State v. Trader

[Cite as State v. Trader, 

.]


                                        COURT OF APPEALS
                                     RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                       JUDGES:
STATE OF OHIO                                  :       Hon. Kevin W. Popham, P.J.
                                               :       Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
                         Plaintiff-Appellee    :       Hon. David M. Gormley, J.
                                               :
-vs-                                           :
                                               :       Case No. 2025-CA-0001
ASHLEE TRADER                                  :
                                               :
                     Defendant-Appellant       :       OPINION




CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                           Appeal from the Mansfield Municipal Court,
                                                   Case No, 2024-CRB-73K



JUDGMENT:                                          Affirmed



DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                            August 11, 2025



APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee                             For Defendant-Appellant

JODIE M. SCHUMACHER                                ASHLEE TRADER
Prosecuting Attorney                               780 E. Debby Lane
BY: MICHELLE FINK                                  Ontario, OH 44906
Assistant Prosecutor
38 South Park Street
Mansfield, OH 44902
[Cite as State v. Trader, 

.]


Popham, P.J.,

       {¶1}      Defendant-Appellant Ashlee Trader (“Trader”) appeals her conviction and

sentence after a no contest plea in the Mansfield Municipal Court, Richland County, Ohio.

For the reasons below, we affirm.

                                         Facts and Procedural History

       {¶2}      Trader and the complainant were neighbors who became embroiled in a

property line dispute. Both parties contacted law enforcement multiple times to report

perceived encroachments. T. at 7. Officers recorded body camera footage during these

responses. 

       {¶3}      Trader allegedly installed video surveillance cameras aimed at the

complainant’s residence and subsequently posted footage online.           Trader was also

alleged to have trespassed on the complainant’s property, contacted the complainant’s

employer concerning the complainant’s prior criminal history, and published disparaging

statements about the complainant and her family on various social media platforms.

       {¶4}      On September 1, 2023, Trader was charged with menacing by stalking, a

first-degree misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 2903.211. The case was transferred to the

Mansfield Municipal Court in January 2024.

       {¶5}      On November 20, 2024, the State informed the trial court that, pursuant to

pretrial discussions, it would amend the menacing by stalking charge to disorderly

conduct, a fourth-degree misdemeanor under R.C. 2917.11(A), in exchange for a no-

contest plea. T. at 3. Trader accepted the plea agreement, entered a no-contest plea,

and stipulated to a finding of guilt. Id. at 5.
      {¶6}      The prosecutor read the complaint into the record. Id. at 5-6. The trial court

found that the charging document adequately alleged the elements of fear of physical

harm and persistence - elements sufficient to support a fourth-degree misdemeanor

charge of disorderly conduct. Id. at 6. The court accepted the plea and entered a finding

of guilt. Id.

      {¶7}      Prior to sentencing, the trial court heard statements from defense counsel,

the complainant, and the prosecution. A disagreement arose over whether the State had

previously indicated an intent to recommend a jail sentence. T. at 11-13. The court

acknowledged its involvement in pretrial discussions, and gave consideration to the

complainant’s statement, particularly noting that she and her family had moved from the

neighborhood at considerable cost and inconvenience. Id. at 14.

      {¶8}      The court then imposed sentence as follows:

                [C]onsistent with previous discussions, the Court is going to, at this

       point, impose a maximum fine of $250, 30 days in jail, that is suspended.

                                       Assignments of Error

      {¶9}      Trader presents five assignments of error for our review,

      {¶10}     “WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPOSING A SUSPENDED

