[Cite as State v. Lee,
2025-Ohio-2744.]
COURT OF APPEALS
DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, P.J.
Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
: Hon. Robert G. Montgomery, J.
-vs- :
:
MICHAEL LEE : Case No. 25-CAA-01-0002
:
Defendant - Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas, Case No. 24 CRI 03 0207
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: August 4, 2025
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
KATHERYN L. MUNGER WILLIAM R. CRAMER
145 North Union Street 1554 Polaris Parkway
3rd Floor Suite 325
Delaware, OH 43015 Columbus, OH 43240
King, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Michael Lee appeals the January 2, 2025 judgment of
conviction and sentence of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff-
Appellee is the State of Ohio. We affirm the trial court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} On Friday, February 28, 2024, at 5:00 p.m., Lee rented a 26-foot box truck
for 24 hours from a Budget Truck Rental business in Delaware County. When Lee picked
up the truck, Chad Day, the dealer at Budget, informed Lee that he needed the truck back
in a timely fashion as he had another reservation for it that weekend. Lee advised he
would likely return the truck that evening, and if not, first thing the following morning.
{¶ 3} Lee failed to return the truck as promised. Day contacted Lee who stated
he would return the truck that day, after hours. Day advised an after-hours return was not
acceptable and that the truck had to be returned by 5:00. Again, Lee failed to return the
truck. Lee maintained possession of the truck for a month before Day contacted police
and reported the truck stolen. The truck was entered into a national stolen vehicle
database. The Budget corporate office sent a certified letter to Lee, but the letter was
returned as undeliverable. The office also sent emails to the email address provided by
Lee attempting to recover the truck without success. While the truck was in Lee's
possession, per the terms of the contract he signed, he was charged for the additional
days as well as a late charge.
{¶ 4} On April 4, 2024, a traffic camera in Willoughby, Ohio captured the truck's
license plate. Willoughby Police Department Officer Disanto was nearby and received
notification of the stolen vehicle. Disanto located the truck and initiated a traffic stop. Lee
acted surprised when told he was pulled over because the truck was reported stolen. Lee
was arrested and the truck was returned to Day.
{¶ 5} On April 24, 2024, the Delaware County Grand Jury returned an indictment
charging Lee with one count of grand theft of a motor vehicle pursuant to
R.C.2913.02(A)(2) and one count of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle pursuant to R.C.
2913.03(B).
{¶ 6} Lee pled not guilty to the charges and elected to proceed to a jury trial which
took place on October 24, 2024. The state presented testimony from Day and two police
officers and Lee testified on his own behalf. On the charge of unauthorized use, Lee
asserted the affirmative defense that he had a reasonable yet mistaken belief that he was
authorized to continue to use the truck because Budget continued to charge his credit
card.
{¶ 7} After hearing the evidence and deliberating, the jury acquitted Lee of grand
theft of a motor vehicle, but convicted him of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Lee
was subsequently sentenced to eight months of incarceration and ordered to make
restitution to Budget.
{¶ 8} Lee filed an appeal and the matter is now before this court for consideration.
He raises three assignments of error as follow:
I
{¶ 9} "APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER THE STATE AND
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS WERE VIOLATED BY A CONVICTION FOR
UNAUTHORIZED USE OF A MOTOR VEHICLE BASED ON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
BECAUSE THE RENTAL COMPANY CONTINUED TO CHARGE APPELLANT'S
CREDIT CARD FOR THE USE OF THE RENTAL TRUCK."
II
{¶ 10} "THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT APPELLANT'S
CONVICTION FOR UNAUTHORIZED USE OF A MOTOR VEHICLE BECAUSE THE
RENTAL COMPANY CONTINUED TO CHARGE APPELLANT'S CREDIT CARD FOR
USAGE OF THE RENTAL TRUCK."
