[Cite as State v. Peterson,
2025-Ohio-2937.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
PORTAGE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2024-P-0075
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Criminal Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas
SETH A. PETERSON,
Trial Court No. 2024 CR 00351
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: August 18, 2025
Judgment: Affirmed
Connie J. Lewandowski, Portage County Prosecutor, and Kristina K. Reilly, Assistant
Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Eric R. Fink, 11 River Street, Kent, OH 44240 (For Defendant-Appellant).
SCOTT LYNCH, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Seth A. Peterson, appeals his convictions for
tampering with evidence and aggravated trafficking and/or possession of drugs. For the
following reasons, Peterson’s convictions are affirmed.
Substantive and Procedural History
{¶2} On May 2, 2024, the Portage County Grand Jury returned an indictment
against Peterson charging him with tampering with evidence (count one); aggravated
trafficking in drugs (count two); aggravated possession of drugs (count three); failure to
comply with order or signal of police officer (count four); and driving under suspension
(count five).
{¶3} On October 22-24, 2024, the case was tried before a jury in Portage County.
Prior to trial, the driving under suspension charge (count five) was dismissed nolle
prosequi. The following relevant testimony was presented:
{¶4} Patrolman Brock Wise of the Ravenna Police Department testified that, on
April 26, 2024, at about 10:00 p.m., he observed an orange Nissan Kicks exiting the Paige
Street Apartments onto Paige Street. Wise recognized the vehicle as belonging to a
woman recently taken into custody for drug-related felony warrants. He suspected
Peterson who also had multiple felony warrants was operating the vehicle. He followed
the vehicle to Riddle Avenue. After observing the vehicle stop in a marked crosswalk,
Wise initiated a traffic stop. The vehicle initially stopped on King Street, but fled when
Wise exited his police cruiser. The vehicle continued down a variety of streets, running
stop signs and red lights and reaching speeds in excess of 60 m.p.h. Wise pursued the
vehicle to Interstate 76 continuing west to Interstate 77 until the Copley/Fairlawn area
west of Akron.
{¶5} The dash cam video from Officer Wise’s police cruiser was played for the
jury. Along Summit and Prospect Streets, the driver’s arm can be seen outside the
window. Wise testified that “plastic bags” and a “crystal-like substance” were being
thrown from the window. The crystal-like substance had “almost like a rock consistency.”
It was hitting the windshield so Wise radioed the other officers in pursuit to close their
windows to avoid contamination. On the interstate, the vehicle wove through traffic at
speeds in excess of 90 m.p.h. The vehicle was brought to a stop in Summit County
through the deployment of spike strips, a “rolling road block,” and the presence of road
construction.
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{¶6} Peterson was taken out of the car and placed in handcuffs. Inside the
vehicle, Officer Wise noted “a large amount of crystal-like substance throughout the entire
vehicle mostly on the driver’s floorboard” as well as “a large amount of clothing and
miscellaneous items.” There was also a white fog that he believed was caused by
narcotics being blown around by the air. Other items recovered from the vehicle included
plastic baggies, a small safe, a digital scale, and $515 in loose cash. About a half an
hour after the pursuit ended, narcotics were recovered from the streets where Peterson
was seen throwing them from the window.
{¶7} Patrolman Christopher Dynys of the Ravenna Police Department testified
that, on April 26, 2024, he monitored the radio traffic regarding the pursuit of Peterson,
noting that Peterson was reported to be throwing items, possibly drugs, from the vehicle.
Within about fifteen minutes of the reported pursuit, Dynys went to South Prospect Street
where he recovered a baggie containing a white substance. Dynys’ bodycam video was
played for the jury.
{¶8} Patrolman Alexander DeHoff of the Ravenna Police Department testified
that, on April 26, 2024, he participated in the pursuit of Peterson. As he was travelling on
Summit Street approaching Prospect Street, Patrolman Wise advised that Peterson was
throwing narcotics from the vehicle. He observed a plastic bag “going across the road”
and “hear[d] what sounded like little rocks hitting [his] vehicle and almost kind of like a
dusty cloud in that area.”
