[Cite as State v. Eames,
2025-Ohio-2617.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. {48}L-24-1189
Appellee Trial Court No. CR0202301009
v.
Don Eames DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: July 25, 2025
…
Lawrence A. Gold, Esq., for appellant.
Julia R. Bates, Esq., Prosecuting Attorney and
Evy M. Jarrett, Esq., Assistant Prosecutor, for appellee.
…
ZMUDA, J.
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} In this appeal, appellant, Don Eames, challenges the judgment of the Lucas
County Court of Common Pleas, denying his motion to merge the sentences for
involuntary manslaughter and kidnapping, with the trial court ultimately imposing an
aggregate prison sentence of 16 to 18.5 years. Finding no error, we affirm.
II. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 3} The facts in this case were previously addressed in State v. Eames, 2025-
Ohio-2177 (6th Dist.), the appeal of appellant’s sister and co-defendant, Carissa. In that
case, we summarized the case as follows:
This case arises from the December 3, 2022 murder of victims K.W. and
K.P., both juvenile males. On December 3, 2022, while K.W. and K.P.
were playing video games in the basement of appellant's Toledo home, they
were assaulted, tied up with electrical cords, put into the trunk of a motor
vehicle, taken to an abandoned home in North Toledo, and killed, after
which the home was burned down, in a failed effort to conceal the abovedescribed crimes.
See State v. Eames, 2025-Ohio-21277, ¶ 2 (6th Dist.). Carissa entered a negotiated guilty
plea, admitting to complicity in counts of felonious assault and kidnaping as to each
victim. See
Eames at ¶ 1-5.
{¶ 4} Appellant participated in confronting the victims at the Maumee Street home
of his sister and her boyfriend, co-defendant Corbin Gingrich. Appellant believed the
boys stole a gun from Gingrich, and after one of the boys took out a gun, appellant
tackled him and took part in beating and subduing the boys, before restraining them with
electrical cords. Gingrich then contacted co-defendant Cruz Garcia to take the boys from
the home, and Garcia arrived with two other men, all wearing face masks, and drove the
victims away in the trunk of Garcia’s vehicle. At some point a photo was taken of the
victims, bound at the arms and legs, and the victims were killed at an unknown location
before their bodies were placed in a vacant home in North Toledo. The home was fire-
2.
bombed to conceal the crimes. After an anonymous tip, authorities found the victim’s
bodies a week and a half later.
{¶ 5} As a result of his participation in the crimes, appellant was initially charged
with two counts of murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B) and 2929.02, felonies of the
first degree, and two counts of kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(3) and (C)(2),
felonies of the first degree. After plea negotiations, appellant was charged by information
with tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) and (B), a felony of the
third degree, and obstructing justice in violation of R.C. 2921.32(A)(5) and (C)(4), a
felony the third degree. Additionally, the state amended his murder charges to two counts
of involuntary manslaughter in violation of R.C. 2903.04(A) and (C), each a felony of the
first degree.
{¶ 6} On June 10, 2024, appellant entered a guilty plea to two counts of
involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense to the two murder counts, two
counts of kidnapping, one count of tampering with evidence, and one count of
obstructing justice. In return for his plea, the state agreed to remain silent at sentencing,
with no recommendation as to a sentence.
{¶ 7} At sentencing, appellant’s trial counsel argued that each count of involuntary
manslaughter should merge with the corresponding kidnapping charge, asserting the
indictment included kidnapping as an element of murder, as originally charged. The state
opposed merger, noting appellant entered his guilty plea to involuntary manslaughter,
which merely required an underlying felony offense, and “not specifically kidnapping.”
3.
Additionally, the state argued that the facts demonstrated separate animus, and the
victims sustained separate injuries based on the two offenses.
