[Cite as State v. Morse,
2025-Ohio-2713.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WOOD COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. WD-24-072
Appellee Trial Court No. 24 CR 246
v.
Owen Morse DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: August 1, 2025
…
Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and
David T. Harold, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Samuel E. Gold, for appellant.
…
MAYLE, J.
{¶ 1} In this appeal, following a guilty plea, defendant-appellant, Owen Morse,
appeals the September 27, 2024 judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas
sentencing him to an aggregate prison term of 30 months. For the following reasons, we
affirm.
I. Background and Facts
{¶ 2} Morse was indicted on two counts of domestic violence in violation of R.C.
2919.25(A), both fourth-degree felonies; one count of felonious assault in violation of
R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a second-degree felony; and one count of tampering with evidence
in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), a third-degree felony.
{¶ 3} Morse and the state reached an agreement under which Morse pleaded guilty
to the domestic violence charges, and the state agreed to dismiss the felonious assault and
tampering charges at sentencing. After conducting a thorough Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy,
the trial court accepted Morse’s plea and found him guilty.
{¶ 4} At the sentencing hearing, the state asked the court to impose a “significant
prison sentence” instead of community control because of “the profound negative impact
[Morse] has had on so many people.” It also noted that Morse was convicted in
Michigan less than two years earlier of the equivalent of felonious assault with a firearm
“in a relationship that he was in previously . . .” and had “already been given a chance.”
Additionally, the state saw a “significant abdication of any responsibility” in the
presentence investigation report.
{¶ 5} Next, the victim, A.C., addressed the court. She explained that Morse is her
ex-fiancé, and they have a baby daughter together. They separated about a month before
the June 17, 2024 incident, and had been attempting to coparent, but A.C. felt that Morse
“had done very little to co-parent [their] child.” Because of that, she told Morse on June
15 that she had looked into seeking child support from him. The day of the incident,
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Morse brought the baby to A.C.’s apartment after she finished work. While he was there,
he attempted to dissuade A.C. from seeking child support. When A.C. realized that the
reasons he gave her “were lies in an attempt to manipulate [her] into not filing, . . .” and
told him that she did not believe him, Morse got “very angry.” A.C. was sitting on the
couch breastfeeding their child when Morse “got in [her] face and began to yell.” Soon
after, Morse punched her in the face, knocking out a tooth. She “immediately began to
hear a ringing noise and the sound of [the baby] crying.” The follow-through of Morse’s
punch hit the baby. A.C. believed that Morse “wanted to hurt [her] so badly he didn’t
even think twice about the fact that [she] was holding [their] baby.”
{¶ 6} A.C. went to the kitchen to get away from Morse after he hit her, and,
although she thought that he was leaving, he turned around and came back toward her.
When she showed Morse her tooth and told him that he had hit her so hard that it fell out,
Morse asked to see the tooth, grabbed it from her, and told her that he was “taking it so
you don’t have evidence.”
{¶ 7} A.C. ultimately needed to have three teeth repaired. Following the assault,
she was “on edge, pretty much, all the time,” “no longer trust[ed] even those closest to
[her],” and had nightmares about Morse coming after her. The baby had a bruise on her
temple for about a week after the incident but was otherwise unharmed.
{¶ 8} A.C. also told the court that Morse had threatened her life and her family
members’ lives on “multiple occasions” and said that he would kill or hurt her or her
family if she called the police. He claimed to have “people” who would hurt them on his
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behalf if he were in jail. A.C. believed that, “when given the opportunity, Owen would
commit similar crimes” because he had threatened her life and choked her before, was
convicted of crimes in Michigan for holding a gun to his ex-girlfriend’s head, and told
A.C. that he “won that situation, [he] left her, his ex, with lifelong trauma[,]” which he
said “as though it were a trophy he was proud of.” Ultimately, she thought that Morse
was “a scary and dangerous individual,” and said, “I fear for my daughter and my family
and I’s [sic] safety upon his release, as well as any other female that may get involved
with him in the future.”
{¶ 9} Before Morse and his attorney spoke, Morse’s father addressed the court.
He said that he and Morse’s mother were “saddened” by what Morse had put A.C.
through but were “not ready to give up on [their] son yet.” He believed that Morse had
made “tremendous strides” with his mental health issues while he was in jail during this
case by taking anger management classes and engaging in counseling. Morse’s counselor
had found him a place at a “facility that will teach him to manage his illness and get him
on the correct medicines.” Morse’s father also said that Morse “knows he has to get
better or he loses his daughter forever. He, so much, wants the chance to be in her life
and be a dad, and to do that, he has to work on himself first.”
