[Cite as State v. Dillon,
2025-Ohio-254.]
COURT OF APPEALS
MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
:
: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. John W. Wise, J.
: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
-vs- :
: Case No. CT2024-0038
:
RANDY DILLON :
:
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Muskingum County
Court of Common Pleas, Case No.
CR2007-0114
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: Janaury 29, 2025
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant:
Joseph A. Palmer Randy Dillon, pro se
27 North Fifth Street #579-012
Zanesfield, Ohio 43702 P.O. Box 5500
Chillicothe, Ohio 45601
[Cite as State v. Dillon, 2025-Ohio-254.]
Delaney, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant–Appellant Randy Dillon has appealed the March 4, 2024, Journal
Entry of the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas denying his Application for DNA
Testing. He has appeared pro se. Plaintiff–Appellee is the State of Ohio.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} In 2008, Defendant was found guilty following a jury trial of burglary,
kidnapping, attempted murder, and rape of a victim under the age of 10. On February 29,
2024, he filed a post-conviction Application for DNA Testing with the Muskingum County
Court of Common Pleas seeking to retest two items of clothing. We affirmed the judgment
and sentencing in State v. Dillon, 2009-Ohio-3134 (5th Dist.). The following facts are
taken from that appeal.
{¶3} Sometime late the night before or in the early morning of March 13, 2007,
a 14-month-old child was picked up in her bed and taken out of her home. Her mother
had put her in her crib sometime after 11:00 p.m. When she went to check on her at 4:00
a.m., the child was missing. The child was found in a field before noon the next day, where
she had been wrapped in a comforter and left lying on the ground. She was found by a
man walking in the field. A driver stopped to help and another man who had been driving
through the area earlier came back and offered his assistance. After medical crews and
law enforcement arrived, the child was taken for medical care.
{¶4} Around the same time the child was being put to bed, Defendant was
drinking with a friend and some other people. Sometime after midnight, Defendant
borrowed his friend’s van to go purchase more cigarettes. He did not return but called
about 5:00 a.m. from a gas station and said he needed a ride.
[Cite as State v. Dillon, 2025-Ohio-254.]
{¶5} The clerk at the station called the police because Defendant was bothering
the customers. When the police arrived, they arrested him on an unrelated warrant. After
his arrest, appellant met with a patrolman and filed a report indicating that he was
attacked, robbed, and abducted during the timeframe when the state contended that the
alleged crimes occurred. Through a series of sustained objections, this information was
never presented to the jury.
{¶6} When the van was subsequently found in the area where the child was
rescued, Defendant became a suspect in her abduction. Tire castings recovered from
behind the child’s house were consistent with the tires on the van. The comforter wrapped
around the child had previously been placed in the back of the van by its owner. There
was a sheet in the van that matched the one that had been on the child’s bed.
{¶7} An eyewitness described seeing someone walking alongside the road away
from the area where the child had been left at around 4:00 a.m. The person he saw had
similar characteristics to Defendant. Additionally, surveillance video from two separate
gas stations placed Defendant in the same area moving in a direction away from the field.
{¶8} The shoes Defendant was wearing at the time he was arrested had mud on
them. The mud was analyzed and found to be consistent with mud samples taken from
the location where the van was recovered.
{¶9} The jury heard medical evidence that the child suffered an injury inside of
her labia majora that was not consistent with a rash but was consistent with sexual
assault. The injury included a small amount of blood.
{¶10} The jury also heard testimony from a forensic scientist with the Ohio Bureau
of Criminal Identification and Investigation (BCI). He testified that amylase was found on
[Cite as State v. Dillon, 2025-Ohio-254.]
her diaper which indicated the presence of saliva, but it did not reveal a conclusive DNA
profile. Testing was done on the onesie that child was wearing when she was found. It
revealed DNA consistent with Defendant's profile on the underarm of the onesie such that
he could not be excluded as a contributor. DNA consistent with the child’s profile was
found on the hip area of the T-shirt Defendant was wearing at the time of his arrest. She
could not be excluded as a contributor. No semen was found on the items that were
submitted for forensic analysis. Defendant did not provide an expert to rebut the DNA
evidence at trial.
{¶11} The jury found Defendant guilty. He was sentenced to 28 years of
incarceration, plus life without parole, to run consecutively.