{¶ 8} The trial court found the counts of involuntary manslaughter did not merge
with the counts of kidnapping, stating:
I believe that this started out – I mean, there’s so many different
stories, but I certainly heard all the testimony during a trial and heard
testimony about Mr. Eames’ part in that, and if you take it all together, the
kidnapping is certainly – there’s almost – I’ll call it – I’m going to call it
two kidnappings in this case.
These young men were kidnapped at this Maumee Street. They were
kept. They were hurt. They were tackled. They were hit. They were
everything. They were probably more scared than anybody I can imagine.
They were tied up with HMDI cords, both their hands and their legs. Then,
again, given over to two people who continued that kidnapping in the trunk
of a car.
If the testimony is to be believed, changed, took the cords off, and
then had tape around them and then were killed, and I don’t – I don’t care
what anybody says, everybody knew what was going to happen when those
youths were given over to those two so I’m going to find these do not
merge in this case.
After noting appellant had the worst criminal record of all the defendants in the case, and
that testimony placed appellant “in the thick of” events leading to the death of the
victims, the trial court was unmoved by appellant’s “wrong place, wrong time” claim.
The trial court found appellant took part in handing two kids over to their killers and, but
for the anonymous tip, appellant’s lies would have prevented the parents of the victims
from learning their child’s fate.
{¶ 9} The trial court addressed the statutory findings under R.C. 2929.13, found
appellant not amenable to community control, and imposed sentence as follows:
4.
(1) Involuntary manslaughter of K.W. in violation of R.C. 2903.04(A) and
(C), a felony of the first degree, 5 to 7.5 years;
(2) Involuntary manslaughter of K.P. in violation of R.C. 2903.04(A) and
(C), a felony of the first degree, 5 to 7.5 years;
(3) Kidnapping of K.W. in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(3) and (C), a
felony of the first degree, 3 to 4.5 years;
(4) Kidnapping of K.P. in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(3) and (C), a felony
of the first degree, 3 to 4.5 years;
(5) Tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) and (B), a
felony of the third degree, 24 months; and
(6) Obstructing justice in violation of R.C. 2921.32(A)(5), (C)(1), and
(C)(4), a felony of the third degree, 24 months.
The trial court determined that no counts merged, finding “the kidnapping is wholly
separate and apart from the final deaths of these two victims.” The trial court ordered the
sentences for tampering and obstruction to run concurrent with each other and concurrent
with the other charges but ordered the sentences for the two counts of involuntary
manslaughter and two counts of kidnapping to all run consecutively, for a total prison
term of 16 to 18.5 years.
{¶ 10} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from this judgment.
III. Assignment of Error
{¶ 11} Appellant asserts a single assignment of error on appeal, as follows:
The trial court erred by denying Appellant’s motion to merge Count 3 with
Count 5, and Count 4 and Count 6, Involuntary Manslaughter and
Kidnapping, as allied offenses of similar import.
5.
IV. Analysis
{¶ 12} In his sole assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court should have
merged the involuntary manslaughter charges with the kidnapping charges, claiming
separately sentencing him as to each charge violated R.C. 2941.25 as well as the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution’s prohibition on subjecting a person to
punishment twice for the same offense, or double jeopardy.
{¶ 13} “R.C. 2941.25 codifies the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 10, Article 1 of the
Ohio Constitution, which prohibit multiple punishments for the same offense.” State v.
Turvey, 2023-Ohio-2248, ¶ 107 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Rogers,
2022-Ohio-4126, ¶
16 (6th Dist.). R.C. 2941.25 provides:
(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to
constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or
information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant
may be convicted of only one.
(B) Where the defendant's conduct constitutes two or more offenses
of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses
of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus
as to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such
offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.
{¶ 14} “The defendant bears the burden of establishing that R.C. 2941.25 prohibits
multiple punishments.” State v. Kretzer, 2024-Ohio-2494, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.), citing
6.
State v. Smith,
2023-Ohio-866, ¶ 10 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Washington, 2013-Ohio-
4982, ¶ 18. We review the trial court’s determination regarding merger de novo.
