[Cite as State v. Lawrence,
2025-Ohio-3023.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
ALLEN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
CASE NO. 1-24-76
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
SEYOUM LAWRENCE, OPINION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. CR 2024 0012
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: August 25, 2025
APPEARANCES:
Chima R. Ekeh for Appellant
John R. Willamowski, Jr. for Appellee
Case No. 1-24-76
MILLER, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Seyoum B. Lawrence (“Lawrence”), appeals the
November 18, 2024 judgment of sentence of the Allen County Court of Common
Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} On January 11, 2024, the Allen County Grand Jury indicted Lawrence
on eight drug-related charges: Counts One and Eight of trafficking in a fentanyl-
related compound in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), (C)(9)(c), fourth-degree
felonies; Count Two of trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound in the vicinity of
a school in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), (C)(9)(d), a second-degree felony;
Counts Three and Four of trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound in violation of
R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), (C)(9)(d), third-degree felonies; Count Five of possession of a
fentanyl-related compound in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(11)(g), a first-
degree felony; Count Six of having weapons while under disability in violation of
R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), (B), a third-degree felony; and Count Seven of engaging in a
pattern of corrupt activity in violation of R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), (B)(1), a first-degree
felony. Count Five included a firearm specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.141(A),
a major-drug-offender specification pursuant to 2941.1410(B), and specifications
for forfeiture of a gun, automobile, and money in a drug case pursuant to R.C.
2941.1417(A). Count Seven included specifications for forfeiture of a weapon,
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vehicle, and property pursuant to R.C. 2941.1417(A). Lawrence filed a written plea
of not guilty on January 19, 2024 to all counts and specifications in the indictment.
{¶3} On August 26, 2024, the parties appeared for a change-of-plea hearing.
Pursuant to a negotiated-plea agreement, Lawrence withdrew his not-guilty plea
with respect to Counts Two, Three, Five, and Seven. In exchange, the State
recommended the dismissal of the remaining counts and the gun specification and
forfeiture of automobile specifications associated with Count Five. The trial court
accepted Lawrence’s guilty pleas and found him guilty thereof and continued the
matter for a presentence investigation. The trial court filed its judgment entry of
conviction on August 27, 2024.
{¶4} The parties appeared for sentencing on October 28, 2024. The trial
court determined that Counts Two, Three, Five, and Seven do not merge and
sentenced Lawrence to 4 to 6 years in prison on Count Two, 24 months in prison on
Count Three, and 11 years to 16 ½ years in prison on Count Five, and 4 to 6 years
in prison on Count Seven. The court ordered the sentences to be served
consecutively to each other for an aggregate term of 21 years to 26 ½ years in prison.
The trial court imposed no fines but ordered the forfeiture of a firearm and $5,544.00
in U.S. currency. The following day, the trial court filed its judgment entry of
sentence and filed a amended judgment entry of sentence on November 18, 2024.
{¶5} Lawrence filed his notice of appeal on December 9, 2024. He raises
two assignments of error for our review.
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Case No. 1-24-76
First Assignment of Error
The record does not clearly and convincingly support the trial
court’s consecutive sentence findings. (Sent. Tr. pgs. 29-30)
{¶6} In his first assignment of error, Lawrence argues that his sentence is
contrary to law. Specifically, he argues that the trial court’s consecutive-sentencing
findings were not supported by the record.
Standard of Review
{¶7} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may reverse a sentence
“only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not
support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is
otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1. Clear and
convincing evidence is that “‘which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a
firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” Id. at ¶ 22,
quoting Cross v. Ledford,
161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.
Relevant Authority
{¶8} “Except as provided in . . . division (C) of section 2929.14, . . . a prison
term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment shall be served concurrently with any
other prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court of this
state, another state, or the United States.” R.C. 2929.41(A). R.C. 2929.14(C)
provides:
(4) [T]he court may require the offender to serve the prison terms
consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is
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necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the
offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the
seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender
poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while
the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction
imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the
Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of
one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more
of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no
single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of
the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the
offender’s conduct.
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future
crime by the offender.
{¶9} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires a trial court to make specific findings on
the record when imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Hites, 2012-Ohio-1892,
¶ 11 (3d Dist.). Specifically, the trial court must find: (1) consecutive sentences are
necessary to either protect the public or punish the offender, (2) the sentences would
not be disproportionate to the offense committed; and (3) one of the factors in R.C.
2929.14(C)(4)(a), (b), or (c) applies.
Id.
{¶10} The trial court must state the required findings at the sentencing
hearing prior to imposing consecutive sentences and incorporate those findings into
its sentencing entry. State v. Sharp, 2014-Ohio-4140, ¶ 50 (3d Dist.), citing State v.
Bonnell,
2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 29. A trial court “has no obligation to state reasons to
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support its findings” and is not “required to give a talismanic incantation of the
words of the statute, provided that the necessary findings can be found in the record
and are incorporated into the sentencing entry.” Bonnell at ¶ 37.
{¶11} Furthermore, pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a), appellate court may
only “modify or vacate consecutive sentences if it clearly and convincingly finds
that the record does not support the trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings.”
State v. Gwynne, 2023-Ohio-3851, ¶ 22.
Analysis: Consecutive Sentencing
{¶12} Lawrence does not argue that the trial court failed to make the requisite
consecutive-sentencing findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Rather, Lawrence
contends the record does not support the trial court’s findings.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated:
I’m going to order that the sentences be consecutive to each other
under 2929.14(C). I find that consecutive sentences are necessary to
protect the public from future crime and to punish the Defendant.
And, consecutive sentences under the circumstances are not
disproportionate to the seriousness of the conduct and the danger to
the public the Defendant poses. Also, . . . all of these offenses, were
committed as part of a course of conduct and the harm caused by the
multiple offenses is so great and unusual that no single prison term for
any of the offenses committed . . . would adequately reflect the
seriousness of the conduct.
(Oct. 28, 2024 Tr. at 29-30). The trial court memorialized those findings in its
sentencing entries. Accordingly, the record reflects that the trial court made the
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appropriate R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings before imposing consecutive sentences and
incorporated those findings into its sentencing entry.
{¶13} Nonetheless, Lawrence argues that the trial court’s finding that
consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public was not supported by the
record. Specifically, Lawrence argues that the record does not support the trial
court’s findings that consecutive sentences were disproportionate to the seriousness
of his offenses and the danger he poses to the public. In support of his contention,
Lawrence asserts that his prior felony conviction for possession of drugs was
approximately 10 years ago, that the record does not indicate that anyone suffered
physical or economic harm as a result of his actions, and that his ORAS score was
19 which indicated only a moderate risk of reoffending. However, after reviewing
the record, we disagree.
{¶14} The record indicates that Lawrence and several other individuals
worked collectively to sell fentanyl as part of an organized operation. Lawrence
indicated that he does not use drugs but intentionally sold fentanyl to make a profit.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court expressed concern regarding the dangerous
nature of fentanyl, referring to Lawrence’s actions as “putting . . . poison in[to] the
community.” (Oct. 28, 2024 Tr. at 28). Lawrence acknowledged that he understood
that fentanyl is a dangerous substance and agreed with the court’s characterization
of selling fentanyl as playing “Russian Roulette” with the lives of those to whom he
sold drugs. (Id. at 15). Furthermore, although Lawrence only had two prior felony
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convictions in 2014 for possession of heroin, he had several other misdemeanor
convictions for drug-related offenses in 2012 and 2018, as well as several OVI
convictions.
{¶15} Thus, after reviewing the record, we do not find that the record clearly
and convincingly did not support the trial court’s consecutive-sentencing findings.
Lawrence’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court erred in failing to merge Appellant’s convictions
for the purposes of sentencing. (Sent. Tr. pgs. 29-30)
{¶16} In his second assignment of error, Lawrence argues that the trial court
erred by failing to merge his engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity violation
should have merged with Counts Two, Three, and Five. He alleges that the
engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity conviction arose from the same conduct,
did not cause separate harm, was not committed separately, and had the same
animus as Counts Two, Three, and Five. Again, we disagree.
Allied-Offenses Review
{¶17} We review de novo whether offenses are allied offenses of similar
import. State v. Tall, 2023-Ohio-1853, ¶ 7 (3d Dist.). “De novo review is
independent, without deference to the lower court’s decision.” State v. Hudson,
2013-Ohio-647, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.).
R.C. 2941.25, Ohio’s multiple-count statute, provides:
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(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to
constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the
indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses,
but the defendant may be convicted of only one.
(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses
of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more
offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a
separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain
counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of
all of them.
{¶18} The Supreme Court of Ohio has directed the use of a three-part test to
determine whether a defendant can be convicted of multiple offenses:
As a practical matter, when determining whether offenses are allied
offenses of similar import within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts
must ask three questions when the defendant’s conduct supports
multiple offenses: (1) Were the offenses dissimilar in import or
significance? (2) Were they committed separately? and (3) Were they
committed with separate animus or motivation? An affirmative
answer to any of the above will permit separate convictions. The
conduct, the animus, and the import must all be considered.
State v. Ruff, 2015-Ohio-995, ¶ 31.
{¶19} “[T]wo or more offenses of dissimilar import exist within the meaning
of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant’s conduct constitutes offenses involving
separate victims or if the harm that results from each offense is separate and
identifiable.” Id. at ¶ 23. “At its heart, the allied-offense analysis is dependent upon
the facts of a case because R.C. 2941.25 focuses on the defendant’s conduct.” Id.
at ¶ 26. “[A] defendant’s conduct that constitutes two or more offenses against a
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single victim can support multiple convictions if the harm that results from each
offense is separate and identifiable from the harm of the other offense.” Id.
{¶20} The term “animus” means “purpose or, more properly, immediate
motive.” State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 131 (1979), abrogation recognized in
Ruff. “Like all mental states, animus is often difficult to prove directly, but must be
inferred from the surrounding circumstances.”
Id. “Thus, the manner in which a
defendant engages in a course of conduct may indicate distinct purposes.” State v.
Whipple,
2012-Ohio-2938, ¶ 38 (1st Dist.). “Courts should consider whether facts
appear in the record that ‘distinguish the circumstances or draw a line of distinction
that enables a trier of fact to reasonably conclude separate and distinct crimes were
committed.’”
Id., quoting State v. Glenn,
2012-Ohio-1530, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.).
Analysis
{¶21} Lawrence argues that the trial court erred by not merging the engaging
in a pattern of corrupt activity charge with the predicate offenses for sentencing. In
State v. Miranda, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that State v. Johnson, 2010-Ohio-
6314, the applicable case law for merger analysis at the time, “is not applicable to a
RICO violation and that a RICO offense does not merge with its predicate offenses
for purposes of sentencing.” State v. Miranda, 2014-Ohio-451, ¶ 3. Lawrence
acknowledges the Supreme Court of Ohio’s holding in Miranda; however, he
contends that because Miranda relied on the framework in Johnson in reaching its
conclusion which the Court described in Ruff as “incomplete,” the trial court erred
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by not applying the analysis outlined in Ruff to determine whether the corrupt
activity conviction merged with the predicate offenses. We disagree.
{¶22} In Miranda, the Supreme Court of Ohio explained its reasoning for its
finding that a RICO conviction does not merge with its predicate offenses as
follows:
A RICO offense is dependent upon a defendant committing two or
more predicate offenses listed in R.C. 2923.31(I). However, a RICO
offense also requires a defendant to be “employed by, or associated
with” an “enterprise” and to “conduct or participate in” an “enterprise
through a pattern of corrupt activity.” R.C. 2923.32(A)(1). “Such
pattern must include both a relationship and continuous activity, as
well as proof of the existence of an enterprise. Thus, the conduct
required to commit a RICO violation is independent of the conduct
required to commit [the underlying predicate offenses].” (Emphasis
added.) State v. Dudas, 2009-Ohio-1001, ¶ 46 (11th Dist.). See also
State v. Moulton, 2010-Ohio-4484, ¶ 36 (8th Dist.); State v. Caudill,
1998 WL 833729, *9 (3d Dist.). The intent of RICO is “‘to
criminalize the pattern of criminal activity, not the underlying
predicate acts.’” State v. Thomas, 2012-Ohio-5577, ¶ 61 (3d Dist.),
quoting State v. Dodson, 2011-Ohio-6222, ¶ 68 (12th Dist.). See also
Dudas at ¶ 47.
Moreover, one of the purposes of the RICO statute is to provide
“‘enhanced sanctions . . . to deal with the unlawful activities of those
engaged in organized crime.’” (Emphasis added.) State v. Schlosser,
79 Ohio St.3d 329, 332 (1997), quoting the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, Statement of Findings and Purpose, 84 Stat. 922,
reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm.News at 1073. “The RICO
statute was designed to impose cumulative liability for the criminal
enterprise.” Id. at 335. In State v. Thomas, 2012-Ohio-5577, ¶ 61,
the court stated that “[i]f the purpose of [RICO] is to provide enhanced
sanctions, this purpose is furthered by not merging [the predicate
offenses with the RICO offense].” See also Dudas, 2009-Ohio-1001,
at ¶ 47; Moulton,
2010-Ohio-4484, at ¶ 37.
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Construing the similarly worded federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C.
1962(c), federal circuit courts have similarly concluded that the
purpose of RICO in providing enhanced sanctions indicates an intent
to permit cumulative punishments for the RICO offense and its
underlying predicate offenses. See United States v. Sutton, 700 F.2d
1078, 1081 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Greenleaf,
692 F.2d 182,
189 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Boylan,
620 F.2d 359, 361 (2d
Cir. 1980); United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 282-284 (3d Cir.
1986); United States v. Truglio, 731 F.2d 1123, 1128-1130 (4th Cir.
1984), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d
849 (4th Cir.1996); United States v. Phillips,
664 F.2d 971, 1015 (5th
Cir. 1981); United States v. Morgano, 39 F.3d 1358, 1367 (7th Cir.
1994); United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 864 (8th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Beale, 921 F.2d 1412, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991).
Miranda at ¶ 13-15. Accordingly, in determining that an engaging in a pattern of
corrupt activity conviction does not merge with the underlying predicate offenses,
the Supreme Court relied not on Johnson, but on the text and statutory scheme of
the engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity statute. Furthermore, subsequent to
Ruff, appellate courts have continued to cite the Supreme Court of Ohio’s holding
in Miranda for the proposition that an engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity
conviction does not merge with its predicate offenses for sentencing. See State v.
Christian,
2016-Ohio-516, ¶ 35 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Moulton, 2010-Ohio-
4484, ¶ 38 (8th Dist.) (“‘[t]he argument that predicate offenses should be merged
with a conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity has been consistently
rejected by Ohio courts, on the basis that ‘a RICO violation is a discrete offense that
can be prosecuted and punished separately from its underlying predicate
offenses’”); State v. Walker,
2021-Ohio-4321, ¶ 33 (10th Dist.); State v. Frost,
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2020-Ohio-6920, ¶ 18 (11th Dist.); State v. Coleman,
2019-Ohio-4415, ¶ 53-54 (5th
Dist.); State v. Ross,
2017-Ohio-9400, ¶ 70 (4th Dist.). Thus, we find Lawrence’s
argument to be without merit.
{¶23} Lawrence’s second assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶24} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Allen County Court
of Common Pleas.
Judgment Affirmed
WALDICK, P.J. and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby
rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the
judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.
27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the
proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
Mark C. Miller, Judge
Juergen A. Waldick, Judge
William R. Zimmerman, Judge
DATED:
/jlm
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