[Cite as State v. Sheppard,
2025-Ohio-2747.]
COURT OF APPEALS
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES:
STATE OF OHIO : Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
: Hon. Kevin W. Popham, J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. David M. Gormley, J.
:
-vs- :
: Case No. 2025 CA 0001
TRAMEL SHEPPARD :
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Stark County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 2024CR1747
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: August 4, 2025
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
KYLE L. STONE
Stark County Prosecutor BERNARD HUNT
BY VICKI L. DESANTIS 2395 McGinty Road N.W.
Assistant Prosecutor North Canton, OH 44720
110 Central Plaza S., 5th Floor
Canton, OH 44702
Popham, J.,
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Tramel Antwan Sheppard (“Sheppard”) appeals his
conviction and sentence after a jury trial in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas. For
the reasons below, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On August 20, 2024, the Stark County Grand Jury returned an indictment
charging Sheppard with one count of violating a protection order, a third-degree felony in
violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(2)/(B)(4), and three counts of menacing by stalking, fourth
degree felonies in violation of R.C. 2903.211(A)(1)/(B)(2)(a), (e), and (g).
{¶3} A two-day jury trial commenced on November 13, 2024, during which the
following evidence was presented.
The Victim’s Testimony
{¶4} T.R. testified that she met Sheppard in 2022 while both were employed at
Shearer’s. 1T. at 1051. T.R. testified that she invited Sheppard to her church. Id. at 107.
T.R. testified that when Sheppard asked her out on a date, T.R. declined, responding,
“I’m God’s girl. I’m going with the Lord.” Id. at 123. T.R. never gave Sheppard her phone
number or address. Id.
{¶5} T.R. testified that Sheppard made her uncomfortable at work on multiple
occasions. T.R. testified, if she was napping in the break room, or resting her head in the
office due to a headache, Sheppard would begin massaging her. Id. at 107-108. After
the second incident, when Sheppard laughed, T.R. testified that she told him, “That’s not
funny. Stop.” Id. at 108. T.R. also testified that Sheppard asked her for sex, said she
1 For clarity, the transcript of Sheppard’s jury trial will be referred to as “__T.__” signifying the volume
and page number.
owed him children, and threatened, “I’m going to get you.” Id. Despite T.R. repeatedly
telling him she was not interested, Sheppard continued his behavior, prompting T.R. to
report him to their employer. Shortly thereafter, Sheppard was terminated from his
employment. Id. at 109.
{¶6} T.R. further testified that Sheppard began causing disruptions at her church.
During a service, he proposed to her in front of the congregation. 1T. at 110. T.R. testified
that she was startled and confused, as they had never been romantically involved. T.R.
testified that Sheppard later became aggressive with the church pastor, and T.R. began
avoiding Sheppard. T.R. testified that, on one occasion, her cousin had to intervene and
tell Sheppard to leave her alone. Id. at 111. T.R. testified that, on another occasion,
while T.R. was walking her grandmother to the car, Sheppard attempted to speak to her.
T.R. testified that she told him, “No, don’t talk to me. I’m taking my grandma out to the
car. Leave me alone.” Id. T.R. testified that Sheppard was asked to not return to the
church. Id.
{¶7} T.R. testified she never dated Sheppard, never had drinks with him, never
expressed romantic interest, and told him multiple times to leave her alone. 1T. at 111.
{¶8} T.R. testified that due to the ongoing harassment, she filed a complaint and
obtained a civil protection order (CPO), effective February 1, 2024, through February 1,
2029. The CPO prohibited any contact between Sheppard and T.R. 1T. at 112-113;
State’s Exhibit 18.
{¶9} T.R. testified that despite the CPO she began receiving letters from
Sheppard, even though she had never provided him with her address. 1T. at 113.
Between April and August 2024, she received seventeen such letters. Id. at 113-114; 2T.
at 207; State’s Exhibits 1-17. Some letters were signed by Sheppard, while others were
purportedly from “God.” Id. at 114, 119. T.R. testified that Sheppard wrote in the letters
that he was coming to see her, that they would be together soon, and acknowledged they
could not live together because of the CPO. Id. at 117-118. T.R. testified that she filed
a report with the Stark County Sheriff’s Office. Id. at 114. T.R. testified that on another
occasion, Sheppard showed up at her home, prompting her to contact the police. Id. at
123.
