[Cite as State v. Jackson,
2025-Ohio-2622.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 24CA012175
Appellant
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
TERRENCE JACKSON COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
Appellee CASE No. 23 CR 109852
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: July 28, 2025
HENSAL, Judge.
{¶1} The State of Ohio appeals from the judgment of the Lorain County Court of
Common Pleas, granting Terrence Jackson’s motion to suppress. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} Just before 3:00 a.m., Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Michael Wearsch saw a
car on the road without headlights. The car was stopped at a red light directly opposite him. The
traffic light turned green on Trooper Wearsch’s side of the road first, so he was able to drive past
the stopped car, make a U-turn, and begin accelerating toward the car before the light turned green
on that side of the road. When the light turned green, the stopped car remained stationary for
approximately three seconds before moving. The trooper decided to stop the car.
{¶3} Mr. Jackson was the driver and sole occupant of the car Trooper Wearsch stopped.
When the trooper signaled for him to stop, Mr. Jackson did so without difficulty. The trooper saw
that Mr. Jackson had bloodshot, glassy eyes. He found Mr. Jackson’s speech to be “low and
2
mumbled” and detected an odor of alcohol and burnt marijuana coming from the car. Mr. Jackson
denied drinking but admitted that he had smoked earlier that evening.1 He was unable to produce
either a license or state identification card at Trooper Wearsch’s request, but he immediately
answered each of the trooper’s questions and complied with his instructions. Because dispatch
informed Trooper Wearsch that Mr. Jackson had an active warrant, he had Mr. Jackson exit his
car while he investigated the matter. He handcuffed Mr. Jackson and placed him in the back of
his police cruiser. Mr. Jackson had no difficulty exiting his car, standing, or walking to the cruiser.
{¶4} When Trooper Wearsch used his mobile data terminal to research Mr. Jackson’s
warrant, he discovered that Mr. Jackson had a suspended license. He exited his cruiser and opened
its back door to remove Mr. Jackson. At that point, he once again detected the odor of alcohol.
Mr. Jackson continued to deny that he had consumed alcohol, and Trooper Wearsch admitted to
Mr. Jackson that the odor could have come from someone he had arrested and transported in his
cruiser earlier that evening. He attempted to conduct field sobriety testing, but Mr. Jackson refused
the tests. Trooper Wearsch then arrested Mr. Jackson.
{¶5} Mr. Jackson was charged with two counts of operating a vehicle under the influence
of alcohol or drugs (“OVI”), in violation of Revised Code Sections 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and (A)(2)(a)
or (b), respectively, and one count of driving under suspension. Both OVI counts carried a repeat
OVI offender specification based on his having received five or more OVIs within twenty years
of his charged offenses.
{¶6} Mr. Jackson filed a motion to suppress, and the trial court held a hearing on his
motion. Following the hearing, the State filed a brief in opposition. The trial court granted Mr.
1
Trooper Wearsch asked Mr. Jackson whether he had smoked without naming any specific
substance.
3
Jackson’s motion, finding that Trooper Wearsch lacked probable cause to detain and arrest him
for an OVI. The State immediately appealed the trial court’s judgment. It raises one assignment
of error for review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING TERRENCE JACKSON’S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AS THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE
TO ARREST FOR OVI.
{¶7} In its sole assignment of error, the State argues the trial court erred when it found
that Trooper Wearsch lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Jackson for an OVI. A motion to
suppress evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372,
¶ 8. “When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and
is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of
witnesses.”
Id., citing State v. Mills,
62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366 (1992). Thus, a reviewing court
“must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible
evidence.”
Id., citing State v. Fanning,
1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20 (1982). “Accepting these facts as true,
the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the
trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.”
Id., citing State v. McNamara,
124 Ohio App.3d 706, 710 (4th Dist. 1997). This Court, therefore, grants deference to the trial
court’s findings of fact but conducts a de novo review of whether the trial court applied the
appropriate legal standard to those facts. State v. Booth,
2003-Ohio-829, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.).