{¶12} Defendant filed an Application for DNA Testing in the Muskingum County
Court of Common Pleas. He is seeking to have the two of the same articles of clothing
retested, specifically the onesie that the child was wearing and the T-shirt he was wearing
that night. With his application, he attached a laboratory report that was presented at trial
regarding the results of the DNA testing. It reflects that DNA profiling was performed using
polymerase chain reaction testing on a diaper, a onesie, and a T-shirt.
{¶13} The diaper was tested using cuttings from the crotch as well as swabs from
the area. There was insufficient DNA profile data to draw any conclusions regarding the
source of the DNA.
{¶14} The DNA profile from swabs used on the underarm area of the onesie was
a mixture of at least two individuals. The BCI scientist testified that the major DNA profile
was consistent with the child and the partial minor DNA profile was consistent with
contributions from the child’s mother and the Defendant. The BCI report stated “[b]ased
[Cite as State v. Dillon, 2025-Ohio-254.]
on the national database provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the proportion
of the population that cannot be excluded as possible contributors to the mixture of DNA
profiles” was 1 in 4,919 unrelated individuals. Neither the child’s mother nor Defendant
could be excluded as a contributor to the DNA.
{¶15} The DNA profile from swabs used on the hip of the T-shirt was a mixture of
at least three individuals. The major DNA profile was consistent with Defendant. The
partial minor DNA profile was consistent with contributions from the child and an unknown
individual. The BCI report stated “[b]ased on the national database provided by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the proportion of the population that cannot be excluded
as possible contributors to the mixture of DNA profiles” was 1 in 88 unrelated individuals.
The child could not be excluded as a contributor.
{¶16} The trial court summarily denied the Application for DNA testing and
Defendant filed his notice of appeal. The court then asked the parties to submit findings
of facts and conclusions of law. Defendant’s assignment of error to this Court is based on
the trial court’s subsequent findings of fact and conclusions on law in the second
Judgment Entry.
{¶17} In this case, the trial court made the following findings of fact:
Defendant filed an Application for DNA testing on February 29, 2024. Said DNA
was previously tested and the results were introduced by the State during the jury
trial. The defendant was found guilty by the Jury. Defendant requested DNA to be
tested again on the same biological evidence that was presented during the trial
back in April 2008, over 16 years ago. DNA expert testimony was presented during
the trial. Defendant did not introduce any expert to rebut the State’s witness on the
DNA testimony.
{¶18} The trial court also made the following conclusions of law:
[Cite as State v. Dillon, 2025-Ohio-254.]
The prior DNA testing conducted on the evidence collected by law enforcement,
clearly established the biological material belonged to the Defendant. The identity
of the Defendant, as the perpetrator, was not in doubt, as evidenced by the
extensive trial record, and the verdict of the Jury. Therefore, the Application for
DNA Testing is Denied.
Defendant has appealed the denial of his application.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶19} THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED IT’S [SIC] DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT
PRIOR DNA TESTING CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THE BIOLOGICAL MATERIAL
BELONGED TO THE DEFENDANT AND THAT THE IDENTITY OF THE DEFENDANT,
AS THE PERPETRATOR, WAS NOT IN DOUBT, WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT’S
APPLICATION FOR DNA TESTING.
ANALYSIS
{¶20} Before we analyze the Defendant’s assignment of error, we first address
the effect of filing a judgment summarily denying an application for testing and then
issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law after the notice of appeal had been filed.
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that when a case has been appealed, “the trial court
loses jurisdiction except to take action in the aid of the appeal.” In re S.J., 2005-Ohio-
3215. A similar situation occurred, however, in State v. Riley, 2024-Ohio-5712, when the
trial court failed to comply with R.C. 2953.73(D) and denied an application without
explanation. The trial court then supplemented its order with adopted findings and
conclusions.
{¶21} The Ohio Supreme Court raised the question of whether explaining a
reason is an act in aid of the appeal and, as such, affected jurisdiction. It stated “although
the question whether the trial court may correct its own error after an appeal has been
[Cite as State v. Dillon, 2025-Ohio-254.]
filed is an interesting one, this court did not accept jurisdiction over that question and we
will therefore not address it.” This Court will proceed accordingly.
{¶22} Although Defendant has posed a single assignment of error, he has
asserted that since his trial there have been advances in DNA testing that would make
the results more accurate. He has argued that the trial court erred in denying his
application because it concluded that the prior testing clearly established the biological
material belonged to him and it concluded that the results identifying him as the
perpetrator were not in doubt. Finally, he has argued that the trial court did not properly
review the record or case law necessary to consider the issues.
