State v. Jones

[Cite as State v. Jones, 

.]


                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                    :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,              :
                                                             No. 114560
                 v.                               :

ROBERT JONES,                                     :

                 Defendant-Appellant.             :


                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 14, 2025


          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CR-24-688794-A


                                            Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Sarah E. Hutnik, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Mary Catherine Corrigan, for appellant.

LISA B. FORBES, P.J.:

                   Robert Jones (“Jones”) appeals his convictions for felonious assault

and having weapons while under disability (“HWWUD”). For the following reasons,

we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History

              This case is about an altercation in which Jones fired a gun at another

individual.

              On February 12, 2024, Jones was charged with Count 1, felonious

assault, a felony of the second degree, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), with one-

and three-year firearm specifications pursuant to R.C. 2941.141(A) and

R.C. 2941.145(A), and Count 2, HWWUD, a felony of the third degree, in violation

of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3).

              On September 18, 2024, the case proceeded to a jury trial. On

September 19, 2024, the jury found Jones guilty on all counts. On October 15, 2024,

the court imposed a sentence of seven to nine years in prison.

              Jones appealed, raising the following assignments of error:

      I. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress.

      II. The guilty verdict cannot be upheld because the evidence and
      testimony presented at trial did not establish the appellant’s guilt
      beyong [sic] a reasonable doubt as to either count.

II. Trial Testimony

      A. Ricardo Richmond

              Richmond testified that he lives at a “row house” on Hough Avenue

(“the House”). On July 20, 2022, Richmond encountered “a good friend of mine,” a

woman whose name he could not remember, while he was driving from the store to

the House. Richmond sometimes employs people to clean the House, which he

struggles to do because of past back surgeries. Richmond’s friend (“the Woman”)
had cleaned for him before, and Richmond offered her “[$]20, $25” to do so again

on this day.

               Richmond and the Woman drove to the House. When they arrived,

the Woman walked to a gate by the parking lot. Richmond stated that he “barely

goes over” to that area because there are a “lot of males hanging out in there . . .

smoking and drinking.” The Woman “started talking to a gentleman on the other

side” of the gate. Richmond had “never met him a day in my life. I never seen him

until that day. Never, ever met him, seen him, laid my eyes on him or nothing.”

Meanwhile, Richmond entered the House.

               A few minutes later, Richmond came out of the house and told the

Woman, “‘Come on, let’s get this job done . . . so you can go, I can go, move on with

the . . . rest of my day.” Per Richmond, the man on the other side of the gate then

“stood up and . . . told [him], ‘You[’re] being disrespectful.’” At this point, Richmond

testified, “me and him start having words back to back. He telling me[,] ‘Well, that’s

my sister, and you disrespecting her. You ain’t going to be disrespecting her.’”

               After a verbal exchange, the man — whom Richmond later identified

as Jones — “hops over the gate and . . . com[es] towards me.” Richmond testified

that he and Jones “square off” before Jones “swings at me first.” Richmond

retreated from Jones, who came forward towards Richmond. Richmond tried to

reach Jones, at which point Jones “grabbed his gun, pulled it out, shot right at me.”

Richmond described the gun as being “all black,” a “nine or a .45.” Per Richmond,
Jones “shot once” and missed. At that point, per Richmond, Jones rode away on a

bicycle.

               After the shooting, Richmond called the House’s rental office and

“told them what just happened.” Per Richmond, “they already knew. They said they

seen it on the camera. There’s a camera on the building pointing directly over

towards our parking lot.” Nobody from the rental office testified, and any footage

this camera may have recorded is absent from the record.