{¶8} “Before an officer may effectuate a warrantless arrest, he must have probable cause
that the suspect is engaging in criminal activity.” State v. Consiglio, 2021-Ohio-990, ¶ 13 (9th
Dist.). “[T]his Court reviews a probable cause determination de novo.” State v. Russo, 2009-
4
Ohio-6914, ¶ 6 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Sunday, 2006-Ohio-2984, ¶ 28 (9th Dist.). “The legal
standard for probable cause to arrest for OVI is whether ‘at the moment of the arrest, the police
had sufficient information, derived from a reasonably trustworthy source of facts and
circumstances, sufficient to cause a prudent person to believe that the suspect was driving under
the influence.’” State v. Krzemieniewski,
2016-Ohio-4991, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.), quoting State v.
Homan,
89 Ohio St.3d 421, 427 (2000), superseded by statute on other grounds. While “[t]he
amount of evidence necessary for probable cause . . . is less evidence than would be necessary to
support a conviction[,]” probable cause is “a stricter standard than reasonable and articulable
suspicion.” State v. McGinty,
2009-Ohio-994, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.); State v. Mays,
2008-Ohio-4539, ¶
23.
{¶9} Initially, we note that the State has only asked us to determine whether Trooper
Wearsch had probable cause to detain and arrest Mr. Jackson for an OVI. The State never argued
that the trooper had probable cause (1) to detain Mr. Jackson due to his active warrant(s), and (2)
to arrest him once the trooper discovered he was driving under suspension. This Court, therefore,
takes no position on whether independent grounds for Mr. Jackson’s detention and arrest existed.
We confine our review to the limited argument the State made in the lower court and maintains on
appeal.
{¶10} For ease of review, we begin by outlining the evidence presented at the suppression
hearing. Trooper Wearsch testified that he was traveling westbound on State Route 611 when he
spotted a car on the eastbound side of the road. The car was stopped at a red light. It was dark
outside at nearly 3:00 a.m., but the car did not have its headlights on. Trooper Wearsch drove past
the car, made a U-turn, and drove back towards the car as its driver waited for the light to turn
green. It was the trooper’s impression that the driver had a delayed response when the light turned
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green. Nevertheless, he admitted that the delay only amounted to about three seconds. Trooper
Wearsch did not testify that he observed any erratic driving, speeding, or lanes violations.
{¶11} Trooper Wearsch identified Mr. Jackson as the driver of the car. He testified that
Mr. Jackson had bloodshot, glassy eyes and his speech “was low and mumbled.” He testified that
he asked Mr. Jackson for his license, but Mr. Jackson said he did not have one. He testified that
he then asked Mr. Jackson if he had a state identification card, and Mr. Jackson spent between 20
to 30 seconds searching around the car before giving up. Trooper Wearsch testified that bloodshot
eyes, mumbled speech patterns, and difficulty finding identification cards can all be indicators of
drug or alcohol impairment. Further, he testified that he detected both an odor of alcohol and an
odor of burnt marijuana coming from the car. When the trooper asked Mr. Jackson if he had been
drinking or smoking, Mr. Jackson admitted that he had smoked. He indicated that he had done so
a few hours before the stop. The trooper did not ask Mr. Jackson what substance he had smoked.
{¶12} Trooper Wearsch testified that he removed Mr. Jackson from the car, searched him,
and placed him in the back of the police cruiser. Mr. Jackson remained inside the cruiser while
Trooper Wearsch used his mobile data terminal. When the trooper finished, he exited his cruiser
and opened its back door to get Mr. Jackson. He testified that, when he opened the door, he noticed
an odor of alcohol. Trooper Wearsch then attempted to conduct field sobriety testing, but Mr.
Jackson refused. At that point, he arrested Mr. Jackson.
{¶13} On cross-examination, Trooper Wearsch conceded that smoking can cause
bloodshot, glassy eyes. He admitted that he did not notice Mr. Jackson having dilated pupils,
which could have been a sign that he was under the influence of marijuana. Trooper Wearsch
agreed that Mr. Jackson immediately answered questions and did not appear to have any problems
maneuvering his car, standing, or walking to the police cruiser. When defense counsel asked
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whether Mr. Jackson’s “mental processes were intact as a sober person’s would be,” the trooper
responded affirmatively. He also agreed that Mr. Jackson’s ability to process information appeared
to be “lightning quick . . . .” Trooper Wearsch admitted telling Mr. Jackson that the odor of alcohol
he noticed in the back of his police cruiser “may have been [from] the last person that [he] arrested
because they were very high[.]”
