[Cite as State v. Pitts,
2025-Ohio-2941.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
ALLEN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
CASE NO. 1-24-72
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
TEIR D. PITTS, OPINION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. CR2024 0138
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: August 18, 2025
APPEARANCES:
Chima R. Ekeh for Appellant
John R. Willamowski, Jr. for Appellee
Case No. 1-24-72
MILLER, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Teir Pitts (“Pitts”), appeals the November 12,
2024 judgment of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
{¶2} This cases arises from a November 8, 2023 incident, in which Pitts, an
inmate in the Allen County Jail, and other inmates, verbally harassed a female
corrections officer. When the officer called for assistance, another corrections
officer entered Pitts’s cell and was physically assaulted by Pitts. The corrections
officer sustained injuries from the incident, including a cut lip and a broken tooth
which subsequently required dental surgery.
{¶3} On June 13, 2024, the Allen County Grand Jury indicted Pitts on a
single count of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), (D)(1)(a), a
second-degree felony. At arraignment, Pitts entered a not-guilty plea to the
indictment. The Grand Jury returned a superseding indictment on July 11, 2024
which charged Pitts with the same felonious assault charge but, now included a
Repeat Violent Offender (“RVO”) specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.149(A). At
an arraignment held on July 22, 2024, Pitts entered a not-guilty plea to the
superseding indictment.
{¶4} The parties appeared for a jury trial on September 30, 2024. However,
before the commencement of trial, Pitts informed the court of his desire to change
his plea. Pursuant to a negotiated-plea agreement, Pitts withdrew his guilty plea and
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entered a guilty plea to the superseding indictment and the RVO specification which
was amended to a discretionary sentence pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(a)(ii). The
parties agreed to recommend an indefinite sentence of six to nine years for the
felonious-assault charge. The trial court accepted Pitts’s guilty pleas and found him
guilty. The court continued the matter for sentencing and ordered a presentence
investigation be prepared.
{¶5} On November 7, 2024, at the onset of the sentencing hearing, Pitts made
an oral motion to withdraw his guilty plea. After conducting a hearing on Pitts’s
motion to withdraw, the trial court overruled the motion. The trial court proceeded
to sentencing where it sentenced Pitts to an indefinite term of six to nine years in
prison. The trial court imposed 605 days of post-release control to run consecutively
to the sentence imposed on the felonious assault charge. No additional time was
imposed for the RVO.
{¶6} Pitts filed a notice of appeal on November 15, 2024. He raises two
assignments of error for our review.
First Assignment of Error
Appellant’s sentence is contrary to law. (Sent. Tr. pg. 103)
{¶7} In his first assignment of error, Pitts argues that his sentence is contrary
to law because the trial court allegedly erred in imposing 605 days of prison for
Pitts’s remaining post-release control without reducing the time by a 270-day
administrative sanction he already served. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.
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{¶8} “Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court will reverse a sentence
‘only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not
support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is
otherwise contrary to law.’” State v. Nienberg, 2017-Ohio-2920, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.),
quoting State v. Marcum,
146 Ohio St.3d 516,
2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1. “Clear and
convincing evidence is that “‘which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a
firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.”’”
Id., quoting
Marcum at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford,
161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three
of the syllabus.
{¶9} “‘R.C. 2929.141 governs sentencing for a felony offense committed
while on post-release control[.]’” State v. Mills, 2022-Ohio-2821, ¶ 7 (3d Dist.),
quoting State v. Murray,
2017-Ohio-1293, ¶ 10 (4th Dist.). R.C. 2929.141(A) states,
in pertinent part, as follows:
(A) Upon the conviction of or plea of guilty to a felony by a person
on post-release control at the time of the commission of the felony,
the court may terminate the term of post-release control, and the court
may do either of the following regardless of whether the sentencing
court or another court of this state imposed the original prison term
for which the person is on post-release control:
(1) In addition to any prison term for the new felony, impose a prison
term for the post-release control violation. The maximum prison term
for the violation shall be the greater of twelve months or the period of
post-release control for the earlier felony minus any time the person
has spent under post-release control for the earlier felony. In all cases,
any prison term imposed for the violation shall be reduced by any
prison term that is administratively imposed by the parole board as a
post-release control sanction. A prison term imposed for the violation
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shall be served consecutively to any prison term imposed for the new
felony. The imposition of a prison term for the post-release control
violation shall terminate the period of post-release control for the
earlier felony.