               Richmond then called 9-1-1. At trial, the State presented an audio

recording of this call. At the beginning of the recording, an automated voice

timestamps the call as having occurred at “July 20, 2022, 12:12:46 PM.” During the

call, Richmond told a 9-1-1 operator that, outside his House, someone had shot at

him but missed. Per Richmond, the shooter then rode away on a mountain bike he

described as black and either gray or green.1 Richmond described the shooter as

“light-skinned,” with “dreads” and wearing a “blue work uniform.” Also during the

9-1-1 call, Richmond said that he did not know the identity of the shooter but that

“he be over here all the time. I see him all the time.” At trial, Richmond stated, “I

don’t know why I said that . . . because I never met him” prior to the day of the

shooting.

               Richmond testified that officers from the Cleveland Division of Police

responded to the scene and spoke with him. Per Richmond, these officers searched




      1 Richmond’s description of the latter color is unclear in the audio recording.
for a bullet or bullet casing, which they did not find. Richmond stated that he did

not remember seeing a bullet or bullet casing, either.

               Richmond and Cleveland Division of Police detective Michael Dunn

(“Det. Dunn”) spoke about the shooting on several occasions. During one of these

conversations, Richmond played for Det. Dunn a “video [of the altercation] that

somebody had recorded from the balcony at the building” and sent to Richmond by

phone. At trial, Richmond did not identify the videographer, and the videographer

did not testify.

               Later, a Cleveland Division of Police detective administered to

Richmond a photo lineup. Richmond testified that he was asked to identify anybody

that he knew from the incident. Richmond circled a photo of Jones. He also

identified Jones in the courtroom as the shooter.

       B. Dennison Crowell

               Dennison Crowell (“Officer Crowell”) testified that he is a police

officer for the Cleveland Division of Police and that he responded to Richmond’s

House on July 20, 2022 to investigate a shooting.          Officer Crowell spoke to

Richmond and searched for physical evidence, including a bullet or shell casing,

neither of which he found.

       C. Stevie Green

               Stevie Green (“Officer Green”) testified that he is a police officer for

the Cleveland Division of Police and that he responded to the House on July 20,

2022, to investigate a shooting. Officer Green stated that Richmond “was kind of
shooken [sic] up so it was obvious that something had occurred.” Officer Green

spoke to Richmond and searched for physical evidence, including a bullet or shell

casing, neither of which he found. As for whether it was unusual not to find these

items at the scene of a discharged firearm, Officer Green stated, “[S]ometimes you

can, sometimes you can’t,” in part because “it’s difficult to locate such a small thing.”

       D. Det. Dunn

                Det. Dunn testified that he is a detective for the Cleveland Division of

Police and that he investigated this shooting. Det. Dunn accessed video recorded by

a Real-Time Crime Center camera (“RTCC camera”) located near Richmond’s

House. RTCC cameras are placed throughout Cleveland to record video for the

purpose of helping law enforcement solve crimes. Det. Dunn testified regarding

RTCC camera footage captured near the House, timestamped 12:10 and dated July

20, 2022. The footage showed “people” and “movement in [the] area . . . where our

incident would have occurred.” The video also showed a male riding a bicycle that

is black and blue away from the House. Per Det. Dunn, the man on the bicycle “looks

like the described individual,” meaning a “brown-skinned male with dreadlocks and

a blue . . . jumpsuit.”

                Det. Dunn also stated that he spoke with Richmond several times

during his investigation, by phone and in person. During an in-person conversation,

Richmond used his phone to play for Det. Dunn a video that Richmond claimed one

of his neighbors recorded of the incident. The neighbor purportedly sent this video
to Richmond. Det. Dunn’s body camera captured the video as Richmond played it

using his phone.

               The body-camera footage of the phone recording showed two people,

who are Black, moving in a circle and raising their fists, as though about to fight.

Two other people, who are also Black, are standing nearby. At no point in the video

does either person swing at the other. Eventually, the camera cuts away from the

men, showing only cars. At that point, a loud noise is audible. Det. Dunn testified

that this sound was consistent with a gunshot. No gun is visible in the video.

               Det. Dunn testified that, per Richmond, “one of his friends from the

neighborhood [was] able to advise him that the suspect’s first name was Robert and

that he also is known to work at the Karamu House.” Det. Dunn went to Karamu

House to investigate. There, Det. Dunn found and photographed a mountain bike

that was black and blue. Det. Dunn also encountered and spoke to Jones. Det.

Dunn’s body camera captured this conversation.

               The body-camera footage shows that Det. Dunn spoke through a

police car window to a black man who identified himself as “Robert Jones.” The

footage begins with Jones approaching the passenger side of the vehicle, and Det.

Dunn asking, “What’s going on brother?” and “What’s your name?” The video does

not include any events that lead up to Jones approaching the vehicle.

               After Jones identified himself, Det. Dunn exited the car. For the rest

of the video, Det. Dunn stood with his back to the car’s front-passenger seat, facing

Jones. Another police officer stood to Jones’s left, at points leaning against the rear
bumper of the car. Det. Dunn then informed Jones that he was investigating a fight

and an alleged firearm discharge. Jones denied knowing about the shooting but

stated that he remembered “fighting somebody” or that “somebody swung on me.”

Det. Dunn then asked if Jones’s sister was involved. Jones said that she was. Then,

Det. Dunn read Jones his rights; in response, Jones asked for an attorney.

               After requesting an attorney, Jones continued to speak about the

incident. In relevant part, Jones stated, “It was him disrespecting me, talking crazy

to me.” Jones also said, “I basically . . . hopped on my bike and rode away,” because

“I heard somebody called the police.”        Jones continued, “I said, ‘What for?’

Somebody discharged a firearm, ain’t nobody shoot at nobody.” Jones further

provided that his mother had lived near Richmond’s House for years and that her

neighbors knew him because he checked on her often. Finally, Jones stated that the

man he fought “pushed me so . . . we ‘bout to fight.” Jones mimicked raising his fists

while recounting these events to Det. Dunn.

               While Jones spoke, Det. Dunn stated, “I get a report. I just have to

follow up.” Det. Dunn was otherwise silent. After Jones finished speaking, Det.

Dunn reiterated, “If you don’t want to talk to me about it, I respect that right.” Det.

Dunn then asked for Jones’s contact information. Det. Dunn wrote down Jones’s

phone numbers, gave Jones his business card, and returned to his vehicle.

               Later, Det. Dunn generated a “blind photo lineup” using the Ohio Law

Enforcement Gateway, an online network. Jones’s Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles

(“OBMV”) photo was placed alongside OBMV photos that showed people of similar
height, weight, age, and skin color. Det. Dunn gave the photo lineup to a detective

that had not been assigned to investigate this case. Det. Dunn stated he did not tell

the detective which of the photographed individuals he suspected to be the shooter.

The detective administered the photo lineup to Richmond.              The identifying

information of the individuals in the photo lineup was not provided to Richmond.

Richmond selected the photo of Robert Jones, who he believed shot at him.

               On cross-examination, Det. Dunn admitted that he could not verify

that the video Richmond received from a neighbor was recorded on July 20, 2022.

Det. Dunn also admitted that he did not talk to the neighbor who purportedly

recorded the video or any of the other individuals visible in the video. Det. Dunn

admitted a gun is not visible in the video.

               Also on cross-examination, Det. Dunn addressed the lack of physical

evidence discovered at the House. Det. Dunn stated, after being fired, a bullet “could

ricochet, it could skip, it could go a million different places . . . .” Det. Dunn also

stated that a shell casing “[c]ould have went many different places,” after a firearm

discharge, depending on the type of firearm, caliber of bullet, and “where the

person’s pointing” the firearm.

III. Law and Analysis

      A. Assignment of Error No. I — Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

               In his first assignment of error, Jones asserts that his attorney

provided ineffective assistance of counsel by not moving to suppress parts of Det.

