[Cite as State v. Brown,
2025-Ohio-2810.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
TRUMBULL COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2025-T-0001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Criminal Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas
WILLIAM BROWN,
Trial Court No. 2024 CR 00711
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: August 11, 2025
Judgment: Affirmed
Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor, and Charles L. Morrow, Assistant
Prosecutor, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH
44481 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Christopher P. Lacich, Roth Blair Roberts Strasfield & Lodge, 100 East Federal Street,
Suite 600, Youngstown, OH 44503 (For Defendant-Appellant).
SCOTT LYNCH, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, William Brown, appeals his convictions for Felonious
Assault, Having Weapons While Under Disability, and a firearm specification in the
Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas. For the following reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the lower court.
{¶2} On September 18, 2024, Brown was indicted by direct presentment to the
Trumbull County Grand Jury for Felonious Assault, a felony of the second degree in
violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) with a firearm specification under R.C. 2941.145; and
Having Weapons While Under Disability, a felony of the third degree, in violation of R.C.
2923.13(A)(3).
{¶3} A jury trial was held on December 2-3, 2024. The following pertinent
testimony and evidence were presented:
{¶4} Kashe Smith witnessed a group of people fighting at her apartment complex
on June 15, 2023. She attempted to break up the fight by moving a woman involved.
Multiple people began hitting Smith, who responded by making comments about fighting
one of the girls who attacked her. According to Smith, Brown then approached her with
a gun and said: “You’re gonna do what? You ain’t doing nothing.” He put the gun to her
left eye, told her he would shoot her, and hit her in the back of the head with the gun. She
stated that she was familiar with firearms and described it as “metal,” “hard,” “heavy,” and
“a real handgun.” A surveillance video of the incident was played, which showed the fight,
Smith’s involvement, and Brown pulling a dark object appearing to be a handgun from his
pocket and holding it toward Smith’s face, then hitting her in the back of the head.
{¶5} Detective Nicole Smith of the Warren Police Department spoke with Kashe
Smith, who identified Brown as the perpetrator. Kashe told Detective Smith that Brown
had put the gun in her eye and hit her across the back of the head, although she did not
report that he threatened to kill her. Detective Smith indicated that it is often the case
that, in this type of incident, police do not recover the firearm. Patrolman William Fowler
who responded to the incident also reported that they did not recover a firearm from the
scene.
{¶6} The jury found Brown guilty of the counts as charged in the indictment. The
court sentenced Brown to a total prison term of eight to nine years.
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{¶7} Brown timely appeals and raises the following assignment of error:
{¶8} “The trial court committed reversible error and an abuse of discretion when
it failed to grant the Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss [Rule 29] for his convictions were based
on legally insufficient evidence and were against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
Weight and Sufficiency of the Evidence
{¶9} Criminal Rule 29(A) provides that “[t]he court . . . shall order the entry of a
judgment of acquittal . . . if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” In
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State
v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. “The question of
whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction ‘is a test of adequacy,’ which we review
de novo.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Hall,
2025-Ohio-1708, ¶ 11 (11th Dist.).
{¶10} In contrast, “weight of the evidence addresses the evidence’s effect of
inducing belief” and the reviewing court asks “whose evidence is more persuasive—the
state’s or the defendant’s?” State v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 25, citing State v.
Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). An appellate court must consider all the
evidence in the record, the reasonable inferences, the credibility of the witnesses, and
whether, “in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created
such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new
trial ordered.” (Citation omitted.)
Thompkins at 387. “[A] finding that a conviction is
supported by the weight of the evidence necessarily must include a finding of sufficiency.”
(Citation omitted.) State v. Barnes,
2023-Ohio-353, ¶ 43 (11th Dist.).
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Case No. 2025-T-0001
{¶11} Brown argues that there was insufficient evidence that a firearm was used,
discharged, or operable as is required to support his convictions.
{¶12} To convict Brown of Felonious Assault, the State was required to prove that
he did knowingly “[c]ause or attempt to cause physical harm to another . . . by means of
a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance.” R.C. 2903.11(A)(2). For Having Weapons
While Under Disability, the State was required to prove that he did “knowingly acquire,
have, carry, or use any firearm or dangerous ordnance,” although prohibited from doing
so due to a felony drug conviction. R.C. 2923.13(A)(3). Finally, the firearm specification
requires proof that he “had a firearm on or about [his] person or under [his] control while
committing the offense and displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm. . . or used it to
facilitate the offense.” R.C. 2941.145(A).
{¶13} In relation to the existence of the firearm, Kashe Smith gave detailed
testimony that Brown placed a firearm at her eye and then hit her on the head with it. She
explained that she was familiar with guns, saw the gun, and described it as heavy and
made of metal. She did not express any doubt that the item used by Brown while
assaulting her was a firearm.
Operability of the Firearm
{¶14} Brown argues that to sustain the convictions, the State was required to
demonstrate that, in addition to using a firearm, such firearm was operable. R.C.