JAIL SENTENCE, AND MAXIMUM FINES CONTRARY TO THE AGREED-UPON PLEA

TERMS, AS DEMONSTRATED IN THE EMAIL FROM ATTORNEY MAYER ABOUT THE

PLEA DEAL (EXHIBIT C). THE PLEA AGREEMENT SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED NO

JAIL TIME, NO PROBATION, AND NO RESTITUTION; HOWEVER, THE TRIAL COURT

IMPOSED A SUSPENDED 30-DAY JAIL SENTENCE AND MAXIMUM FINES,

VIOLATING THE NEGOTIATED PLEA AGREEMENT.”
     {¶11}   “II. WHETHER THE PROSECUTOR'S CONDITIONING OF THE PLEA

OFFER ON THE PAYMENT OF A CIVIL DEBT CONSTITUTED MISCONDUCT, AS

EVIDENCED BY EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE (EXHIBIT I-11) AND THE GRIEVANCE

FILED WITH THE OHIO SUPREME COURT DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL (EXHIBIT J-1

TO J-3). THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY LINKED A CRIMINAL PLEA TO A CIVIL

OBLIGATION, VIOLATING ETHICAL GUIDELINES AND OHIO REVISED CODE

2921.03   (COERCION).     ADDITIONALLY,   WHETHER     THE   PROSECUTOR

MISREPRESENTED      THE   FACTS   SURROUNDING   THE   SERVICE   OF   THE

SUMMONS, AS SHOWN IN EXHIBIT B, POLICE REPORT OF HOW THE SUMMONS

WAS SERVED & EXHIBIT A, TRANSCRIPT OF THE PLEA HEARING.”

     {¶12}   “III. WHETHER THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE TIMELY

AND COMPLETE DISCOVERY, INCLUDING BODY CAM FOOTAGE, DEPRIVED THE

DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL, AS DEMONSTRATED IN EXHIBIT H (PUBLIC

RECORDS REQUESTS AND RESPONSES), EXHIBIT A-7 (TRANSCRIPT OF PLEA

HEARING), AND EXHIBIT F-1 TO F-55 (DISCOVERY DOCUMENTS).         THESE

EXHIBITS SHOW THAT CRITICAL MATERIALS WERE EITHER WITHHELD OR

PROVIDED LATE, VIOLATING THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND

PREVENTING ADEQUATE PREPARATION.”

     {¶13}   “IV. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO RULE ON CRITICAL

MOTIONS, INCLUDING THE MOTION TO DISMISS FOR PROSECUTORIAL

MISCONDUCT, MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE, AND MOTION TO COMPEL THE

BILL OF PARTICULARS, DEPRIVED THE DEFENDANT OF A FAIR OPPORTUNITY

TO CHALLENGE KEY ISSUES IN THE CASE, AS DEMONSTRATED IN THE
PROCEDURAL RECORD AND MOTIONS FILED.                    THESE MOTIONS WERE NOT

ADDRESSED BY THE COURT, HINDERING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S

DEFENSE.”

      {¶14}   “V. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S RELIANCE ON CIVIL MATTERS,

PARTICULARLY THE VICTIM'S IMPACT STATEMENT (EXHIBIT G-1 TO G-3),

IMPROPERLY       INFLUENCED       THE    SENTENCING        DECISION.     THE    VICTIM'S

STATEMENT, WHICH FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON CIVIL PROPERTY ISSUES

UNRELATED       TO    THE    CRIMINAL     CHARGE,      SHOULD      NOT     HAVE    BEEN

CONSIDERED IN SENTENCING, AS IT UNDERMINED THE FAIRNESS AND

INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS. THIS RELIANCE ON CIVIL MATTERS

WAS NOT APPROPRIATE UNDER STATE V. BROWN, 65 OHIO ST.3D 649 (1992)

[sic.], WHICH HELD THAT SUCH ISSUES SHOULD NOT INFLUENCE CRIMINAL

SENTENCING.”

                                      Pro se appellants

      {¶15}   We understand that Trader has filed this appeal pro se. Nevertheless, “like

members of the bar, pro se litigants are required to comply with rules of practice and

procedure.” Hardy v. Belmont Correctional Inst., 

 (10th Dist.). See

also State v. Hall, 

 (11th Dist.). We also understand that “an

appellate court will ordinarily indulge a pro se litigant where there is some semblance of

compliance with the appellate rules.” State v. Richard, 

, ¶ 4 (8th Dist.)

