[Cite as State v. Barhams,
2025-Ohio-270.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 113689
v. :
ERIC BARHAMS, JR., :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 30, 2025
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-23-679275-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Timothy R. Troup, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Wegman Hessler Valore and Dean M. Valore, for
appellant.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J.:
Appellant Eric Barhams, Jr. (“Barhams”) appeals his convictions
arguing that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily.
He also appeals the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division’s
judgment entry finding him not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile
justice system. After reviewing the facts of the case and pertinent law, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural History
On November 22, 2022 Barhams was charged in a 12-count complaint
in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division (“juvenile
court”) case number DL22112049. On November 28, 2022, the State moved the
juvenile court to relinquish jurisdiction to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common
Pleas, General Division pursuant to R.C. 2152.10(B). On January 19, 2023, Barhams
waived the probable cause hearing requirement and, on March 7, 2023, an
amenability hearing was conducted by the juvenile court. After assessing the
requisite statutory factors, the juvenile court found Barhams was not amenable to
rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system. Barhams’ case was then bound
over to the general division of the common pleas court for further proceedings —
Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-23-679275-A.
On March 10, 2023 Barhams was indicted by a Cuyahoga County Grand
Jury in a 12-count indictment including the following: two counts of aggravated
murder, unclassified felonies, in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A), with one- and three-
year firearm specifications; two counts of murder, unclassified felonies, in violation
of R.C. 2903.02(A) with one- and three-year firearm specifications; two counts of
murder, unclassified felonies, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B), with one- and three-
year firearm specifications; four counts of felonious assault, felonies of the second
degree, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A), with a one- and three-year firearm
specifications; tampering with evidence, a felony of the third degree, in violation of
R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), with a one-year firearm specification and obstructing official
business, a second degree misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A).
On December 18, 2023 after the court conducted a Crim.R. 11 plea
colloquy, Barhams pled guilty to murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A) with a
three-year firearm specification and guilty to involuntary manslaughter in violation
of R.C. 2903.04(A).
On February 20, 2024 the trial court sentenced Barhams to an
aggregate indefinite prison term of 22-24 years to life pursuant to the Reagan Tokes
Law.
Barhams raises three assignments of error for our review:
First Assignment of Error:
Appellant’s plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
entered.
Second Assignment of Error:
The trial court abused its discretion committing reversible error and
prejudicing Appellant when it found Appellant not to be amenable to
rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system and bound him over to
adult court.
Third Assignment of Error:
The trial court committed reversible error prejudicing Appellant when
it imposed an unconstitutional sentence upon Appellant pursuant to
the “Reagan-Tokes Law,” which is unconstitutional on its face.
Law and Argument
First Assignment of Error
For his first assignment of error Barhams argues that his guilty pleas
were not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered. Specifically, Barhams
argues that the trial court failed to inform him about the mandatory postrelease
control he would be subjected to prior to accepting his plea pursuant to Crim.R.
11(c)(2). We disagree.
“The underlying purpose of Crim.R. 11(C) is to convey certain
information to a defendant so that he or she can make a voluntary and intelligent
decision regarding whether to plead guilty.” State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473,
479-480 (1981). A trial court’s compliance with Crim.R. 11 when it accepts an
offender’s plea is reviewed under a de novo standard. State v. Cardwell, 2009-Ohio-
6827, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Stewart,
51 Ohio St.2d 86 (1977).
Crim.R. 11 reads, in pertinent part:
(C)(2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or
a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest
without first addressing the defendant personally either in-person or
by remote contemporaneous video in conformity with Crim.R. 43(A)
and doing all of the following:
(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea
voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and
of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that the
defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of
community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.
(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the
defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no
contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may
proceed with judgment and sentence.
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant
understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights
to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s
favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant
cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)-(c). Specific to this appeal, this court has held that postrelease
control constitutes “a portion of the maximum penalty involved in an offense for
which a prison term is imposed” under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). State v. Ponomarenko,
2024-Ohio-4789, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Simmons,
2013-Ohio-5026, ¶ 4 (8th
Dist.).
The applicable standard when determining whether a defendant’s
plea was made understandingly and voluntarily in compliance with Crim.R. 11(C) is
no longer one of strict or substantial compliance. State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765
at ¶ 17. Instead, the Ohio Supreme Court identified these questions to be asked when
reviewing a trial court’s Crim.R. 11(C) plea colloquy:
(1) Has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule?
(2) If the trial court has not complied fully with the rule, is the
purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of
demonstrating prejudice? and
(3) If a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that
burden?
Id. When a trial court completely fails to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) or
(C)(2)(b), the defendant need not show prejudice.
Id.
During Barhams’ plea hearing the court informed Barhams as follows:
THE COURT: [Postrelease control] would only apply to Count Seven.
In Count Seven, the PRC would be for a mandatory minimum of twoyears up to a maximum of five-years on that sentence in Count Seven.