2923.11(B)(1) defines a firearm as “any deadly weapon capable of expelling or propelling
one or more projectiles by the action of an explosive or combustible propellant. ‘Firearm’
includes an unloaded firearm, and any firearm that is inoperable but that can readily be
rendered operable.” A firearm must be operable to sustain convictions for Having
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Weapons While Under Disability and a firearm specification. State v. Kovacic, 2003-Ohio-
5219, ¶ 23 (11th Dist.) (“operability is an essential element of” a firearm specification);
State v. Johns, 2015-Ohio-2455, ¶ 22 (11th Dist.) (operability considered for the purposes
of having weapons under disability conviction).
{¶15} As an initial matter, the fact that the firearm used in the offense was not
recovered or introduced as evidence does not mandate a determination that its operability
could not be proven. “[T]he recovery of a firearm used in a criminal offense is not required
to prove that a particular firearm was operable at the time of the crime.” Johns at ¶ 31;
State v. Tyler,
2013-Ohio-3393, ¶ 40 (11th Dist.) (“it is not necessary to admit the firearm
. . . into evidence in order to establish a firearm specification”) (citation omitted). Instead,
“[i]n determining whether an individual was in possession of a firearm and whether the
firearm was operable . . . at the time of the offense, the trier of fact may consider all
relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the crime.” Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d at
385; R.C. 2923.11(B) (in determining whether a firearm is capable of being fired, “the trier
of fact may rely upon circumstantial evidence, including, but not limited to, the
representations and actions of the individual exercising control over the firearm.”). The
Ohio Supreme Court has held that where the defendant brandishes a firearm and
threatens to discharge it, “‘the threat can be sufficient to satisfy the state’s burden of
proving that the firearm was operable.’”
Johns at ¶ 31, quoting
Thompkins at 384.
{¶16} In the present matter, there was circumstantial evidence of operability
presented through Kashe Smith’s testimony. She testified that Brown held the gun to her
eye, implying a threat of shooting, and then further verbally stated that he would kill her.
This court has found sufficient evidence of operability in similar circumstances where a
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Case No. 2025-T-0001
gun was not fired. For example, in Tyler, this court found an “implicit threat” where the
victim observed and described the gun, it was pointed toward his face, and he was afraid
he would be shot. It concluded that “[p]ointing the gun says all one needs to know
regarding the implicit threat component” and the facts satisfied the requirement to
demonstrate operability set forth in Thompkins. Tyler at ¶ 41-42. Also State v. Hunter,
2018-Ohio-5325, ¶ 21-24 (11th Dist.) (brandishing a firearm and pointing it at victims while
stealing property was sufficient evidence of operability); State v. Hansard, 2018-Ohio-
5181, ¶ 37 (11th Dist.) (evidence supported a finding of operability where the defendant
pointed a gun at the victim’s forehead, told him not to move, and stole an item).
{¶17} Brown’s citation to State v. Howse, 2024-Ohio-503 (9th Dist.), is unavailing.
In Howse, the court found the discharge of a firearm demonstrated its operability. Id. at
¶ 17. The fact that this was sufficient to support a conviction for weapons disability and
firearm specification convictions does not preclude other, differing facts from also
supporting such convictions.
{¶18} As to Felonious Assault, the State demonstrated Brown used a “deadly
weapon,” defined as “any instrument, device, or thing capable of inflicting death, and
designed or specially adapted for use as a weapon, or possessed, carried, or used as a
weapon.” R.C. 2923.11(A). In addition to being an operable firearm, the weapon was
also used to hit Smith in the head. An item can be a deadly weapon if capable of being
used as a bludgeon, particularly in an area such as the head. State v. Valentin, 2009-
Ohio-6038, ¶ 37-41 (11th Dist.). There was sufficient evidence that the firearm was a
deadly weapon.
{¶19} In relation to his manifest weight claims, Brown reiterates the argument that
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there was a lack of evidence to demonstrate a firearm was discharged or operable. As
noted above, the testimony of the victim established operability. There is nothing in the
record to contradict her testimony that the object Brown held to her face and hit her with
was a firearm. While Detective Smith testified that Kashe had not mentioned the threat
to kill her, the jury was in the best position to determine whether Kashe’s testimony was
credible. Further, even if the verbal threat was not made, as noted above, pointing the
gun in Smith’s eye implied a threat for the purpose of operability. Tyler at ¶ 41-42. We
disagree with Brown’s statement that the State’s case was based on Kashe Smith’s
“interpretation of the video” of the incident. Her testimony established the events she
experienced and the surveillance video showing Brown holding an object consistent with
a handgun only served to buttress Smith’s testimony. Smith’s testimony, largely
uncontradicted, supported by the video, provided evidence that supported the convictions
by the weight and sufficiency of the evidence.
{¶20} The sole assignment of error is without merit.
{¶21} For the foregoing reasons, Brown’s convictions for Felonious Assault,
Having Weapons While Under Disability, and a firearm specification in the Trumbull
County Court of Common Pleas are affirmed. Costs to be taxed against appellant.
ROBERT J. PATTON, P.J.,
MATT LYNCH, J.,
concur.
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Case No. 2025-T-0001
JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the Opinion of this court, the assignment of error is
without merit. The order of this court is that the judgment of the Trumbull County Court
of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Costs to be taxed against appellant.
JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH
PRESIDING JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON,
concurs
JUDGE MATT LYNCH,
concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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