[Cite as In re C.W.,
2025-Ohio-262.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
FULTON COUNTY
In re C.W. Court of Appeals No. F-24-002
Trial Court No. DL2231092
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Decided: January 24, 2025
…
Timothy C. Holtsberry, for appellee, C.W.
Latina Bailey, for appellant, A.H.
…
SULEK, P.J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from the dispositional judgment entry of the Fulton County
Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, following its adjudication of delinquency of
appellee C.W. on two counts of gross sexual imposition. Appellant A.H., the minor
victim of C.W.’s delinquent conduct, appeals the juvenile court’s failure to award
restitution. For the reasons that follow, the juvenile court’s judgment is reversed, and this
matter is remanded for a restitution hearing.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On December 20, 2023, the Defiance County Juvenile Court adjudicated
C.W. delinquent on two counts of gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C.
2907.05(A)(4), felonies of the third degree if committed by an adult. A third count of
gross sexual imposition was dismissed. The matter was then transferred to the Fulton
County Juvenile Court for disposition, and a predisposition investigation report was
prepared.
{¶ 3} In the report, A.H.’s parents expressed a desire to be reimbursed for A.H.’s
behavioral and equine therapy sessions as a form of punishment for C.W. A.H.’s
behavioral therapy costs $100 per session, while her equine therapy costs $40 per session.
In addition, A.H.’s father, Jo.H., reported that his previous mental health concerns have
been exacerbated, causing him to see mental health providers three to four times per
week and to have his medications adjusted. A.H.’s mother, Ju.H., also has been receiving
counseling as C.W.’s conduct brought up memories of her own childhood abuse. In
describing what they would like to see happen to C.W., A.H.’s parents specifically
checked the boxes for “no contact,” “restitution,” “incarceration,”
“counseling/treatment,” and “other.”
{¶ 4} The Fulton County Juvenile Court held the dispositional hearing on
February 7, 2024. Relevant here, neither the prosecutor nor the victim’s father raised the
issue of restitution. The trial court did note, however, that A.H.’s family requested
restitution in the predisposition investigation report. It responded, “That’s a civil matter.
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You may want to contact a lawyer there’s a statute that provides for parental liability and
you may want to talk to your attorney about that.” The trial court then proceeded to
impose its disposition.
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 5} A.H. timely appeals the trial court’s dispositional judgment entry, asserting
one assignment of error for review:
1. The trial court erred when it refused to order Adjudicated
Delinquent Appellee C.W. to pay restitution to Victim-Appellant A.H. in
violation of Article I, Section 10a(A)(7) of the Ohio Constitution, Revised
Code Section 2152.20, and Revised Code Section 2152.203.
III. Analysis
{¶ 6} “Marsy’s Law,” which is enshrined in the Ohio Constitution, provides,
(A) To secure for victims justice and due process throughout the criminal
and juvenile justice systems, a victim shall have the following rights, which
shall be protected in a manner no less vigorous than the rights afforded to
the accused:
...
(7) to full and timely restitution from the person who committed the
criminal offense or delinquent act against the victim.
...
(B) The victim, the attorney for the government upon request of the victim,
or the victim’s other lawful representative, in any proceeding involving the
criminal offense or delinquent act against the victim or in which the
victim’s rights are implicated, may assert the rights enumerated in this
section and any other right afforded to the victim by law. If the relief
sought is denied, the victim or the victim’s lawful representative may
petition the court of appeals for the applicable district, which shall promptly
consider and decide the petition.
...
(D) As used in this section, “victim” means a person against whom the
criminal offense or delinquent act is committed or who is directly and
proximately harmed by the commission of the offense or act. The term
“victim” does not include the accused or a person whom the court finds
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would not act in the best interests of a deceased, incompetent, minor, or
incapacitated victim.
Ohio Const., art. I, § 10(a).