Dunn’s body-camera footage. Jones argues that, in the video of his conversation
with Det. Dunn at Karamu House, Jones made self-incriminating statements during

a custodial interrogation before Det. Dunn informed him of his rights against self-

incrimination under Miranda v. Arizona, 

 (1966). Had trial counsel

moved to suppress this video, Jones argues, the court would have excluded it from

the record, which would have changed the outcome of the trial. We disagree.

              “To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show

his attorney was deficient — made errors so serious that he was not functioning as

‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment — and that these errors prejudiced

the defense — deprived defendant of a fair trial.” State v. Newberry, 2025-Ohio-

2004, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 

 (1984).

“To show that a defendant has been prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance,

the defendant must prove that there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not

for the counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been different.” State v.

Bradley 

 (1989), paragraph three of the syllabus.

              Failure to file a motion to suppress does not necessarily constitute

ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Sanchez, 

 (8th Dist.),

citing State v. Madrigal, 

 (2000). To establish ineffective

trial counsel in this context, the record must demonstrate that “the motion would

have been granted.” 

.

              To establish whether Jones’s hypothetical motion to suppress would

have been granted, we must decide whether, in Det. Dunn’s body-camera footage,

Jones made self-incriminating statements during a custodial interrogation before
law enforcement rendered Miranda warnings. A defendant’s self-incriminating

statements during a custodial interrogation are inadmissible unless law

enforcement has informed the defendant of his Miranda rights, including the right

to remain silent. State v. Nieves, 

 (8th Dist.), citing Miranda,

.

                A custodial interrogation is “questioning initiated by law enforcement

officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his

freedom of action in any significant way.” 

. The determination of

whether a custodial interrogation has occurred turns on “‘how a reasonable man in

the suspect’s position would have understood his situation.’” State v. Farris, 2006-

Ohio-3255, ¶ 14, quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 

 (1984). An

individual is in “custody” for Miranda purposes if, “under the totality of the

circumstances, a reasonable person would not feel free to end the encounter and

leave.” State v. Griffith, 

 (8th Dist.), citing Yarborough v.

Alvarado, 

 (2004).            “‘Interrogation’ includes express

questioning as well as ‘any words or actions on the part of the police (other than

those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are

reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.’” State v.

Hall, 

 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Strozier, 

(2d Dist.), quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 

 (1980).

                A suspect who volunteers information without being asked

questions is not subject to a custodial interrogation and is not entitled to Miranda
warnings. State v. McGuire, 

 (1997). In other words,

“Miranda does not affect the admissibility of ‘volunteered statements of any kind.’”

 quoting 

.

              We find that, after Det. Dunn read Jones his Miranda rights and

Jones asked for an attorney, all of Jones’s statements about the altercation with

Richmond were voluntary. Det. Dunn did not elicit communication from Jones.

Det. Dunn did not ask Jones questions regarding the altercation or tell Jones to

recount what had happened. Det. Dunn spoke only to explain why he was speaking

with Jones, stating, “I get a report. I just have to follow up.” After Jones finished

speaking, Det. Dunn reiterated, “If you don’t want to talk to me about it, I respect

that right.” Det. Dunn then asked for Jones’s contact information.

              Det. Dunn also did not take any actions that he should have known

would elicit an incriminating response from Jones.        Except when Det. Dunn

explained that he was required to follow up with Jones, Det. Dunn stood silently

while Jones was speaking. Det. Dunn otherwise acted only to write down Jones’s

phone numbers, give Jones his business card, and return to his vehicle. The

statements Jones made after requesting a lawyer were voluntary and, therefore, not

subject to suppression.

              We turn next to the statements Jones made before Det. Dunn read

him his Miranda rights. Some of these statements are immaterial because Jones

repeated them voluntarily after asking for a lawyer. Before being informed of his

Miranda rights, Jones admitted to having been in a fight, stating, “I remember
fighting somebody . . . somebody swung on me.” After requesting a lawyer, Jones

again stated, “He pushed me so . . . we ‘bout to fight.” Again, Det. Dunn said nothing

and did nothing that prompted Jones to begin talking. Because Jones made the

latter statement voluntarily, there would not have been legal grounds to exclude it

at trial.