{¶10} T.R. testified that the letters made her feel anxious, uncomfortable, and
unsafe, as it seemed Sheppard did not respect the legal protections in place. 1T. at 115-
117. T.R. testified that the experience has caused her ongoing anxiety, negatively
impacted her relationships, and left her in fear for her safety. Id. at 116-117, 123.
Sheppard’s Testimony
{¶11} Sheppard testified that he wrote the letters in an attempt to build a
relationship with T.R. 2T. at 151. Acknowledging that the CPO barred him from her
home, he testified the letters were his alternative means of contact. 2T. at 160.
{¶12} When asked why he identified himself as “God,” Sheppard testified it was
an emotional decision and that being “God” was significant in his relationship with T.R.,
although he claimed he would not impose his beliefs on others. 2T. at 152-153. Sheppard
testified the CPO did not apply to him because he was “God,” though he conceded that
the order listed his legal name. 2T. at 156.
{¶13} Sheppard testified that he only referred to himself as “God” with T.R.:
Um, at first she said that she was my girl, like when we worked
together, and I kind of looked at her strange. Then she was like, Oh, I'm
God's girl. And I kind of like, wait, ran from her cause I was, I was scared
for the simple fact that I didn't know like how she would know who I was,
like who told her about me? Who even know (sic) what happened to me?
2T. at 158. Sheppard further testified,
A. No, she wants a relationship with God, and that's what I'm trying
to give her.
Q. But she doesn't want one with Tramel Sheppard?
A. Correct.
2T. at 161-162.
Sheppard denied any intent to harm T.R.,
Q. And your intention with that would be?
A. Um, nothing harmful, like nothing harmful or nothing, or anything
like that, just like wanting to love her.
Q. And you would never say or do anything to harm her?
A. No.
Q. And that includes making her feel emotionally distressed?
A. Correct.
Q. And if she were to feel emotionally distressed, it was not your
intent?
A. Correct.
Q. And you would not do so knowingly?
A. No. Never, never my intention to like make her distressful or
anything like that.
Q. What did you believe the consequences, if any, of writing the
letters would be?
A. Honestly, I really didn't think about the consequences 'cause I felt
like I was doing the right thing.
Q. Okay. Why did you feel like you were doing the right thing?
A. Because I was being myself.
Q. And it's not part of your character to ever cause harm to anyone?
A. No.
2T. at 153-154.
{¶14} Sheppard testified that he had a prior conviction for menacing by stalking
last year (2023), and a prior conviction for felonious assault in Summit County in 2010.
2T. at 159.
The Verdict and Sentence
{¶15} The jury found Sheppard guilty of all charges. On November 18, 2024, the
trial court held a sentencing hearing.
{¶16} The trial court sentenced Sheppard to 36 months for violation of a civil
protection order and 12 months for one count of menacing by stalking, with those
sentences to be served concurrently. For purposes of sentencing, the court merged the
remaining two counts of menacing by stalking. Judgment Entry of Conviction and
Sentence, Dec. 4, 2024.
Assignments of Error
{¶17} Sheppard raises two assignments of error,
{¶18} “I. APPELLANT'S CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”
{¶19} “II. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO RENEW ITS
MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL AT THE CLOSE OF ALL EVIDENCE.”
I.
{¶20} Sheppard maintains his convictions are against the manifest weight of the
evidence, arguing that the state failed to present sufficient evidence that he recklessly
violated the protection order, and that he knowingly caused T.R. to believe he would
cause her mental distress, [which is] the required mens rea for a finding of guilt to
menacing by stalking. (Appellant’s brief at 7; 9).
Standard of Appellate Review –Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶21} The term “manifest weight of the evidence” relates to persuasion. Eastley
v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 19. It concerns “the inclination of the greater amount of
credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.”
