[Cite as State v. Thompson,
2025-Ohio-3022.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
ALLEN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 1-24-51
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
DEXTER L. THOMPSON, OPINION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. CR2023 0209
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: August 25, 2025
APPEARANCES:
Allison F. Hibbard for Appellant
John R. Willamowski, Jr. for Appellee
Case No. 1-24-51
ZIMMERMAN, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Dexter L. Thompson (“Thompson”), appeals the
August 8, 2024 judgment entry of sentence of the Allen County Court of Common
Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} This case stems from allegations that Thompson, a probation officer at
the Lima Municipal Court, engaged in improper sexual conduct with three of his
probationers—S.P., J.H., and C.S.1 Relevantly, the investigation in this case began
after another probationer reported the alleged conduct between Thompson and S.P.
to a different probation officer. As a result, the case was referred to the Lima Police
Department, and a subsequent investigation identified J.H. and C.S. as additional
alleged victims. In particular, it was alleged that Thompson (1) engaged in sexual
conduct with S.P. on two separate occasions, once at the probation office and a
second time at S.P.’s home; (2) kissed J.H. during a meeting, then grabbed her hand
and moved it to his pants; and (3) exposed his penis to C.S. while he was her
probation officer.
{¶3} On July 13, 2023, the Allen County Grand Jury indicted Thompson on
seven counts: Counts One and Three of sexual battery in violation of R.C.
2907.03(A)(1), (B), third-degree felonies; Counts Two and Four of sexual battery
1
While this appeal pertains to three victims, charges related to a fourth victim were also filed against
Thompson but were later dismissed and are not at issue in this appeal.
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in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(6), (B), third-degree felonies; Count Five of gross
sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1), (C)(1), a fourth-degree felony;
and Counts Six and Seven of public indecency in violation of R.C. 2907.09(A)(1),
(C)(2), fourth-degree misdemeanors. Thompson filed written pleas of not guilty to
the charges in the indictment.
{¶4} On November 6, 2023, Thompson filed a motion to suppress evidence.
The State filed a memorandum in opposition to Thompson’s suppression motion on
November 20, 2023 and Thompson filed his reply on November 29, 2023.
Following a hearing on December 1, 2023, the trial court denied Thompson’s
motion.
{¶5} On January 11, 2024, under a superseding indictment, the Allen County
Grand Jury indicted Thompson on three additional counts: Counts Eight, Nine, and
Ten of sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.06(A)(1), (C), third-degree
misdemeanors. On January 17, 2024, Thompson appeared for arraignment and
pleaded not guilty to the superseding indictment. After the trial court denied the
State’s motion to continue trial due to the unavailability of the fourth victim, the
trial court granted the State’s motion to sever Counts Eight, Nine, and Ten on June
24, 2024.
{¶6} On June 27, 2024, Thompson filed motions in limine requesting that the
trial court determine that evidence regarding the detective’s investigative methods
and his own prior medical records would be admissible at trial.
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{¶7} The case proceeded to a jury trial on June 25-28, 2024 on Counts One
through Seven.2 On June 28, 2024, the jury found Thompson guilty of Counts One
through Five but not guilty of Counts Six and Seven.3
{¶8} On August 8, 2024, the trial court sentenced Thompson to 36 months
in prison as to Counts Two and Four, respectively, and to 18 months in prison as to
Count Five. The trial court further ordered that Thompson serve the terms
consecutively for an aggregate sentence of 7 1/2 years in prison. The trial court also
classified Thompson as a Tier III sex offender.
{¶9} Thompson filed his notice of appeal on August 14, 2024. He raises four
assignments of error for our review. For ease of our discussion, we will begin by
discussing Thompson’s second and third assignments of error together, followed by
his first assignment of error.
Second Assignment of Error
Appellant’s Convictions for Sexual Battery (Counts 1 and 3) And
Gross Sexual Imposition Are Not Supported By Sufficient
Evidence.
Third Assignment of Error
Appellant’s Convictions Are Against The Manifest Weight Of
The Evidence; Therefore, His Convictions Are In Violation Of
The Ohio State Constitution And The Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments To The United States Constitution.
2
The State dismissed Counts Eight, Nine, and Ten on August 28, 2024.
3
The trial court merged Counts One and Two and Counts Three and Four for purposes of sentencing.
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{¶10} In his second and third assignments of error, Thompson argues that his
sexual battery and gross sexual imposition convictions are based on insufficient
evidence and are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Standard of Review
{¶11} Manifest “weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are
clearly different legal concepts.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389
(1997). Therefore, we address each legal concept individually.
{¶12} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at
trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average
mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio
St.3d 259 (1981), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional
amendment on other grounds, State v. Smith,
80 Ohio St.3d 89 (1997). Accordingly,
“[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. “In deciding if the
evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor assess the
credibility of witnesses, as both are functions reserved for the trier of fact.” State v.
Jones,
2013-Ohio-4775, ¶ 33 (1st Dist.). See also State v. Berry,
2013-Ohio-2380,
¶ 19 (3d Dist.) (“Sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy rather than
credibility or weight of the evidence.”), citing
Thompkins at 386.
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{¶13} On the other hand, in determining whether a conviction is against the
manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record,
“‘weigh[] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[] the credibility of
witnesses and determine[] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier
of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that
the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at 387,
quoting State v. Martin,
20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). A reviewing
court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating
to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass,
10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight standard,
“[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the
conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v.
Haller,
2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Hunter,
2011-Ohio-6524,
¶ 119.
Analysis
{¶14} Before we address the merits of Thompson’s arguments in his second
and third assignments of error, we must acknowledge that Thompson challenges the
sufficiency and the weight of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding of guilt as
to his sexual battery convictions in Counts One and Three. However, we decline to
address the merits of these arguments because these counts were merged at
sentencing, rendering any potential error harmless. Accord State v. Sheldon, 2019-
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Ohio-4123, ¶ 11 (3d Dist.). This court has consistently held that we need not review
sufficiency or weight of the evidence challenges for counts that are merged as allied
offenses. Id. As long as the defendant is sentenced on the surviving count, any
error in the finding of guilt for the merged count is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Id.
{¶15} That is precisely the situation here. That is, the trial court determined
that Count One merged with Count Two, and Count Three merged with Count Four.
The State then elected to have Thompson sentenced on Counts Two and Four.
Because Thompson was ultimately sentenced on Counts Two and Four—not Counts
One and Three—we need not address any arguments challenging the sufficiency or
weight of the evidence regarding the jury’s finding of guilt as to Thompson’s sexual
battery charges under Counts One and Three. Accord id. at ¶ 12; State v. Ramos,
2016-Ohio-7685, ¶ 13, 18 (8th Dist.). Therefore, we will begin by addressing
Thompson’s sufficiency of the evidence of the argument as it relates to his gross
sexual imposition conviction.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
{¶16} As an initial matter, the record reveals that Thompson—except for a
motion regarding Count Seven—failed to move the trial court for acquittal under
Crim.R. 29(A) at the close of the State’s evidence and renew that motion at the
conclusion of his case or at the close of all evidence on all charged counts.
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In order to preserve the issue of sufficiency on appeal, this court has
held that “[w]hen a defendant moves for acquittal at the close of the
state’s evidence and that motion is denied, the defendant waives any
error which might have occurred in overruling the motion by
proceeding to introduce evidence in his or her defense. In order to
preserve a sufficiency of the evidence challenge on appeal once a
defendant elects to present evidence on his behalf, the defendant must
renew his Crim.R. 29 motion at the close of all the evidence.”
State v. Hurley, 2014-Ohio-2716, ¶ 37 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Edwards, 2004-
Ohio-4015, ¶ 6 (3d Dist.). Based on this court’s precedent, Thompson’s failure to
move for acquittal under Crim.R. 29(A) at the close of the State’s evidence (except
as to Count Seven), and then failing to renew the motion at the conclusion of his
case-in-chief or at the conclusion of all evidence, waived all but plain error on
appeal. Id. at ¶ 37.
{¶17} “However, ‘[w]hether a sufficiency of the evidence argument is
reviewed under a prejudicial error standard or under a plain error standard is
academic.’” Id. at ¶ 38. “Regardless of the standard used, ‘a conviction based on
legally insufficient evidence constitutes a denial of due process, and constitutes a
manifest injustice.’” Id. Accordingly, we will proceed to determine whether the
State presented sufficient evidence to support Thompson’s convictions. See id.
{¶18} Thompson was convicted of gross sexual imposition in violation of
R.C. 2907.05, which provides, in its relevant part, that “[n]o person shall have
sexual contact with another . . . when . . . [t]he offender purposely compels the other
person . . . to submit by force or threat of force.” R.C. 2907.05(A)(1). R.C.
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2907.01(B) defines “sexual contact” as “any touching of an erogenous zone of
another, including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or,
if the person is a female, a breast, for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying
either person.” R.C. 2907.01(B). “A person acts purposely when it is the person’s
specific intention to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a
prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender
intends to accomplish thereby, it is the offender’s specific intention to engage in
conduct of that nature.” R.C. 2901.22(A).
{¶19} On appeal, Thompson argues that his gross sexual imposition
conviction is based on insufficient evidence because the State failed to present
sufficient evidence of the threat of force element of the offense. As a result, we will
address only whether Thompson compelled J.H. to engage in sexual contact by force
or threat of force.
{¶20} In addressing the force-or-threat-of-force language under Ohio’s rape
statute, the Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that compelling a person by “force
or threat of force” occurs when a defendant either uses physical force or creates a
belief that force will be used if the victim does not submit. State v. Schaim, 65 Ohio
St.3d 51 (1992), paragraph one of the syllabus. The court also specified that a
“threat of force can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the sexual
conduct.”
Id. See also State v. Henry,
2009-Ohio-3535, ¶ 26 (3d Dist.) (applying
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the Supreme Court of Ohio’s discussion of the force-or-threat-of-force element to
Ohio’s gross sexual imposition statute).
{¶21} Indeed, “‘[f]orce’ is defined as ‘any violence, compulsion, or
constraint physically exerted by any means upon or against a person or thing.’”
(Emphasis in original.) State v. Euton, 2007-Ohio-6704, ¶ 60 (3d Dist.) (Preston,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), quoting R.C. 2901.01(A)(1). See also
R.C. 2907.05(D) (“A victim need not prove physical resistance” for the offender to
be guilty of gross sexual imposition). “Nevertheless, . . . case law demonstrates that
the type and amount of force necessary to purposefully compel a victim to submit
‘by force or threat of force’ depends upon the victim and offender’s relationship.”
State v. Wine,
2012-Ohio-2837, ¶ 41 (3d Dist.). “[T]he key inquiry for determining
whether the State presented sufficient evidence [of] the element of force is whether
(based on the totality of the circumstances) the ‘victim’s will was overcome by fear
or duress.’” Id. at ¶ 41, quoting In re Forbess,
2010-Ohio-2826, ¶ 40 (3d Dist.).
{¶22} On appeal, Thompson argues his conviction for gross sexual
imposition is based on insufficient evidence because there was a complete absence
of evidence showing any physical force, threats of force, or promises of
probationary benefits to compel J.H.’s submission. Thompson’s argument is
unpersuasive. Rather, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, the record reflects sufficient evidence of both actual force and an
implied threat of force to establish that J.H.’s will was overcome by fear or duress.
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{¶23} Determinately, the State presented sufficient evidence of actual force.
Specifically, J.H. testified that, during a probation meeting, Thompson grabbed her
arm and pulled her close to him in order to hug and kiss her. J.H. further testified
that, immediately following the kiss, Thompson then grabbed her hand and moved
it to the front of his pants, where she could feel his erect penis through his clothing.
These acts fall squarely within the legal definition of force.
{¶24} Notwithstanding the State’s presentation of sufficient evidence
demonstrating actual force, the State presented sufficient evidence of a threat of
force. That is, the evidence presented by the State at trial reflects that J.H.’s will
was overcome by fear or duress. Critically, as J.H.’s probation officer, Thompson
held supervisory and disciplinary authority over her, and the gross sexual imposition
offense occurred in the coercive setting of a formal probation meeting. Indeed,
J.H.’s trial testimony about feeling “nervous” and “paranoid” is direct evidence of
the fear that this power imbalance created. (June 25-28, 2024 Tr., Vol. II, at 411).
Therefore, a jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that J.H.’s will was
overcome by the duress of resisting an official who controlled her freedom.
{¶25} For these reasons, we conclude that Thompson’s gross sexual
imposition conviction is based on sufficient evidence.
Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶26} Having concluded that Thompson’s gross sexual imposition
conviction is based on sufficient evidence, we next address Thompson’s argument
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that his sexual battery convictions under Counts Two and Four and his gross sexual
imposition conviction are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In support
of his manifest-weight-of-the-evidence argument, Thompson contends that the
victims’ testimonies were unreliable and not credible. Thompson asserts that the
jury lost its way by convicting him in the face of the victims’ initial denials, their
behavior after the alleged incidents, and a complete lack of corroborating evidence
to support their claims. Specifically, he notes that searches of his office produced
no physical evidence, while reviews of his work computer and emails also revealed
nothing incriminating.
{¶27} As with many sexual-abuse cases, this case presents the “classic ‘he-
said/she-said’” scenario, “with no physical evidence to corroborate the [victims’]
allegation[s].” In re N.Z., 2011-Ohio-6845, ¶ 79 (11th Dist.). “Thus, credibility of
the witnesses was the primary factor in determining guilt.”
Id. As we noted above,
“the weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are
primarily for the trier of the facts.” DeHass,
10 Ohio St.2d 230 at, paragraph one
of the syllabus. “When examining witness credibility, ‘the choice between credible
witnesses and their conflicting testimony rests solely with the finder of fact and an
appellate court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the finder of fact.’”
In re N.Z. at ¶ 79, quoting State v. Awan,
22 Ohio St.3d 120, 123 (1986). “A fact
finder is free to believe all, some, or none of the testimony of each witness appearing
before it.”
Id. “‘“A verdict is not against the manifest weight of the evidence
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because the [jury] chose to believe the State’s witnesses rather than the defendant’s
version of the events.”’” State v. Missler, 2015-Ohio-1076, ¶ 44 (3d Dist.), quoting
State v. Bean,
2014-Ohio-908, ¶ 15 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Martinez, 2013-
Ohio-3189, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.).
{¶28} In this case, the jury was presented with two conflicting narratives and,
after weighing the evidence, found the victims’ testimony to be credible. Compare
State v. White, 2017-Ohio-1488, ¶ 51 (3d Dist.) (affirming convictions for rape and
gross sexual imposition after the jury found the testimony of the four victims
regarding the sexual abuse to be credible). Indeed, the jury had the superior first-
hand perspective to evaluate the testimony of the victims, S.P. and J.H., as well as
the testimony of Thompson, who took the stand in his own defense. Specifically,
even though Thompson emphasizes the victims’ initial denials in support of his
argument, our review of the record reveals that the State presented evidence that
their hesitation stemmed from a credible fear that, as probationers, no one would
believe their word against that of their probation officer. The jury was entitled to
find this explanation compelling and to believe the victims’ ultimate testimony,
which was internally consistent and partially corroborated by Facebook messages
showing an inappropriate relationship.
{¶29} Furthermore, the jury heard Thompson’s testimony, which included
his own damaging admissions that undermined his credibility. In particular,
Thompson conceded that he violated policy by visiting a victim’s home at 10:00
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p.m. on a Sunday and admitted that his behavior with the victims was inappropriate.
The jury was free to conclude that these admissions of professional misconduct
made his denials of the criminal acts less believable.
{¶30} Moreover, the jury proved that it did not lose its way, as it carefully
parsed the evidence and acquitted Thompson on the two counts related to the third
victim, C.S. This split verdict demonstrates the jury performed its function
diligently, weighing the evidence as to each specific charge rather than blindly
accepting the State’s entire case.
{¶31} Accordingly, we conclude that the trier of fact did not clearly lose its
way and create a manifest miscarriage of justice that Thompson’s sexual battery
convictions under Counts Two and Four and his gross sexual imposition conviction
must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Thus, Thompson’s sexual battery
convictions under Counts Two and Four and his gross sexual imposition conviction
are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶32} Thompson’s second and third assignments of error are overruled.
First Assignment of Error
Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Acquire A Certified
Copy Of Defendant’s Medical Records In Advance Of Trial.
{¶33} In his first assignment of error, Thompson argues that his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to obtain a certified, admissible copy of his medical
records in advance of trial. He contends that these records, which documented his
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erectile dysfunction, were critical to his defense as they would have cast doubt on
the validity of the victims’ allegations.
Standard of Review
{¶34} A defendant asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must
establish: (1) the counsel’s performance was deficient or unreasonable under the
circumstances; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. State v.
Kole, 92 Ohio St.3d 303, 306 (2001), citing Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984). In order to show counsel’s conduct was deficient or unreasonable, the
defendant must overcome the presumption that counsel provided competent
representation and must show that counsel’s actions were not trial strategies
prompted by reasonable professional judgment.
Strickland at 687. Counsel is
entitled to a strong presumption that all decisions fall within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance. State v. Sallie,
81 Ohio St.3d 673, 675 (1998).
Tactical or strategic trial decisions, even if unsuccessful, do not generally constitute
ineffective assistance. State v. Carter,
72 Ohio St.3d 545, 558 (1995). Rather, the
errors complained of must amount to a substantial violation of counsel’s essential
duties to his client. See State v. Bradley,
42 Ohio St.3d 136, 141-142 (1989),
quoting State v. Lytle,
48 Ohio St.2d 391, 396 (1976), vacated in part on other
grounds,
438 U.S. 910 (1978).
{¶35} “Prejudice results when ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
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different.’” State v. Liles, 2014-Ohio-259, ¶ 48 (3d Dist.), quoting
Bradley at 142,
citing
Strickland at 691. “‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.’”
Id., quoting Bradley at 142 and citing
Strickland at 694.
Analysis
{¶36} In this case, Thompson argues that his trial counsel was ineffective,
emphasizing that his trial counsel admitted that his failure to acquire certified
medical records was a “mistake” that prevented the jury from seeing evidence of
Thompson’s erectile dysfunction, which he contends was crucial to undermining the
credibility of the victims’ allegations. However, even if we assume that
Thompson’s trial counsel’s performance was deficient, Thompson’s claim fails
because he cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the error. Importantly,
Thompson cannot demonstrate the required prejudice because he was able to present
his medical defense to the jury through his own extensive testimony regarding his
cancer diagnosis and alleged erectile dysfunction. See Cleveland v. Johns, 2024-
Ohio-3301, ¶ 33 (8th Dist.). Indeed, the medical records would have been merely
cumulative, serving only to document what Thompson himself already told the jury.
Compare State v. Vulgamore, 2021-Ohio-3147, ¶ 69 (4th Dist.) (holding that trial
counsel was not ineffective for failing to obtain medical records that would have
been merely cumulative of the defendant’s own testimony and could have
potentially harmed the defense).
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{¶37} Furthermore, the records were of limited value, as they were from
2018—four years before the incidents—and did not contain a definitive medical
diagnosis, but rather a self-report of symptoms for which Thompson refused
treatment. Thus, given that the jury was fully aware of his alleged condition and
still found him guilty on the counts related to S.P. and J.H., there is no reasonable
probability that the admission of these inconclusive, four-year-old records would
have changed the outcome of the trial. Importantly, this conclusion is bolstered by
the fact that the jury acquitted Thompson of Counts Six and Seven pertaining to the
allegations by the third victim, C.S. Therefore, we conclude that Thompson’s trial
counsel was not ineffective for failing to obtain an admissible copy of his medical
records.
{¶38} Thompson’s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶39} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
MILLER and EPLEY, J.J., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby
rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the
judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.
27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the
proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
William R. Zimmerman, Judge
Mark C. Miller, Judge
Christopher B. Epley
DATED:
/hls
… Judge Christopher B. Epley of the Second District Court of Appeals, sitting
by Assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
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