{¶9} After Peterson’s vehicle was brought to a stop, Patrolman DeHoff
conducted a search of it. There was an open safe on the front passenger’s seat with a
digital scale and a “crystalline substance” which appeared to be methamphetamine inside
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it. There were also crystalline substances on the driver’s side floorboard, including “the
largest singular piece [he had] ever seen.” In the front seat area, DeHoff found unused
hypodermic needles and small baggies. DeHoff’s bodycam video was played for the jury.
{¶10} Patrolman Adam Mohler of the Ravenna Police Department testified that,
on April 26, 2024, he unsuccessfully attempted to join the pursuit of Peterson. Instead,
he went to Summit Street where Patrolman Wise had advised that Peterson was throwing
narcotics from the vehicle. He arrived within minutes. Mohler initially searched the side
of the road but, upon learning the narcotics were thrown from the driver’s side window,
he searched the middle of the road. There he located a pile of white crystalline substance
that he believed to be methamphetamine. The substance was collected in an evidence
baggie. Mohler’s bodycam video was played for the jury.
{¶11} Martin Lewis, a forensic scientist with the Bureau of Criminal Identification
and Investigation, analyzed the substances recovered by law enforcement from scenes
associated with Peterson’s flight and arrest. Lewis testified as follows regarding four
submissions received from law enforcement: Exhibit 24 collected from the driver’s side
floorboard of the vehicle: “a crystalline substance [with a] weight [of] 17.80 grams and …
contain[ing] methamphetamine”; Exhibit 17 collected from the safe in the vehicle: “a
crystalline substance, weighed 0.74 grams … contain[ing] methamphetamine”; Exhibit 31
recovered from Summit Street: “a crystalline substance weighing 0.66 grams and …
contain[ing] methamphetamine”; and Exhibit 21: “a white substance weighing 1.61 grams
and … found to contain xylazine and fentanyl.” The aggregate weight of the evidence
submitted for testing, which was found to contain methamphetamine, was 19.20 grams.
{¶12} The jury found Peterson guilty of the four remaining charges.
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{¶13} On November 4, 2024, the sentencing hearing was held. The trial court
merged counts two (aggravated trafficking) and three (aggravated possession) and the
state chose to proceed with count two. The court sentenced Peterson to an indefinite
sentence of seven to ten and a half years for aggravated trafficking, thirty-six months for
failure to comply, and twelve months for tampering with evidence. Peterson’s aggregate
sentence is eleven to fourteen and a half years.
Assignments of Error
{¶14} [1.] Mr. Peterson’s convictions for aggravated possession and/or
aggravated trafficking are not supported by sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction.
{¶15} [2.] Mr. Peterson’s conviction for tampering with evidence is against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶16} [3.] The trial court erred in failing to grant Mr. Peterson’s motion in limine.
First Assignment of Error: Sufficiency of the Evidence
{¶17} Sufficiency of the evidence is a “term of art meaning that legal standard
which is applied to determine whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence
is legally sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.” (Citation omitted.) State
v. Thompkins, 1997-Ohio-52, ¶ 23 (“[i]n essence, sufficiency is a test of adequacy”).
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court considers “whether,
after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. Jenks,
61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. “A
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presents a question of law, which on appeal
is reviewed de novo.” State v. Dunn,
2024-Ohio-5742, ¶ 28.
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Aggravated Possession and/or Trafficking
{¶18} In order to convict Peterson of aggravated possession, the state was
required to prove that he “knowingly obtain[ed], possess[ed], or use[d] a controlled
substance or a controlled substance analog.” R.C. 2925.11(A). If the controlled
substance is a schedule II-controlled substance, its possession constitutes aggravated
possession. “[A]ggravated possession of drugs is a felony of the fifth degree.” R.C.
2925.11(C)(1)(a). However, “[i]f the amount of the drug involved equals or exceeds five
times the bulk amount but is less than fifty times the bulk amount, aggravated possession
of drugs is a felony of the second degree, and the court shall impose as a mandatory
prison term a second degree felony mandatory prison term.” R.C. 2925.11(C)(1)(c).
