[Cite as State v. Miller,
2025-Ohio-2684.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 114629
v. :
ROBERT B. MILLER, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 31, 2025
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-20-652565-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Megan Helton, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Friedman, Nemecek, Long & Grant, L.L.C. and Eric C.
Nemecek, for appellant.
WILLIAM A. KLATT, J.:
Defendant-appellant Robert B. Miller (“Miller”) appeals the trial
court’s imposition of consecutive prison sentences. For the following reasons, we
affirm the lower court’s sentence.
Factual and Procedural History
This is Miller’s third appeal following his 2022 convictions on gross
sexual imposition and child endangering that arose from Miller’s physical and
sexual abuse of his daughter R.M. and physical abuse of his daughter H.M.
The underlying facts and initial sentencing were summarized by this
court in Miller’s direct appeal:
At trial, the state elicited substantial testimony regarding Miller’s home
life, including allegations that he perpetrated physical and sexual abuse
against members of his family through fear, isolation, and
manipulation.
...
Miller’s eldest daughter, R.M. testified that Miller was “extremely
violent” and had “extreme anger control issues.” (Tr. 129-130.) She
explained that Miller was very strict and believed discipline was
necessary to correct his children’s misbehavior. Rather than grounding
his children, Miller would “line [them] up and beat [them] until
someone admitted to whatever it was he thought [they] did.” (Tr. 122.)
R.M. testified that Miller used various objects to facilitate his discipline,
including wooden paddles, leather straps, hangers, and cords. R.M.
opined that Miller’s “spare the rod, spoil the child” philosophy of
parenting was premised on “[his] interpretation of the Bible and what
he thought was the correct way to do things.” (Tr. 122.)
R.M. testified that Miller also engaged in a pattern of sexual abuse that
began when she was a child. . . .
R.M. . . . first disclosed the sexual abuse to her mother when she was 17
years old. . . . In the years that followed, R.M. told several other
individuals about her sexual abuse, including her youngest sister, H.M.,
her childhood friend, her boyfriend, and her youth pastor. The rest of
R.M.’s family learned of Miller’s conduct during a family meeting held
in 2015. Ultimately, however, R.M. did not report Miller’s conduct to
the police until November 2019.
H.M. corroborated much of R.M.’s testimony regarding their father’s
anger and disciplinary practices, stating that his “beatings” and “verbal
abuse” were premised on his strict religious practices. (Tr. 213.) When
H.M. was 17-years old, Miller learned that she had lied about her
whereabouts and had visited a boy without permission. When H.M.
arrived home later that day, Miller “took her inside and pulled out an
extension cord and beat [H.M.] again and again until [her] legs were so
bruised and swollen that … for the rest of the month [she] couldn’t
wear shorts no matter how hot it was.” (Tr. 214.) . . .
H.M. did not disclose the incident of abuse to the police until 2019.
H.M. was reluctant to file a police report against Miller because she
“wanted to move on with [her] life.” (Tr. 218.) Years later, however,
H.M. decided to cooperate with the investigation against Miller
because “[he] proved he is still a threat to society.” (Tr. 218-219.)
Miller’s middle daughter, Ra.M., reiterated much of the testimony of
her sisters, R.M. and H.M. She confirmed that Miller often forced her
oldest sister, R.M., to sleep in his bed without any of the other children.
She further testified that Miller was quick to anger and very strict. . . .
Miller’s sister-in-law, H.D., testified that she lived with Miller and Mary
[(Miller’s former wife and the mother of R.M., H.M., and Ra.M.)] in
1989 and served as a live-in nanny for several years. At some point in
1996, . . . Miller then forced H.D. to engage in vaginal intercourse. . . .
Forensic testing performed in October 2021, confirmed that Miller is
the biological father of H.D.’s eldest daughter, S.W., born July 10, 1997.
H.D. maintained that S.W. was conceived during the sexual assault in
1996.
...
Miller’s nieces, . . . testified on behalf of Miller. Each described their
fondness for Miller and the important role he played in their childhood.
[The nieces] spent significant time in Miller’s home and often observed
him administer discipline to his children. They stated that Miller used
a wooden paddle to whip the children, but “the rule was three swats,
three whooping not hard enough to leave a mark[.]” (Tr. 350.) . . .
