[Cite as State v. Adams,
2025-Ohio-2800.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-24-1234
Appellee Trial Court No. CR0202302262
v.
Anthony Alan Bais Adams DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: August 8, 2025
…
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and
Lorrie J. rendle, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Henry Schaefer, for appellant.
…
OSOWIK, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal of an April 12, 2024 judgment of the Lucas County Court
of Common Pleas, denying appellant’s motion to suppress, filed in the course of the R.C.
2921.331(B) failure to comply with the signal or order of a police officer offense
underlying this appeal.
{¶ 2} For clarity, we note that although appellant attaches the September 10, 2024
sentencing judgment to this appeal, and captions it as the, “Judgment Entry Appealed”,
the sole assignment of error contests the propriety of the trial court’s April 12, 2024
motion to suppress judgment entry, denying the motion to suppress, which became a final
and appealable order upon appellant’s conviction and sentencing on September 10, 2024.
For the reasons set forth below, this court affirms the judgment of the trial court.
{¶ 3} Appellant, Anthony Bais Adams, sets forth the following sole assignment of
error:
“I. The Court erred when it failed to grant [appellant’s] Motion to Suppress.”
{¶ 4} The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. On October 15,
2022, two Lucas County Sheriff’s Department deputies, Deputies Navarre and Danielski
(“Navarre” and “Danielski”), were separately patrolling a portion of Springfield
Township, with both deputies on patrol in the vicinity of the Hill Ave. and McCord Rd.
intersection.
{¶ 5} While on patrol, both deputies placed focus upon surveillance of a particular
Hill Ave. residence, due to its known, ongoing history of unlawful drug activity;
including trafficking, consumption, and overdose incidents.
{¶ 6} Navarre first observed appellant’s vehicle pull into the driveway of the
subject Hill Ave. residence. Navarre then notified Danielski that a vehicle with Michigan
plates and darkly tinted windows had just arrived at the known drug house and to keep it
under surveillance, as Danielski’s current position was better situated than Navarre’s for
continued surveillance of appellant’s vehicle. Danielski observed a passenger in the
2.
vehicle go into the residence, stay inside for approximately two minutes, and then return
to appellant’s vehicle.
{¶ 7} Upon appellant’s vehicle leaving the residence, Danielski followed it,
activated his overhead emergency lights, and attempted to conduct a traffic stop of
appellant. Navarre’s vehicle was following Danielski’s vehicle, as they attempted to
initiate a traffic stop of appellant.
{¶ 8} Although appellant initially pulled into the parking lot of a commercial
business at Hill Ave. and McCord Rd., and slowed down, appellant did so just long
enough for the passenger to jump out of the vehicle. Appellant then sped away, fleeing
the scene at a high rate of speed. No traffic stop was effectuated.
{¶ 9} Danielski remained at the location where the passenger had fled on foot,
while Navarre drove off in pursuit of appellant. Appellant led Navarre on a high-speed
chase, during which appellant ignored traffic devices, drove off of the roadway, through
front yards, onto sidewalks, and ultimately abandoned his vehicle at a commercial
business on Airport Hwy., whereupon appellant fled on foot into the woods behind the
business.
{¶ 10} Following appellant’s abandonment of his vehicle and escape into the
woods, responding law enforcement officers recovered appellant’s wallet, cell phone, and
State of Michigan identification card from the abandoned vehicle. Officers subsequently
confirmed that the abandoned vehicle was registered to appellant.
3.
{¶ 11} The record shows that all items recovered from appellant’s vehicle were
obtained following appellant’s flight from the deputies, abandonment of his vehicle, and
escape into the nearby woods. In conjunction, the record shows that in the course of the
disposition this case, appellant acknowledged his flight from the deputies and conceded
that he did so due to being on active post-release control for a separate aggravated
burglary conviction at the time of the attempted traffic stop.
{¶ 12} On August 16, 2023, appellant was indicted on one count of failure to
comply with the signal or order of a police officer, in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B), a
felony of the third degree. On March 8, 2024, appellant filed a motion to suppress,
arguing that the deputies concerns regarding observing appellant’s darkly tinted windows
prior to attempting to make a traffic stop was pretextual, as Ohio’s window tint
regulations are inapplicable to appellant’s Michigan vehicle, thereby arguably
undercutting claims of possessing the requisite reasonable articulable suspicion to make a
traffic stop.
{¶ 13} On March 26, 2024, the suppression hearing was conducted. Appellee
offered the testimony of Navarre and Danielski. Appellant presented no witnesses.
{¶ 14} Navarre testified that while the issue of window tinting arose during the
traffic encounter with appellant, the way that the events ultimately unfolded, no traffic
stop was effectuated, as appellant fled prior to completion of a traffic stop. Inquiry was
made of Navarre, “And just to be clear was the – were any traffic citations issued for this
4.
vehicle?” Navarre replied, “No.” In conjunction, inquiry was next made of Navarre,
“And, in fact, was the [traffic] stop able to be completed?” Navarre replied, “No.”
