[Cite as State v. Rutledge,
2025-Ohio-3025.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
HANCOCK COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
CASE NO. 5-24-43
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
KEON L. RUTLEDGE, OPINION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Hancock County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 2023 CR 476
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: August 25, 2025
APPEARANCES:
W. Alex Smith for Appellant
Steven M. Powell for Appellee
Case No. 5-24-43
WALDICK, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Keon L. Rutledge (“Rutledge”), brings this appeal
from the October 31, 2024, judgment of the Hancock County Common Pleas Court
sentencing him to prison after a jury found him guilty of Aggravated Possession of
Drugs. On appeal, Rutledge argues that there was insufficient evidence presented to
convict him and that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Background
{¶2} On October 31, 2023, Rutledge was indicted for Aggravated Possession
of Drugs, specifically methamphetamines, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a second
degree felony because the amount equaled or exceeded five times the bulk amount
but was less than fifty times the bulk amount. It was alleged that a search of
Rutledge’s vehicle during a traffic stop uncovered 54 grams of methamphetamines
in Rutledge’s trunk. Rutledge pled not guilty to the charge.
{¶3} On July 22-23, 2024, Rutledge proceeded to a jury trial, wherein he was
convicted of the charge as indicted. On October 28, 2024, Rutledge was sentenced
to serve a prison term with a “mandatory definite minimum term of five (5) years
and a maximum indefinite term of seven and one-half (7 1/2) years.” A judgment
entry memorializing his sentence was filed October 31, 2024. It is from this
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judgment that Rutledge appeals, asserting the following assignments of error for our
review.
First Assignment of Error
The jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court erred in allowing the State to proceed under a
theory of constructive possession where the State failed to present
sufficient evidence that Appellant knowingly exercised control
over the drugs.
{¶4} As Rutledge argues his assignments of error together in his brief, we
will address them together as well.
First and Second Assignments of Error
{¶5} In his assignments of error, Rutledge argues that there was insufficient
evidence presented to convict him of Aggravated Possession of Drugs and that his
conviction was against the weight of the evidence. Specifically, he contends that the
evidence did not support a finding that he was in constructive possession of the
methamphetamines found in his trunk, particularly given that he was a passenger in
his vehicle at the time of the traffic stop.
Standard of Review
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{¶6} It is well established that “[t]he legal concepts of sufficiency of the
evidence and weight of the evidence are both quantitatively and qualitatively
different.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (1997), paragraph two of the
syllabus. “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at
trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average
mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks,
61 Ohio St.
3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. Consequently, “[t]he relevant inquiry
is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. “ ‘In deciding if the evidence was sufficient, we
neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor assess the credibility of witnesses, as both
are functions reserved for the trier of fact.’ ” State v. Williams, 2024-Ohio 2307, ¶
21 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Jones,
2013-Ohio-4775, ¶ 33 (1st Dist.).
{¶7} By contrast, when reviewing whether a verdict was against the manifest
weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and examines
the conflicting testimony. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). In
doing so, an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and
all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine
whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the factfinder “clearly lost its way
and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
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reversed and a new trial ordered.” Id. When applying the manifest-weight standard,
“[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the
conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court's judgment.” State v.
Haller,
2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Hunter,
2011-Ohio-6524,
¶ 119.
Evidence Presented
{¶8} Many of the facts in this case are not in dispute. On May 22, 2023,
Sergeant Matthew Cook of the Ohio State Highway Patrol was conducting “traffic
enforcement” on I-75 in Hancock County. (Tr. at 180). At approximately 7:50 a.m.,
Sergeant Cook was observing southbound traffic when he saw a dark-colored Dodge
Charger that had window tint that he believed “was much darker than would be
allowed by law.” (Id. at 181). He then initiated a traffic stop of the Dodge Charger.
{¶9} Sergeant Cook approached the driver’s-side of the vehicle and spoke
with the driver—a female named Tavis. Rutledge, the registered owner of the Dodge
Charger, was in the front passenger seat of the vehicle. After speaking with Tavis
and Rutledge about the window tint, Sergeant Cook tested the window tint on the
vehicle. He showed Rutledge and Tavis that the windows were significantly darker
than allowed by law.
{¶10} Sergeant Cook testified that while he was speaking with Tavis and
Rutledge he detected the “overwhelming odor of raw marijuana emitting from inside
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the vehicle.” (Tr. at 185-186). He then asked Tavis to step out of the vehicle so he
could run her driving information and look for indicators of impairment.
{¶11} After conducting a pat-down of Tavis for weapons, Sergeant Cook had
Tavis sit in the front passenger seat of his patrol car. Sergeant Cook asked Tavis
about marijuana, and Tavis said she had last consumed marijuana approximately
four hours before the traffic stop. She also admitted she had a small amount of
marijuana in her purse in the front passenger area of the vehicle. Sergeant Cook
testified that recreational marijuana was not yet legal in Ohio at the time of the
traffic stop.
{¶12} Sergeant Cook indicated that he would only be issuing a written
warning for the window tint. However, he also stated he was going to search the
vehicle. Around this time, another trooper arrived at the scene to assist Sergeant
Cook.
{¶13} Sergeant Cook returned to the Dodge Charger and asked Rutledge to
step out of the vehicle. He asked if he could search Rutledge’s person and Rutledge
consented. A small amount of raw marijuana was found in Rutledge’s pocket.
Sergeant Cook escorted Rutledge to the rear of the police cruiser and had Rutledge
sit in the cruiser with the door open. Sergeant Cook then went and searched the
Dodge Charger while the other officer at the scene watched Rutledge and Tavis.
{¶14} In the trunk of the vehicle, Sergeant Cook located two backpacks or
pieces of luggage. One of the bags had pill bottles inside that belonged to Rutledge.
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Sergeant Cook also located multiple bags from a marijuana dispensary in Michigan.
The bags had receipts stapled to them, some with Rutledge’s name on the receipts
and some with Tavis’s name. Both Rutledge and Tavis also had cash on them,
though it was unclear exactly how much.
{¶15} Sergeant Cook continued his search of the trunk and he located a
smaller paper bag “kinda tucked on the wheel well of the trunk, closest to the left
taillight.” (Tr. at 208). Inside the paper bag were two smaller plastic bags, each
containing multi-colored, triangular-shaped tablets. Sergeant Cook suspected that
the tablets may contain ecstasy/MDMA or methamphetamine. The tablets were
subsequently sent for lab testing and it was determined they contained
methamphetamine and weighed over 54 grams. There were 197 tablets total.
{¶16} While the search was occurring, Rutledge sat in the backseat of the
cruiser and he was recorded on the cruiser’s camera. Just as Sergeant Cook was
searching the trunk and pulling the paper bag with the tablets out, Rutledge was
saying to himself that he needed a “miracle.” Shortly thereafter he said “it’s over”
and cursed to himself.
{¶17} Rutledge also received a phone call while he was in the back seat of
the cruiser and he answered it. During the call he said he got pulled over coming
back from the dispensary. He said “it’s over for me.”
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{¶18} Sergeant Cook returned to the rear of the cruiser and asked Rutledge
about the pressed tablets that had a tesla logo. Rutledge said he did not know
anything about them.
{¶19} After that conversation, