[Cite as State v. Corlett,
2025-Ohio-2907.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MAHONING COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
BRUCE DUANE CORLETT,
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Case No. 25 MA 0015
Criminal Appeal from the
Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio
Case No. 2024 CR 25
BEFORE:
Mark A. Hanni, Cheryl L. Waite, Katelyn Dickey, Judges.
JUDGMENT:
Affirmed and Remanded.
Atty. Lynn Maro, Mahoning County Prosecutor, Atty. Ralph M. Rivera and Atty. Kristie M.
Weibling, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for Plaintiff-Appellee and
Atty. Christopher P. Lacich, Roth, Blair, for Defendant-Appellant.
Dated: August 14, 2025
–2–
HANNI, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Bruce Duane Corlett, appeals from a Mahoning
County Common Pleas Court judgment convicting him of two counts of unlawful sexual
conduct with a minor and sentencing him to seven years in prison, following his guilty
plea. Appellant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in sentencing him to a
maximum sentence on Count 1 and to consecutive sentences. He also suggests that his
plea may have been made unknowingly. Because Appellant’s sentence is not contrary
to law and because he entered his plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, the trial
court’s judgment is affirmed. However, because the trial court failed to include all three
consecutive sentencing findings in its judgment entry, which it made at the sentencing
hearing, we must remand this matter for it to enter a nunc pro tunc entry to correct this
clerical mistake.
{¶2} Appellant pleaded guilty in this case. Thus, the facts of record are scant.
Sometime in 2023, Appellant, who was in his sixties, struck up a friendship with the victim,
a 15-year-old girl. The two spent time smoking marijuana together. In June 2023,
Appellant asked the victim if she wanted to “have some fun.” He then performed oral sex
on the victim and also attempted to have intercourse with her. The victim immediately
reported this incident to her grandmother. Upon investigation, Appellant’s DNA was found
on the victim’s breast.
{¶3} On January 11, 2024, a Mahoning County Grand Jury indicted Appellant on
two counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor (Counts 1 and 2), third-degree felonies
in violation of R.C. 2907.04(A)(B)(3); one count of sexual imposition (Count 3), a third-degree misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 2907.06(A)(4)(C); and one count of corrupting
another with drugs (Count 4), a fourth-degree felony in violation of R.C.
2925.02(A)(4)(a)(C)(3). Appellant initially pleaded not guilty.
{¶4} On Appellant’s motion, on March 15, 2024, the trial court ordered a forensic
examination to determine Appellant’s competency to stand trial and an evaluation of
Appellant’s sanity at the time of the offense. The forensic evaluation determined that
Appellant was both competent to stand trial and sane at the time of the offense.
Case No. 25 MA 0015
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{¶5} On May 16, 2024, Appellant requested a second opinion on the competency
and sanity evaluation. The trial court granted this request and ordered a second forensic
evaluation.
{¶6} On November 20, 2024, the parties stipulated to the conclusion of the
second forensic evaluation that Appellant was both competent to stand trial and sane at
the time of the offense.
{¶7} Appellant subsequently engaged in plea negotiations with Plaintiff-Appellee, the State of Ohio. On December 19, 2024, the trial court held a change of plea
hearing. Appellant indicated that he wished to enter a guilty plea to Counts 1 and 2. In
exchange, the State would dismiss Counts 3 and 4. The State would also recommend a
seven-year sentence while Appellant would argue for a lesser sentence. The trial court
accepted Appellant’s guilty plea, ordered a presentence investigation (PSI), and set the
matter for sentencing.
{¶8} The trial court held Appellant’s sentencing hearing on February 6, 2025. It
sentenced Appellant to five years on Count 1 and two years on Count 2, to be served
consecutively for a total sentence of seven years. The court also designated Appellant
as a Tier II sex offender. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on February 24, 2025.
{¶9} Appellant now raises a single assignment of error that states:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND IMPOSED A SENTENCE CLEARLY
AND CONVINCINGLY CONTRARY TO THE LAW, WHEN IT SENTENCED
THE APPELLANT TO A DEFINITE PRISON SANCTION OF SEVEN
YEARS, AS A RESULT OF IMPOSING THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE ON
COUNT ONE AND FOR COUNT TWO TO RUN CONSECUTIVE TO
COUNT ONE (CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES)[.]
{¶10} Appellant argues the trial court simply adopted the State’s recommendation
without any consideration of the mitigating factors presented at the sentencing hearing
and in the PSI. Appellant points to evidence that he suffered sexual abuse by his father
and that he suffers from mental illness. He also claims that because he is age 67, a
seven-year sentence is potentially a life sentence. Under these facts, Appellant claims
his sentence is contrary to law. Appellant further makes much of the fact that his counsel
Case No. 25 MA 0015
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did not object to his sentence. And he asserts that the trial court “mechanically” applied
the sentencing statutes without giving any consideration to his circumstances. He also
takes issue with his maximum sentence on Count 1 and his consecutive sentences.
{¶11} When reviewing a felony sentence, an appellate court must uphold the
sentence unless the evidence clearly and convincingly does not support the trial court's
findings under the applicable sentencing statutes or the sentence is otherwise contrary to
law. State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1.
{¶12} Appellant was convicted of two third-degree felonies in violation of R.C.
2907.04. The possible prison sentences for a third-degree felony in violation of R.C.
2907.04 are 12, 18, 24, 30, 36, 42, 48, 54, or 60 months. R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a). Thus,
appellant's five-year prison sentence on Count 1 was the maximum sentence authorized
by statute.
{¶13} In sentencing a felony offender, the trial court must consider the
seriousness and recidivism factors set out in R.C. 2929.12(B)(C)(D)(E). In sentencing an
offender to a maximum sentence, however, the court is not required to make any specific
findings before imposing a maximum sentence. State v. Riley, 2015-Ohio-94, ¶ 34 (7th
Dist.).
{¶14} Before sentencing Appellant, the trial court listened to arguments from both
counsel. It also listened to statements from the victim, the victim’s grandmother,
Appellant’s niece, Appellant’s son, and Appellant. The court discussed the PSI, which
indicated that Appellant had suffered sexual abuse by his own father. The court then
stated that because of that past sexual abuse, this case was even more offensive.
(Sentencing Tr. 16-17). The court explained that Appellant “would know more than most
how you can destroy a young person’s psyche, their trust in others, affect their
relationships for the rest of their lives by doing exactly what he did.” (Sentencing Tr. 17).
It went on to explain that while it recognized sympathy for Appellant’s terrible upbringing,
the thing that was most important at sentencing was the harm to the victim and ensuring
that “the system” does not demean it. (Sentencing Tr. 17).
{¶15} The court went on to state that it considered the principles and purposes of
sentencing in accordance with R.C. 2929.11, R.C. 2929.12, and R.C. 2929.13.
(Sentencing Tr. 17-18). It stated that it weighed the seriousness and recidivism factors.
Case No. 25 MA 0015
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(Sentencing Tr. 18). The court further stated that harsher charges could have been
brought against Appellant with harsher penalties. (Sentencing Tr. 18-19).
{¶16} Appellant’s maximum sentence on Count 1 is not contrary to law. The trial
court considered all of the statutory sentencing considerations. Further, it was not
required to make any particular findings before sentencing Appellant to a maximum
sentence. And, contrary to Appellant’s assertion, the trial court specifically took into
consideration the fact that Appellant himself had been a victim of sexual abuse.
{¶17} As to the issue of consecutive sentences, R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires a
trial court to make specific findings:
(4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions
of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison
terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is
necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender
and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness
of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public,
and if the court also finds any of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses
while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction
imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised
Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of
one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of
the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single
prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses
of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.
(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime
by the offender.
Case No. 25 MA 0015
–6–
{¶18} It has been held that although the trial court is not required to recite the
statute verbatim or utter “magic” or “talismanic” words, there must be an indication that
the court found (1) that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from
future crime or to punish the offender, (2) that consecutive sentences are not
disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger posed to
the public, and (3) one of the findings described in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a), (b), or (c). State
v. Bellard, 2013-Ohio-2956, ¶ 17 (7th Dist.). The court need not give its reasons for
making those findings however. State v. Power,
2013-Ohio-4254, ¶ 38 (7th Dist.). A trial
court must make the consecutive sentence findings at the sentencing hearing and must
additionally incorporate the findings into the sentencing entry. State v. Williams, 2015-
Ohio-4100, ¶ 33-34 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Bonnell,
2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 37.
{¶19} In this case, the trial court made each of the three statutorily-required
consecutive sentencing findings at the sentencing hearing. The court was not required
to give its reasons for making these findings. Power at ¶ 38. The trial court found that
consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crime by
Appellant and to punish him. (Sentencing Tr. 19). It found that consecutive sentences
were not disproportionate to the seriousness of Appellant’s conduct and the danger he
posed to the public. (Sentencing Tr. 19). And it found that Appellant’s criminal history
demonstrated consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future
crime. (Sentencing Tr. 19). As to Appellant’s criminal history, the court referenced
Appellant’s record dating back to 2010 including convictions for menacing,
telecommunications harassment, violating a protection order, and multiple instances of
disorderly conduct.
{¶20} But the trial court only incorporated two out of the three findings into its
judgment entry. In the judgment entry, the court found that (1) consecutive sentences
were necessary to protect the public from future crime and to punish Appellant and (2)
consecutive sentences were not disproportionate to the seriousness of Appellant’s
conduct and the danger he posed to the public. But it did not incorporate the third required
finding that Appellant’s criminal history demonstrated that consecutive sentences were
necessary to protect the public from future crime.