Mary also testified on behalf of the defense. Mary did not dispute the
nature of Miller’s discipline practices or his use of objects to
“administer spankings.” (Tr. 420.) However, Mary denied ever seeing
Miller spank his child with a cord. Mary testified that she had private
conversations with Miller when his discipline crossed the line, but that
it was her duty to “submit and respect [her] husband.” (Tr. 421.)
Regarding the incident when H.M. was 17-years[-]old, Mary testified
that Miller “started whipping her for not telling the truth about where
she was or who she was with.” (Tr. 431.) Mary stated that H.M.
sustained bruises on her legs and had a difficult time wearing pants as
a result of her injuries.
Mary was aware of R.M.’s allegations of sexual abuse against Miller well
before a police report was filed in 2019. Mary explained that R.M. first
disclosed Miller’s inappropriate behavior when she was 16 years old.
However, Mary did not report the alleged conduct because R.M.
“begged and pleaded with [her] over and over again to … not say
anything.” (Tr. 434.) Ultimately, Mary did not contact the authorities
or otherwise disclose the allegations to anyone else out of fear of
“embarrassing [R.M.] and, you know, the family[.]” (Tr. 434.)
Miller testified on his own behalf. Throughout his direct examination,
Miller described his perspectives on parenting, including his duty as
“the head of the household” to “correct” his children’s behavior when
necessary. (Tr. 455-456.) Miller conceded that he was strict with his
children and would “spank or whoop” them with a paddle, his hand, or
a belt. Miller further confirmed that there were specific occasions
where he has “gotten out of hand in spanking [his] children.” (Tr. 461.)
For instance, Miller testified that when H.M. was 17-years old, he
believed that H.M. had been lying about her whereabouts one day, so
he “whipped her” with a leather belt until she admitted that she had
been with a boy from work. Miller did not dispute that he was angry
and went “overboard.” (Tr. 422.) However, he denied using an
extension cord, and further minimized the degree of harm caused to
H.M., stating that she was able to go into work later that same day.
With respect to the allegations of sexual abuse, Miller “unequivocally”
denied touching R.M. inappropriately. (Tr. 474.) He testified that he
did allow his children to sleep in his bed occasionally, but that he never
touched R.M.’s vagina, never performed oral sex on R.M., and never
required R.M. to touch his penis. Finally, Miller conceded that he had
sexual intercourse with H.D. in 1996. However, he maintained that it
was a consensual encounter.
At the conclusion of trial, Miller was found guilty of gross sexual
imposition, a felony of the third degree, as charged in Count 2 of the
indictment; child endangering, a felony of the third degree, as charged
in Count 4 of the indictment; and child endangering, a felony of the
second degree, as charged in Count 5 of the indictment. Miller was
found not guilty of rape and gross sexual imposition as charged in
Counts 1, 3, and 6 of the indictment. Thereafter, the trial court found
Miller not guilty of the sexually violent predator specification attached
to Count 2 of the indictment.
At sentencing, the trial court imposed a five-year term of imprisonment
on Count 2. The trial court found the child endangering offenses were
allied offenses of similar import that merged for the purposes of
sentencing. The state elected to proceed with sentencing on the
second-degree felony offense charged in Count 5. The trial court,
however, imposed an eight-year term of imprisonment on the thirddegree felony offense charged in Count 4. The prison terms imposed
on Counts 2 and 4 were ordered to run consecutively to each other, for
an aggregate 13-year prison term.
State v. Miller, 2023-Ohio-1141, ¶ 5-24 (8th Dist.) (“Miller I”).
Miller filed a direct appeal, and
this court held that the State had failed to present sufficient evidence to
support Miller’s second-degree felony child-endangering conviction
and modified the conviction to a first-degree misdemeanor. Miller I at
¶ 64. Miller’s sentence on that count was vacated, and the case was
remanded for the State to reelect which child endangering offense it
wished the trial court to impose sentence on. . . .
On remand, the trial court conducted a de novo resentencing hearing
and Miller’s two counts for child endangering remained subject to
merger. However, because the original count that Miller had been
sentenced under had been reduced from a second-degree felony to a
first-degree misdemeanor, the State elected for him to be sentenced on
the other child-endangering count, a felony of the third degree. The
trial court imposed a 36-month prison term on that count and again
ordered Miller’s sentence for child endangering to be served
consecutive to his five-year sentence for gross sexual imposition.
State v. Miller, 2024-Ohio-2578, ¶ 3-6 (8th Dist.) (“Miller II”).
Following the trial court’s resentencing on remand from Miller I —
when the court sentenced Miller to an aggregate eight-year prison term — Miller
filed a second appeal. See Miller II. This court found, in Miller II, that during the
first resentencing hearing, the trial court failed “to make the required finding that
consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the danger the offender poses to
the public.” Id. at ¶ 10. We reversed the trial court’s imposition of consecutive
sentences and remanded the matter a second time, for the sole purpose of
conducting a new sentencing hearing to comply with the statutory language of R.C.
2929.14(C)(4).
On remand following Miller II, the trial court conducted its second
resentencing hearing on November 4, 2024, for the limited purpose of determining
whether the five-year prison sentence on Count 2 and the three-year prison sentence
on Count 4 could be run consecutively. The trial court heard from counsel for Miller
and the State; Miller chose not to make a statement.
The State argued that R.M. was subjected to sexual and physical
abuse by Miller for a number of years and H.M. endured significant physical abuse
on numerous occasions including when Miller whipped her with an extension cord.
The State argued that Miller’s sexual and physical abuse of his children constituted
a course of conduct, demonstrated the danger Miller posed to the public, and
showed the seriousness of Miller’s conduct. The State further argued that the
offenses were so great or unusual that a single prison term could not adequately
reflect the seriousness of Miller’s conduct. The State asked the trial court to fully
consider the trial transcripts and victim statements of R.M. and H.M. from the first
sentencing hearing in June 2022. The victim statements were introduced as exhibits
at the November 2024 resentencing hearing.
Defense counsel contended that Ohio law favors concurrent
sentences. Defense counsel contended that Miller did not “evidence[ ] any kind of
criminal behavior towards the public” but only to his family and any such threat was
eliminated because Miller’s family stopped communicating with him after the trial.
Miller’s counsel further argued that 70-year-old offenders like Miller “are unlikely
to be a threat to the public.” Additionally, defense counsel argued that the ten-year
gap in time between the sexual abuse of R.M. that supported the gross sexual
imposition conviction and the beating of H.M. that justified the child endangerment
conviction as well as the difference in the nature of the offenses — sexual versus
physical abuse — precluded the trial court from finding that Miller’s offenses
constituted a course of conduct.
After hearing from counsel, the trial court sentenced Miller to a five-
year sentence on Count 2 and a 36-month sentence on Count 4, to be served
consecutively. The trial court also made these findings:
Mr. Miller, on Count 2, stipulated to, you’ll receive a five-year sentence.
On Count 4 you’ll receive a 36-month sentence. I do find that these
offenses were committed as part of a course of conduct that was so great
or that the harm was so great or unusual that a single prison term would
not adequately reflect the seriousness of your conduct.
Mr. Miller, of the hundreds of cases I’ve tried and thousands of cases
I’ve handled, I remember yours very well. You are frankly an
incestuous sadist cloaked as a religious zealot and I find your behavior
over the course of your minor children’s life to be reprehensible. As far
as protecting the public, immediate family is public. After five years
Mr. Miller could get out and make any attempts he wants to contact his
immediate family and their progeny so given the fact that Mr. Miller
engaged in corporal punishment throughout their lifetime, although
uncharged, it was extremely severe. Given the fact that on multiple
occasions he placed his hands on the vaginal area of his own daughter
for his sexual gratification, I find, again, that consecutive sentences are
warranted.
An eight-year total sentence as a single term is not disproportionate to
the crimes that you’ve committed against your own minor children and
the harm inflicted upon them that will last a lifetime was so great or
unusual that a single term would not reflect the seriousness of your
conduct.
I find these offenses were committed as part of a course of conduct that
included severe corporal punishment and sexual abuse of the
defendant’s female minor children. . . .
Tr. 17-19. Counsel for the State clarified the court’s findings as to disproportionality:
ASSISTANT PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: Judge, just under the
factors, just to be clear, you indicated it’s not disproportionate to the
harm inflicted, but is it not disproportionate to the seriousness of the
offender’s conduct as well?
THE COURT: Yes.
ASSISTANT PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: Thank you, Judge.
THE COURT: Mr. Miller, eight years is not disproportionate to the
seriousness of your conduct. You’re ordered remanded.
Tr. 19-20.
On December 4, 2024, Miller filed a timely notice of appeal
presenting one assignment of error:
Miller’s rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution, as well as Article 1, Section 9 and 16 of
the Ohio Constitution, were violated by the trial court’s imposition of a
consecutive sentence which was contrary to law.
Legal Analysis
“In Ohio, there is a presumption that prison sentences should be
served concurrently, unless the trial court makes the findings outlined in R.C.
2929.14(C)(4) to warrant consecutive service of the prison terms.” State v. Morris,
2016-Ohio-7614, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Primm,
2016-Ohio-5237, ¶ 64 (8th
Dist.), citing State v. Cox,
2016-Ohio-20, ¶ 3 (8th Dist.), and R.C. 2929.41(A). To
implement consecutive sentences, the sentencing court must find that (1) a
consecutive sentence is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to
punish the offender, and (2) the consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to
the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the
public. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). The court must also find that any one of the following
apply:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while
the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction
imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the
Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one
or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the
multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single
prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the
courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s
conduct.
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future
crime by the offender.
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). A sentencing court’s failure to make the above statutory
findings is “‘contrary to law.’” State v. Hendricks, 2015-Ohio-2268, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.),
quoting State v. Bonnell,
2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 37.
The sentencing court must make the statutory findings at the
sentencing hearing and also incorporate the findings into its sentencing entry.
Hendricks at ¶ 12, citing Bonnell at syllabus. Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), the
trial court must “find” the relevant sentencing factors before it imposes consecutive
sentences.
Morris at ¶ 26. “However, a word-for-word recitation of the language of
the statute is not required, and as long as the reviewing court can discern that the
trial court engaged in the correct analysis and can determine that the record
contains evidence to support the findings, consecutive sentences should be upheld.”
Bonnell at ¶ 29.
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) makes it clear that if the court has properly made
the required findings in order to impose consecutive sentences, we must affirm
those sentences unless “we ‘clearly and convincingly’ find ‘[t]hat the record does not
support the court’s findings[.]’” State v. Carson, 2015-Ohio-4183, ¶ 2 (8th Dist.)
quoting R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State v. Venes,
2013-Ohio-1891 (8th Dist.), we noted:
It is also important to understand that the clear and convincing
standard used by R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) is written in the negative. It does
not say that the trial judge must have clear and convincing evidence to
support its findings. Instead, it is the court of appeals that must clearly
and convincingly find that the record does not support the court’s
findings. In other words, the restriction is on the appellate court, not
the trial judge.
Id. at ¶ 21. The review of a claim that the record does not support the trial court’s
findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) is “‘extremely deferential.’” State v. Balbi, 2015-
Ohio-4075, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.), quoting Venes at ¶ 21.
Miller concedes in his appellate brief that the trial court satisfied the
statutory requirements of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) during the sentencing hearing, and the
corresponding journal entry contained the same language. Appellant’s brief, p. 8.
However, Miller argues that although the trial court recited the necessary statutory
findings that are a prerequisite to imposing consecutive sentences, the record does
not support the court’s findings that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect
the public or that Miller’s offenses constituted a course of conduct. Miller also
argues that the imposition of consecutive sentences does not achieve the overriding
purposes of felony sentencing.
A. Protect the Public
Miller initially argues that the record does not support a finding that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime. Miller
argues that he is not a threat to the public since his crimes were against his family
rather than the public at large and he has had no contact with his children or former
wife since his convictions. Miller also contends that he will be close to 70 years old
after serving the five-year prison sentence and “70 year olds are unlikely to be a
threat to the public at that stage.” Tr. 10.
The trial court stated that immediate family constitutes the public and
consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public. The trial court also
found Miller’s lack of contact with his family while he was imprisoned did not
prevent him from attempting to initiate contact upon his release from prison.
This court has found that where a mother abused her own children,
the record supported the trial court’s finding that consecutive sentences were
necessary to protect her children as well as the public. See State v. Stover, 2025-
Ohio-458, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.). Additionally, Miller’s lack of contact with his immediate
family during his imprisonment and his age upon release did not negate the trial
court’s finding that consecutive sentences were needed to protect Miller’s family.