{¶19} In order to convict Peterson of aggravated trafficking, the state was required
to prove that he knowingly “[p]repare[d] for shipment, ship[ped], transport[ed], deliver[ed],
prepare[d] for distribution, or distribute[d] a controlled substance or a controlled substance
analog, when the offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the controlled
substance or a controlled substance analog is intended for sale or resale by the offender
or another person.” R.C. 2925.03(A)(2). If the controlled substance is a schedule II-
controlled substance, its possession constitutes aggravated trafficking. “[A]ggravated
trafficking in drugs is a felony of the fourth degree.” R.C. 2925.03(C)(1)(a). However, “if
the amount of the drug involved equals or exceeds five times the bulk amount but is less
than fifty times the bulk amount, aggravated trafficking in drugs is a felony of the second
degree, and the court shall impose as a mandatory prison term a second degree felony
mandatory prison term.” R.C. 2925.03(C)(1)(d).
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{¶20} Methamphetamine is a schedule II-controlled substance classified as a
stimulant. Adm.Code 4729:9-1-02(C)(2). The bulk amount of methamphetamine is three
grams. R.C. 2925.01(D)(1)(g).
{¶21} “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware
that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a
certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that
such circumstances probably exist. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact
is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person subjectively
believes that there is a high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts
with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.” R.C. 2901.22(B).
Whether Peterson Knowingly Possessed and/or Transported Methamphetamine
{¶22} Peterson’s first argument is that there was no evidence connecting him to
the methamphetamine in question beyond the fact that he was driving his girlfriend’s car
on the date in question. “Mr. Peterson did not knowingly possess or traffic drugs, but was
merely driving a vehicle, owned by his girlfriend, who had been arrested on felony
warrants for drug-related offences, and who had all of her earthly possessions in the
vehicle, including those related to drugs.” Appellant’s brief at 10.
{¶23} There is abundantly sufficient evidence in the record that Peterson
knowingly possessed and/or transported methamphetamine. Primarily, there is the
evidence that Peterson was actively disposing of methamphetamine during his flight from
police by throwing it from the vehicle. Inasmuch as Peterson necessarily had control of
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the methamphetamine to dispose of it, he had actual possession of it 1. R.C. 2925.01(K)
(“‘[p]ossess’ or ‘possession’ means having control over a thing or substance”); State v.
Foti, 2024-Ohio-699, ¶ 28 (11th Dist.) (“[a] person has ‘actual possession’ of an item if
the item is ‘within his immediate physical possession’”) (citation omitted). Inasmuch as
Peterson was fleeing from the police, Peterson’s possession and/or trafficking the
methamphetamine was knowing. State v. Echols,
2024-Ohio-5088, ¶ 32 (“i[i]t is today
universally conceded that the fact of an accused’s flight, … and related conduct, are
admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt, and thus of guilt itself”) (citation
omitted).
{¶24} We note that, even without evidence of direct physical control, the fact that
Peterson was the sole occupant of the vehicle with the ability to exercise control and
dominion of the methamphetamine found in plain view (as well as the other contents of
the vehicle) bolstered by his flight from the police readily establishes constructive
possession. “Constructive possession exists when an individual knowingly exercises
dominion and control over an object, even though that object may not be within his
immediate physical possession.” State v. Hankerson, 70 Ohio St.2d 87 (1982), syllabus.
The circumstances cited above support a finding of constructive possession in the present
case. The methamphetamine in the vehicle was readily accessible to Peterson and his
knowledge of its presence can be demonstrated by it being in plain view and/or his flight
from police. State v. Hobbs,
2024-Ohio-2601, ¶ 21 (11th Dist.) (“Hobbs’ dominion and
control over the firearm is readily demonstrated by the undisputed facts that Hobbs was
1. It will be recalled that the aggravated possession and trafficking charges were based on the
methamphetamine recovered from Prospect Street, the floorboard of the vehicle, and an open safe on the
passenger’s seat of the vehicle.
