[Cite as State v. Harris,
2025-Ohio-2796.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240342
TRIAL NOS. C/24/CRB/389/A/B/C
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
KEESHA HARRIS, :
JUDGMENT ENTRY
Defendant-Appellant. :
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs.
The judgments of the trial court are affirmed in part and reversed and appellant
discharged in part for the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date.
Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal,
allows no penalty, and orders that costs are taxed 50% to appellee and 50% to
appellant.
The court further orders that 1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the
Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and 2) the mandate be sent to the trial
court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk:
Enter upon the journal of the court on 8/8/2025 per order of the court.
By:_______________________
Administrative Judge
[Cite as State v. Harris, 2025-Ohio-2796.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240342
TRIAL NOS. C/24/CRB/389/A/B/C
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
OPINION
KEESHA HARRIS, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed in Part, Reversed and Appellant Discharged
in Part
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 8, 2025
Connie Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald W. Springman,
Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Lora Peters, Assistant
Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
ZAYAS, Judge.
{¶1} Following a jury trial, Keesha Harris appeals her convictions for failure
to comply with an officer’s order, disorderly conduct, and obstructing official business.
In three assignments of error, Harris argues that the trial court erred in denying her
Crim.R. 29(A) motion for acquittal, the court erred by incorrectly instructing the jury
on failure to comply, and her convictions were based on insufficient evidence and were
contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm
the judgments of the trial court in part, reverse the judgments in part, and discharge
Harris from further prosecution for disorderly conduct and obstruction of official
business.
Factual and Procedural History
{¶2} Keesha Harris was charged with failure to comply with an officer’s order
in violation of R.C. 2921.331(A), disorderly conduct, and obstructing official business
(“OOB”) after an encounter with a patrol officer who was conducting a traffic stop of
an unknown vehicle, and an officer who responded to the scene. Harris pleaded not
guilty and proceeded to a jury trial.
{¶3} The State’s first witness was a patrol officer employed by Springfield
Township. The patrol officer testified that he was conducting a traffic stop when he
first encountered Harris. As he was speaking with the driver he had pulled over for a
traffic violation, Harris pulled up parallel to the stop, and the officer asked her to move,
either to the side of the road or away from the scene. The patrol officer testified that
Harris responded by saying, “I can do what I want, and I don’t have to listen to you.”
The officer estimated that Harris was next to the traffic stop for 30 seconds. When
Harris refused to move her car, the patrol officer requested more officers to respond
and continued processing the traffic stop.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶4} The patrol officer testified that as Harris “cleared the roadway,” other
officers arrived. After Harris had pulled over, the other officers approached her, and
he could hear loud talking. The patrol officer testified that Harris inconvenienced him
and delayed his traffic stop for “probably a total of five minutes.”
{¶5} On cross-examination, the patrol officer confirmed that Harris moved
her vehicle forward approximately 40 feet and parked in the far-right lane. At that
time of the evening, she could legally park in that lane.
{¶6} The next witness was a fellow Springfield Township officer who
responded to the call for assistance. The responding officer testified that as he arrived
on the scene, he saw a car stopped in the left lane parallel to the car in the right lane
that the patrol officer had pulled over. The responding officer parked behind the
patrol officer’s cruiser and observed the patrol officer motion to Harris to move
forward. The responding officer estimated that he arrived 90 seconds after receiving
the initial request for assistance, and that Harris remained in the lane of traffic for
about 90 seconds. Harris eventually moved out of the lane of traffic after an exchange
with the patrol officer.
{¶7} After Harris parked, the responding officer observed Harris while she
exited from her vehicle and stood halfway between her vehicle and the traffic stop for
about a minute. When he heard Harris shouting profanities, he intended to approach
her and let her know she could film the police stop but not while standing in the middle
of the road. He was unable to convey that message to her because the yelling
continued. Harris continued to stand in the road until a small child exited from her
car. The child approached Harris and asked her to return to the car.
{¶8} While Harris was shouting, the responding officer noticed lights coming
on in the surrounding homes and people standing at their doors watching the traffic
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
stop. The responding officer estimated that the homes were about 80 feet from the
road. After he saw the child exit from the passenger seat, he made the decision to
approach her and investigate the child potentially riding in the vehicle unrestrained
and Harris’s filming from the middle of the road.
{¶9} As the responding officer approached Harris, she retreated and tried to
enter her driver’s side door. The officer commanded her to stand on the sidewalk so
he could investigate the “traffic violations” that he observed. The officer further
testified that he asked Harris to step onto the sidewalk six to eight times and explained
to her that she was not free to leave and must interact with him. Harris opened the
car door and started to enter her vehicle when a “tugging match” occurred. The officer
grabbed Harris because her conduct was disorderly, and he believed that she was
attempting to flee. During the arrest, Harris fell to the ground during a physical
altercation with the responding officer.
{¶10} When Harris initially exited from her vehicle, she was holding a phone
in front of her as she shouted profanities, and the responding officer assumed she was
recording. Harris was holding the phone throughout the encounter. The officer
estimated that two to three minutes had elapsed from his arrival to Harris’s arrest.
{¶11} The responding officer was shown a video taken by Harris that captured
part of the interaction that he had with her. At the end of the video, the officer is
depicted making contact with Harris. The responding officer can be heard saying,
“Come over to the sidewalk.” Harris responded, “I ain’t did nothing.” The officer
replied “yeah, you did,” and told her that the child was not in a car seat. Between six
and eight seconds after telling her to come to the sidewalk, the officer grabbed her. At
this point, Harris was no longer filming and she did not try to lunge at or strike the
officer.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶12} After the responding officer’s testimony, the State rested and Harris
moved for a judgment of acquittal under Crim.R. 29. Harris argued that to secure a
conviction for failure to comply, the State was required to prove that the officer’s order
involved an act or omission in operating her motor vehicle, and Harris was not in her
vehicle at the time of the order. With respect to the disorderly-conduct charge, Harris
contended that the State failed to prove that her conduct recklessly caused another
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm. Harris sought an acquittal on the obstructing-
official-business charge because “[t]here was no testimony regarding any affirmative
act by Ms. Harris that resulted in this charge.” After reviewing the complaints, the
trial court overruled the motion.
{¶13} The trial proceeded, and Harris testified on her behalf. Harris testified
that she was at a red light and observed a police cruiser stop a vehicle. When the light
turned green, Harris turned and the driver of the car looked at her in a way that
alarmed her, so she pulled over to watch the traffic stop. Harris testified that she
slowed down when passing the vehicle but did not stop on the road. Harris again
testified that she was not asked to move by the patrol officer. Harris pulled over in the
parking lane and observed the car involved in the traffic stop and two police cruisers
parked behind her car. After she parked, Harris tried to observe the traffic stop from
her car mirrors but could not see what was happening because the officer was not
standing at the driver’s side of the vehicle.
{¶14} Harris exited from her car and walked to the back of her car. At that
moment, an officer said something to her, and she began to record the exchange. The
officer told her “you need to get out of here.” Harris started moving slowly back to her
car and responded with profanities and other comments as heard on the video. The
responding officer began walking toward her and grabbed her, smacked the phone
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
from her hand, and threw her on the ground. Harris testified that she never entered
her car or attempted to close the driver’s door on the officer.
{¶15} After Harris’s testimony, both parties rested. The court instructed the
jurors that to find Harris guilty of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police
officer, the jury must find “[t]he defendant operated a motor vehicle so as to willfully
elude or flee a police officer after receiving a visible or audible signal from a police
officer to bring their motor vehicle to a stop.” Although no one objected to the
instruction, the instruction the court gave was for a violation of R.C. 2921.331(B),
which states, “No person shall operate a motor vehicle so as willfully to elude or flee a
police officer after receiving a visible or audible signal from a police officer to bring the
person’s motor vehicle to a stop.” Harris was charged with violating R.C. 2921.331(A),
which provides, “No person shall fail to comply with any lawful order or direction of
any police officer invested with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic.” The
jury returned with guilty verdicts on all three counts.
Motions for Acquittal
{¶16} In her first assignment of error, Harris contends that the trial court
erred in denying the Crim.R. 29(A) motions for acquittal by improperly relying on the
complaints to overrule the Crim.R. 29(A) motions for acquittal, when the evidence
presented in the State’s case-in-chief was insufficient to prove the offenses.
{¶17} A trial court’s ruling on a Crim.R. 29 motion is reviewed under the
standard that applies to a review for sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Wynn, 2017-
Ohio-8045, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.); State v. Kennard, 2022-Ohio-2055, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.). Where
a defendant challenges the denial of a Crim.R. 29(A) motion made at the conclusion
of the State’s case-in-chief, however, our review is limited to the evidence then
available to the trial court. State v. Bailey,
2017-Ohio-2679, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.).
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶18} Under Crim.R. 29(A), a trial court is required to construe the evidence
in a light most favorable to the State and determine whether reasonable minds could
reach different conclusions about whether the evidence proves each element of the
offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Miller, 2010-Ohio-5532, ¶ 12
(12th Dist.), citing State v. Bridgeman,
55 Ohio St.2d 261, 263 (1978). A reviewing
court must determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Ham,
2017-Ohio-9189, ¶ 19 (1st Dist.), citing State v. Jenks,
61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991),
paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶19} Harris argues the trial court erred in denying her Crim.R. 29 motion at
the close of the State’s case-in-chief because the court did not review whether the
evidence was sufficient to prove the offenses and instead relied on the allegations
contained in the complaint.