III
{¶ 11} "THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE JURY'S
REJECTION OF APPELLANT'S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE THAT HE HAD A MISTAKEN
BUT REASONABLE BELIEF THAT HE WAS AUTHORIZED TO CONTINUE USING THE
VEHICLE WHEN THE RENTAL COMPANY CONTINUED TO CHARGE APPELLANT'S
CREDIT CARD FOR THE USE OF THE RENTAL TRUCK."
I, II, III
{¶ 12} Because they are interrelated, we address Lee's assignments of error
together. In these assignments of error, Lee argues his conviction for unauthorized use
of a motor vehicle is against the manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence, and that
the jury's rejection of his affirmative defense was against the weight of the evidence. We
disagree.
Applicable Law
{¶ 13} A review of the sufficiency of the evidence and a review of the manifest
weight of the evidence are separate and legally distinct determinations. State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387(1997) "While the test for sufficiency requires a
determination of whether the State has met its burden of production at trial, a manifest
weight challenges questions whether the State has met its burden of persuasion."
Id. at
390.
{¶ 14} On review for sufficiency, a reviewing court is to examine the evidence at
trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would support a conviction. State v.
Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991). "The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Jenks at
paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307 (1979). On
review for manifest weight, a reviewing court is to examine the entire record, weigh the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and
determine "whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and
created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and
a new trial ordered." State v. Martin,
20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). See also,
State v. Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d 380 (1997). The granting of a new trial "should be
exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the
conviction."
Martin at 175.
{¶ 15} Lee was charged with unauthorized use of a motor vehicle pursuant to R.C.
2913.03(B) which provides in relevant part "[n]o person shall knowingly use or operate a
. . .motor vehicle . . . without the consent of the owner or person authorized to give
consent, and either remove it from this state or keep possession of it for more than forty-
eight hours."
{¶ 16} "R.C. 2913.03(B) prohibits the use or operation of a motor vehicle without,
beyond, or after revocation of the owner's consent." State v. Rose, 63 Ohio St.3d 585
(1992), syllabus.
Lee's Arguments
{¶ 17} Lee asserted an affirmative defense pursuant to R.C. 2913.03(C)(1),
arguing that at the time of the alleged offense, though mistaken, he reasonably believed
he was authorized to use or operate the truck because Budget continued to charge his
credit card.
{¶ 18} Evidence presented by the State demonstrated that Lee signed a contract
with Budget which clearly stated the rental period of 24 hours and the date and time the
truck was due back to Budget. State's exhibit 1. Further, Lee was aware that he was to
return the truck the following day because Day told Lee he had another reservation for
the truck that weekend and therefore needed it back as agreed. Lee advised he would
have the truck back as soon as that night or at the latest, the following morning. Transcript
of trial (T.) 166. When Lee failed to return the truck as agreed, Day called Lee who stated
he was running late and would return the truck after hours. Day advised this was not
acceptable and told Lee the truck had to be retuned by 5:00 p.m. T. 155-157. When Lee
failed to return the truck per the terms of his agreement with Budget, and after being
verbally told to return the truck, Lee was using the vehicle both beyond Budget's consent
and after revocation of Budget's consent. We find this evidence was sufficient to prove
Lee's unauthorized use of the vehicle. We further find the jury did not lose its was in so
convicting Lee.
{¶ 19} Finally, we find the jury also did not lose its way in rejecting Lee's affirmative
defense. Lee testified that because Budget continued to charge his credit card, he
believed he remained authorized to use the truck. But as outlined above, the jury also
heard from Day who testified Lee was aware of when the truck needed to be returned,
failed to timely return it, and then continued to use the truck after being told directly by
Day to return it. Simply because Budget engaged in an act of loss prevention by
continuing to charge Lee's cars does not also mean Lee had Budget's consent to use the
truck indefinitely.
{¶ 20} Lee's assignments of error are overruled.
{¶ 21} The judgment of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By: King, J.
Baldwin, P.J. and
Montgomery, J. concur.