The trial court made the required R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) finding that consecutive
sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crime, and this court does
not find clearly and convincingly that the record does not support that finding.
B. Course of Conduct
Miller disputes the trial court’s finding that Miller committed two or
more offenses that constituted a course of conduct. Specifically, Miller argues this
court cannot rely on his commission of multiple offenses that were committed ten
years apart to justify a course-of-conduct finding. Miller relies on State v. Tucker,
2019-Ohio-652 (2d Dist.), where the trial court erroneously found the offender
demonstrated a course of conduct and imposed consecutive sentences. The Tucker
Court found that because Tucker’s conviction for abduction was not linked in any
manner to a drive-by shooting Tucker committed on a separate date, in a different
location, and with different motivations and unrelated facts, no course of conduct
occurred. Miller’s reliance on Tucker, where the two convictions had no
commonality, is not analogous to the instant matter.
This court has found that
[a]lthough Ohio’s sentencing statutes do not specifically define “course
of conduct,” the Supreme Court of Ohio has found that a course of
conduct may be established by factual links, such as time, location,
cause of death, similar motivation, or some connection that ties the
offenses together as part of a single course of conduct. State v. Short,
129 Ohio St.3d 360,
2011-Ohio-3641,
952 N.E.2d 1121, ¶ 144; State v.
Sapp, 105 Ohio St.3d 104,
2004-Ohio-7008,
822 N.E.2d 1239,
syllabus; see also State v. Squires, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110059,
2021-Ohio-2035, ¶ 11-12.
State v. Colon,
2022-Ohio-2137, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.). See State v. Squires, 2021-Ohio-
2035, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Summers,
2014-Ohio-2441, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.)
(“‘some connection, common scheme or some pattern or psychological thread that
ties [the offenses] together’”).
Upon review, we find that Miller’s convictions for gross sexual
imposition and child endangering — which took place ten years apart — were not
temporally linked, but timing is not the sole determinant when establishing course
of conduct. See State v. Holiday, 2017-Ohio-4306 (8th Dist.) (The trial court found
a course of conduct for two incidents that occurred in March 2003 and October
2007.). The record shows Miller abused R.H. and H.M. “over the course of [his]
minor children’s [lives].” Miller engaged in a course of conduct during which he
manipulated his relationship with family members within the confines of their
home. Miller used his authoritarian role as a parent to control and isolate his
vulnerable, minor daughters and subject R.M. to sexual and physical abuse and
H.M. to physical abuse. In the facts before us, the record demonstrates the
convictions share some connection, common scheme, or psychological thread that
ties the offenses together to establish a single course of conduct.
We note that the trial court, during the November 2024 resentencing
hearing, referenced alleged physical and sexual abuse by Miller that was unrelated
to the convicted charges. “[U]ncharged criminal conduct can be considered by the
court during sentencing so long as it is not the ‘sole basis’ for the sentence.” State v.
Tidmore, 2019-Ohio-1529, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.). The trial court did not err when it relied
on a broad range of information, including allegations of uncharged criminal
conduct, when sentencing Miller.
Moreover, we disagree with Miller’s argument that Miller I’s
determination that allowed joinder of the various charges against Miller in one
indictment and trial of those offenses in one proceeding now precludes a finding that
Miller demonstrated a single course of conduct. In Miller I, this court denied
Miller’s request for severance stating:
After careful consideration, we find the allegations levied against Miller
relied on evidence that was sufficiently simple and direct. In this case,
there is nothing in the record to suggest the jury was confused by the
evidence or was improperly influenced by the cumulative effect of the
joinder. Although the victims named in the indictment were members
of Miller’s family, the alleged conduct was separated in time and
involved unrelated facts and circumstances. The evidence supporting
each offense was distinct and uncomplicated, and the state’s witnesses
discussed the evidence relating to each victim separately, succinctly,
and without significant overlap or conflation of proof.
Miller I, 2023-Ohio-1141, at ¶ 84 (8th Dist.). A finding that the evidence of separate
convictions could be presented without confusing the trier of fact is not contrary to
finding those same charges share some connection, common scheme, or
psychological thread that amounts to a single course of conduct. Miller also provides
no case law in support of this argument.