{¶ 7} A.H. contends that the trial court erred when it declined to consider
restitution, dismissing it as a “civil matter.” Generally, “[a] decision to award restitution
lies within the sound discretion of a juvenile court and will not be reversed on appeal
absent an abuse of discretion.” In re N.V., 2024-Ohio-2197, ¶ 15 (6th Dist.), quoting In
re A.B.,
2021-Ohio-4273, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.). In this case, however, the issue is not the trial
court’s exercise of discretion in awarding or not awarding restitution, rather it is the trial
court’s erroneous determination that restitution is not permitted in delinquency
proceedings, but is instead a civil matter. “When a court’s judgment is based on an
erroneous interpretation of the law, an abuse-of-discretion standard is not appropriate.”
State v. Futrall,
2009-Ohio-5590, ¶ 6. Thus, this matter will be reviewed de novo. See
id. at ¶ 7.
{¶ 8} Under Marsy’s Law, the victim is entitled to full and timely restitution.
Further, R.C. 2152.20(A)(3) provides, in relevant part,
If a child is adjudicated a delinquent child . . . the court may order any of
the following dispositions, in addition to any other disposition authorized or
required by this chapter:
...
(3) . . . [R]equire the child to make restitution to the victim of the child’s
delinquent act . . . in an amount based upon the victim’s economic loss
caused by or related to the delinquent act . . ..
The victim, victim’s representative, victim’s attorney, if applicable, the
prosecuting attorney, or the delinquent child or juvenile traffic offender
may provide information relevant to the determination of the amount of
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restitution. The amount the court orders as restitution shall not exceed the
amount of the economic loss suffered by the victim as a direct and
proximate result of the delinquent act . . .. If the court decides to or is
required to order restitution under this division and the amount of the
restitution is disputed by the victim or survivor, victim’s estate, victim’s
representative, or victim’s attorney, if applicable, or by the delinquent child
. . ., the court shall hold a hearing on the restitution. The court shall
determine the amount of full restitution by a preponderance of the evidence.
“Economic loss” includes “[m]ental health counseling expenses.” R.C. 2152.203(B)(3).
{¶ 9} C.W. argues that restitution is not appropriate in this case because no
evidence was presented to suggest an exact amount of economic loss. While it is true
that no evidence was presented as to restitution, this was only because the trial court
erroneously dismissed it as an option. Thus, since A.H. is entitled to restitution under
Marsy’s Law, this matter must be remanded to the trial court for a hearing to determine
the mental health counseling expenses that she incurred as a result of C.W.’s offenses
against her.
{¶ 10} A.H. further argues that her parents are also direct victims of C.W.’s
conduct and are also entitled to restitution from him under Marsy’s Law. A.H.’s parents,
however, have not appealed the trial court’s decision denying them restitution. The
notice of appeal names only A.H, and the docketing statement lists appellant’s counsel as
the attorney for “Victim-Appellant A.H.” Likewise, A.H.’s lone assignment of error
states that “[t]he trial court erred when it refused to order Adjudicated Delinquent
Appellee C.W. to pay restitution to the Victim-Appellant A.H.”
{¶ 11} Moreover, A.H. lacks standing to raise this argument on behalf of her
parents.
5.
{¶ 12} “An appeal is permitted only to correct errors which injuriously affect an
appellant.” In re Leo. D., 2002-Ohio-1174, *2, fn. 2 (6th Dist.); see also Ohio Contract
Carriers Assn. v. Pub. Util. Comm.,
140 Ohio St. 160 (1942), syllabus; Mulqueeny v.
Mentor Chiropractic Center, Inc.,
2002-Ohio-1687, *2 (11th Dist.). “An appellant
usually does not have standing to argue issues affecting another person.” UBS Fin.
Servs., Inc. v. Lacava,
2017-Ohio-7916, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.). “‘Similarly, a party generally
may not prosecute an appeal to protect the rights of a third party.’”
Id., quoting
Mulqueeny at *2. “An appellant may not assign errors committed against a non-
appealing party, unless the errors are prejudicial to the rights of the appellant.” Id.; see
also
Mulqueeny at *2; Warino v. Worldwide News. Corp.,
2013-Ohio-5884, ¶ 14 (7th
Dist.); Alesi v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Commrs.,
2014-Ohio-5192, ¶ 51 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 13} Any error in the portion of the trial court’s judgment concerning A.H.’s
parents’ ability to recover restitution has not resulted in prejudice to A.H. because she
had the opportunity to challenge the portions of the decision that affect her in this appeal.