Case No. 25 MA 0015
–7–
{¶21} The trial court's inadvertent failure to include the consecutive sentence
findings is merely a clerical mistake and does not render the sentence contrary to law.
State v. Fuller, 2016-Ohio-7285, ¶ 28 (7th Dist.), citing Bonnell,
2014-Ohio-3177, at ¶ 30.
The proper remedy is for the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc judgment entry to reflect
what actually occurred in open court at the sentencing hearing.
Id. Therefore, we must
remand this case with instructions for the court to issue a nunc pro tunc judgment entry
to correct this clerical error.
{¶22} Although he does not raise the voluntariness of his plea as an assignment
of error, Appellant makes a brief mention that his plea was “suspect” in light of his mental
illness. Thus, we will briefly review Appellant’s plea.
{¶23} Pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2), the trial court must follow a certain procedure
for accepting guilty pleas in felony cases. Before the court can accept a guilty plea to a
felony charge, it must conduct a colloquy with the defendant to determine that he
understands the plea he is entering and the rights he is voluntarily waiving. Crim.R.
11(C)(2). If the plea is not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, it has been obtained in
violation of due process and is void. State v. Martinez, 2004-Ohio-6806, ¶ 11 (7th Dist.),
citing Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
{¶24} A trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) pertaining to the
waiver of five federal constitutional rights. Martinez at ¶ 12. These rights include the right
against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, the right to confront one's accusers, the
right to compel witnesses to testify by compulsory process, and the right to proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). A trial court need only substantially
comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) pertaining to non-constitutional rights such as: informing
the defendant of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved and, if
applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or community control sanctions
at the sentencing hearing; informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant
understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest; and informing the defendant that
the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.
Martinez at ¶ 12, citing Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)(b).
{¶25} In this case, the trial court properly advised Appellant of each of the
constitutional rights he was waiving by entering a guilty plea. The court advised him that
Case No. 25 MA 0015
–8–
he was waiving the right to a jury trial, the right to confront witnesses against him, the
right to compel witnesses on his behalf, the right to require the State to prove his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right against self-incrimination. (Plea Tr.12-14).
Appellant does not dispute this in his brief. Thus, the trial court strictly complied with
Crim.R. 11(C)(2) pertaining to the waiver of Appellant's federal constitutional rights.
{¶26} Therefore, we must move on to consider whether the trial court substantially
complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) pertaining to Appellant's non-constitutional rights. The
trial court advised Appellant of the nature of the charges against him, the maximum
penalty he faced, and the effect of a guilty plea. (Plea Tr. 8-9, 19). The court did not
specifically state that it could proceed immediately to sentencing. But it informed
Appellant that it would listen to his and counsel’s arguments and any statement by the
victim and it would not go beyond the State’s recommended sentence of seven years.
(Plea Tr. 9-10). The court also ordered a presentence investigation and indicated it would
schedule sentencing for a later date. So the court met the substantial compliance
standard in this case. Again, Appellant does not dispute this in his brief.
{¶27} Appellant only claims that he exhibited some confusion surrounding his
plea. This was due to the fact that he was pleading guilty to Counts 1 and 2 (both unlawful
sexual conduct with a minor) and the State was dismissing Counts 3 and 4 (sexual
imposition and corrupting another with drugs). When asked by the court what his plea
was, Appellant was confused as to which two counts he was pleading guilty to. (Plea Tr.
20). The court then took a brief recess so Appellant could go over the matter with his
counsel. (Plea Tr. 21). The court then took another recess so Appellant could speak with
his niece who was also in the courtroom. (Plea Tr. 23). After speaking with his counsel
and his niece, Appellant told the court he did not have any further questions. (Plea Tr.
25). He then entered his guilty plea to Counts 1 and 2. (Plea Tr. 25). Thus, while he
may have initially been confused as to which offense corresponded to which count
number, the trial court made sure Appellant had ample time to discuss the matter with
counsel before proceeding in an informed manner.
{¶28} Thus, Appellant entered his plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
Case No. 25 MA 0015
–9–
{¶29} Accordingly, Appellant’s sole assignment of error has merit and is sustained
only as it pertains to the consecutive sentencing findings in the judgment entry. The
assignment of error is without merit and is overruled in all other respects.
{¶30} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. The
matter is remanded solely for the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc judgment including
all of the statutory consecutive sentencing findings that it made at the sentencing hearing.
Waite, J., concurs.
Dickey, J., concurs.
Case No. 25 MA 0015
[Cite as State v. Corlett, 2025-Ohio-2907.]
For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignment of error has
merit and is sustained only as it pertains to the consecutive sentencing findings in the
judgment entry. The assignment of error is without merit and is overruled in all other
respects. It is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the Court of
Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio, is affirmed. The matter is remanded solely
for the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc judgment including all of the statutory
consecutive sentencing findings that it made at the sentencing hearing. Costs to be
waived.
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
This document constitutes a final judgment entry.