Turvey
at ¶ 109, citing
Smith at ¶ 10 (additional citation omitted.).
{¶ 15} In considering a motion to merge allied offenses into a single conviction,
courts must address the defendant’s conduct, or how the offenses were committed.
Kretzer at ¶ 13, citing State v. Tellis,
2020-Ohio-6982, ¶ 74 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Ruff,
2015-Ohio-995, ¶ 25. The test for merger under R.C. 2941.25 requires three questions:
“(1) Were the offenses dissimilar in import or significance? (2) Were they committed
separately? and (3) Were they committed with separate animus or motivation? An
affirmative answer to any of the above will permit separate convictions. The conduct, the
animus, and the import must all be considered.” State v. Bailey,
2022-Ohio-4407, ¶ 10,
quoting State v. Earley,
2015-Ohio-4615, ¶ 12, quoting
Ruff at ¶ 31.
{¶ 16} In this case, appellant argues that his conduct relative to involuntary
manslaughter and kidnapping was “part of a continuing course of conduct and not
committed separately.” Appellant further argues that kidnapping served as the underlying
offense or was an element of involuntary manslaughter, and both offenses are felonies of
the first degree. However, while claiming he was not present at the deaths, appellant also
acknowledged his complicity in causing the victims’ death and his guilty plea served as
an admission to the facts underlying each offense.
{¶ 17} An offense is committed separately if one offense is complete before the
second offense occurs. State v. Fisher, 2023-Ohio-2088, ¶ 21 (6th Dist.). Appellant argues
7.
a continuing course of conduct rather than separately committed offenses, but the facts
noted by the trial court include restraint and a beating, followed by movement, followed
by a second restraint and beating, and culminating in delivery of the victims to their
masked killers. “[W]hen “the restraint is prolonged, the confinement is secretive, or the
movement is substantial so as to demonstrate a significance independent of the other
offense, there exists a separate animus as to each offense sufficient to support separate
convictions.” State v. Grate,
2020-Ohio-5584, ¶ 107, citing State v. Logan,
60 Ohio St.2d
126, 130 (1979).
{¶ 18} Additionally, we previously addressed merger of kidnapping with another
offense, with the primary question concerning the nature of the kidnapping offense, or
“whether the restraint or movement of the victim is merely incidental to a separate
underlying crime or, instead, whether it has a significance independent of the other
offense.” State v. Sproles, 2023-Ohio-3403, ¶ 49 (6th Dist.), quoting Logan, at 135; State
v. Dean,
2018-Ohio-1740, ¶ 66 (6th Dist.). We have found kidnapping did not merge with
rape where there was “separate and identifiable harm related solely to the kidnapping
count” based on the fear of dying experienced by the victim relative to the kidnapping,
separate from the harm related to the subsequent rape. State v. McKinney, 2020-Ohio-
3547, ¶ 30-31 (6th Dist.).
{¶ 19} Here, the facts demonstrate both a prolonged confinement and movement,
followed by a subsequent confinement, and separate and identifiable harm attributable to
kidnapping and involuntary manslaughter. As the trial court noted, the victims were
8.
bound and assaulted in the basement, then moved to a vehicle’s trunk, bound again and
transported to the vacant home where they would later be found, deceased. Considering
these facts, we agree with the trial court’s finding that the kidnapping and involuntary
manslaughter offenses were not subject to merger under R.C. 2941.25. Appellant’s sole
assignment of error, therefore, is not well-taken.
V. Conclusion
{¶ 20} Having found substantial just to be done, we affirm the judgment of the
Lucas County Court of Common Pleas. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of appeal
pursuant to App.R. 24.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See, also, 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Gene A. Zmuda, J. [[Applied Signature]]
JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, J. [[Applied Signature 2]]
JUDGE
Charles E. Sulek, P.J. [[Applied Signature 3]]
CONCUR JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
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