Once post-release control is imposed, if you violate, the Adult Parole
Authority would be authorized to return you to prison for up to a
maximum of one half of the original sentence imposed. If you are
convicted of a new felony while on post-release control, in addition to
being punished for the new offense, the judge could add an additional
consecutive prison term of one-year, or what time remains on your
post-release control term, whichever is greater, as a maximum. And if
you were ever placed on post-release control for this case, if while on
post-release control you fail to report to your parole officer, you could
be charged with a crime of escape, which is a separate felony.
Sir, do you have any questions about your rights, the charges, the
penalties or anything I've gone over today?
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Dennie, Ms. Dixon, are you satisfied the Court has
complied with Criminal Rule 11?
MR. DENNIE: Yes, Judge.
THE COURT: And Mr. Dakdouk?
MR. DAKDOUK: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Let the record reflect the Court is
satisfied that Mr. Barhams has been informed of his constitutional
rights, that he understands the nature of the charges, the effect of a
plea, and the maximum penalties which may be imposed.
We find on a review of the record that the trial court complied with
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) by informing Barhams during the plea hearing that he would be
subject to postrelease control upon his release from prison pursuant to his guilty
plea to Count 7. As noted above in Ponomarenko, this is part of the “maximum
penalty involved” as required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). Further we find Barhams did
not object during the hearing to anything that occurred and instead he indicated his
agreement and acceptance to everything the court said.
Based on the foregoing we overrule Barhams’ first assignment of error.
Second Assignment of Error
For his second assignment of error, Barhams argues that the juvenile
court abused its discretion by finding that he was not amenable to rehabilitation
within the juvenile justice system and binding him over to the common pleas court.
We disagree.
An appellate court reviews a juvenile court’s amenability
determination under an abuse-of-discretion standard. In re M.P., 2010-Ohio-599,
¶ 14. A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is unreasonable, arbitrary
or unconscionable. State v. Hill,
2022-Ohio-4544, ¶ 9, citing Blakemore v.
Blakemore,
5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). So long as the juvenile court considers the
appropriate statutory factors and the record provides a rational and factual basis to
support its decision, the juvenile court’s amenability determination cannot be
reversed, regardless of our personal views of the evidence. State v. Nicholson, 2022-
Ohio-2037, ¶ 206 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Crosby,
2019-Ohio-2217 (8th Dist.).
“Juvenile courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over children alleged to
be delinquent for committing acts that would constitute a crime if committed by an
adult.” In re M.P. at ¶ 11; R.C. 2151.23(A). “Pursuant to R.C. 2152.12, under specified
circumstances a juvenile may be subject to a mandatory or discretionary transfer,
also referred to as bindover, from the juvenile court setting to adult court for
criminal prosecution. Whether an alleged offender is subject to mandatory or
discretionary transfer depends on such factors as the nature of the offense, the age
of the child, and the child’s prior criminal history.” R.C. 2152.12(A) and (B); State
v. Jones, 2022-Ohio-1169, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.), citing Steele v. Harris,
2020-Ohio-5480,
¶ 10.
In this case, Barhams’ transfer was discretionary. “Discretionary
transfer, as its name implies, allows judges the discretion to transfer or bind over to
adult court certain juveniles who do not appear to be amenable to care or
rehabilitation within the juvenile system or appear to be a threat to public
safety.” State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 90 (2000); R.C. 2152.12(C). In a
discretionary transfer proceeding, the juvenile court may transfer the child to adult
court for prosecution if it finds (1) that the child was at least 14 years old at the time
of the charged act; (2) there is probable cause to believe that the child committed
the charged act and (3) the child is not amenable to care or rehabilitation within the
juvenile system, and the safety of the community may require that the child be
subject to adult sanctions. R.C. 2152.12(B). State v. Taylor,
2024-Ohio-5094, ¶ 35
(8th Dist.).
Here it is undisputed that Barhams was 15 years old at the time of the
underlying offenses which satisfies the first requirement. Next, the court is required
to determine if there is probable cause that Barhams committed the acts charged.
Taylor at ¶ 35 . Here, however, Barhams waived the probable cause hearing. With
probable cause established, the last thing the juvenile court was required to do was
conduct an amenability hearing.
An amenability hearing “‘is a factual determination of whether the
accused is amenable to treatment and rehabilitation within the juvenile penal
system.’” Jones, 2022-Ohio-1169, at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Hopfer,
112 Ohio App.3d
521 (2d Dist. 1996). In making the amenability determination under R.C.
2152.12(B), the juvenile court must weigh the statutory factors favoring transfer in
R.C. 2152.12(D) against the statutory factors disfavoring transfer in R.C. 2152.12(E)
and indicate on the record the specific factors it weighed in making its
determination. R.C. 2152.12(B)(3);
Taylor at ¶ 35. The juvenile court also orders an
investigation into the child’s social history, education, family situation and other
relevant factors including a mental examination. R.C. 2152.12(C);
Jones at ¶ 22.
Discretionary transfer occurs only after a juvenile court finds the juvenile is
unamenable.
Id.
The statutory factors that a juvenile court must consider “in favor of
transfer” include:
(1) The victim of the act charged suffered physical or psychological
harm, or serious economic harm, as a result of the alleged act.