(Emphasis deleted.) State v. Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), superseded by
constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith,
80 Ohio St.3d 89,
102 n.4 (1997); State v. Martin,
2022-Ohio-4175, ¶ 26.
{¶22} When reviewing the manifest weight of the evidence, the question is
whether the jury clearly lost its way in resolving conflicts, resulting in a manifest
miscarriage of justice, even if the evidence is legally sufficient. Thompkins at 387; State
v. Issa,
93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67 (2001).
{¶23} Appellate courts have traditionally presumed the jury’s assessment is
correct, given its ability to observe witnesses’ demeanor, gestures, and tone, all critical
factors in evaluating credibility. Eastley at ¶ 21; Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland,
10
Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). As the Eastley Court noted, “If the evidence is susceptible to
more than one interpretation, the reviewing court is bound to adopt the one most
consistent with the verdict and judgment, and most favorable to sustaining them.”
{¶24} The Supreme Court of Ohio reiterated that an appellate court must examine
the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the
credibility of witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the
jury “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
conviction must be reversed.” State v. Jordan, 2023-Ohio-3800, ¶ 17. The Court
specifically directed, “‘Sitting as the “thirteenth juror,’” the court of appeals considers
whether the evidence should be believed and may overturn a verdict if it disagrees with
the trier of fact’s conclusion.”
Id., citing State v. Martin,
20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st
Dist.1983).
{¶25} A manifest-weight claim succeeds only in “the exceptional case in which the
evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387
[internal quotations omitted].
{¶26} To reverse a conviction on manifest-weight grounds, all three judges on the
appellate panel must concur. Ohio Const., Art. IV, § 3(B)(3); Bryan-Wollman v. Domonko,
2007-Ohio-4918, ¶¶ 2-4, citing Thompkins, syllabus ¶ 4.
Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the jury clearly lost its way and created
such a manifest miscarriage of justice that Sheppard’s convictions for violating a
protection order and menacing by stalking must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
Violating a Protection Order – R.C. 2919.27(A)(2)
{¶27} Sheppard was convicted of violating a protection order. R.C. 2919.27(A)(2)
provides that:
No person shall recklessly violate the terms of [a] protection order
issued pursuant to section 2151.34, 2903.213, or 2903.214 of the Revised
Code.
{¶28} A violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(2) is elevated to a third-degree felony under
R.C. 2919.27(B)(4) if the violation is committed while the offender is engaged in a felony.
{¶29} Sheppard argues that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he acted “recklessly.” (Appellant’s brief at 7-8). Sheppard contends that the State
presented no evidence that he acted indifferently to the consequences of his actions, or
that he disregarded a risk that his conduct was likely to cause a certain result. (Appellant’s
brief at 7).
{¶30} Here, the trial court instructed the jury as follows,
Recklessly. A person acts recklessly when, with heedless
indifference to the consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk
that his conduct is likely to cause a certain result. A person is reckless with
respect to circumstances when, with heedless indifference to the
consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that such
circumstances are likely to exist.
“Risk” means a significant possibility as contrasted with a remote
possibility that a certain result may occur.
2T. at 165-166.
{¶31} The Eighth District has observed,
The legislature intentionally based the definition of “recklessness” on
the likelihood, rather than the probability, of a certain result. State v. Young,
2005-Ohio-3584, (8th Dist.) citing R.C. 2901.22(C) Staff Notes. “Something
is ‘probable’ when there is more reason for expectation or belief than not,
whereas something is ‘likely’ when there is merely good reason for
expectation or belief.” Id.
State v. Hardman,
2016-Ohio-498, ¶ 38 (8th Dist.). The defendant’s awareness of the
likelihood of the result is the key. “‘If the result is probable, the person acts “knowingly;”
if it is not probable, but only possible, the person acts “recklessly” if he chooses to ignore
the risk.’” In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Emrich,
75 Ohio St.3d 1517, 1519
(1996), quoting State v. Edwards,
83 Ohio App.3d 357, 361 (10th Dist. 1992); State v.
Clay,
2008-Ohio-6325, ¶ 32 (Lanzinger, J., concurring); State v. Ashcraft, 2023-Ohio-
2378, ¶ 23 (5th Dist.); State v. Hunter,
2021-Ohio-1714, ¶ 28 (5th Dist.). In other words,
a person acts “recklessly” when he or she is aware that there is a substantial and
unjustifiable risk, or chance, that the proscribed result will occur and nevertheless
chooses to engage in the act and run the risk.
{¶32} Criminal intent is usually a question of fact for determination by the jury and
can be inferred from facts and circumstances reasonably tending to manifest a mental
attitude. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274 (1952); State v. Wallen,
21 Ohio
App.2d 27, 35 (5th Dist. 1969). The intent with which an act is committed may be inferred
from the act itself and the surrounding circumstances, including acts and statements of a
defendant. State v. Garner,
74 Ohio St.3d 49, 60 (1995); Wallen,
21 Ohio App.2d at 34;
Ashcraft, ¶ 22.
{¶33} Here, Sheppard admitted that he intentionally wrote the letters to T.R.
because he wanted to have a romantic relationship with her. 2T. at 151. Sheppard further
testified that he knew a CPO barred him from having contact with T.R. Sheppard testified
that he then began referring to himself as “God,” exclusively to T.R., because the CPO
did not apply to “God.” 2T. at 156. Sheppard testified that he knew T.R. did not want a
relationship with Tramel Sheppard. 2T. at 161-162. Sheppard testified that he
disregarded the consequences of his actions in writing to T.R. 2T. at 153-154.
{¶34} The jury was aware that T.R. reported Sheppard’s unwanted advances to
her employer, and that the employer subsequently terminated Sheppard’s employment.
The jury heard testimony that T.R.’s cousin and pastor intervened on her behalf and told
Sheppard to leave T.R. alone. The jury heard testimony that T.R. obtained a CPO to
keep Sheppard away from her.
{¶35} The jury could reasonably conclude that Sheppard was aware of the risk his
conduct posed and that he disregarded it. His own testimony supports such a finding: he
knew the order was in place, understood its terms, and nonetheless chose to
communicate with T.R. repeatedly. Moreover, T.R.’s testimony and other evidence, such
as reports to her employer, law enforcement, and the court, establish that Sheppard was
repeatedly warned to cease contact, yet persisted in his communications.
{¶36} There is substantial evidence, set forth in full above, from which a
reasonable inference of Sheppard’s recklessness may be drawn. State v. Wallen, 21 Ohio
App.2d at 35.
{¶37} For these reasons, we conclude that a reasonable person could have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Sheppard did recklessly violate the terms of a protection
order. We find, therefore, that the state met its burden of production regarding each
element of the crime of violating a protection order for which Sheppard was indicted and,
accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to submit the charge to the jury and to support
Sheppard’s conviction.
Menacing by Stalking – R.C. 2903.211(A)(1)
{¶38} Sheppard was also convicted of menacing by stalking in violation of R.C.
2903.211(A)(1), which states:
(A)(1) No person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly
cause another person to believe that the offender will cause physical harm
to the other person or a family or household member of the other person or
cause mental distress to the other person or a family or household member
of the other person. In addition to any other basis for the other person’s
belief that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person or the
other person’s family or household member or mental distress to the other
person or the other person’s family or household member, the other
person’s belief or mental distress may be based on words or conduct of the
offender that are directed at or identify a corporation, association, or other
organization that employs the other person or to which the other person
belongs.
…
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of menacing by stalking.
…
(2) Menacing by stalking is a felony of the fourth degree if any of the
following applies:
(a) The offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty
to a violation of this section or a violation of section 2911.211 of the Revised
Code.
…
(e) The offender has a history of violence toward the victim or any
other person.
…
(g) At the time of the commission of the offense, the offender was the
subject of a protection order.
{¶39} R.C. 2901.22(B) sets forth the definition of how and when a person acts
knowingly,
A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is
aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will
probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances
when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When
knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense,
such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is
a high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a
conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.