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the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle, and that the firearm was recovered from the
backseat of the vehicle”); State v. Ellis, 2020-Ohio-1115, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.) (“the defendant’s
attempt to flee led to a natural inference that he was aware of the gun’s presence”)
(citation omitted); State v. Hanshaw,
2009-Ohio-2515, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.) (“drugs that are
found in plain view and are in close proximity to a defendant can establish constructive
possession”) (citation omitted).
{¶25} Finally, Peterson emphasizes that the vehicle and its contents most likely
belonged to Peterson’s girlfriend. Assuming, arguendo, that the foregoing is true, it would
not negate the evidence supporting possession and trafficking inasmuch as ownership of
the drugs is not a prerequisite for possession. Hobbs at ¶ 23.
Whether the State Proved that the Amount of Methamphetamine Involved Exceeded
Five Times the Bulk Amount
{¶26} Peterson’s second argument is that the state did not and could not prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, the amount of methamphetamine recovered inasmuch as, in
the process of collecting the methamphetamine, it was “literally scraped from the roadway
and/or the dirty interior of the vehicle.” “[B]ecause a foreign substance was mixed
together with the crystal-like substance, the State did not prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Mr. Peterson possessed and/or trafficked five times the bulk amount but …
less than fifty times the bulk amount of Methamphetamine.” Appellant’s Brief at 11.
{¶27} The bulk amount of methamphetamine is 3 grams and five times that
amount is 15 grams. The State introduced evidence of an aggregate of 19.20 grams of
methamphetamine in 3 exhibits: 17.80 grams from the floorboard (Exhibit 24), 0.74 grams
from the safe (Exhibit 17), and 0.66 grams from Summit Street (Exhibit 31). The collection
of the methamphetamine was documented through the officers’ testimony and body cam
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video. The methamphetamine contained in Exhibit 24 by itself exceeds five times the
bulk amount by 2.80 grams.
{¶28} During cross-examination, Lewis, the BCI forensic scientist, described
Exhibit 24 as “a larger chunk of crystal material as well as smaller [pieces].” Morris
weighed the entire contents of the package and took a random sample for testing. Morris
noted that “[t]here are some small flecks of brown material” in the package, “a few,
numerous, hard to number,” although “the vast majority is crystalline.” Morris could not
say what the “brown specks” were. The contents of Exhibit 17 also contained flecks
distinguishable from the white crystalline substance.
{¶29} The issue raised by Peterson is illustrated by the case of State v. Bilah,
2023-Ohio-4070 (8th Dist.), where the defendant, fleeing the police, “was pulling out
plastic baggies, tearing them open, and throwing them in the air, which created a large
cloud of suspected fentanyl.” Id. at ¶ 2. “The police skimmed the gray powder from the
snow and put it into plastic vials; however, because some snow got in that then melted,
the lab analysis was done on the gray liquid that had formed.” Id. at ¶ 3. The forensic
scientist who analyzed the gray liquid testified that it tested positive for fentanyl and what
its weight was, but “the amount of fentanyl was not separated out.” Id. at ¶ 5. The
sufficiency of this evidence to prove the weight of the fentanyl was challenged on appeal.
{¶30} The court of appeals explained the situation as follows:
Typically, the state recovers drugs and their associated compounds,
but the state normally is not associated with “creating” them. Here,
it is the “creation” of the overall weight of the mixture, with the
inclusion of the melted snow, that is problematic. Although arguably
it is appellant’s conduct in discarding the drugs into the snow that
caused the problem, historically weight has been based on the
defendant’s choice of drugs combined with the defendant’s cutting
agents and compounds. Ultimately, it is for the legislature to
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determine if it wishes to punish offenders for discarding drugs and
complicating the recovery and subsequent weighing process.
Id. at ¶ 19.
{¶31} The court in Bilah concluded that the evidence was insufficient to sustain
the charges. The court noted:
Although the state points to other evidence presented at trial, which
among other evidence included photographs of the gray fentanyl in
the snow and testimony that only “a minor amount of the snow” was
collected, the forensic scientist testified the weight of the contents in
the vials included the fluid and that there was no way to know if the
vials had a little more than a trace of fentanyl in them. We cannot
speculate as to the amount [of] fentanyl that was in the vials.