A.H., therefore, lacks standing to challenge the trial court’s denial of restitution to her
parents.
{¶ 14} Furthermore, this is not a case where the rights of A.H. and her parents are
so interwoven or dependent on each other as to require a reversal of the trial court’s entire
judgment.
{¶ 15} “Generally, a reversal as to an appealing party will not justify reversal as to
a nonappealing party unless the respective rights of the appealing party and nonappealing
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party are so interwoven or dependent on each other as to require a reversal of the whole
judgment.” McAdams v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2020-Ohio-3702, ¶ 28, citing Wigton
v. Lavender,
9 Ohio St.3d 40 (1984), syllabus; see also In re Complaint of Pilkington N.
Am., Inc.,
2015-Ohio-4797, ¶ 34 (“[W]here one party appeals a judgment, a reversal as to
that party generally will not justify a reversal as to nonappealing parties.”).
{¶ 16} In Wigton, Aetna Insurance Company and several other plaintiffs filed a
complaint against the defendants alleging that three minors unlawfully entered a barn and
burned, damaged, and destroyed the barn and its contents. Wigton at 41. At trial, the
court directed a verdict in favor of the defendants.
Id. Of the plaintiffs, only Aetna
appealed. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the
matter for a new trial.
Id. On remand, the trial court held that the nonappealing plaintiffs
did not have standing to participate in the new trial because they did not appeal the
directed verdict.
Id.
{¶ 17} The Supreme Court affirmed and held that “each of the [nonappealing
plaintiffs] and Aetna in this property damage case had separate and distinct causes of
action arising out of an alleged single act . . ., causing separate and severable damage to
property in differing degrees and amounts. Four separate and distinct lawsuits could have
been filed.” Id. at 43. Nonetheless, “Aetna was the only plaintiff who appealed the trial
court’s grant of the directed verdict. It had no interest in this appeal except to have the
judgment reversed as to it, for none of its interests was contingent upon or in conflict
with those interests of the other plaintiffs.”
Id. Accordingly, “[s]o far as the retrial of the
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case is concerned, there is no reason why that trial cannot be had with relation to Aetna’s
claim without in any way affecting the rights of [the nonappealing plaintiffs] as
determined by the previous judgment.”
Id.
{¶ 18} More recently, in McAdams, the plaintiff filed a complaint against
Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MB USA) and Mercedes-Benz of Easton (MB Easton)
asserting claims related to mechanical problems with her vehicle. The trial court entered
summary judgment in favor of the defendants and concluded that the plaintiff’s claims
were barred by res judicata because she was bound by a class action settlement.
McAdams at ¶ 15. The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed. Id. at ¶ 17-18. MB
USA appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio; MB Easton did not.
{¶ 19} The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial
court’s judgment as to MB USA. Id. at ¶ 27. The court recognized the “Tenth District’s
error also affects the judgment against MB Easton,” however, “because MB Easton did
not appeal, we leave the Tenth District’s judgment as to that party undisturbed.” Id. at ¶
28.
{¶ 20} In this case, the rights of A.H. and her parents are not so interwoven or
dependent on each other as to require a reversal of the trial court’s entire judgment. The
issue of restitution owed by C.W. to A.H. for mental health counseling expenses that she
incurred is not contingent on, or in conflict with, her parents’ ability to seek restitution
for their own mental health counseling expenses. The hearing on what restitution is owed
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to A.H. can proceed without in any way affecting the rights of her parents as determined
by the trial court’s previous judgment.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 21} Accordingly, A.H.’s assignment of error is well-taken only to the extent
that it pertains to the trial court’s denial of restitution to her.
{¶ 22} The judgment of the Fulton County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile
Division, is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for a restitution
hearing on the amount of economic damages sustained by A.H. C.W. is ordered to pay
the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment reversed
and remanded.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Christine E. Mayle, J. ____________________________
JUDGE
Charles E. Sulek, P.J.
CONCUR ____________________________
JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, J.