Here, the trial court found the offenses were committed as part of a
course of conduct and the harm from those offenses was so great or unusual that a
single prison term would not adequately reflect the seriousness of Miller’s conduct.
The trial court made the necessary R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) finding that Miller’s actions
constituted a single course of conduct, and this court does not find clearly and
convincingly that the record does not support the court’s finding.
C. Overriding Purposes of Felony Sentencing
Miller argues that the imposition of consecutive sentences does not
comport with the purposes of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and,
therefore, is contrary to law and not supported by the record. Specifically, Miller
argues a minimum sanction would have accomplished the purposes of felony
sentencing because his offenses did not impact the public, he is unlikely to reoffend
at 70 years old after serving a five-year prison sentence, and his designation as a
sexual predator and the associated registration obligations protect against the
likelihood of future misconduct. Miller cites to State v. Hawley, 2020-Ohio-1270
(8th Dist.), where this court found a 56-year prison sentence was inconsistent with
the purposes of the felony sentencing statute and the imposition of consecutive
sentences demeaned the seriousness of other more violent crimes and the harms to
other victims.
Under R.C. 2929.11(A), the overriding purposes of felony sentencing
are to (1) protect the public from future crime by the offender and others, (2) punish
the offender, and (3) promote the effective rehabilitation of the offender using the
minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes without
imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government resources. A
sentence imposed for a felony should be reasonably calculated to achieve the three
overriding purposes of felony sentencing and must be “commensurate with and not
demeaning to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the
victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by
similar offenders.” R.C. 2929.11(B).
Trial courts need not make factual findings under R.C. 2929.11 before
imposing a maximum sentence. State v. Kronenberg, 2015-Ohio-1020, ¶ 27 (8th
Dist.), citing State v. Bement,
2013-Ohio-5437, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.). In fact,
“[c]onsideration of the factors is presumed unless the defendant affirmatively shows
otherwise.” State v. Seith,
2016-Ohio-8302, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Keith,
2016-Ohio-5234 (8th Dist.). ‘“[T]his court has consistently recognized that a trial
court’s statement in the journal entry that it considered the required statutory
factors, without more, is sufficient to fulfill its obligations under the sentencing
statutes.’” State v. White,
2018-Ohio-3414, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), quoting
Kronenberg at
¶ 27, citing State v. Wright,
2014-Ohio-3321 (8th Dist.). Accordingly, this court has
“‘refused to find that a sentence is contrary to law when the sentence is in the
permissible range and the court’s journal entry states that it “considered all required
factors of the law” and “finds that prison is consistent with the purposes of R.C.
2929.11.””’ State v. Browning,
2022-Ohio-127, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), quoting State v.
Williams,
2014-Ohio-1618, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. May,
2013-Ohio-2697,
¶ 16 (8th Dist.).
We find no merit to Miller’s argument that the consecutive maximum
sentences do not comport with R.C. 2929.11. Miller’s sentence on Count 2, in
violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), carried a maximum penalty of 60 months in prison,
and his sentence on Count 4, in violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(3), carried a maximum
prison sentence of 36 months. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a) and (b). Thus, Miller’s
sentences of five years on Count 2, gross sexual imposition, and three years on Count
4, child endangering — both felonies of the third degree — were within the
permissible statutory ranges. The trial court’s November 5, 2024 sentencing
judgment entry states, “[T]he court considered all required factors of the law” and
“[T]he court finds that prison is consistent with the purpose[s] of R.C. 2929.11.” The
trial court’s statements during the November 2024 sentencing hearing, as
previously discussed in this opinion, as well as the record demonstrate the
imposition of maximum consecutive sentences on Miller conformed with the
purposes of felony sentencing, and Miller did not affirmatively show otherwise.
We do not find by clear and convincing evidence that the record does
not support the trial court’s findings to impose consecutive sentences, and Miller
has not affirmatively demonstrated that the trial court did not consider the R.C.
2929.11 factors prior to imposing maximum sentences. For the foregoing reasons,
we overrule Miller’s assignment of error.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
_____________________
WILLIAM A. KLATT, JUDGE*
MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and
DEENA R. CALABRESE, J., CONCUR
(*Sitting by assignment: William A. Klatt, J., retired, of the Tenth District Court
of Appeals.)