{¶14} The trial court found that Mr. Jackson immediately pulled over when Trooper
Wearsch stopped him for driving without headlights. The court found that Mr. Jackson operated
his vehicle “as a sober person would” because he stopped and accelerated appropriately at a traffic
light on the road, parked his car without difficulty, and “exhibited divided attention tasks by
recognizing he was being pulled over while simultaneously doing so . . . .” The court found that
Mr. Jakson had no problem standing or walking, immediately answered Trooper Wearsch’s
questions, and promptly complied with his orders. Further, it found that he did not have dilated
pupils, his mental processes were “lightning quick”, and Trooper Wearsch could not say whether
he had consumed any alcohol or had recently smoked marijuana. The court concluded that Mr.
Jackson’s appearance, his physical condition, and his ability to operate his car mitigated against a
finding that he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. It concluded that Trooper Wearsch
lacked probable cause to arrest him for an OVI.
{¶15} The State has not challenged any of the trial court’s factual findings as lacking in
competent, credible evidence. Instead, it argues that the trial court erred when it granted Mr.
Jackson’s motion to suppress because, under the totality of the circumstances, Trooper Wearsch
had probable cause to arrest him for an OVI. It points to Mr. Jackson’s failure to use his headlights,
his slow response to the change in the traffic light, the appearance of his eyes, the distortion of his
7
speech, the extended time he spent searching for an identification card, and the odor of alcohol
and burnt marijuana that Trooper Wearsch detected during the traffic stop.
{¶16} Upon review, we cannot conclude the trial court erred when it found that Trooper
Wearsch lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Jackson for an OVI. Although Mr. Jackson was
operating a car without headlights, there was no evidence that he drove erratically, exceeded the
speed limit, or committed any moving violations. Compare Krzemieniewski, 2016-Ohio-4991 at
¶ 19 (9th Dist.) (probable cause existed where defendant committed two marked-lanes violations,
had bloodshot and glossy eyes, admitted having smoked marijuana recently, and had raw
marijuana in his car). Trooper Wearsch admitted that Mr. Jackson’s delayed response at the traffic
light amounted to no more than three seconds. He also admitted that Mr. Jackson responded to his
command to stop, pulled over without difficulty, and immediately answered each question he
posed. Trooper Wearsch never described the intensity of the odor of alcohol he detected when he
encountered Mr. Jackson, and he admitted that the back of his police cruiser might have smelled
of alcohol due to its prior occupant. The trooper described Mr. Jackson’s speech as “low and
mumbled” but gave no indication that it was slurred. Although he described Mr. Jackson as having
bloodshot, glassy eyes, he conceded that those symptoms could be caused by smoke. Trooper
Wearsch readily admitted that Mr. Jackson’s mental processes were “lightning quick” and “intact
as a sober person’s would be . . . .” Moreover, he never observed Mr. Jackson sway, stumble, or
otherwise have difficulty when exiting his car and walking to the police cruiser. Although Mr.
Jackson spent time looking for an identification card, the trooper admitted that he asked Mr.
Jackson for some other type of state identification card after he asked him for his license. Mr.
Jackson’s response to the license question was immediate. He never claimed to have one. The
trooper conceded that Mr. Jackson’s search was related to the trooper’s follow-up question about
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a different form of identification. Thus, a reasonable person could conclude that Mr. Jackson spent
time searching for an alternative form of identification that would act as an adequate substitute for
his license.
{¶17} As noted, the probable cause standard requires more than just reasonable,
articulable suspicion. See Mays, 2008-Ohio-4539, at ¶ 23. The record reflects that “there was no
indication of erratic driving or behavior, and there was little indication of physical impairment that
would contribute to a conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that [Mr. Jackson] was
impaired.” State v. Hopp,
2016-Ohio-8027, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.). Accordingly, we cannot conclude
the trial court erred when it found that Trooper Wearsch lacked probable cause to arrest Mr.
Jackson for an OVI. The State’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶18} The State’s sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Lorain
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
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mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JENNIFER HENSAL
FOR THE COURT
FLAGG LANZINGER, P. J.
STEVENSON, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
ANTHONY CILLO, Prosecuting Attorney, and MARK ANTHONY KOZA, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellant.
MICHAEL E. STEPANIK, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.