Id. at ¶ 21; accord State v. Spencer, 2017-Ohio-456, ¶ 46-48 (4th Dist.) (where the heroin
submitted by analysis was inseparably attached to its plastic wrapping there was
insufficient evidence to determine the weight of the heroin).
{¶32} We find Bilah distinguishable from the present case. In Bilah the fentanyl
mixed with the melted snow to create a gray liquid in which the fentanyl and snow were
indistinguishable. Any estimation of the amount of fentanyl relative to the snow was
purely speculative and, therefore, the issue was characterized as one of sufficiency. In
the present case, the crystalline substance (the methamphetamine) is visually
distinguishable from whatever foreign material (the brown specks or flecks) that were
included in the submissions. The question of whether the foreign material contributed
more than 4.20 grams to the aggregate weight of the crystalline substance (or 21.875
percent of the aggregate weight of 19.20 grams) could be considered in light of the
physical evidence without undue speculation. As acknowledged by Peterson, the issue
is not the purity of the methamphetamine but to what extent the foreign material
contributed to the overall weight. Stated otherwise, the issue raised by Peterson in the
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present case involves the weight rather than the sufficiency of the evidence. Though
visible, the specks and flecks were not substantial compared to the amount of
methamphetamine. Moreover, the amount of crystalline substance that was actually
collected was only a portion what was found in the vehicle and on the road. The jury
could readily conclude (as it did) that the weight of the foreign material did not significantly
contribute to the overall weight of the methamphetamine submitted for analysis.
Accordingly, a reasonable jury could conclude that the amount of methamphetamine
recovered exceeded five times the bulk amount.
{¶33} The first assignment of error is without merit.
Second Assignment of Error: Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶34} The term “‘manifest weight of the evidence’ refers to a greater amount of
credible evidence and relates to persuasion.” Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 19.
“[W]hen an appellate court reviews whether a judgment is against the manifest weight of
the evidence, the court looks at the entire record and ‘“weighs the evidence and all
reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in
resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.”’”
(Citations omitted.) State v. Jordan,
2023-Ohio-3800, ¶ 17. “Sitting as the ‘thirteenth
juror,’ the court of appeals considers whether the evidence should be believed and may
overturn a verdict if it disagrees with the trier of fact’s conclusion.”
Id. Nonetheless, “[i]n
weighing the evidence, the court of appeals must always be mindful of the presumption
in favor of the finder of fact.”
Eastley at ¶ 21.
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Tampering with Evidence
{¶35} In order to convict Peterson of aggravated possession, the state was
required to prove that he, “knowing that an official proceeding or investigation is in
progress, … [a]lter[ed], destroy[ed], conceal[ed], or remove[d] any record, document, or
thing, with purpose to impair its value or availability as evidence in such proceeding or
investigation.” R.C. 2921.12(A)(1).
Whether Peterson’s Conviction is Against the Weight of the Evidence
{¶36} Peterson maintains that Officer Wise’s testimony that he was throwing
drugs out of the vehicle during the pursuit is neither credible nor corroborated by other
evidence. He claims no other officers saw drugs being thrown from the vehicle; Wise’s
dashcam does not record drugs being thrown from the vehicle (“at most, you can only
see Mr. Peterson’s hand outside the open window”); Wise exaggerated the speeds
traveled during the pursuit; an open window and high speeds would draw loose items,
such as plastic baggies, out of the window; and Summit and Prospect Streets remained
unsecured until officers arrived allowing for the possibility of the drugs found being
unrelated to Peterson’s conduct.
{¶37} We find all these points undermined by the evidence in the record. Officer
Wise’s testimony was credible. He identified in real time where Peterson was disposing
of the drugs so that other responding officers were on scene well before the pursuit
concluded. Officer Dynys almost immediately found the baggie containing fentanyl on
Prospect Street. It took Officer Mohler about a half an hour to locate the loose
methamphetamine on Summit Street, but he was on the scene shortly after Wise reported
Peterson’s activity. Wise’s dashcam video does depict plastic baggies as well as other
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material being thrown from the vehicle Peterson was operating. Officer DeHoff, who
participated in the pursuit of Peterson until its conclusion, testified that he saw a baggie
“going across the road” and heard what sounded like “little rocks” hitting his police cruiser.