{¶ 10} When defense counsel spoke, she asked the court to impose community
control sanctions. She said that Morse was honorably discharged from the national
guard; had a criminal record that consisted of three traffic violations and two felony
convictions in Michigan; had been in compliance with the terms of his Michigan
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probation until the underlying incident happened; and had mental health issues that he
needed to resolve. To improve his mental health, he began counseling before the June 17
incident, and had a place in an intensive, dual-diagnosis treatment program with
admission scheduled for the next day. Additionally, Morse admitted to hitting A.C. and
knew that his reaction to the situation was inappropriate.
{¶ 11} Regarding the facts of the incident, counsel challenged the state’s claim in
its sentencing memorandum that A.C. had “broke[n]” two molars; she noted that the
medical records said that A.C. had “chipped” two teeth. Counsel also disputed the state’s
claim that Morse had hit the baby. On the responding officer’s body camera video, A.C.
said that she “thought” that Morse had hit the baby and “d[id]n’t know if anything hit
her.” Additionally, the child’s medical records indicated that the bruise on her temple
happened when “child hit head with hard plastic toy.”
{¶ 12} Finally, when Morse addressed the court, he said that he was “deeply sorry
and remorseful” for and “so embarrassed and ashamed” of his actions. He regretted that
he was missing out on important moments in his daughter’s life and “can’t wait for the
day [he] can be an active father again.” His time in jail had “completely allowed [him] to
see the consequences of [his] actions, [and] allowed [him] to work on [him]self.” He
concluded by saying, “I know nothing I say can change the past, but I can only pray that
I’m given the opportunity to get the mental help I need to control my emotions which
caused my actions so this never happens again.”
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{¶ 13} Before imposing sentence, the trial court noted that it had reviewed the
presentence investigation report and letters from Morse, his family members, A.C., and
her family members. The court found that a prison sentence was necessary because
Morse was on probation for a “substantially similar offense” at the time of this offense,
he “struck the mother of [his] child in the face while she was holding the child and
caused injury[,]” he “didn’t learn from the first time,” and he “can’t make the same
mistake twice.”
{¶ 14} The court sentenced Morse to 18 months in prison on one count of
domestic violence, and 12 months on the other court. It ordered him to serve his
sentences consecutively, for an aggregate prison term of 30 months. To justify
consecutive sentences, the court said,
I believe that the facts support that a consecutive sentence is
necessary to protect the public and to punish the offender, I do not believe
consecutive sentences are disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct
and the danger that he poses to the public. Additionally, I do believe that
two or more offenses were committed as part of a course of conduct that
was so harmful and great or unusual that no single term adequately reflects
the seriousness of that conduct.
{¶ 15} Morse now appeals, and raises the following assignment of error:
The Trial Court erred to the prejudice of the Appellant by imposing
consecutive sentences for a total term of 30 months incarceration.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 16} In his brief, Morse argues that, although the trial court made all of the
findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), it erred by imposing consecutive sentences
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because “the sentence imposed was disproportionate in light of relevant mitigating
factors.”1 The state responds that the trial court made all of the findings required by R.C.
2929.14(C)(4) and consecutive sentences are not clearly and convincingly unsupported
by the record.
{¶ 17} We review felony sentencing challenges under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). See
State v. Kleinhans, 2023-Ohio-2621, ¶ 24 (6th Dist.). Under that statute, an appellate
court “may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence that is appealed under this
section or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for
resentencing” only if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings
under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of
section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code,
whichever, if any, is relevant;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).
{¶ 18} Morse challenges the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences
under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Under that section, when a trial court imposes multiple prison
terms for convictions of multiple offenses, it may require the offender to serve the prison
terms consecutively if it finds that “consecutive service is necessary to protect the public
1
Morse also contends that the trial court erred by imposing a prison sentence (instead of
community control sanctions) because of the presumptions in favor of community control
for fourth-degree felonies in R.C. 2929.13(B)(1) and 2929.19(B)(4) and seems to argue
that the trial court incorrectly weighed the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. He did
not assign these issues as error, however, so we cannot consider them. State v. Roberson,
2017-Ohio-4339, ¶ 103 (6th Dist.); App.R. 12(A)(1)(b); App.R. 16.
