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2025 Ohio 2972

State v. Nikzad

Ohio Court of Appeals

Decided August 18, 2025

Ohio Court of Appeals · decided 2025-08-18

Sufficiency of the evidence

Relies on Jackson v. Virginia · State v. Jenks

Decided 2025-08-18

[Cite as State v. Nikzad, 
2025-Ohio-2972
.]


                                        COURT OF APPEALS
                                       STARK COUNTY, OHIO
                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT


  STATE OF OHIO                                    Case No. 2024CA00199

   Plaintiff - Appellee                            Opinion And Judgment Entry

  -vs-                                             Appeal from the Municipal Court, Case
                                                   No. 2024TRD6399
  EMILY S. NIKZAD
                                                   Judgment: Reversed
  Defendant – Appellant
                                                   Date of Judgment Entry: August 18, 2025



BEFORE: William B. Hoffman; Andrew J. King; Robert G. Montgomery, Appellate
Judges

APPEARANCES: BAILEY J. RICCI, for Plaintiff-Appellee; ATHENA A. GIAVASIS, for
Defendant-Appellant.




                                             OPINION

King, J.

         {¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Emily Nikzad appeals the November 20, 2024

judgment of the Massillon Municipal Court which convicted her of speeding in a school

zone. Plaintiff-Appellee is the State of Ohio. We reverse the trial court.

                              FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

         {¶ 2} On the morning of September 19, 2024, Perry Township Police Officer Brian

Henne was working school zone traffic enforcement at Central Catholic High School and

Saint Joan of Arc Elementary school in Perry Township pursuant to a special traffic

enforcement grant. At 7:40 a.m., Officer Henne observed Nikzad driving her gold Chevy
sedan through the school zone at what appeared to Henne to be faster than 20 miles per

hour. Henne checked Nikzad's speed with his department issued hand-held laser and

confirmed Nikzad was traveling at 37 miles per hour. Henne subsequently cited Nikzad

for traveling at a speed greater than 35 miles per hour in a school zone.

       {¶ 3} Nikzad pled not guilty to the citation and opted to proceed to a bench trial

which took place on November 20, 2024. The trial court stated it was stipulating to the

qualifications of Officer Henne as an officer of 25 years, and that he was an expert on

speed, radar, and speeding in a school zone. Counsel for Nikzad objected to a stipulation

as to the officer's qualifications. The State elicited the above outlined evidence and played

the officer's dash camera footage for the court. Nikzad presented no evidence. The trial

court found Nikzad guilty of speeding in a school zone, speed greater than 35 miles per

hour, a misdemeanor of the fourth degree.

       {¶ 4} Nikzad filed an appeal and the matter is now before this court for

consideration. She raises three assignments of error as follow:

                                              I

       {¶ 5} "THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO

SUSTAIN A CONVICTION AGAINST APPELLANT, AND THE CONVICTIONS MUST BE

REVERSED."

                                             II

       {¶ 6} "THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST

WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND MUST BE REVERSED."
                                             III

       {¶ 7} "THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF

COUNSEL."

                                              I

       {¶ 8} In her first assignment of error, Nikzad argues her conviction is not

supported by sufficient evidence. We agree.

       {¶ 9} On review for sufficiency, a reviewing court is to examine the evidence at

trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would support a conviction. State v.

Jenks, 
61 Ohio St.3d 259
 (1991). "The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the

evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Jenks at

paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U.S. 307
 (1979).

       {¶ 10} Nikzad was cited pursuant to R.C. 4511.21(B)(1) which provides speed

limits in school zones. That section states in relevant part:



              (1)(a) Twenty miles per hour in school zones during school recess

              and while children are going to or leaving school during the opening

              or closing hours, and when twenty miles per hour school speed limit

              signs are erected . . .



       {¶ 11} Nickzad argues the State failed to prove 20 mile per hour signs were

erected in accordance with the statue and further failed to prove Henne was qualified to
use the radar device and that the device was in good working condition. We address

Nikzad's first argument as it is dispositive of this appeal.

       {¶ 12} During its direct examination of Office Henne, the State asked Henne how

a motorist is alerted to the school zone in question. Henne answered: "So, this school

zone has, uh, for westbound traffic two sets of flashing lights. Uh, you have one in the

area of Subway and one in the area of Mears Nissan and for vehicles traveling eastbound,

you have a flashing light at Bordner Avenue." Transcript of trial at 5.

       {¶ 13} There was no follow up questioning by the State to establish whether or not

this school zone was also delineated by signs. We have reviewed Henne's dash camera

footage and note it also contains no evidence of posted signs. Because the record is

devoid of any evidence of signage defining a school zone, we find the State failed to

establish Nikzad was speeding in a school zone pursuant to R.C. 4511.21(B)(1)(a).

       {¶ 14} The first assignment of error is sustained.

                                             II, III

       {¶ 15} In light of our ruling on Nikzad's first assignment of error, the second and

third assignments of error are moot.

       {¶ 16} The judgment of conviction and sentence of the Massillon Municipal Court

is reversed.
      {¶ 17} For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment of the

Massillon Municipal Court is reversed.

      {¶ 18} Costs are waived.



By: Hoffman, P.J.

King, J. and

Montgomery, J. concur.

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