Finally, there was methamphetamine scattered throughout the vehicle after the pursuit
clearly suggesting that Peterson had been opening baggies and trying to dispose of the
methamphetamine during the course of the pursuit. The weight of evidence weighs
heavily in favor of the conviction for tampering with evidence.
{¶38} The second assignment of error is without merit.
Third Assignment of Error: Admissibility of Relevant Evidence
{¶39} “Ordinarily, a trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the
admissibility of evidence in any particular case, so long as such discretion is exercised in
line with the rules of procedure and evidence.” Rigby v. Lake Cty., 58 Ohio St.3d 269,
271 (1991). “All relevant evidence,” defined as “evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence,” “is admissible.” Evid.R.
401 and 402. Relevant evidence “is not admissible if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading
the jury,” and “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Evid.R.
403(A) and (B). “An appellate court which reviews the trial court's admission or exclusion
of evidence must limit its review to whether the lower court abused its discretion.”
Rigby
at 271.
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Motions in Limine and Plain Error
{¶40} “[A]n order denying a motion in limine is a preliminary ruling about an
evidentiary issue that is anticipated, and the issue is preserved only by a timely objection
when the issue is actually reached during the trial.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Brunson,
2022-Ohio-4299, ¶ 25. An appellate court applies a plain-error standard of review when
the movant fails to renew their objections when the evidence is introduced at trial. Id.;
State v. Frazier,
2007-Ohio-5048, ¶ 133 (“the defense did not renew its objections at trial
to the introduction of evidence … and thus waived all but plain error”); Crim.R. 52(B)
(“[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were
not brought to the attention of the court”).
Whether the Trial Court Erred by Admitting Evidence of Fentanyl
{¶41} “Here, Mr. Peterson made an oral motion in limine prior to the start of trial
regarding the exclusion of any mention of fentanyl and/or xylazine found by Officer Dynys
on Prospect Street in Ravenna because Mr. Peterson was not charged with possession
and/or trafficking in fentanyl and thus it was not evidence of any crime allegedly
perpetrated by Mr. Peterson.” It was further argued “that any mention of fentanyl would
only serve to inflame the jury and color their view of Mr. Peterson.” Appellant’s brief at
16.
{¶42} Peterson failed to renew his objection to the introduction of evidence of
fentanyl at the time Officer Dynys testified regarding its discovery or when Lewis testified
regarding its identity. Instead, he renewed the motion in limine after the defense had
rested. Accordingly, he has waived all but plain error. Regardless, we find neither plain
error nor an abuse of discretion.
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{¶43} Although not charged with possession or trafficking of the fentanyl, it was
directly relevant and probative to the charge of tampering with evidence inasmuch as he
removed the fentanyl with the purpose to impair its value or availability as evidence. A
conviction for tampering with evidence is sustainable where an attempt is made to destroy
potential evidence regardless of whether the item’s evidentiary value is established. See,
e.g., State v. Lester, 2008-Ohio-1255, ¶ 20-25 (8th Dist.) (conviction for tampering with
evidence affirmed where the defendant swallowed a cigarette although the presence of
drugs in it was never established). Additionally, the discovery of the fentanyl corroborated
Officer Wise’s testimony that Peterson was throwing drugs from the vehicle. There was
no error in the admission of the evidence.
{¶44} The third assignment of error is without merit.
{¶45} For the foregoing reasons, Peterson’s convictions for tampering with
evidence and aggravated trafficking and/or possession of drugs are affirmed. Costs to
be taxed against the appellant.
ROBERT J. PATTON, P.J.,
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,
concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the Opinion of this court, the assignments of error are
without merit. The order of this court is that the judgment of the Portage County Court of
Common Pleas is affirmed.
Costs to be taxed against the appellant.
JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH
PRESIDING JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON,
concurs
JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND,
concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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