{¶23} Post-conviction DNA testing is governed by R.C. 2953.71 to 2953.81. An
eligible offender who wishes to request DNA testing must submit an application to the
court of common pleas that sentenced him. R.C. 2953.73.1
{¶24} Upon receipt of the application, the trial court examines the application and
the criteria of R.C. 2953.74 to determine if the offender is eligible for additional DNA
testing. R.C. 2953.74(A) provides if an eligible offender applies for DNA testing “and a
prior definitive DNA test has been conducted regarding the same biological evidence that
the offender seeks to have tested, the court shall reject the offender's application.” R.C.
2953.74(A); State v. Prade, 2010-Ohio-1842; State v. Noling,
2013-Ohio-1764. The Ohio
Supreme Court referred to whether there is a prior definitive test as the “threshold
criterion.”
Noling at ¶ 34.
1 R.C. 2953.73(E)(1) was ruled unconstitutional on other grounds by State v. Noling,
2016-Ohio-8252.
The two invalid provisions were deemed severable from the remainder of the statue and do not apply to
this opinion.
[Cite as State v. Dillon,
2025-Ohio-254.]
{¶25} A trial court has discretion to determination whether to grant a post-
conviction request for DNA testing. R.C. 2953.72(A)(8); State v. Scott, 2022-Ohio-4277.
The decision depends on the facts of each case. State v. Barnette,
2024-Ohio-1172, ¶31
(7th Dist.). An appellate court must affirm the decision unless we find that the trial court’s
decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State ex rel. Elsass v. Shelby
Cty. Bd. of Commrs.,
92 Ohio St.3d 529.
{¶26} In this case, there is no dispute that Defendant is an eligible offender and
that DNA testing was already done on the two articles of clothing he seeks to retest: the
onesie and his T-shirt. In its second Journal Entry, the trial court concluded that the prior
DNA testing “clearly established the biological material belonged to the Defendant” and
that the trial record and jury verdict established that Defendant was the perpetrator.
Although the trial court did not expressly specify the statutory basis for which it was
rejecting Defendant’s application, it concluded the original testing was definitive. As a
result, it was required to reject the application.
{¶27} A definitive DNA test is defined, in pertinent part, as follows:
a DNA test that clearly establishes that biological material from the perpetrator of
the crime was recovered from the crime scene and also clearly establishes
whether or not the biological material is that of the eligible offender. A prior DNA
test is not definitive if the eligible offender proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that because of advances in DNA technology there is a possibility of
discovering new biological material from the perpetrator that the prior DNA test
may have failed to discover. Prior testing may have been a prior “definitive DNA
test” as to some biological evidence but may not have been a prior “definitive DNA
test” as to other biological evidence.
R.C. 2953.71(U).
{¶28} Accordingly, the prior DNA test must clearly establish that it recovered
biological material from the perpetrator, and it must then clearly establish that it did or did
[Cite as State v. Dillon, 2025-Ohio-254.]
not come from the offender. In other words, it “appears that the statute is intended not to
allow a repeat test when the defendant already has a positive DNA test that connects the
offender to the crime scene.” State v. Blair,
2018-Ohio-4041, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.).
{¶29} At trial, a forensic scientist with the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification
and Investigation (“BCI”) testified regarding the testing that was performed and the results
he determined. He stated that they first isolate the stain and extract DNA from the cells.
They next determine how much DNA Is present. They then “amplify sixteen different
regions along the DNA strand” and develop a profile so they can make comparisons of
these regions with known DNA. The work is then peer reviewed by another court qualified
analysist and administratively reviewed by a superior.
{¶30} In this case, the DNA testing established that biological material from
someone other than the child and the mother was recovered from the crime scene. The
State’s report provided that the DNA profile from the swabs used on the underarm of the
onesie was a mixture of at least two individuals. The major DNA profile was consistent
with the child. The partial minor profile was consistent with contributions from Defendant
and the mother. The Defendant could not be excluded as a contributor. Based on the
national database provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the report stated that
the proportion of the population that could not be excluded was 1 in 4,919 unrelated
individuals. At trial, Defendant did not provide an expert witness to refute either the
interpretation of the DNA profiles or the statistical techniques used to make the
conclusions.
