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2025 Ohio 2623

State v. Moore

Ohio Court of Appeals

Decided July 28, 2025

Ohio Court of Appeals · decided 2025-07-28

Appellant's conviction for criminal trespass was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the property owner testified she saw appellant only two inches from her dining room window, despite appellant knowing that he did not have permission to be on her property. Where the sentencing entry mistakenly listed the manner of conviction as a guilty plea when appellant was convicted following a bench trial, the case was remanded for the limited purpose of having the trial court issue a nunc pro tunc sentencing entry to correct the manner of conviction.

Decided 2025-07-28

[Cite as State v. Moore, 
2025-Ohio-2623
.]



                                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

                          TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

                                            BUTLER COUNTY




 STATE OF OHIO,                                   :

        Appellee,                                 :     CASE NO. CA2024-10-123

                                                  :           OPINION AND
     - vs -                                                 JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                                  :             7/28/2025

 ASHER MOORE,                                     :

        Appellant.                                :




                CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM HAMILTON MUNICIPAL COURT
                              Case No. CRB 2402045


Antoinette M. Dillard, City of Hamilton Assistant Law Director, for appellee.

Christopher P. Frederick, for appellant.




                                             OPINION

        HENDRICKSON, P.J.

        {¶ 1} Appellant, Asher Moore, appeals from his conviction in the Hamilton

Municipal Court for criminal trespass.

        {¶ 2} On June 14, 2024, appellant was charged by complaint with one count of

criminal trespass in violation of R.C. 2911.21(A)(1), a misdemeanor of the fourth degree.
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Appellant entered a not guilty plea, and the matter proceeded to a bench trial.

       {¶ 3} At trial, the State presented testimony from Charm Street. Street testified

that she and appellant previously had a relationship and that appellant was the father of

her five-year-old daughter. Street previously had a protection order against appellant,

which prohibited him from having contact with her or their daughter. The protection order

expired in September 2023. Street was unable to renew the protection order because she

did not have appellant's address and could not serve him with the necessary documents.

Despite the protection order no longer being in place, appellant knew he was not welcome

on her property.

       {¶ 4} On May 6, 2024, Street was residing at a home on Cereal Avenue in

Hamilton, Butler County, Ohio. That evening, Street was advised by a neighbor that

someone was lurking outside her home. Street looked out her dining room window and

saw a man right outside the window, about two inches away. Though it was dark outside

and the man was wearing a hooded sweatshirt with a medical mask covering part of his

face, Street recognized the man as appellant. Street explained that the streetlight gave

enough light for her to see the man's face, the man did not have the hood on his sweatshirt

pulled up, and he was wearing the medical mask under his nose, leaving "the whole top

of his head" visible. Street testified she "[could] see his nose . . . his eyes . . . his

cheekbones . . . [and] his forehead." She knew it was appellant. Street testified appellant

"knows that he is not allowed on my property." She locked herself and her daughter in a

bedroom and called the police.

       {¶ 5} By the time officers arrived on scene, appellant had already left the area.

She gave a statement to the responding officers. A neighbor's Ring doorbell camera

recorded a person in the area of her property during the time in question, and this

recording was introduced as an exhibit at trial. The recording, however, did not capture a

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close-up view of the person's face or that person's activities on Street's property. Street

believed there might have been additional security footage showing the person right next

to her dining room window, but that footage was not introduced as evidence at trial.

       {¶ 6} Two days after the incident, Street served a new application for a protection

order on appellant. She indicated she had found his address online, after reviewing court

records.

       {¶ 7} Appellant presented an alibi defense at trial. He testified that he could not

have been the man outside Street's residence on May 6, 2024 as he was at his girlfriend's

home on Williams Avenue in Hamilton, Ohio on the evening in question. Appellant

claimed that he prepared a meal and played Uno with his girlfriend and her children before

he and his girlfriend went to bed together. He denied leaving his girlfriend's home to go

to Street's residence, stating he had "no reason to be over there." He indicated he has

"never" been to Street's home and "never will, because I know how she is."