Failure to Comply
{¶20} Harris was charged under R.C. 2921.331(A) which provides, “No person
shall fail to comply with any lawful order or direction of any police officer invested
with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic.” “A person is guilty of failure to
comply, if, after receiving a lawful order from a police officer invested with authority
to direct, control, or regulate traffic, that person failed to comply with that order.”
State v. Wagenknecht, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 2962, *5 (9th Dist. June 29, 1994).
{¶21} The State argues that the offense occurred when the patrol officer
ordered Harris to move her vehicle while stopped parallel to the traffic investigation.
The patrol officer testified that he asked Harris to move to the side of the road when
she stopped next to the traffic investigation. Harris responded that she could do what
she wanted and did not need to listen to the officer. According to the patrol officer’s
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
testimony, Harris inconvenienced him and delayed the traffic stop for “probably a total
of five minutes.” The responding officer testified that he saw Harris’s car stopped in
the left lane parallel to the car in the right lane that the patrol officer had pulled over
and observed the patrol officer gesture to Harris to move forward. The responding
officer estimated that he arrived 90 seconds after receiving the initial request for
assistance, and that Harris remained in the lane of traffic for about 90 seconds.
{¶22} Harris contends that she complied with the order to move her vehicle,
and therefore, the State failed to prove that she did not comply with the order.
{¶23} Viewing the evidence most favorably to the State, Harris stopped her car
in a lane of travel to observe a traffic incident. The patrol officer ordered her to move
to the side of the road or away from the scene. Instead of complying, Harris informed
the patrol officer that, “I can do what I want, and I don’t have to listen to you.” Harris
remained in the lane of traffic from 30-90 seconds before moving her vehicle. Thus,
the State produced sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find the elements of failure
to comply beyond a reasonable doubt.
Disorderly Conduct
{¶24} Harris was charged with persistent disorderly conduct for recklessly
causing inconvenience to the neighbors by engaging in turbulent behavior and
persisting in the conduct after a reasonable warning or request to desist. Harris
contends that there was no testimony by any neighbor who claimed to have been
annoyed or inconvenienced. Harris further argues that the neighbors may have been
watching the incident because police cars were in front of their homes.
{¶25} The responding officer testified that Harris was standing in the parking
lane shouting profanities for up to a minute. While Harris was yelling, the officer
observed people watching the incident from their homes and lights coming on in the
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
neighboring homes.
{¶26} Notably, there was no testimony from any of the neighbors that they
were annoyed or inconvenienced, and neither officer testified that the neighbors
complained of the noise. See State v. Smith, 2002-Ohio-5994, ¶ 14-19 (2d Dist.)
(holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove disorderly conduct where “the
prosecution failed to show that Smith recklessly caused another inconvenience,
annoyance, or alarm based upon his yelling.”); State v. Holmes,
129 Ohio App.3d 735
(2d Dist. 1998) (holding that the fact other people may have heard an individual’s use
of profanity directed at a police officer is insufficient to show that the people were
inconvenienced, alarmed, or annoyed when none of them testified that they were, in
fact, inconvenienced, alarmed, or annoyed); City of Eastlake v. Kirkpatrick, 2007-
Ohio-6945, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.) (holding that there was no evidence that defendant’s use
of profanity directed at a police officer inconvenienced the bystanders in the
neighboring properties where none of the neighbors testified).
{¶27} Accordingly, after reviewing the record and considering the evidence in
a light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the State did not present
sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Harris caused
inconvenience to the neighbors by shouting profanities.
Obstructing Official Business
{¶28} Next, Harris argues that the conviction for OOB was not supported by
sufficient evidence because the failure to comply with an order to get on the sidewalk
was not an affirmative act and the officer was not impeded by her conduct. However,
the complaint alleged that the basis of the charge was that “Keesha enter[ed] her
vehicle and attempt[ed] to shut the door on arresting officers after being advised she
was under arrest. Defendant then refused to give her hands to officers to be
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
handcuffed. A struggle occurred to a point that Keesha was taken to the ground.”
