[Cite as State v. Reed,
2025-Ohio-2969.]
COURT OF APPEALS
MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
: Hon. Robert G. Montgomery, J.
-vs- :
:
TERESA REED : Case No. CT2025-0005
:
Defendant - Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas, Case No. CR2024-0674
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: August 18, 2025
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
JOSEPH A. PALMER APRIL F. CAMPBELL
27 North Fifth Street 6059 Frantz Road
Zanesville, OH 43701 Suite 206
Dublin, OH 43017
King, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Teresa Reed appeals the December 19, 2024
judgment of conviction and sentence of the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas.
Plaintiff-Appellee is the State of Ohio. We affirm the trial court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} On October 7, 2024, The Central Ohio Drug Enforcement Task Force
(CODE) made a controlled buy of methamphetamines from Reed at her home. The buy
was for 3.89 grams, an amount of methamphetamine which exceeded the bulk amount,
but was less than five times the bulk amount. The following day, a search warrant was
executed at Reed's home where an additional 4.385 grams of methamphetamine and a
small amount of cash was discovered.
{¶ 3} As a result of these events, on October 16, 2024 the Muskingum County
Grand Jury returned an indictment charging Reed as follows:
{¶ 4} Count one: aggravated trafficking in drugs, a felony of the second degree,
with a property forfeiture specification.
{¶ 5} Count two: illegal manufacture of drugs, a felony of the first degree, with
property forfeiture specification.
{¶ 6} Count three: aggravated possession of drugs, a felony of the third degree,
with a specification for forfeiture of money in a drug case.
{¶ 7} Count four: aggravated trafficking in drugs, a felony of the second degree
with a forfeiture of property specification and a specification for forfeiture of money in a
drug case.
{¶ 8} At some point which is not clear from the record, the State amended count
one to a felony of the third degree.
{¶ 9} On October 23, 2024, Reed filed an affidavit of indigency for purposes of
the appointment of counsel. On October 24, 2024 via judgment entry, the trial court
determined Reed was in indigent circumstances and appointed defense counsel. The
same day, Reed appeared before the trial court and entered pleas of not guilty to each
count of the indictment.
{¶ 10} On December 13, 2024, counsel for Reed filed a motion to waive mandatory
fines. Counsel argued that Reed was found indigent for purposes of appointed counsel,
had been incarcerated for the pendency of the case, and would be serving a prison term.
{¶ 11} On December 16, 2024, following plea negotiations with the State, Reed
appeared before the trial court for a change-of-plea hearing. Per signed plea agreement,
Reed agreed to enter pleas of guilty to counts one and three of the indictment, felonies of
the third degree, to forfeit her real property located on Putnam Avenue in Zanesville, Ohio,
forfeit $145 in cash, and withdraw any previous motions filed in the case. In return, the
State agreed to dismiss the balance of the indictment. The parties stipulated counts one
and three did not merge.
{¶ 12} The trial court accepted Reed's pleas to count one, aggravated trafficking
in drugs, and count three, aggravated possession of drugs, followed the agreement of the
parties and imposed the agreed-upon aggregate sentence of 48 months. Each count also
carried a mandatory fine of at least $5000 and a maximum of $10,000. The trial court
imposed a $5000 fine on count one "because it is a trafficking count," and waived the fine
on count three. Transcript of plea and sentence, December 16, 2024, 14-15. Counsel for
Reed then mentioned her motion to waive the mandatory fines. The trial court indicated
it intended to impose the fine for the trafficking conviction. Counsel did not object, but
rather responded that Reed was interested in a payment plan and would address that
matter with the clerk's office. T. 17. On February 25, 2025, Reed sent a letter to the
Muskingum County Clerk of Courts indicating she owed $5,733.82 in fines, fees and court
costs and stating she desired to make monthly payments of $10 on that obligation. Docket
item 44.
{¶ 13} Reed filed an appeal and the matter is now before this court for
consideration. She raises one assignment of error as follows:
I
{¶ 14} "THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT WAIVED ONE
MANDATORY FINE DUE TO REED'S INDIGENCE BUT IMPOSED ONE ON A
SEPARATE ACCOUNT."
{¶ 15} In her sole assignment of error, Reed argues the trial court abused its
discretion when it waived one mandatory fine, but imposed the second. We disagree.
{¶ 16} We review the trial court's decision to impose a mandatory fine for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Barker, 2014-Ohio-3946, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.). "Abuse of discretion"
means an attitude that is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Huffman v. Hair
Surgeon, Inc.,
19 Ohio St.3d 83, 87 (1985). Most instances of abuse of discretion will
result in decisions that are simply unreasonable, rather than decisions that are
unconscionable or arbitrary. AAAA Ent., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redev.
Corp.,
50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990). An unreasonable decision is one backed by no
sound reasoning process that would support that decision.
Id. "It is not enough that the
reviewing court, were it deciding the issue de novo, would not have found that reasoning
process to be persuasive, perhaps in view of countervailing reasoning processes that
would support a contrary result."
Id.
{¶ 17} R.C. 2929.18(B)(1) is applicable to the fine imposed in this matter. That
section states:
(B)(1) For a first, second, or third degree felony violation of any
provision of Chapter 2925., 3719., or 4729. of the Revised Code, the
sentencing court shall impose upon the offender a mandatory fine of
at least one-half of, but not more than, the maximum statutory fine
amount authorized for the level of the offense pursuant to division
(A)(3) of this section. If an offender alleges in an affidavit filed with
the court prior to sentencing that the offender is indigent and unable
to pay the mandatory fine and if the court determines the offender is
an indigent person and is unable to pay the mandatory fine described
in this division, the court shall not impose the mandatory fine upon
the offender.
{¶ 18} The applicable fine here was a maximum of $10,000 and a minimum of
$5,000 for each count. R.C. 2929.18(3)(c).
{¶ 19} Reed argues that because she filed an affidavit of indigency for purposes
of appointment of counsel at the onset of her case she was indigent for purposes of a
mandatory fine. In State v. Davenport, 2017-Ohio-688, however, the Second District
found "[B]eing indigent and being unable to pay are not the same . . . [A] finding of
indigence for purposes of appointed counsel does not shield the defendant from paying
a fine. . . This is because the ability to pay a fine over time is not equivalent to the ability
to pay legal counsel a retainer fee at the onset of criminal proceedings." Id. ¶ 33-35;
accord State v. Johnson,
2021-Ohio-3380 (6th Dist.).
{¶ 20} As noted by the First District:
Under the statute, "the burden is upon the offender to affirmatively
demonstrate that he or she is indigent and is unable to pay the
mandatory fine." State v. Gipson, 80 Ohio St.3d 626, 635,
687 N.E.2d
750 (1998). The filing of an affidavit of indigency alone does not
automatically entitle the offender to a waiver of the fine. See id. at
636 (determining that the defendant's indigency at the time of
sentencing does not preclude the trial court from imposing a fine
upon the defendant); State v. Ficklin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99191,
2013-Ohio-3002, ¶ 13 (recognizing that " 'indigency' refers to a
present financial ability and 'is unable to pay' encompasses a future
ability to pay as well"). The trial court must consider both the
offender's present and future ability to pay the fine. R.C.
2929.19(B)(5).
{¶ 21} State v. Freeman, 2018-Ohio-4973, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.).
{¶ 22} The trial court is not required to hold a hearing on the matter or make
specific findings. State v. Lewis, 2012-Ohio-4858, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.) As long as the record
contains an indication that the trial court considered the defendant's present and future
ability to pay the fine, the fine is not contrary to law. State v. Collier,
2009-Ohio-4652, ¶
11 (10th Dist.).
{¶ 23} Here we find the record reflects Reed has monthly income consisting of SSI.
Further, she has already demonstrated her ability to pay small monthly installments by
making arrangements with the Muskingum County Clerk of Courts to do so, even while
incarcerated. See docket item 44. While Reed argues that the trial court cannot find her
indigent and unable to pay the mandatory fine on one count, but yet order her to pay the
mandatory fine on another count, she cites no authority to support her argument.
Moreover, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a fraction of the
fine it was authorized to impose.
{¶ 24} The sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 25} The Judgment of the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas is
affirmed.
By: King, J.
Hoffman, P.J. and
Montgomery, J. concur.