(2) Impose a sanction under sections 2929.15 to 2929.18 of the
Revised Code for the violation that shall be served concurrently or
consecutively, as specified by the court, with any community control
sanctions for the new felony.
{¶10} Pitts alleges that the trial court erred by imposing 605 days in prison
for the violation of his post-release control. He concedes that the offense was
committed while he was on post-release control supervision and that the trial court
was entitled to terminate his post-release control and impose a prison sentence for
the time he spent under post-release control for the earlier felony. However, he
argues that the trial court erroneously included a 270-day administrative prison
sentence imposed on him by the Adult Parole Authority (“APA”) as a result of his
post-release control violation in contravention of R.C. 2929.141(A)(1) (“In all
cases, any prison term imposed for the violation [of post-release control] shall be
reduced by any prison term that is administratively imposed by the parole board as
a post-release control sanction.”) After review, we do not find clear and convincing
evidence that the record supports Pitts’s argument.
{¶11} At the change-of-plea hearing on September 30, 2024, the trial court
noted that Pitts would be subject to an additional sanction for violating the terms of
his post release control and this judicial sanction would run consecutively to any
sentence imposed for the felonious-assault charge. When the parties appeared for
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sentencing on November 7, 2024, the State submitted a letter from the APA, dated
that same day, indicating Pitts had 833 days remaining on post release control that
could be imposed as a judicial sanction. (State’s Ex. No. 14). However, the trial
court did not impose all of the additional time referenced in the November 7, 2024
letter. From our review of the record, it appears the trial court was aware of the
administrative sanction and took that into account when fashioning the judicial
sanction of 605 days to be imposed consecutively to his sentence for the felonious
assault.
{¶12} We recognize the information from the APA and the calculations
involved are not a model of clarity regarding credit for time spent in relation to the
various PRC violations. For example, from a Sanction Receipt and Prison Term
Order from the APA (State’s Ex. No. 16) it appears Pitts was incarcerated on
November 3, 2023, five days before the felonious assault incident, and
administratively sanctioned to 228 days incarceration as a result of an APA hearing
held on December 14, 2023. Because the APA sanction imposed only 228 days to
be served by Pitts, it appears the APA already afforded him 42 days of jail-time
credit from the 270-day sanction.
{¶13} Because the record indicates the trial court was aware of the
administrative sanction and did not impose the all of the available time Pitts had
remaining on post release control, we do not find the record clearly and
convincingly demonstrates any error by the trial court sentencing him to 605 days
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in prison for the violation of the terms of his post-release control supervision.
Additionally, because Pitts has failed to affirmatively demonstrate any failure to
comply with R.C. 2929.141(A)(1), we therefore afford the trial court the
presumption of regularity in the proceedings in accordance with the law. State v.
Edwards, 157 Ohio St. 175, 183 (1952) (it is our duty to presume the trial court
acted in accordance with the law unless the record demonstrates the contrary); State
v. Frazier,
2024-Ohio-518, ¶ 10 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Phillips, 2022-Ohio-
1262, ¶ 24 (2d Dist.) (“‘[I]n appeals, all reasonable presumptions consistent with
the record will be indulged in favor of the legality of the proceedings below.’”).
{¶14} Pitts’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court abused its discretion in overruling Appellant’s
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Sent. Tr. pg. 62).
{¶15} In his second assignment of error, Pitts contends that the trial court
erred by overruling his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
{¶16} “The decision to grant or deny a presentence motion to withdraw a
guilty plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Xie, 62 Ohio
St.3d 521 (1992), paragraph two of the syllabus. “Therefore, appellate review of a
trial court’s decision to deny a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is
limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion.” State v. Keehn, 2014-Ohio-
3872, ¶ 14 (3d Dist.). An abuse of discretion is more than a mere error in judgment;
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it suggests that a decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v.
Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157-158 (1980). “When applying this standard, a
reviewing court may not simply substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.”
Keehn at ¶ 14, citing State v. Adams,
2009-Ohio-6863, ¶ 33 (3d Dist.).
{¶17} A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed by Crim.R. 32.1,
which provides:
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only
before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court
after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit
the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.
Although “a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be freely and
liberally granted[,] . . . a defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a
plea prior to sentencing.” Xie at 527.
{¶18} “A trial court must conduct a hearing to determine whether there is a
reasonable and legitimate basis for the withdrawal of the plea.” Id. at paragraph one
of the syllabus.
When reviewing a trial court’s denial of a presentence motion to
withdraw a guilty plea, this court considers several factors, including:
(1) whether the withdrawal will prejudice the prosecution; (2) the
representation afforded to the defendant by counsel; (3) the extent of
the hearing held pursuant to Crim. R. 11; (4) the extent of the hearing
on the motion to withdraw the plea; (5) whether the trial court gave
full and fair consideration of the motion; (6) whether the timing of the
motion was reasonable; (7) the stated reasons for the motion; (8)
whether the defendant understood the nature of the charges and
potential sentences; and (9) whether the accused was perhaps not
guilty or had a complete defense to the charges.
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State v. Liles, 2019-Ohio-3029, ¶ 11 (3d Dist.). “None of the factors is
determinative on its own and there may be numerous additional aspects ‘weighed’
in each case.” State v. North,
2015-Ohio-720, ¶ 16 (3d Dist.).
{¶19} Pitts argues that, contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, the above-
listed factors weigh in favor of him withdrawing his guilty plea. After reviewing
the record, we disagree.
{¶20} First, we consider whether the State would be prejudiced by the
withdrawal of the guilty plea. At the hearing, the State argued that it may be
prejudiced by the withdrawal of the guilty plea due to difficulty tracking down a
witness. The witness, who was no longer employed at the jail, posed challenges to
locate and serve with a subpoena. However, the State noted that they were
eventually able to subpoena the witness for the scheduled trial and had some
confidence that the witness would have appeared for trial.
{¶21} Second, Pitts argued his trial counsel was ineffective for several
reasons. He contended his trial counsel had done “nothing” for him, including
allegedly refusing to file several motions, prompting Pitts to attempt to file them pro
se. He stated that he and counsel clashed due to his perception that his counsel was
not working diligently on his case and his counsel’s alleged refusal to raise certain
issues. Pitts also argued that he understood the plea agreement to be a fixed term of
six years, rather than the indefinite term of six to nine years, and he blamed his trial
counsel for the confusion.
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{¶22} The record does indicate that Pitts did indeed attempt to file several
pretrial motions pro se. However, there is no indication the motions had merit. As
the trial court noted, Pitts’s counsel had a professional duty not to file frivolous
motions. Pitts’s argument that he did not understand the plea agreement is not
supported by the record. At the change-of-plea hearing, Pitts did initially indicate
some confusion regarding the indefinite nature of the jointly-recommended prison
term. However, the trial court gave a detailed explanation of the indefinite
sentencing paradigm, and, during this explanation, Pitts repeatedly confirmed that
he understood that the agreed sentence was six to nine years in prison. Accordingly,
his argument that he did not understand the indefinite nature of his sentence at the
hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea rings hollow.
{¶23} With respect to the third factor, Pitts conceded the trial court’s Crim.R.
11 colloquy was proper and that this factor weighs against him. After reviewing the
transcript of the change-of-plea hearing, we agree.
{¶24} Regarding the fourth and fifth factors, Pitts challenges the extent of
the hearing on his motion to withdraw and alleges the trial court did not give full
and fair consideration of the motion. We disagree. A review of the transcript of the
change-of-plea hearing indicates that the trial court conducted a thorough hearing
on the motion to withdraw. At the hearing, Pitts and his trial counsel provided
detailed arguments relating to the relevant considerations. Based on the trial court’s
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statements, it is clear the trial court understood and considered the arguments made
by Pitts and his counsel, even though the court ultimately overruled the motion.
{¶25} Relating to sixth factor, the oral motion to withdraw the guilty plea
was made at the commencement of the sentencing hearing. The trial court stated
that, late in the previous day, it became aware that Pitts may be seeking to withdraw
his guilty plea, but it was not until the parties appeared for sentencing that the motion
was made. Although Pitts places great emphasis on the fact that the parties had
some knowledge that he was considering filing a motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
under the circumstances present here, we do not find his argument with respect to
this factor to be compelling.
{¶26} Pitts’s stated reason for the motion was that he believed that he had a
self-defense claim. Pitts informed the court he believed the corrections officer broke
protocol by entering his cell, causing Pitts to fear for his safety and use physical
force against the officer. Pitts contends the trial court did not consider his argument
and “shut [him] down” when he tried to give the trial court more details.
Specifically, Pitts alleges that he tried to explain to the trial court that he wanted to
present the incident report written by the corrections officer to support his theory of
self-defense, and the trial court erred by not permitting him to explain his argument
in more detail. However, from the transcript of the hearing, it is clear the trial court
understood the basis of Pitts’s argument and was only trying to protect him from
making statements that could later be used to his detriment.
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{¶27} With respect to the eighth factor relating to whether Pitts understood
the nature of the charges and potential sentences, Pitts concedes that he fully
understood the nature of the charges. However, he alleges that he did not understand
the plea deal with the State and had the mistaken impression that the jointly-
recommended sentence was a definite term of six years. As detailed in our
discussion of the second factor, although Pitts did initially express some confusion
regarding the indefinite nature of his sentence, those concerns were addressed in
great detail by the trial court, and Pitts expressed several times that he understood
the indefinite nature of his sentence prior to entering his plea of guilty. Accordingly,
this factor weighs against Pitts. The trial court further stated that it “took great care
to watch [Pitts’s] body language and to listen to the tone of his voice while he was
answering for any sign he was confused” and found none. (JE Denying Motion to
Withdraw Plea, Nov. 12, 2024).
{¶28} Finally, Pitts argued he has a complete defense to the charges because
his actions were allegedly made in self-defense. However, the trial court found that
Pitts “acknowledged that he struck the corrections officer because he believed the
officer was coming to ‘do harm’ to him by the way he entered the cell.” (JE Denying
Motion to Withdraw Plea, Nov. 12, 2024). Yet, “[t]here was no evidence that even
after being struck by the defendant that the officer did anything to harm the
defendant” and Pitts had “had no other evidence to support his belief” that he acted
in self-defense. (Id.).
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{¶29} After reviewing all the applicable factors in light of the totality of the
circumstances, the trial court’s decision to deny Pitts’s motion was not
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. From the record, it appears that Pitts
had a change of heart regarding his decision to enter a guilty plea, which does not
serve as a “reasonable basis requiring a trial court to permit the defendant to
withdraw the plea.” State v. Campbell, 2009-Ohio-4992, ¶ 7 (4th Dist.).
Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Pitts’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
{¶30} Pitts’s second assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶31} Pitts’s assignments of error are overruled. Having found no error
prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm
the judgment of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment Affirmed
WALDICK, P.J. and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby
rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the
judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.
27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the
proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
Mark C. Miller, Judge
Juergen A. Waldick, Judge
William R. Zimmerman, Judge
DATED:
/jlm
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