State v. Nagy

[Cite as State v. Nagy, 

.]


                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                   :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,             :
                                                           No. 90400
                 v.                              :

THOMAS H. NAGY,                                  :

                 Defendant-Appellant.            :


                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: APPLICATION DENIED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 5, 2025


          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CR-81-169518-ZA
                              Application for Reopening
                                 Motion No. 585294


                                           Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Michael R. Wajda, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Michael A. Partlow, for appellant.


MARY J. BOYLE, P.J.:

                Thomas H. Nagy (“Nagy”) has filed an application for reopening

pursuant to App.R. 26(B) and State v. Murnahan, 

 (1991), based

on claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Nagy is attempting to reopen
the appellate judgment rendered in State v. Nagy, 

 (8th Dist.), in

which this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment classifying Nagy as a sexually

oriented offender.

             For the reasons that follow, we deny Nagy’s application to reopen the

appeal.

                              I. Procedural History

             On May 18, 1982, Nagy accepted the terms of a negotiated plea

agreement with the State and pleaded guilty to aggravated murder in violation of

R.C. 2903.01. Nagy was sentenced to “life imprisonment.” No direct appeal was

taken from the conviction and sentence.

             On August 6, 2007, Nagy appeared before the trial court pursuant to

Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180 for a sexual-offender-classification hearing. At the conclusion

of the hearing, the trial court classified Nagy as a sexually oriented offender.

             Nagy appealed the trial court’s judgment, arguing (1) “the trial court

erred when it ruled that [he] was a sexually-oriented offender although he was not

convicted of a sexual offense,” (2) “the trial court erred when it allowed the

prosecutor to read from the original Cleveland police department homicide file

which was not in evidence,” and (3) “the trial court erred when it directly questioned

and interrogated [him] in spite of the objections of defense counsel.” Upon review,

this court overruled Nagy’s assignments of error and affirmed his sexual-offender

classification. Nagy at ¶ 24-48.
             On June 13, 2025, Nagy filed a motion for leave to file an application

for reopening pursuant to App.R. 26(B). In the application, Nagy asserts that he was

denied effective assistance of appellate counsel because appellate counsel “did not

challenge his classification as a sexually-oriented offender as being against the

manifest weight of the evidence.” Nagy contends that the result of Nagy “would

have been quite different” had appellate counsel challenged the weight of the

evidence supporting his classification.

                               II. Law and Analysis

             App.R. 26(B) provides a limited means of reopening an appeal based on

claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. State v. Barnes, 2020-Ohio-

4988, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.). The rule only applies to appeals from “the judgment of

conviction and sentence” and requires that the application be filed within 90 days

“from journalization of the appellate judgment unless the applicant shows good

cause for filing at a later time.” App.R. 26(B)(1).

             Interpreting the language of App.R. 26(B), this court has determined

that the rule “does not apply to subsequent postconviction proceedings, including

resentencing, motions to vacate sentence and hearings to determine the propriety

of guilty pleas.” State v. Perotti, 

 (8th Dist.), citing State v.

Loomer, 

 (1996). See also State v. Smith, 

, ¶ 3 (8th

Dist.), citing Perotti. Relevant here, this court has further specified that App.R.

26(B) “cannot be utilized to reopen an appeal that dealt with the classification of [a

defendant] as a sexually-oriented offender under the former Megan’s Law.” State v.
Trem, 

, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.); accord State v. Nelson, 

, ¶ 3

(8th Dist.) (finding App.R. 26(B) could not be used to reopen an appeal taken from

the applicant’s classification as a sexual predator).

             As mentioned, Nagy did not file a direct appeal from his conviction and

sentence in 1982. The present application seeks to reopen an appeal from the trial

court’s classification of Nagy as a sexually oriented offender approximately 26 years

after his conviction and sentence were entered.1 Because App.R. 26(B) applies only

to the direct appeal of a criminal conviction and sentence, it cannot now be

employed to reopen the appeal that dealt with Nagy’s sexual-offender classification

under former R.C. Ch. 2950.

              Accordingly, the application for reopening is denied.



MARY J. BOYLE, PRESIDING JUDGE

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., and
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR




1 It must also be noted that sex-offender-classification proceedings under former R.C.
Ch. 2950 are civil and not criminal in nature. State v. Green, 

, ¶ 29 (8th
Dist.).