       {¶ 8} Appellant's girlfriend, Heather Murphy, testified that appellant was with her

at her home on May 6, 2024. She indicated that she and appellant followed their usual

routine that evening, which included cooking dinner, spending time with her children,

watching movies, and going to bed around 10:30 or 11:00 p.m. She indicated she

remembered the events of May 6, 2024 because the next day she and appellant had to

cancel plans to go to a Cincinnati Reds game after appellant was arrested on an unrelated

matter. She indicated appellant was with her the "entire time" on the evening of May 6,

2024, and he was not in the vicinity of Street's residence.

       {¶ 9} After considering the foregoing testimony and reviewing the Ring video

recording, the trial court found appellant guilty of criminal trespass. In finding appellant

guilty, the court stated, in pertinent part, the following:

              [F]rom the day that we had this video evidence, where

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              someone is walking in front of her house, that's the day the
              person walked up to the house. Well, that person walks up to
              her house and looks in her window, that person did not have
              privilege to be there.

              And so the only real issue is whether or not the State has
              proven identity in this case by proof beyond a reasonable
              doubt. And they didn't – they did not do that with the video
              evidence. The video evidence doesn't show who the – who
              the person is. It shows that there is a person.

              And the real evidence of who that person was, the believable
              evidence came from Ms. Street, when she testified that she
              looked out the window and she saw the Defendant there. And
              she was within inches of him, and she immediately ran to her
              bedroom and locked herself in the bedroom so he couldn't get
              her.

              ...

              [S]he wasn't equivocal about it. She wasn't "it might have
              been him, it looked like him." She knew who it was.

The court further noted that it had considered appellant's alibi defense but "didn't believe

that alibi defense at all." The court proceeded to sentence appellant to 30 days in jail, with

15 days suspended, two years of community control, and a fine of $100.

       {¶ 10} Appellant appealed his conviction, raising the following as his sole

assignment of error:

       {¶ 11} [APPELLANT'S] CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT

OF THE EVIDENCE.

       {¶ 12} Appellant argues his conviction for criminal trespass was against the

manifest weight of the evidence as Street's identification of him as the perpetrator of the

offense was unreliable, she had motive to falsely claim that he had trespassed as a means

of obtaining his address in order to serve a protection order, and he had presented a

credible alibi defense.

       {¶ 13} A manifest weight of the evidence challenge examines the "inclination of


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                                                                      Butler CA2024-10-123

the greater amount of credible evidence, offered at a trial, to support one side of the issue

rather than the other." State v. Barnett, 
2012-Ohio-2372
, ¶ 14 (12th Dist.). To determine

whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the reviewing court

must look at the entire trial record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences,

consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether in resolving the conflicts

in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State

v. Graham, 
2009-Ohio-2814
, ¶ 66 (12th Dist.). "While appellate review includes the

responsibility to consider the credibility of witnesses and weight given to the evidence,

'these issues are primarily matters for the trier of fact to decide.'" State v. Barnes, 2011-

Ohio-5226, ¶ 81 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Walker, 
2007-Ohio-911, ¶ 26
 (12th Dist.).

An appellate court, therefore, will overturn a conviction due to the manifest weight of the

evidence only in extraordinary circumstances to correct a manifest injustice when the

evidence presented at trial weighs heavily in favor of acquittal. 
Id.,
 citing Thompkins, 78

Ohio St.3d at 387.

       {¶ 14} Appellant was convicted of criminal trespass in violation of R.C.

2911.21(A)(1), which provides that "[n]o person, without privilege to do so, shall . . .

[k]nowingly enter or remain on the land or premises of another." A person acts "knowingly"

when, regardless of purpose, "the person is aware that the person's conduct will probably

cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature." R.C. 2901.22(B).

       {¶ 15} "Privilege is the distinguishing characteristic between unlawful trespass and

lawful presence on the land or premises of another." State v. Roland, 
2013-Ohio-1382, ¶ 17
 (12th Dist.). Privilege is "an immunity, license, or right conferred by law, bestowed by

express or implied grant, arising out of status, position, office, or relationship, or growing

out of necessity." R.C. 2901.01(A)(12). "Where no privilege exists, entry constitutes

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                                                                      Butler CA2024-10-123

trespass." State v. Lyons, 
18 Ohio St.3d 204, 206
 (1985).