{¶31} The mother testified that she put her child to bed sometime after 11:00
p.m., and awoke to find her missing at 4:00 a.m. In addition to the mother’s expected
[Cite as State v. Dillon, 2025-Ohio-254.]
DNA, another person’s DNA would indicate a person picked the child up at some point
between 11:00 p.m. and noon the next day when she was found. The test clearly
established biological material that came from the child in the major profile and a mixture
of two people in the minor profile. The minor profile was consistent with the mother and
Defendant.
{¶32} Further, the DNA profile from the hip of Defendant’s T-shirt was a mixture
of at least three individuals, including partial minor profiles consistent with contributions
from the child and another unknown individual. Although the proportion of the population
that could not be excluded as possible contributors was lower at 1 in 88 unrelated
individuals, the child could not be excluded as a contributor to the DNA.
{¶33} Defendant has argued that the trial court abused its discretion in
determining that the prior testing was definitive because he claimed it did not clearly
establish that the biological material belonged to him. He cited State v. Thomas, 2017-
Ohio-8011, for the proposition that for a DNA sample may not be attributed to a particular
individual unless the sample matches that individual’s DNA “with a less than 1 in 30 billion
probability that the DNA comes from another source.”
{¶34} In Thomas, the Court was not addressing R.C. 2953.71(U) and post-
conviction DNA testing. Instead, it was determining if evidence of a knife collection was
admissible when the evidence against the defendant in a murder was case was
circumstantial and lacked overwhelming evidence of guilt. When analyzing the evidence,
the Court concluded that there was no corroborating, probative, scientific, or forensic
evidence to connect Thomas with DNA found on the victim. Thomas, 2017-Ohio-8011, at
¶ 46. In reviewing the DNA testing, the Court noted the statistical frequency of the DNA
[Cite as State v. Dillon,
2025-Ohio-254.]
on the victim’s underwear would be found in 1 in 10 males and the DNA on the swab
would be found in 1 of 926 males. Id. at ¶ 26. An expert indicated that he would attribute
DNA to a source only when there is less than a 1 in 30 billion probability of a match.
{¶35} Defendant contends that DNA testing introduced at his trial “yielded DNA
profiles that fell so short of being attributable to any one person.” Defendant cites two
more cases with similar statistical frequencies: State v. Eckard, 2016-Ohio-5174 (3d Dist.)
(1 in 37,130,000,000) and State v. Jordan,
2016-Ohio-603 (2d Dist.) (1 in
562,700,000,000,000,000). The only two cases cited in the State’s response yield similar
results: State v. Martin,
2018-Ohio-1843 (8th Dist.) (1 in 1,000,000,000,000) and State v.
Barnette,
2024-Ohio-1172 (7th Dist.) (1 in 39,000,000,000).
{¶36} In this case, on cross examination, Defendant’s counsel specifically asked
the State’s expert if they see higher numbers in DNA results. The witness answered that
“in some cases they do.” He was clear, however, that the DNA found was “consistent”
with the profiles.
{¶37} Pursuant to the test results, Defendant is included as a contributor of
biological material recovered from the clothing. With DNA testing, the results can be
categorized in three ways. The results can include a defendant, exclude a defendant, or
be inconclusive. In this case, Defendant could not be excluded. R.C. 2953.71(I) defines
“inclusion” as follows:
“Inclusion” or “inclusion result” means a result of DNA testing that scientifically
cannot exclude, or that holds accountable, the subject offender as a contributor of
the biological material recovered from the crime scene or victim in question, in
relation to the offense.
[Cite as State v. Dillon, 2025-Ohio-254.]
{¶38} Absent a specific statistical frequency for what “clearly establishes whether
or not the biological material is that of the eligible offender,” this Court defers to the
discretion of the trial court to determine whether the testing was definitive on a case by
case basis. Based on expert testimony that the DNA was consistent with the Defendant’s,
the trial court ruled that a determinative test had already taken place. As a result, it was
required to reject the application.
{¶39} Even if the test reflected DNA from both the perpetrator and the defendant,
R.C. 2953.71(U) states that a prior DNA test is not definitive if the eligible offender proves
by a preponderance of the evidence that because of advances in DNA technology there
is a possibility of discovering new biological material from the perpetrator that the prior
DNA test may have failed to discover. It provides:
In addition to a result that reflects both the perpetrator and the defendant, A prior
DNA test is not definitive if the eligible offender proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that because of advances in DNA technology there is a possibility of
discovering new biological material from the perpetrator that the prior DNA test
may have failed to discover. Prior testing may have been a prior “definitive DNA
test” as to some biological evidence but may not have been a prior “definitive DNA
test” as to other biological evidence.
R.C.2953.71(U). This puts the burden on the offender to prove that there are advances
in technology that would make it possible to discover new biological material. State v.
Barnette, 2024-Ohio-1172 (7th Dist.).
{¶40} In this case, Defendant did not produce any evidence as to what specific
tests were available or that they would exclude him rather than just change the odds of
consistency. Although he stated that a more advanced form of the polymerase chain
reaction technique would reveal more of the DNA information and allow a more accurate
comparison, the results would have to exclude him as a possible contributor. He failed to
[Cite as State v. Dillon, 2025-Ohio-254.]
present any evidence about advances in DNA technology that would determine the DNA
on the onesie was not his or that the DNA on his T-shirt was not the child’s.
{¶41} The statutory language in R.C. 2953.71(U) came about after the Ohio
Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Prade. In that case, an expert witness testified that
the best source of the perpetrator’s DNA would come from a lab coat that was over a bite
mark made on the murder victim’s arm. At the time of the initial trial, the DNA from the
victim’s blood overwhelmed or diluted the DNA from the biter's cells. Although an expert
at trial testified other DNA would have been important in identifying the killer, the bite mark
showed only the victim’s DNA. As a result, the defendant’s DNA was excluded.
{¶42} Ten years later, the defendant filed a post-conviction application for new
DNA testing. He provided expert testimony that a new test was available which could
isolate male DNA and overcome the female DNA that was present, potentially leading to
the discovery of the killer. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the prior DNA test was not
definitive when a new DNA testing method could detect information that could not be
detected by the prior DNA testing methods. Prade, 2010-Ohio-1842, at ¶ 30.
{¶43} In State v. Biggs, 2013-Ohio-3333 (5th Dist.), ¶ 15, this Court analyzed a
defendant’s request for DNA testing and determined that, even with experts testifying on
his behalf, the defendant did not establish any new testing method that was “innovative,
advanced or new scientific test or form of analysis unavailable at the defendant’s trial.”
The Court concluded that, based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Prade, the defendant
failed to meet his burden required for the resubmission of the tissue slides for DNA testing.
Id. at ¶ 20.
[Cite as State v. Dillon,
2025-Ohio-254.]
{¶44} It is important to note that the Ohio Supreme Court limited its holding in
Prade “to situations in which advances in DNA testing have made it possible to learn
information about DNA evidence that could not even be detected at the earlier trial.” Prade
at ¶ 29. It expressly noted that it did not have before it “the issue of whether to allow new
DNA testing in cases in which a prior DNA test provided a match or otherwise provided
meaningful information and the inmate is simply asking for a new test using the latest
testing methods.” (Emphasis added).
Id.
{¶45} This is the very situation we have in this case. The DNA profile was
consistent with Defendant such that he could not be excluded. Defendant did not provide
any evidence that there were specific tests available that would exclude his DNA from
consideration.
{¶46} The prior DNA testing on the onesie was consistent with the child, the
mother, and Defendant. The prior DNA testing on the T-shirt was consistent with the
Defendant, another individual, and the child. The results provided meaningful information
as to who touched the child the night she went missing. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that the prior DNA test was definitive. It was therefore statutorily
required to reject new testing. Similarly, Defendant did not meet his burden of proving the
prior tests were not definitive and the trial court did not err in refusing to accept his
application.
{¶47} Even if the prior test had not been a definitive DNA test, the statutory
scheme still prevents the trial court from accepting the application unless
the offender shows that DNA exclusion when analyzed in the context of and upon
consideration of all available admissible evidence related to the subject offender's
case as described in division (D) of this section would have been outcome
determinative at the trial stage in that case.
[Cite as State v. Dillon, 2025-Ohio-254.]
R.C. 2953.74(B)(2). “Outcome determinative” has been defined, in pertinent part, as if the
results of DNA testing had been presented at the trial and they had been analyzed along
with all available admissible evidence related to the offender's case, “there is a strong
probability that no reasonable factfinder would have found the offender guilty of that
offense.” R.C. 2953.71(L).
{¶48} In State v. Swanson, the defendant wanted to have a cigarette butt found
at the crime scene tested. This Court determined that for the trial court to find that DNA
evidence on the cigarette butt was outcome determinative, it would have to disregard all
the identification evidence provided at trial by the victims and witnesses. A review of the
record establishes that this evidence was substantial and therefore, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when the court determined that DNA testing would not be outcome
determinative. State v. Swanson, 2005-Ohio-5471, ¶ 14, aff'd,
2007-Ohio-1383; see also
State v. Wilson, (exclusion would not strengthen a defendant’s innocence claim when the
jury had convicted him without DNA evidence).
{¶49} In this case, even if the DNA profiles were excluded on the respective
items, Defendant could not demonstrate that there was a “strong probability” that no
reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty. While the DNA results indicated the
Defendant was holding the child, the jury heard additional evidence throughout the trial.
{¶50} The admissible evidence in this case included testimony that Defendant
knew the mother and her child because he had previously rented garage space on the
mother’s property. It was unrefuted that the night the child was abducted, Defendant had
borrowed a friend’s van around midnight. The same van was found 500 feet from where
[Cite as State v. Dillon, 2025-Ohio-254.]
the child was found. Tire castings recovered from behind the child’s house were
consistent with the tires on the van. The child was wrapped in a comforter that the van’s
owner’s had placed in the back of the van. There was a sheet in the van that matched the
one that had been on the child’s bed.
{¶51} An eyewitness described seeing someone walking alongside the road
away from the area where the child had been left at around 4:00 a.m. The person he saw
had similar characteristics to Defendant. Surveillance video from two separate gas
stations placed Defendant in the same area moving in a direction away from where the
child was found. Sometime after 5:00 a.m., appellant made a phone call from a gas station
saying he needed a ride. When he was arrested at the gas station, he had mud on his
shoes that was later deemed consistent with mud samples taken from the location where
the van was recovered.
{¶52} The jury heard evidence from a forensic analyst for the Ohio BCI that he
detected the presence of amylase, an enzyme, on the baby's diaper. According to the
analyst, amylase is present in saliva and is approximately 50 times more concentrated in
saliva than in any other body fluid. Despite the presence of amylase, the BCI could not
develop a sufficient profile to draw any conclusions regarding the source of the DNA. The
jury also heard evidence from a physician that there was a tiny tear in front of the child’s
hymen, a tiny amount of bleeding, and redness to the area. The injury was not any type
of skin irritation. A nurse practitioner testified that the injury was very concerning for sexual
abuse or assault.
{¶53} Defendant applied for DNA testing to the Muskingum County Court of
Common Pleas, the trial court that sentenced him. In this case, male DNA would not be
[Cite as State v. Dillon, 2025-Ohio-254.]
on the child’s onesie unless the man was holding the child, as the perpetrator of the
kidnapping must have done. The trial court found the DNA test established that the
biological material recovered was consistent with Defendant’s DNA profile. Therefore, the
trial court determined that it must reject Defendant's Application for DNA Testing pursuant
to R.C. 2953.74.
{¶54} Defendant’s final argument is that the trial court abused its discretion “in
the way it handled the Defendant’s Application for DNA testing” because it “never gave
the Defendant’s Application the attention it deserved.” He based his claim on the fact that
the court initially denied the application without explanation.
{¶55} R.C. 2953.73 provides what materials the court must review in making its
determination. It states:
[The court] shall consider the application, the supporting affidavits, and the
documentary evidence and, in addition to those materials, shall consider all the
files and records pertaining to the proceedings against the applicant, including, but
not limited to, the indictment, the court's journal entries, the journalized records of
the clerk of the court, and the court reporter's transcript and all responses to the
application filed under division (C) of this section by a prosecuting attorney or the
attorney general, unless the application and the files and records show the
applicant is not entitled to DNA testing, in which case the application may be
denied.
{¶56} In its Journal Entry, the court referenced the tests and the extensive trial
record. There were no supporting affidavits attached to the application. There is nothing
to indicate that the trial court did not properly consider this matter in reaching its
conclusion.
{¶57} We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Defendant's
application for DNA testing pursuant to R.C. 2953.74(A). The sole assignment of error is
overruled.
[Cite as State v. Dillon, 2025-Ohio-254.]
CONCLUSION
{¶58} The judgment of the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas
is affirmed.
By: Delaney, P.J.,
Wise, J. and
Baldwin, J., concur.