{¶40} Whether a person acts knowingly can only be determined, absent a
defendant’s admission, from all the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the
doing of the act itself. State v. Johnson, 56 Ohio St.2d 35, 38 (1978) citing State v.
Huffman,
131 Ohio St. 27 (1936); State v. Jackson,
57 Ohio St.3d 29, 38 (1991).
{¶41} The jury heard evidence that Sheppard’s unwanted advances toward T.R.
began while the two were co-workers. The unwanted conduct continued at their mutual
church. Sheppard admitted that he intentionally wrote the letters to T.R., because he
wanted to have a romantic relationship with her. 2T. at 151. Sheppard further testified
that he knew a CPO barred him from having contact with T.R. Sheppard testified that he
then began referring to himself as “God,” exclusively, to T.R., and the CPO did not apply
to “God.” 2T. at 156. Sheppard testified that he knew T.R. did not want a relationship
with Tramel Sheppard. 2T. at 161-162. Sheppard testified that he disregarded the
consequences of his actions in writing to T.R. 2T. at 153-154.
{¶42} T.R. testified that she filed a report with the Stark County Sheriff’s Office
when Sheppard appeared unannounced at her home. T.R. further testified that she
obtained a CPO barring Sheppard from contacting her. T.R. testified that the experience
has caused her ongoing anxiety, negatively impacted her relationships, and left her in
fear for her safety. 1T. at 116-117, 123.
{¶43} We conclude that a reasonable person could have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Sheppard, while a CPO was in effect, did knowingly engage in a
pattern of conduct that caused T.R. mental distress. We find, therefore, that the state
met its burden of production regarding each element of the crime of menacing by stalking
for which Sheppard was indicted and, accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to submit
the charge to the jury and to support Sheppard’s conviction.
{¶44} The jurors had the opportunity to observe T.R. and Sheppard during the
trial. Each was subjected to cross-examination.
{¶45} Upon review of the entire record, weighing the evidence and all reasonable
inferences as a thirteenth juror, including considering the credibility of the witnesses, we
find that the record contains no compelling evidence weighing heavily against Sheppard’s
convictions. Rather, we find the greater amount of credible evidence produced at trial,
particularly Sheppard’s own admissions, supports the jury’s verdict on both counts.
Accordingly, we find no indication that the jury lost its way or ignored substantial evidence
in reaching its verdict.
{¶46} Sheppard’s first assignment of error is overruled.
II.
{¶47} In his second assignment of error, Sheppard contends that his trial counsel
was ineffective in not renewing the Crim.R. 29(A) motion for acquittal at the completion
of the evidence.
{¶48} To succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, a defendant must
satisfy a two-prong test. First, a defendant must show that trial counsel’s representation
was ineffective, specifically that it fell below an objective standard of reasonable
representation and violated an essential duty to the client. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984). In assessing such claims, a reviewing court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.
Id. at 690.
{¶49} Even if the defendant shows deficient performance, he or she must also
satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test by showing prejudice. That is, the
defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s errors were so serious as to undermine the
reliability of the trial’s outcome. Strickland at 694. This requires a showing that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional error, the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different.
Id. See also State v. Harris,
2024-Ohio-2993, ¶¶
28-29 (5th Dist.)
{¶50} Here, even assuming deficiency, Sheppard cannot show prejudice. The
Supreme Court of Ohio has held that failure to renew a Crim.R. 29(A) motion does not
waive sufficiency challenges on appeal. State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 346 (2001);
State v. Carter,
64 Ohio St.3d 218, 223 (1992). See also, State v. Lee,
2016-Ohio-1045,
¶ 30 (5th Dist.); State v. Ray,
2025-Ohio-2023, ¶ 39 (5th Dist.). As set forth above, this
Court concluded that Sheppard’s convictions are supported by sufficient evidence and
were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, because a Crim. R.
29(A) motion would not have been granted, Sheppard cannot show that he was
prejudiced by counsel’s failure to renew such a motion at the conclusion of the evidence.
{¶51} Sheppard’s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶52} The judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By Popham, J.,
Hoffman, P.J, and
Gormley, J., concur;