CONCURS, IN PART, DISSENTS,
IN PART, AND WRITES JUDGE
SEPARATELY.
DUHART, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
{¶ 23} The statutes at issue in this case are R.C. 2152.20 and R.C. 2152.203.
Under R.C. 2152.20(A)(3), if a child is adjudicated a delinquent child for an act that
9.
would not be a minor misdemeanor if committed by an adult, the juvenile court may
require the child to make restitution to the victim of the child’s delinquent act in an
amount based upon the victim’s economic loss caused by or related to the delinquent act.
The statute further provides that “[i]f the court decides to or is required to order
restitution under this division and the amount of the restitution is disputed by the
victim…or by the delinquent child…the court shall hold a hearing on the restitution,” and
that “[t]he court shall determine the amount of full restitution by a preponderance of the
evidence.” R.C. 2152. 20(A)(3) (emphasis added). R.C. 2152.203(B)(1) provides that
“economic loss” includes, but is not limited to, mental health counseling expenses.
{¶ 24} Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a, “Marsy’s Law,” states:
(A) To secure for victims justice and due process throughout
the criminal and juvenile justice systems, a victim shall have
the following rights, which shall be protected in a manner no
less vigorous than the rights afforded to the accused:
…
(3) to be heard in any public proceeding
involving …disposition;
(7) to full and timely restitution from the person who
committed the criminal offense or delinquent act against the
victim.
(B) The victim, the attorney for the government upon request
of the victim, or the victim’s other lawful representative, in
any proceeding involving the criminal offense or delinquent
act against the victim or in which the victim’s rights are
implicated, may assert the rights enumerated in this section
and any other right afforded to the victim by law. If the relief
sought is denied, the victim or the victim’s lawful
representative may petition the court of appeals for the
applicable district, which shall promptly consider and decide
the petition.
10.
{¶ 25} “Restitution in Ohio is limited to economic losses suffered by the victim as
a direct and proximate result of the commission of the offense.” State v. Yerkey, 2022-
Ohio-4298, ¶ 1. “Generally speaking, a consequence is a direct and proximate result of an
act when the consequence is foreseeable and is produced by the natural and continuous
sequence of events following the act.” Id. at ¶ 16; see also State v. Whitaker, 2024-Ohio-
2495, ¶ 37 (6th Dist.).
{¶ 26} Here, I agree with the majority that A.H. is a victim who under the Ohio
Constitution (and under R.C. 2152.20, and R.C. 2152.203) is entitled to a hearing on the
matter of restitution for mental health counseling expenses that she incurred as a result of
the offenses that were committed against her by C.W.
{¶ 27} In this case, we are also asked to consider whether A.H.’s parents are
entitled to be heard in connection with their own claims for restitution for mental health
counseling expenses.
{¶ 28} Beginning with the question of whether A.H.’s parents are themselves
“victims” under the law, I once again look to Marsy’s Law, which defines a victim as
follows:
As used in this section, “victim” means a person against
whom the criminal offense or delinquent act is committed or
who is directly and proximately harmed by the commission of
the offense or act.…
Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a (D).
{¶ 29} As stated in Judge Boyle’s concurring opinion in Cleveland v. Alrefaei,
2020-Ohio-5009, ¶ 78 (8th Dist.), under Marsy’s Law, a victim “does not need to be
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named in the complaint or indictment, but rather just directly and proximately harmed by
the act.” Noting that the federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”) similarly defines a
crime victim as a person “directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission
of a Federal offense, Judge Boyle pointed to the words of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, which observed:
The CVRA…does not limit the class of crime victims to
those whose identity constitutes an element of the offense or
who happen to be identified in the charging document. The
statute, rather, instructs the district court to look at the offense
itself only to determine the harmful effects the offense has on
parties. Under the plain language of the statute, a party may
qualify as a victim, even though it may not have been the
target of the crime, as long as it suffers harm as a result of the
crime’s commission.