(internal quotation omitted); Haines v. Kerner, 

 (1972) (pleadings

prepared by prisoners who do not have access to counsel should be liberally construed);

McNeil v. United States, 

 (1993) (same); Houston v. Lack, 

 (1988) (some procedural rules must give way because of the unique circumstance of

incarceration). See also State v. Harris, 

, ¶¶ 9 - 10 (5th Dist.).

        {¶16}   Although in a pro se action this Court allows latitude to the unrepresented

defendant in the presentation of her case, this Court is not required to totally disregard

rules of procedure. See, Wellington v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 

, ¶

18. (A substantial disregard for the rules cannot be tolerated).

        {¶17}   This Court does not have discretion and must disregard facts, arguments,

or evidence presented in the appellate brief when those facts, arguments, or evidence

were not presented to the trial court. In State v. Hooks, 

 (2001), the

Supreme Court of Ohio noted, “a reviewing court cannot add matter to the record before

it that was not a part of the trial court's proceedings, and then decide the appeal on the

basis of the new matter. See, State v. Ishmail, 

 (1978).” It is also a

longstanding rule “that the record cannot be enlarged by factual assertions in the brief.”

Dissolution of Doty v. Doty, 

 (4th Dist., Feb. 28, 1980), citing Scioto Bank

v. Columbus Union Stock Yards, 

 (10th Dist. 1963). New material

and factual assertions contained in any brief in this Court may not be considered. See

North v. Beightler, 

, quoting Dzina v. Celebrezze, 

,

¶ 16.

        {¶18}   Therefore, we have disregarded facts in the parties’ briefs, and exhibits

attached to those briefs, that are outside of the trial court record. State v. Stevens, 2023-

Ohio-2736, ¶ 16 (5th Dist.).
                                    The Mootness Doctrine

      {¶19}    Mootness is a jurisdictional question because courts are tasked with

deciding adversarial legal cases and issuing judgments that can be carried into effect.

Cyran v. Cyran, 

, citing Fortner v. Thomas, 

 (1970).

See also United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 

 (1920); North Carolina v.

Rice, 

 (1971). Under the mootness doctrine, courts will not decide

cases in which there is no longer an actual legal controversy between the parties. In re

A.G., 

. Because mootness is jurisdictional, a court must address it

even if the parties do not raise the issue. Rice, 

. Here, the State contends

that this appeal is moot because Trader voluntarily completed the sentence imposed by

the trial court.

      {¶20}    As the Supreme Court of Ohio has noted, “an event that causes a case to

be moot may be proved by extrinsic evidence outside the record.” State ex rel. Nelson v.

Russo, 

 (2000), quoting Pewitt v. Lorain Correctional Inst., 

 (1992). Accord, Miner v. Witt, 

, 239 (1910). See also

State v. Lawless, 

 (5th Dist.); State v. Williams, 

(5th Dist.).

      {¶21}    Although there are exceptions to the mootness doctrine, none apply in this

case. See, e.g., In re Suspension of Huffer from Circleville High School, 

 (1989), paragraph one of the syllabus (noting the two exceptions to the mootness

doctrine are when “the issues are capable of repetition, yet evading review” or the case

“involves a matter of public or great general interest”).
      {¶22}   With respect to mootness in misdemeanor cases, the Supreme Court of

Ohio has held,

              The completion of a sentence is not voluntary and will not make an

       appeal moot if the circumstances surrounding it demonstrate that the

       appellant neither acquiesced in the judgment nor abandoned the right to

       appellate review, that the appellant has a substantial stake in the judgment

       of conviction, and that there is subject matter for the appellate court to

       decide.

Cleveland Hts. v. Lewis, 

 (2011), paragraph one of the syllabus.

In Cleveland Hts., the Court specifically held that,

              The expiration of an inactive period of probation during the pendency

       of an appeal does not render the appeal moot because the misdemeanant

       failed to file a motion for stay in the appellate court where the misdemeanant

       unsuccessfully sought a stay of execution from the trial court to prevent an

       intended appeal from being declared moot and subsequently filed a notice

       of appeal to challenge the conviction.

 at paragraph 2 of the syllabus. Trader received a suspended 30-day jail sentence, but

she did not seek a stay on the payment of the imposed fine in either the trial court or this

Court; rather, she voluntarily paid the fine in full before she filed a notice of appeal.
        {¶23}   However, even when a defendant has voluntarily completed the sentence,

the case is not moot if a collateral disability results. Sibron v. New York, 

, 54-

55 (1968); State v. Wilson, 

 (1975). But see State v. Berndt, 

 (1987) (Enhanced penalty on subsequent conviction for the same crime

is not a collateral disability). Trader has pointed to no evidence from which it could be

inferred that she would suffer a collateral disability or loss of civil rights from the

conviction.

        {¶24}   Because Trader voluntarily completed her sentence – vis-à-vis paid the fine

and did not seek a stay from the trial court or this Court, and there is no indication of a

resulting collateral disability or loss of civil rights from the conviction, the appeal is moot.

                                             Plain Error

        {¶25}   Even if we found the appeal were not moot, Trader’s arguments would still

fail.

        {¶26}   Normally, an appellate court need not consider error that was not called to

the attention of the trial court at a time when the error could have been avoided or

corrected by the trial court. State v. Williams, 

 (1977). Accordingly,

a claim of error in such a situation is usually deemed to be forfeited absent plain error.

However, plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although not

brought to the attention of the trial court. Crim.R. 52(B). Trader did not object during the

plea hearing or raise any of the issues now presented in this Court. Nor has she claimed

plain error on appeal. Because she does not claim plain error on appeal, we need not

consider it. See, State v. Quarterman, 

 (appellate court need

not consider plain error where appellant fails to timely raise plain-error claim); State v.
Gavin, 

 (4th Dist.), citing Wright v. Ohio Dept. of Jobs & Family

Servs., 

 (9th Dist.) (when a claim is forfeited on appeal and the

appellant does not raise plain error, the appellate court will not create an argument on his

behalf); State v. McCreary, 

. ¶ 65 (5th Dist.); State v. Carbaugh, 2023-

Ohio-1269, ¶ 67 (5th Dist.); State v. Fitts, 

, ¶ 21 (6th Dist.); Simon v.

Larreategui, 

 (2d Dist.).

      {¶27}   Nevertheless, even if we were to consider Trader’s claims under plain error

review, they would not succeed.

      {¶28}   Crim.R. 52 grants appellate courts limited authority to correct trial errors.

Crim.R. 52(A) applies to preserved errors and allows reversal only if the error affected

substantial rights. Crim.R. 52(B) governs unpreserved errors and permits reversal only if

the error was plain and affected substantial rights. The critical distinction is the burden of

proof: under plain-error review, the burden is on the defendant; under harmless-error

review, the State bears the burden. State v. Jones, 

. See also

State v. Bond, 

.

      {¶29}   To establish plain error under Crim.R. 52(B), a defendant must show: (1) an

error occurred; (2) the error was obvious; and (3) the error affected the outcome of the

proceeding. State v. McAlpin, 

, quoting State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-

2459, ¶ 22; accord State v. Bailey, 

. All three elements must be met.

Bailey, ¶ 9, citing State v. Barnes, 

 (2002).

      {¶30}   To show that the error affected substantial rights, the appellant must

demonstrate a reasonable probability that it prejudiced the outcome - this mirrors the
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Rogers, ¶ 22, citing United States

v. Dominguez Benitez, 

, 81–83 (2004). See Bond, ¶ 22.

      {¶31}   Even where the elements of plain error are satisfied, an appellate court is

not required to correct the error. Rogers, ¶ 23; State v. Perry, 

(2004). See also State v. Newlon, 

 (5th Dist.); State v. Wycinski, 2024-

Ohio-5203, ¶¶ 21-23 (5th Dist.). Correction of plain error is reserved for exceptional cases

to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. Bailey, ¶ 8, citing State v. Long, 

 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.

                                                I.

      {¶32}   In her first assignment of error, Trader maintains the trial court erred by

imposing a suspended jail sentence and maximum fines, contrary to the agreed upon

plea terms. Trader cites documents that are not part of the trial court record to support

her contention.

                                  Breach of a Plea Agreement

      {¶33}   In this case, the record does not include a written Crim.R. 11(E) or (F) plea

agreement signed by Trader, her attorney, and the assistant prosecuting attorney.

Instead, the terms of the plea negotiations were discussed during the change-of-plea

hearing. Defense counsel stated that their understanding of the plea negotiations was

that Trader would enter a no contest plea, and the charge would be reduced to a fourth-

degree misdemeanor disorderly conduct. T. at 3.

      {¶34}   At the hearing, Trader requested that the court impose a sentence

consisting solely of the maximum fine and court costs. T. at 8. In support of this request,

Trader indicated that she was employed full-time, earning approximately $1,000 per
week. T. at 9. The following exchange then occurred between defense counsel and the

trial court:

               MR. MAYER: She can pay a max fine, Judge.

               THE COURT: Okay.

               MR. MAYER: I did explain to her that, ah, there was a discussion that

        a max fine would be appropriate in this case. She is gainfully employed, and

        she can pay, and I think she intends to pay today.

               THE COURT: Okay. Certainly, if she was unemployed, the Court

        would consider much less than a max fine, but from the sound of things,

        you are, at this time, gainfully employed.

T. at 9 (emphasis added).

       {¶35}   The prosecuting attorney disagreed with the defense recommendation and

instead asked the court to impose a jail sentence. Id. at 11. Ultimately, the trial court

imposed the maximum fine and a 30-day jail sentence; however, the jail sentence was

unconditionally suspended.

       {¶36}   Both the state and Trader agreed that the original charges would be

reduced, and that Trader would enter a plea of no contest instead of a guilty plea. The

record reflects that each party presented a non-binding sentencing recommendation to

the trial court. Even assuming the state agreed to recommend that Trader not receive a

jail sentence, such a recommendation does not bind the trial court or preclude it from

imposing jail time.

       {¶37}   It is well established that a defendant has no right to be offered a plea deal,

nor any right to have the court accept one. Santobello v. New York, 

(1971); Missouri v. Frye, 

 (2012). The decision whether to accept a

plea agreement and the ultimate sentence imposed rests squarely within the trial court’s

discretion. State v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, Aerie No. 1224, 

; State

ex rel. Duran v. Kelsey, 

, ¶ 6, quoting State v. Buchanan, 2003-Ohio-

4772, ¶ 13 (5th Dist.), quoting State v. Pettiford, 

 (12th Dist.). Crim.R. 11

does not anticipate that punishment will be the result of a successful plea bargain because

sentencing is determined expressly either by statute or rests within the sound discretion

of the trial court. State v. Mathews, 

, (10th Dist. 1982); State v.

Summers, 

 (5th Dist.).

      {¶38}   There is no evidence in the record indicating that the trial judge promised

Trader any specific sentence. To be sure, Trader received the sentence she requested:

the maximum fine, with no community control sanctions and no actual jail time imposed.

The 30-day jail term was unconditionally suspended.

      {¶39}   The trial court’s reasoning reflects a sentence based on the evidence and

representations made during the hearing.          Its decision was not arbitrary, legally

erroneous, or unjust. Nor did it produce a result inconsistent with reason or the record.

Accordingly, we find no manifest injustice. The trial court’s imposition of the maximum

fine and an unconditionally suspended 30-day jail sentence does not warrant reversal.

      {¶40}   Trader’s first assignment of error is overruled.

                                                II.

      {¶41}   In her second assignment of error, Trader first contends that the prosecutor

engaged in misconduct by conditioning the plea offer on the payment of a civil debt.
                                      Payment of Civil Debt

      {¶42}   As a threshold matter, this Court is bound by the record before the trial court

and cannot consider facts, arguments, or evidence that were not presented below. Any

new factual claims presented for the first time on appeal, even if included in a brief, are

not properly before this Court and will not be considered. State v. Hooks, 

 (2001), citing State v. Ishmail, 

 (1978).

      {¶43}   Nothing in the record supports Trader’s claim that the plea agreement was

conditioned on any payment to the complainant. Neither the prosecution nor the defense

mentioned restitution or civil payment at the plea hearing, and the trial court did not

impose restitution as part of Trader’s sentence. There is no indication in the record that

Trader paid the complainant any money in exchange for a reduction in charges.

      {¶44}   Trader bears the burden of demonstrating plain error, specifically, that an

error occurred, that the error was obvious, and that there is “a reasonable probability that

the error resulted in prejudice,” meaning it affected her decision to enter the plea, or the

fairness of the proceedings. State v. McAlpin, 

, quoting State v.

Rogers, 

, ¶ 22. Trader has not met that burden. We find no manifest

injustice as a result of the plea negotiations.

                                    Prosecutorial Misconduct

      {¶45}   Trader next argues that the prosecutor misrepresented the facts at the plea

hearing by reciting the factual basis for the original charge of menacing by stalking rather

than the amended charge of disorderly conduct. She contends this amounted to an

inflammatory and misleading narrative that undermined the fairness of her plea. She also
claims the prosecutor misstated her behavior during service of the summons, further

distorting the factual record presented at the hearing.

      {¶46}   The transcript reflects that the prosecutor read the contents of the complaint

into the record. T. at 5-6. The trial court found that the complaint sufficiently alleged the

essential elements to support a fourth-degree misdemeanor charge of disorderly conduct,

including fear of physical harm and persistence. Id. at 6. Based on that determination,

the court accepted the no contest plea and entered a finding of guilt. Notably, Trader

raised no objection at the hearing to the prosecutor’s statements and did not indicate any

confusion or disagreement with the factual basis offered in support of the amended

charge.

      {¶47}   Moreover, the trial judge was already familiar with the original complaint and

the nature of the allegations against Trader. Trader does not explain how the prosecutor’s

recitation of the original facts, already known to the court, rendered her plea involuntary

or otherwise unfair. She likewise fails to specify how the prosecutor’s remarks concerning

the service of the summons had any bearing on the sentence imposed, which matched

the terms of her plea bargain.

      {¶48}   Once again, Trader has not demonstrated that an error occurred, that it was

plain, or that it prejudiced her in a manner affecting her decision to plead. McAlpin, 2022-

Ohio-1567, ¶ 66; Rogers, 

, ¶ 22.

      {¶49}   We find no manifest injustice occurred as a result of the prosecutor’s

statements relating to the facts of the complaint, or what was said by Trader during the

service of summons.

      {¶50}   Trader’s second assignment of error is overruled.
                                                III.

      {¶51}   In her third assignment of error, Trader contends that the State failed to

provide timely and complete discovery, including body camera footage. She argues that

this alleged failure deprived her of a meaningful opportunity to prepare for trial or to

engage in informed plea negotiations. We find this argument unpersuasive.

      {¶52}   At the change of plea hearing, defense counsel informed the court that all

discovery, including the most recent body camera footage, had been received and

reviewed with Trader. Counsel stated:

              [W]e’ve reviewed all the body cam. We have received all that’s been

       in discovery in this case as of Monday, I had a chance to review all of them

       with my client including the most recently provided videos, Ashlee [the

       appellant] could confirm that. And I think that this is what amounts to a very

       reasonable resolution in an otherwise very difficult case for all parties

       involved.

T. at 7.

      {¶53}   Trader did not object to these representations. Nor did she request a

continuance to allow additional time to prepare for trial or further consider the plea offer.

On this record, there is no indication that the alleged discovery issue affected the

voluntariness of her plea or the fairness of the proceedings.

      {¶54}   Trader has not met her burden to show plain error occurred, that the error

was obvious, and that there is a reasonable probability that the error affected her decision

to enter a plea, or the fairness of the proceedings. We find no manifest injustice that

would warrant reversal.
      {¶55}   Trader’s third assignment of error is overruled.

                                                 IV.

      {¶56}   In her fourth assignment of error, Trader contends that the trial court erred

by failing to rule on several critical motions, including a motion to dismiss for prosecutorial

misconduct, a motion to suppress evidence, and a motion to compel a bill of particulars.

She argues that the failure to address these motions deprived her of a fair hearing.

      {¶57}   On November 6, 2024, while represented by counsel, Trader filed the

following motions pro se: a motion to compel a bill of particulars (Docket Entry No. 11), a

motion to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct (Docket Entry No. 12), and a motion to

suppress evidence (Docket Entry No. 13). Trader subsequently entered a negotiated

plea on November 20, 2024.

                             Hybrid Representation Is Not Permitted

      {¶58}   Although a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to waive counsel

and represent herself, Faretta v. California, 

 (1975), there is no

corresponding right to hybrid representation, where a defendant is represented by

counsel and simultaneously acts as her own attorney. State v. Keenan, 

 (1998), citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 

 (1984); State v. Ferguson,

, ¶ 97. Accordingly, a trial court is not required to entertain pro se motions

filed by a defendant who is represented by counsel. See State v. Williams, 2012-Ohio-

3417, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.); State v. Castagnola, 

 (9th Dist.); Storks v.

Sheldon, 

, at *35 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2013); State v. Lamb, 2018-Ohio-

1405, ¶ 56 (4th Dist.); State v. Davis, 

 (10th Dist.); State v.
Greenleaf, 

 (11th Dist.); State v. Brown, 

 (7th

Dist.).

          {¶59}   Because Trader was represented by counsel at the time she filed the

motions at issue, the trial court was under no obligation to consider or rule on them.

Trader has not shown that the trial court’s inaction constituted error, plain or otherwise.

          {¶60}   Trader’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

                                                    V.

          {¶61}   In her fifth assignment of error, Trader argues that the trial court improperly

relied on civil matters, including the complainant’s victim impact statement, when

determining her sentence.

          {¶62}   The purpose of a victim impact statement is to inform the sentencing

authority of the actual harm suffered by the victim and the victim’s family as a result of the

offense. See Payne v. Tennessee, 

 (1991); State v. Fautenberry, 

 (1995). See also R.C. 2947.051(B). Under R.C. 2947.051(A), victim

impact statements are required in all cases where a defendant is convicted of or pleads

guilty to a victim-involved felony.

          {¶63}   For misdemeanor offenses, R.C. 2929.22(D)(1) directs the sentencing court

to consider all relevant oral or written statements made by the victim, the victim’s

representative, or attorney (if applicable), the defendant, defense counsel, and the

prosecuting authority.

          {¶64}   We find that Trader’s claim lacks merit. She expressly agreed during the

proceedings that the maximum fine was an appropriate resolution of the case. The trial

court did not impose community control sanctions under R.C. 2929.25, nor did it order
restitution pursuant to R.C. 2929.28(A). The court also unconditionally suspended her

thirty-day jail sentence. Further, the trial court indicated that if Trader were unemployed,

the court would consider much less than a maximum fine. In short, Trader received the

sentence she bargained for, regardless of the complainant’s statements at sentencing.

      {¶65}   Once again, Trader has not demonstrated that an error occurred, that it was

plain, or that it prejudiced her in a manner affecting her decision to plead, or the fairness

of the proceedings. McAlpin, 

; Rogers, 

, ¶ 22. We

find no manifest injustice occurred as a result of the trial court considering the

complainant’s victim impact statement.

      {¶66}   Trader’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.

      {¶67} The judgment of the Mansfield Municipal Court, Richland County, Ohio is

affirmed.



By Popham, P.J.,

Baldwin, J., and

Gormley, J., concur