{¶29} To support a conviction for OOB, the State must prove that Harris “(1)
performed an act; (2) without privilege; (3) with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay
the performance of a public official of any authorized act within the public official’s
official capacity; and (4) that hampered or impeded the performance of the public
official’s duties.” In re Payne, 2005-Ohio-4849, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.). To prove OOB,
“[t]here must be some substantial stoppage of the officer’s progress before one can say
[he] was hampered or impeded.” State v. Buttram,
2020-Ohio-2709, ¶ 20 (1st Dist.),
citing State v. Stephens,
57 Ohio App.2d 229, 230 (1st Dist. 1978).
{¶30} The responding officer testified that he decided to approach Harris after
the child exited from her vehicle. As he approached, Harris retreated and tried to
reenter her vehicle. The officer further testified that he informed Harris that she was
not free to leave, and Harris started to open the car door and started to get back into
the car as he repeatedly told her to exit from the car. The responding officer did not
testify that Harris tried to close the door on him or that she refused to give him her
hands to be handcuffed.
{¶31} The video clip of the encounter captured by Harris depicts Harris yelling
at the officers while they are standing next to the stopped vehicle. At the beginning of
the video, Harris is standing between her car and the traffic stop, walking backwards
toward her driver’s door. As two officers begin to approach her, Harris continued to
yell. While Harris was standing by the rear passenger door, the responding officer
asked her to get on the sidewalk. Within six to eight seconds of asking Harris to come
to the sidewalk, the officer reached out to grab her, and the video ended. The video
did not show Harris enter her vehicle. Harris was next to the car when the responding
officer reached for her.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶32} The responding officer did not testify that Harris’s conduct impeded or
hampered his investigation. Although there was a six-to-eight second delay between
the time that Harris was asked to move to the sidewalk and the time the officer grabbed
her, the State failed to show that this brief delay hampered or impeded the
investigation.
{¶33} Without evidence of “hampering” or “impeding,” the State failed to
show that Harris hampered or impeded the officers’ child-restraint investigation. See
State v. Coffman, 2024-Ohio-1182, ¶ 29 (1st Dist.) (holding that “without evidence of
‘hampering’ or ‘impeding’ beyond that 20-second delay in apprehending Coffman, the
state failed to show that Coffman hampered or impeded the officers’ breaking-and-
entering investigation”); In re R.B.,
2021-Ohio-3749, ¶ 24-25 (1st Dist.) (holding that
the evidence was insufficient to support the OOB conviction where the juvenile’s
conduct “in closing the back door and momentarily retreating from the back room did
not cause any substantial stoppage of Officer Herring’s progress in securing the
house”). Thus, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Harris
obstructed the officer in the performance of his duties.
{¶34} Accordingly, we overrule the first assignment of error with respect to
the failure-to-comply conviction and sustain the assignment of error with respect to
the disorderly-conduct and OOB convictions.
Jury Instructions
{¶35} Next Harris contends that the trial court improperly instructed the jury
on the elements of R.C. 2921.331(B) when she was charged with violating R.C.
2921.331(A).
{¶36} Harris failed to object to the incorrect instruction, so we review for plain
error. See State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 153 (1980) (explaining that the failure
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
to object to a jury instruction results in a plain-error review). “A trial court’s failure to
charge the jury on every element of each crime with which a defendant is charged does
not per se constitute plain error nor does it necessarily require reversal of a
conviction.” Id. at 154. An appellate court must review the record to determine
“whether substantial prejudice may have been visited on the defendant, thereby
resulting in a manifest miscarriage of justice.”
Id.
{¶37} In this case, there is no dispute that the court improperly instructed the
jury on the elements of R.C. 2921.331(B). The State contends that Harris did not
establish that she was prejudiced by the error. We agree. Harris did not contend or
establish that she was prejudiced by the incorrect instruction.
{¶38} Accordingly, we overrule the second assignment of error.
Manifest Weight
{¶39} Next, Harris argues that her convictions were against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Because we have determined that the convictions for
disorderly conduct and OOB were not supported by sufficient evidence, we examine
the manifest weight of the evidence in support of the failure-to-comply conviction.
{¶40} When considering a weight-of-the-evidence claim, we review “‘the
entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the
credibility of the witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the
evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage
of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v.
Bailey, 2015-Ohio-2997, ¶ 59 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d
380 (1997). We afford substantial deference to credibility determinations because the
factfinder sees and hears the witnesses. See State v. Glover,
2019-Ohio-5211, ¶ 30 (1st
Dist.).
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶41} Although Harris testified that she never stopped her car next to the
traffic stop and was not asked to move by the patrol officer, the jury was in the best
position to observe the witnesses and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. We
cannot conclude that the jury’s credibility determinations were unreasonable or that
the jury lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice.
{¶42} We overrule the third assignment of error.
Conclusion
{¶43} Having sustained Harris’s first assignment of error in part, we reverse
the judgments in part and discharge Harris from further prosecution on the
disorderly-conduct and OOB charges. We affirm the judgment of the trial court with
respect to the conviction for failure to comply.
Judgments affirmed in part, and reversed and appellant discharged in part.
KINSLEY, P.J., and BOCK, J., concur.
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