               The only potentially self-incriminating statement that Jones made

before Det. Dunn read him his Miranda rights but did not repeat after being

Mirandized was that he saw and spoke to his sister before the fight.           These

statements were relevant in conjunction with Richmond’s claim that the man he

fought and who fired a gun was talking with that man’s sister beforehand. Jones’s

admission of this fact helped establish the shooter’s identity.

               However, a defendant does not establish trial counsel was ineffective

for failure to move to suppress statements that, even if excludable, are cumulative

of information established by other evidence. State v. Spaulding, 

 (finding defendant did not “satisfy Strickland’s second prong” of prejudice

regarding “statements that revealed aspects of his criminal history” because “the

jury learned about [defendant’s] criminal history from numerous sources, including

his other statements to police”). The record contains other evidence that Jones was

the shooter, such that Jones did not demonstrate that counsel’s failure to move to

suppress his statement regarding his pre-fight conversation with his sister would

have affected the trial.
               The shooter’s identity is established by Richmond’s selection of

Jones’s picture during the blind photo lineup. Richmond also identified Jones in

the courtroom as the shooter.

               The RTCC footage shows a Black man riding a bicycle away from the

House two minutes before Richmond’s 9-1-1 call. The bicyclist is wearing clothing

that matches Richmond’s description of the shooter’s clothes during the 9-1-1 call.

During his conversation with Det. Dunn, Jones admits that, after the altercation, he

“hopped on [his] bike and rode away.” This evidence, taken together, supports that

Jones was the individual who engaged with Richmond.

               Further, the bicycle in the RTCC footage is black and blue, as was the

bicycle at Karamu House. Although Richmond described the shooter’s bicycle as

black and green or gray during the 9-1-1 call, the jury was free to find that the photo

and video evidence to the contrary outweighed Richmond’s recollection on this issue

of fact.

               Because Jones’s statements about seeing his sister before the fight

were cumulative evidence of the shooter’s identity, Jones has not demonstrated that

excluding them would have impacted the outcome of the trial.

               Accordingly, assignment of error No. 1 is overruled.

       B. Assignment of Error No. II — Manifest Weight of the Evidence

               Jones’s second assignment of error asserts that his conviction was

against the manifest weight of the evidence. A manifest-weight-of-the-evidence

challenge attacks the credibility of the evidence presented and questions whether
the State met its burden of persuasion. State v. Whitsett, 

 (8th

Dist.). Weight of the evidence “addresses the evidence’s effect of inducing belief,”

i.e., “whose evidence is more persuasive — the state’s or the defendant’s?” State v.

Wilson, 

, ¶ 25, citing State v. Thompkins, 

, 386-

387 (1997). When considering an appellant’s claim that a conviction is against the

manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate court functions as a “thirteenth juror”

and may disagree “with the factfinder’s resolution of . . . conflicting testimony.”

, citing Tibbs v. Florida, 

 (1982). Furthermore, in

State v. Jordan, 

, quoting 

, the Ohio

Supreme Court held that “[s]itting as the ‘thirteenth juror,’ the court of appeals

considers whether the evidence should be believed and may overturn a verdict if it

disagrees with the trier of fact’s conclusion.”

               In a manifest-weight challenge, the appellate court examines the

entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn

therefrom, considers the witnesses’ credibility and determines whether, in resolving

conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact ‘“clearly lost its way and created such a

manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial

ordered.’” 

, quoting State v. Martin, 

 (1st

Dist. 1983). Reversal on manifest-weight grounds is reserved for the ‘“exceptional

case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.”’ 

 quoting id.
            1. Felonious Assault

               The manifest weight of the evidence supports Jones’s conviction for

Count 1, felonious assault. The State showed that Jones knowingly attempted to

cause physical harm to another using a deadly weapon, as required to support a

conviction under R.C. 2903.11(A)(2).

               Jones did not testify or otherwise submit evidence for the court to

weigh against the State’s evidence. Therefore, our manifest-weight analysis turns

largely on the testifying victim’s credibility. Ohio courts consistently hold that the

factfinder is “in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses who

testified at trial” and is free to believe all, part or none of each witnesses’ testimony.

State v. Jones, 

 (8th Dist.). At trial, the finder of fact is in the

“best position to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice

inflections that are critical observations in determining the credibility of a witness

and his or her testimony.” State v. Sheline, 

 (8th Dist.).

               Having reviewed the record, we cannot say the jury clearly lost its way

in convicting Jones for this offense. None of the evidence precludes a reasonable

jury from finding credible Richmond’s testimony and assertion during the 9-1-1 call

that someone shot at him. In the video of the altercation that a neighbor purportedly

recorded, a loud noise is audible. Det. Dunn testified that this sound was consistent

with a gunshot.

               Regarding the fact that Cleveland Police discovered no bullet or

casing at the scene, Det. Dunn stated that a bullet could “ricochet . . . a million
different places.” Further, Officer Green stated that law enforcement cannot always

find bullets and bullet casings at the scene of a firearm discharge because these items

are small and hard to locate.

               Jones’s statements, captured in Det. Dunn’s body-camera footage,

also do not preclude a reasonable jury from finding that someone shot at Richmond.

In relevant part, Jones states, “I heard somebody called the police.”           Jones

continues, “I said, ‘What for?’ Somebody discharged a firearm, ain’t nobody shoot at

nobody.” This statement is ambiguous. It is not clear whether Jones is admitting to

Det. Dunn that someone fired a gun but denying that the gun was aimed at any

particular person or is reenacting a conversation in which he denied altogether an

unnamed bystander’s assertion that a gun was fired. Regardless, it was the jury’s

prerogative to believe Richmond’s version of events instead of Jones’s and conclude

that someone shot at Richmond.

               The record also does not preclude a reasonable jury from determining

that the shooter was Jones. As discussed above, Jones’s statements to Det. Dunn

about seeing his sister, in conjunction with Richmond’s claim that the man who

fought and fired a gun at him was interacting with his sister beforehand, support

this conclusion.

               That Jones is the person who fired the gun is also established by

Richmond’s selection of Jones’s picture during the blind photo lineup and

Richmond’s courtroom identification of Jones as the shooter. Further, the RTCC

footage showing a bicyclist wearing clothes that match Richmond’s description in
the 9-1-1 call, taken together with Jones’s admission that he “hopped on [his] bike

and rode away” after the altercation also establish that he was the shooter.

               Lastly, Det. Dunn photographed a black and blue bicycle at Karamu

House, where he spoke to Jones. This matches the colors of the bicycle in the RTCC

footage. Again, although Richmond described the shooter’s bicycle as black and

green or gray during the 9-1-1 call, the jury was free conclude otherwise based on the

photo and video evidence to the contrary.

               Given the foregoing, we cannot say that the jury lost its way in

determining that Jones discharged a firearm at Richmond and convicting him for

felonious assault under R.C. 2903.11(A)(2).

            2. Having Weapons While Under Disability

               The manifest weight of the evidence also supported a conviction

under R.C. 2923.13(A)(3). For the reasons stated above, the State demonstrated

that Jones had or carried a firearm, as required to convict Jones for Count 2,

HWWUD. Nothing in the record indicates that, in doing so, the factfinder clearly

lost its way in finding Jones guilty of this offense.

               Accordingly, assignment of error No. 2 is overruled.

               Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.             The appellant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.



LISA B. FORBES, PRESIDING JUDGE

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., and
WILLIAM A. KLATT, J.,* CONCUR

(*Sitting by assignment: William A. Klatt, J., retired, of the Tenth District Court of
Appeals.)