{¶ 15} Consistently, inquiry was made of Danielski, “And did you attempt to stop
the vehicle that you saw with the dark windows?” Danielski replied, “Yes … The
vehicle pulled into a parking lot, a little plaza parking lot with different businesses …
[T]he passenger exited, and [appellant then] led my partner onto a pursuit.” Follow-up
inquiry was made of Danielski, “So is it fair to say, then, that you weren’t able to actually
conduct a traffic stop?” Danielski replied, “Right.”
{¶ 16} In accord with the testimony of Navarre and Danielski, the record shows
that when appellant’s vehicle briefly pulled into the commercial parking lot, no traffic
stop was made, no traffic citations were issued, and no items were recovered from
appellant’s person or appellant’s vehicle. Appellant’s flight from the parking lot,
admittedly to avoid potential post-release control violation consequences, prompted the
subsequent, high-speed pursuit which underlies this appeal.
{¶ 17} On April 12, 2024, the trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress.
On July 17, 2024, appellant pled no contest to the sole count of failure to comply with the
signal or order of a police officer, in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B), a felony of the third
degree. A presentence investigation was ordered.
{¶ 18} On September 4, 2024, the sentencing hearing was conducted. Appellant
conveyed to the court at sentencing, “I have no excuse for what I did. I know I have to
take responsibility for my actions. I have no idea what I was thinking. … I made a
5.
really bad choice … I realize [that] I put the public at a lot of risk … I know I have
to face the music with it.” Appellant was sentenced to a two-year term of incarceration.
This appeal ensued.
{¶ 19} In the sole assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in
denying appellant’s motion to suppress. In principle support, appellant argues, “The
pretextual stop is not supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion.”
{¶ 20} As this court held in State v. Merillat, 2025-Ohio-1100, ¶ 17 (6th Dist.),
Our review of [a] trial court’s judgment, denying the motion
to suppress in each case, presents a mixed question of law and
fact. State v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 114, 117,
726 N.E.2d
1092 (6th Dist. 1999), citing State v. Smith,
80 Ohio St.3d 89,
105,
684 N.E.2d 668 (1997); see also State v. Burnside,
100
Ohio St.3d 152,
2003-Ohio-5372,
797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8.
Because the trial court determines factual questions, and is in
the best position to consider credibility of the witnesses, we
must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are
supported by competent, credible evidence. (Citations
omitted), Burnside at ¶ 8. However, we review the trial
court’s conclusions independently, and without deference to
the conclusion of the trial court in deciding whether the facts
satisfy the applicable legal standard. State v. Hair, 6th Dist.
Lucas Nos. L-22-1164 and L-22-1165, 2023 WL 4542532, ¶
46, citing State v. Wesson, 137 Ohio St.3d 309, 2013-Ohio-
4575, 999 N.E.2d 557, ¶ 40, quoting Burnside at ¶ 8 … The
reasonable suspicion standard is something less than the
probable cause needed for arrest, permitting an immediate
response by police when confronted with a suspicious
individual. Bobo at 180, 524 N.E.2d 489, quoting Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-146,
92 S.Ct. 1921,
32 L.Ed.2d
612 (1972).
6.
{¶ 21} In conjunction with the above, given that appellant fled the attempted
traffic stop, later abandoned his vehicle, and then escaped into nearby woods on foot, as
pertains to appellant’s wallet, cell phone, and Michigan identification card thereafter
recovered from appellant’s vehicle, as held in State v. Camper, 2023-Ohio-4673, ¶ 25
(10th Dist.), appellant lacked standing to challenge the search and seizure of his
abandoned property:
A defendant does not have standing under the Fourth
Amendment to object to a search and seizure of property the
defendant has voluntarily abandoned. State v. Freeman, 64
Ohio St.2d 291,
414 N.E.2d 1044 (1980), paragraph two of
the syllabus. Defendant lacks standing to challenge a search
of abandoned property because society does not recognize an
expectation of privacy in abandoned property as being
objectively reasonable. Gould at ¶ 20. Accord United States
v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1983) (stating that
‘[w]hen individuals voluntarily abandon property, they forfeit
any expectation of privacy in it that they might have had).’
{¶ 22} In applying these governing legal principles to this case, we note that the
record shows, through the unrefuted suppression hearing testimony of both Navarre and
Danielski, that no traffic stop of appellant was effectuated on October 15, 2022. Rather, a
traffic stop was attempted, but was thwarted prior to completion when appellant fled the
scene of the attempted stop, necessitating the subsequent high-speed chase.
{¶ 23} The record further shows that only upon appellant’s abandonment of his
vehicle after fleeing from the deputies, was appellant’s wallet, cell phone, and Michigan
identification, recovered from appellant’s vehicle, ultimately culminating in appellant’s
sole indictment on one count of failure to comply with the signal or order of a police
officer, in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B), the offense from which this appeal arises.
7.
{¶ 24} Based upon the foregoing, in accord with Merillat and Camper, we
independently find that appellant abandoned the above-described items of property left
behind in his vehicle when fleeing into the woods on foot. As such, appellant lacked any
objectively reasonable privacy interest in the items seized. Based upon the forgoing, the
trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to suppress was supported by competent,
credible evidence. Therefore, we find appellant’s assignment of error not well-taken.
{¶ 25} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of
Common Pleas is hereby affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal
pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________
JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J.
____________________________
Myron C. Duhart, J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
____________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
8.