(2) The physical or psychological harm suffered by the victim due to the
alleged act of the child was exacerbated because of the physical or
psychological vulnerability or the age of the victim.
(3) The child’s relationship with the victim facilitated the act charged.
(4) The child allegedly committed the act charged for hire or as a part
of a gang or other organized criminal activity.
(5) The child had a firearm on or about the child’s person or under the
child’s control at the time of the act charged, the act charged is not a
violation of section 2923.12 of the Revised Code, and the child, during
the commission of the act charged, allegedly used or displayed the
firearm, brandished the firearm, or indicated that the child possessed
a firearm.
(6) At the time of the act charged, the child was awaiting adjudication
or disposition as a delinquent child, was under a community-control
sanction, or was on parole for a prior delinquent child adjudication or
conviction.
(7) The results of any previous juvenile sanctions and programs
indicate that rehabilitation of the child will not occur in the juvenile
system.
(8) The child is emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature
enough for the transfer.
(9) There is not sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within the
juvenile system.
R.C. 2152.12(D).
The statutory factors that a juvenile court must consider “against a
transfer” are:
(1) The victim induced or facilitated the act charged.
(2) The child acted under provocation in allegedly committing the act
charged.
(3) The child was not the principal actor in the act charged, or, at the
time of the act charged, the child was under the negative influence or
coercion of another person.
(4) The child did not cause physical harm to any person or property or
have reasonable cause to believe that harm of that nature would occur,
in allegedly committing the act charged.
(5) The child previously has not been adjudicated a delinquent child.
(6) The child is not emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature
enough for the transfer.
(7) The child has a mental illness or intellectual disability.
(8) There is sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within the
juvenile system and the level of security available in the juvenile system
provides a reasonable assurance of public safety.
In this case, the trial court considered the required statutory factors
for transfer pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(D)(1)-(9). The trial court found factors (1), (3)
and (5)-(9) applied in favor of transfer. Factors (2) and (4) were not applicable.
Under factor (1) the court found that the victim suffered physical harm. For factor
(3), the court found the child’s relationship with the victim, his girlfriend, facilitated
the act charged. For factor (5), the court found that Barhams had a firearm on his
person and that he used the firearm in commission of the act charged. For factor
(6), the court found that at the time of the act charged Barhams was awaiting
adjudication or disposition as a delinquent child since he had been adjudicated as a
delinquent on two separate occasions. For factor (7), as detailed in Barhams’
psychological report, his previous juvenile sanctions do not indicate that
rehabilitation is likely to occur in the juvenile justice system considering his history
of escape, attempted escape and failure to return to previous rehabilitation centers.
Also, while in a rehabilitation center, Barhams fought with another inmate and with
staff and was found with a shank and drugs. For factor (8), the trial court found,
based on Barhams’ psychological report, that his sophistication and maturity scored
in the 88th percentile, indicating he has an internal locus of control and can consider
consequences of his actions. The court found that, based on this report, Barhams
was emotionally, physically and psychologically mature enough for transfer. Last,
as to factor (9), the court found there is not sufficient time to rehabilitate Barhams.
The trial court’s judgment entry shows that it also considered a 10th
factor based on his psychological report finding: “[t]he child has a history of fire
setting, cruelty to animals, and his behavior in the Detention Center shows him
involved in numerous physical altercations.”
The court also considered the factors weighing against transferring
Barhams to the general division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(E). The juvenile court considered the relevant factors and
made following findings:
The child is 16 years of age (D.O.B. March 1, 2007).
Child has not previously been committed to the Ohio Department of
Youth Services.
The youth suffers from major depressive disorder and unspecified
trauma and stress related disorder.
The court did not find any other factors against transfer. We find the juvenile court
considered the appropriate statutory factors for, and against, transfer and the record
provides a rational and factual basis to support this decision. Taylor, 2024-Ohio-
5094, at ¶ 37.
Therefore, we find the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when
it determined that Barhams was not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile court
system under R.C. 2152.12(B). The juvenile court considered Barhams’ full
investigation, including the psychological examination and the evidence presented
at the amenability hearing, and weighed the statutory factors for and against
transfer, as required by R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E), including that he used a firearm
and his age. As such, we overrule Barhams’ second assignment of error.
Third Assignment of Error
In his third assignment of error Barhams alleges that his sentence,
pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law, violated his constitutional rights to a trial by
jury, separation of powers and guarantees of due process. We disagree.
The Reagan Tokes Law, R.C. 2967.271, “requires that for certain first-
and second-degree felony offenses, a sentencing court impose on the offender an
indefinite sentence consisting of a minimum and a maximum prison term.” State v.
Hacker, 2023-Ohio-2535, ¶ 1.
As this court has previously explained, the Ohio Supreme Court has
rejected these arguments that the Reagan Tokes Law violates the separation-of-
powers doctrine, the right to jury trial, or the right to due process. State v. McLoyd,
2023-Ohio-4306, ¶ 66 (8th Dist.), citing
Hacker at ¶ 41. As such, Barhams’ third
assignment of error is without merit and is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______________________________________
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., and
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR
