was appointed. A second, detailed
Lawrence App. No. 23CA35 21
11-page discovery request that sought 35 different categories of documents, witness
statements, evidence, etc. was made about 8 weeks later. Blanton’s counsel stated that
he had obtained and reviewed the video evidence the State had of the criminal acts he
committed. Because Blanton had received discovery responses from the State, the
question is whether a bill of particulars would have provided him additional facts such that
he was precluded or hindered from effectively presenting a defense. Blanton has failed
to demonstrate that his lack of knowledge concerning the specific facts a bill of particulars
would have provided him prejudiced him in his ability to fairly defend himself or evaluate
the State’s plea offer.
{¶48} Here, Blanton has presented only post hoc assertions that he would have
gone to trial on a 38-felony-count indictment instead of pleading guilty to only 8 felonies
if his attorney would have raised the strangulation statute and requested a bill of
particulars. Additionally, the State’s evidence in the case involved multiple videos that
indisputably show Blanton committing heinous acts of violence against a small, helpless
child. “A defendant without any viable defense will be highly likely to lose at trial. And a
defendant facing such long odds will rarely be able to show prejudice from accepting a
guilty plea that offers him a better resolution than would be likely after trial. But that is not
because the prejudice inquiry in this context looks to the probability of a conviction for its
own sake. It is instead because defendants obviously weigh their prospects at trial in
deciding whether to accept a plea.” Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. at 367.
{¶49} Blanton has failed to show that his counsel's performance was deficient,
and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. We overrule the third
assignment of error.
Lawrence App. No. 23CA35 22
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶50} We find that the trial court strictly complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), the
record does not clearly and convincingly fail to support the imposition of consecutive
sentences, and Blanton has failed to establish an effective assistance of counsel claim.
We overrule his assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Lawrence App. No. 23CA35 23
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that appellant shall pay the
costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
LAWRENCE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS to carry this judgment into
execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS
BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is
temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted.
The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of
Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay
is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day
period, or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of
Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of
the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the
appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such
dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY: ________________________
Michael D. Hess, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with
the clerk.