       {¶ 16} Having thoroughly reviewed the record in the present case, we find that

appellant's conviction for criminal trespass is not against the manifest weight of the

evidence. Street's testimony, as believed by the trial court, established that appellant was

on her property, only inches from her dining room window, despite him knowing that he

did not have permission to be on her property. Although it was dark outside and appellant

was wearing a medical mask, Street got a good look at appellant's face. Street explained

that streetlights provided sufficient lighting for her to observe appellant's facial features,

which were visible since appellant was wearing the mask below his nose. Street was

obviously familiar with appellant, as the two were in a prior intimate relationship and have

a child together.

       {¶ 17} Appellant challenges the credibility of Street's testimony, arguing she had a

motive to falsely claim that he had trespassed as a means of obtaining his address in

order to serve a protection order. He further argues that the weight of the evidence

demonstrates that he could not have committed the offense, as he was at his girlfriend's

house on the evening of May 6, 2024. Appellant's alibi defense and the suggestion that

Street had motive to lie were issues addressed at trial through appellant's testimony,

Murphy's testimony, and defense counsel's cross-examination of Street. The trial court

found Street a "believable" or credible witness. The court dismissed the suggestion that

Street had lied about events, noting that Street had not been "equivocal" about the events

or her identification of appellant. Conversely, the court found that appellant's alibi defense

was not believable, noting certain inconsistencies in appellant's and Murphy's testimony

as it related to the activities they engaged in on May 6, 2024. For instance, the court noted

that appellant had indicated he cooked dinner and played Uno that evening, whereas

Murphy indicated her daughter and appellant had cooked dinner before she and appellant

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                                                                      Butler CA2024-10-123

watched movies together.

       {¶ 18} "[W]hen conflicting evidence is presented at trial, a conviction is not against

the manifest weight of the evidence simply because the trier of fact believed the

prosecution testimony." State v. Lunsford, 
2011-Ohio-6529
, ¶ 17 (12th Dist.). "[T]he trial

court, as the trier of fact, is best able to view witnesses and observe their demeanor,

gestures, and voice inflections in weighing witness credibility . . . ." State v. Burkhead,

2009-Ohio-4466
, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.). Here, the trial court clearly found Street to be a credible

witness and believed her testimony that appellant, without privilege to do so, knowingly

entered on her property.

       {¶ 19} Accordingly, based on the evidence presented at trial, we find that

appellant's conviction for criminal trespass was not against the manifest weight of the

evidence. Appellant's sole assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶ 20} However, having reviewed the record in the present case, we notice and

raise, sua sponte, an error in the trial court's Judgment Entry of Conviction. The

sentencing entry mistakenly indicates appellant pled guilty to criminal trespass even

though the trial court found appellant guilty of the offense following a bench trial. Under

Crim.R. 36, "[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record, and

errors in the record arising from oversight or omission, may be corrected by the court at

any time." "'The purpose of a nunc pro tunc entry under Crim.R. 36 is to record actions

that were taken but not correctly recorded.'" State v. Rodriguez, 
2024-Ohio-5632, ¶ 23

(12th Dist.), quoting State v. Baker, 
2023-Ohio-1699, ¶ 32
 (12th Dist.). As the judgment

entry of conviction contains a mistake as to the manner of conviction, we remand this

case and direct the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc sentencing entry reflecting that

appellant was found guilty following a bench trial. Id.; State v. Bowling, 
2025-Ohio-1693, ¶ 19
 (12th Dist.); State v. Geter, 
2025-Ohio-2100, ¶ 16
 (12th Dist.).

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                                                                     Butler CA2024-10-123

       {¶ 21} Judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to the Hamilton Municipal

Court for the limited purpose of issuing a nunc pro tunc sentencing entry to correct the

manner of conviction. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.


       PIPER and BYRNE, JJ., concur.




                            JUDGMENT ENTRY

       The assignment of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the
order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby
is, reversed as to the sentencing entry only, and this cause is remanded for the limited
purpose of issuing a nunc pro tunc sentencing entry to correct the manner of conviction
according to law and consistent with the above Opinion. In all other respects, the
judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

       It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Hamilton Municipal Court for
execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry
shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.

       Costs to be taxed 100% to appellant.


                                         /s/ Robert A. Hendrickson, Presiding Judge


                                         /s/ Robin N. Piper, Judge


                                         /s/ Matthew R. Byrne, Judge




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