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from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not
disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the
offender poses to the public, . . .” and if it also finds any of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses
while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction
imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised
Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of
one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the
multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single
prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses
of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime
by the offender.
{¶ 19} Thus, the statute requires the trial court to make three statutory findings
before imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Beasley, 2018-Ohio-493, ¶ 252; State v.
Bonnell,
2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 26. It must find that (1) consecutive sentences are necessary
to protect the public or to punish the offender; (2) consecutive sentences are not
disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger that the
offender poses to the public; and (3) R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a), (b), or (c) is applicable.
Beasley at ¶ 252. “[T]he trial court must make the requisite findings both at the
sentencing hearing and in the sentencing entry.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at ¶ 253,
citing
Bonnell at ¶ 37.
{¶ 20} The Ohio Supreme Court clarified our standard of review of consecutive-
sentence findings in State v. Jones, 2024-Ohio-1083. There, the court held that
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“[c]onformity with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires the trial court to . . . note that it engaged
in the analysis and that it has considered the statutory criteria and specifie[d] which of the
given bases warrants its decision.” (Internal quotations omitted and second brackets in
original.) Id. at ¶ 14. “[A] reviewing court must be able to ascertain from the record
evidence to support the trial court’s findings.” (Internal quotation omitted.) Id. The
imposition of consecutive sentences will be upheld “provided that the necessary findings
can be found in the record and are incorporated in the sentencing entry.” (Internal
quotations omitted.) Id.
{¶ 21} The “clear and convincing evidence” required by R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) is
“‘that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere “preponderance of the
evidence,” but not to the extent of such certainty as is required “beyond a reasonable
doubt” in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm
belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” State v. Gwynne, 2023-
Ohio-3851, ¶ 14 (lead opinion), quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954),
paragraph three of the syllabus. An appellate court “must have a firm belief or conviction
that the record does not support the trial court’s findings before it may increase, reduce,
or otherwise modify consecutive sentences.” Id. at ¶ 15.
{¶ 22} In this case, Morse concedes that the trial court made the necessary R.C.
2929.14(C)(4) findings. Regardless, he claims that the court’s proportionality finding is
unsupported “in light of relevant mitigating factors.” Specifically, he complains that the
court “did not appear to give significant weight to” any of the mitigation evidence that he
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presented and “the sentence is unreasonable in light of the mitigation disregarded by the
trial court.” Our review of this claim is limited because “[t]he statutory scheme
circumscribes an appellate court’s review of a trial court’s proportionality finding.” State
v. Glover, 2024-Ohio-5195, ¶ 52. That is, both R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and 2953.08(G)(2)
are phrased in the negative, so the trial court must determine that “consecutive sentences
‘are not disproportionate’ to the defendant’s conduct and the danger he poses[,]” and the
appellate court “may modify or vacate only when it finds that the record ‘clearly and
convincingly’ ‘does not support’ the trial court’s finding that consecutive sentences are
not disproportionate.” (Emphasis in original.)
Id., quoting R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and
2953.08(G)(2)(a).
{¶ 23} Here, the record shows that Morse (1) punched A.C., his ex-fiancée and the
mother of his infant child, while she was holding the baby; (2) knocked out one of A.C.’s
teeth and damaged one or two others to the point that they required dental treatment; (3)
may have hit the baby and bruised her head when he punched A.C.; (4) had a criminal
record that consisted of three traffic violations and two felony assault charges from
Michigan that happened less than two years earlier; (5) was on probation for threatening
an ex-girlfriend with a gun and violated the terms of his probation by committing this
offense; (6) had mental health issues; (7) expressed remorse for his conduct and a desire
to better manage his emotions and mental health; (8) had begun mental health treatment;
and (9) had secured a place at a residential treatment facility for people with dual
diagnoses. Based on these facts, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s proportionality
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finding is clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. Therefore, the trial court
properly imposed consecutive sentences. Morse’s assignment of error is not well-taken.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 24} Based on the foregoing, the September 27, 2024 judgment of the Wood
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Morse is ordered to pay the costs of this
appeal under App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See, also, 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Christine E. Mayle, J.
JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, J.
JUDGE
Charles E. Sulek, P.J.
CONCUR. JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
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