[Cite as State v. Gingrich,
2025-Ohio-2546.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-24-1237
Appellee Trial Court No. CR0202301007
v.
Corbin Gingrich DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: July 18, 2025
…
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and,
Lorrie J. Rendle, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Karin L. Coble, for appellant.
…
OSOWIK, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a July 2, 2024 judgment of the Lucas County Court of
Common Pleas, sentencing appellant to a total term of incarceration of 20 to 25 years,
following appellant’s negotiated pleas to two counts of kidnapping, in violation of R.C.
2905.01(A)(3), felonies of the first degree, and two counts of involuntary manslaughter,
in violation of R.C. 2903.04(A), also felonies of the first degree.
{¶ 2} This case arises from the December 3, 2022 murder of victims K.W. and
K.P., both juvenile males. On December 3, 2022, while K.W. and K.P. were playing
video games in the basement of appellant’s Toledo home, they were pistol whipped, tied
up with electrical cords, later put into the trunk of a motor vehicle, taken to an abandoned
home in North Toledo, and killed, after which the home was burned down, in a failed
effort to conceal the above-described crimes.
{¶ 3} Appellant, Corbin Gingrich, sets forth the following two assignments of
error on appeal:
“One: The trial court erred in not merging the kidnapping counts with the
involuntary manslaughter counts for each victim [].
“Two: Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel [].”
{¶ 4} The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. On December 3,
2022, appellant invited the victims to come to the Toledo home that he shared with his
fiancée, co-defendant Carissa Eames (“Carissa”). Appellant believed that the victims
were involved in the recent theft of one of his firearms. The invitation to the victims to
come to appellant’s home was a subterfuge. It facilitated their ambush, and culminated in
their deaths.
{¶ 5} Upon arrival at appellant’s home, the victims went into the basement and
began to play video games. Subsequently, appellant and co-defendant Donald Eames
(“Donald”), Carissa’s brother, went into the basement and confronted the victims about
appellant’s missing gun. A struggle ensued, during which the victims were pistol
whipped, subdued, and then tied up with electrical cords.
{¶ 6} At this juncture, Cruz Garcia (“Garcia”) was contacted to arrange to take the
victims out of appellant’s home. Garcia subsequently drove to appellant’s home,
2.
accompanied by two other males. Upon arrival, the restrained victims were taken by the
men from appellant’s home and put into the trunk of the waiting vehicle. The victims
were then driven away, inside the trunk of the vehicle.
{¶ 7} The victims were ultimately taken to an abandoned home in North Toledo.
The victims were strangled and beaten to death, after which the vacant home in which
their bodies had been left was burned down.
{¶ 8} On December 14, 2022, following an anonymous tip regarding the
disappearance of the boys, the investigation into their disappearance led to the
abandoned, burned home in North Toledo. Excavation of the site recovered two sets of
human remains, later positively identified as the missing boys.
{¶ 9} On January 4, 2023, appellant was indicted on two counts of murder, in
violation of R.C. 2903.02(B), felonies of the first degree, two counts of kidnapping, in
violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(3), felonies of the first degree, one count of obstruction of
justice, in violation of R.C. 2921.32(A), a felony of the third degree, one count of
possession of a firearm while under disability, in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), a
felony of the third degree, and one count of trafficking in marijuana, in violation of R.C.
2925.03(A)(2), a felony of the fourth degree.
{¶ 10} On May 1, 2024, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, appellant pled
guilty to two counts of the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter, in
violation of R.C. 2903.04(A), felonies of the first degree, and two counts of kidnapping,
in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(3), felonies of the first degree. In exchange, the
3.
remainder of the pending offenses were dismissed and appellee agreed to remain silent
regarding merger.
{¶ 11} On July 2, 2022, the sentencing hearing was conducted. The trial court
considered appellant’s sentencing memorandum, including the request for R.C. 2941.25
merger of the offenses as allied offenses of similar import. The trial court set forth the
core facts underpinning its rejection of the request for merger of the offenses. The trial
court held, in relevant part,
[T]here actually was harm done separate and apart during the kidnapping
that did not happen as part of the involuntary manslaughter, and that is [the
victims] being pistol whipped by a gun … they were [subsequently]
handed off and then put [into] the trunk of a car with more harm done …
All those things to me are different, and that is why I’m going to find …
that merger does not apply.
{¶ 12} The trial court then sentenced appellant to a 10 to 15 year term of
incarceration on each involuntary manslaughter conviction, and a three to four and one-
half year term of incarceration on each kidnapping conviction, with the involuntary
manslaughter convictions order to be served consecutively with one another, the
kidnapping convictions order to be served concurrently with one another, and the
involuntary manslaughter sentence order to run consecutively with the kidnapping
sentence, equaling a total term of incarceration of 20 to 25 years. This appeal ensued.
{¶ 13} In the first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in
not merging the kidnapping offenses with the involuntary manslaughter offenses, as R.C.
2941.25 allied offenses of similar import, for sentencing purposes. We do not concur.
4.
{¶ 14} As this court held in State v. Scott, 2024-Ohio-5849, ¶ 84 (6th Dist.),
R.C. 2941.25 prohibits multiple convictions for allied offenses of similar
import arising from the same conduct. State v. White, 2021-Ohio-335, ¶ 8
(6th Dist.). To determine whether multiple convictions constitute allied
offenses, the court must address three questions: (1) did the offenses
involve either separate victims or separate and identifiable harm, (2) were
the offenses committed separately, and (3) were the offenses committed
with separate animus? Id., quoting State v. Ruff,
2015-Ohio-995, ¶ 25. An
affirmative answer to any of the above will permit separate convictions.
Id., quoting State v. Tellis,
2020-Ohio-6982, ¶ 74 (6th Dist).
{¶ 15} In conjunction, as this court held in State v. Gilmer, 2024-Ohio-1178, ¶ 88
(6th Dist.),
The defendant bears the burden of establishing that R.C. 2941.25 prohibits
multiple punishments. State v. Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427, 2013-
Ohio-4982, 999 N.E.2d 661, ¶ 18, citing State v. Mughni,
33 Ohio St.3d 65,
67,
514 N.E.2d 870 (1987). An appellate court reviews de novo whether
offenses should be merged as allied offenses under R.C. 2941.25. State v.
Bailey, 171 Ohio St.3d 486,
2022-Ohio-4407,
218 N.E.3d 858, ¶ 5, citing
State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 482,
2012-Ohio-5699,
983 N.E.2d 1245, ¶
1. Although determining whether R.C. 2941.25 has been properly applied
is a legal question, it necessarily turns on analysis of the facts. Id. at ¶
11.
{¶ 16} As applied to the instant case, R.C. 2905.01(A)(3), the kidnapping statute,
establishes in relevant part, “No person, by force, threat, or deception … shall remove
another from the place where the other person is found or restrain the liberty of the other
person … to terrorize, or to inflict serious physical harm on the victim or another.”
{¶ 17} In conjunction, R.C. 2903.04(A), the involuntary manslaughter statute,
establishes in relevant part, “No person shall cause the death of another … as a
proximate result of the offender’s committing or attempting to commit a felony.”
5.
{¶ 18} In principle support of this appeal, appellant argues, “Remand is
appropriate here as merger was hotly contested, and the trial court’s statements at the
sentencing hearing and in its judgment entry do not speak clearly to appellant’s conduct.”
We do not concur.
{¶ 19} Incongruous with appellant’s characterization that the trial court was
unclear in articulating the underlying criminal conduct constituting the separate offenses,
the transcript of the sentencing hearing reflects that, in rejecting appellant’s merger
argument, the trial court clearly explicated,
[T]here actually was some harm done separate and apart during the
kidnapping that did not happen as part of the involuntary manslaughter, and
that is them being pistol whipped by a gun … [T]hat was done at that
home while they were tied up … separate harm than the murder, that’s
two separate harms … they were [later] handed off and then put in the
trunk of a car with more harm done to them with cords being taken off, and
then [duct tape being put on them], and the hitting [of the victims] with the
guns in the basement. All those things to me are different, and that is why I
am going to find … that merger does not apply.
{¶ 20} The record reflects, as clearly held by the trial court in the above-quoted
findings set forth at sentencing, that these offenses involved two separate victims, K.W.
and K.P., and that the harms inflicted upon them during the commission of these offenses
were distinct and identifiable. The record shows that in facilitation of the kidnapping of
the boys in appellant’s basement, they were pistol whipped in order to be subdued, tied
up first with electrical cords, and then with duct tape, and later put into the trunk of a
motor vehicle. These harms are distinct and identifiable from the subsequent, off-site
murder of both boys.
6.
{¶ 21} The record consistently reflects that these offenses were committed
separately, as likewise held by the trial court in rejection of the merger argument at
sentencing. The record shows that the kidnapping offenses chronologically occurred first
in time, when the boys were tied up with electrical cords upon being physically subdued
in appellant’s basement. The involuntary manslaughter offenses subsequently occurred,
only after the boys were later driven away from appellant’s home in the trunk of a motor
vehicle, and after which they were killed.
{¶ 22} Accordingly, upon our de novo review, we find that the record shows that
the offenses involved separate victims, with separate harms, and were committed
separately. Therefore, in accord with Scott, Gilmer, and R.C. 2941.25, the trial court
properly found that the crimes were not allied offenses of similar import, and did not
merge for sentencing purposes.
{¶ 23} In the second assignment of error, appellant similarly argues that trial
counsel was ineffective, likewise based upon the reasoning underlying appellant’s first
assignment of error, maintaining that the record does not clearly speak to appellant’s
conduct, thereby allegedly hindering appellate counsel in this matter.
{¶ 24} As held by this court in State v. Schramm, 2022-Ohio-1535, ¶ 10 (6th
Dist.),
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the
defendant the effective assistance of counsel … When a defendant
alleges ineffective assistance of counsel [], the defendant must meet the
two-prong test set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
104 S.Ct.
2052,
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Id.; see also State v. Xie,
62 Ohio St.3d 521,
524,
584 N.E.2d 715 (1992) … [T]he defendant must first show that
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counsel’s performance was deficient. Id. Second, the defendant must
demonstrate prejudice resulting from counsel’s deficient performance. Id.
{¶ 25} Given our determination in response to appellant’s first assignment of error,
rejecting appellant’s claim that the record does not clearly speak to appellant’s conduct
and finding that the record contains the requisite facts constituting the separate offenses,
we likewise find that appellant has failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel
on that same proffered substantive basis. Wherefore, appellant’s second assignment of
error is found not well-taken.
{¶ 26} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of
Common Pleas is hereby affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal
pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J .Osowik, J. ____________________________
JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J.
____________________________
Myron C. Duhart, J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
____________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
8.