Id, quoting In re Stewart, 552 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11th Cir. 2008). Another federal circuit
court explained:
‘The requirement that the victim be ‘directly and proximately
harmed’ encompasses the traditional ‘but for’ and proximate
cause analyses.’ In re Rendon Galvis, 564 F.3d 170, 175 (2d
Cir.2009) (citing In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1126 (10th
Cir.2008) (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (noting that “direct[ ]”
harm encompasses a “but-for” causation notion that is
different from proximate harm)). ‘The necessary inquiry is [ ]
fact-specific[.]’ Id. (citations omitted).
In re McNulty,
597 F.3d 344, 350 (6th Cir. 2010).
Thus, under the specific language of Marsy’s Law, “third parties may be able to receive
restitution if the offender’s conduct directly and proximately harmed them.”
Alrefaei at ¶
79 (Boyle, J., concurring).
12.
{¶ 30} To answer the question of whether A.H.’s parents could have been
“directly and proximately harmed” by C.W.’s actions against their daughter, I look to
R.C. 2743.51 for guidance. R.C. 2743.51 provides definitions for terms used in the
Revised Code chapter governing awards of reparations for economic loss arising from
criminally injurious conduct. R.C. 2743.51(L)(2) defines a victim as “[a] person who is
an immediate family member of a victim of criminally injurious conduct that consists
of …a sexual assault, who requires psychiatric care or counseling as a result of the
criminally injurious conduct.” In addition, R.C. 2743.51(F)(2) specifies that “reasonable
charges incurred for psychiatric care or counseling reasonably needed as a result of the
criminally injurious conduct” are an “allowable expense” for victims described under
R.C. 2743.51(L)(2). Thus, under R.C. 2743.51(L)(2) and (F)(2), parents of sexual assault
victims themselves qualify as victims who are entitled to relief for their own counseling
expenses incurred as the result of the offenses committed against their children.
{¶ 31} Even before R.C. 2743.51 was amended to specifically provide that parents
of a sexually abused child are victims in their own right, the Court of Claims in In re
Kaman, 62 Ohio Misc.2d 288, 294 (Jul. 26, 1991), deemed a parent-applicant to be a
victim where “[i]n spite of the lack of spatial and temporal proximity to the crime,” the
parent-applicant “suffered a great deal of emotional distress and anxiety due to her direct
awareness that her daughter had been [sexually] assaulted.”
{¶ 32} I likewise believe in this case that A.H.’s parents are properly viewed as
victims of C.W.’s offenses against A.H. Because counseling expenses of theirs may well
13.
have directly and proximately resulted from the commission of those offenses, it is my
opinion that A.H.’s parents are entitled to a hearing on the matter of restitution for those
expenses.
{¶ 33} In reaching this conclusion, I acknowledge that only A.H., and not her
parents, appealed the trial court’s decision in this case. However,“‘[c]ourts
have…permitted the benefits of an appeal to inure to a nonappealing party…where the
justice of the case requires the reversal or modification of the judgment as to
nonappealing parties.’” Reighard v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating, 2006-Ohio-2814, ¶ 10
(7th Dist.), quoting Wigton v. Lavender,
9 Ohio St.3d 40, 42. Where one party appeals
from a judgment, a reversal as to him will justify a reversal against other non-appealing
parties if “‘the respective rights of the appealing party and non-appealing parties are so
interwoven or dependent on each other as to require a reversal of the whole judgment.’”
Id., citing
Wigton at 43. Here, I would find that the parties’ claims are not separate and
distinct, given the likelihood that any anxiety on the part of A.H.’s parents that resulted
from the assaults on A.H. affected not only them, but also their interactions with A.H.
Thus, I believe the rights of the appealing and non-appealing parties can be said to be so
interwoven as to allow reversal of the entire judgment for all claimants even if this would
serve to inure to the benefit of the non-appealing-parent claimants.
{¶ 34} Accordingly, I concur with the majority opinion’s finding that this matter
must be remanded to the trial court for a hearing to determine the mental health
counseling expenses that A.H. incurred as a result of C.W.’s offenses against her.
14.
However, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I believe A.H.’s
parents are also entitled to a hearing on the matter of restitution for their own counseling
expenses that may have directly and proximately resulted from the commission of C.W.’s
offenses against their daughter.
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
15.
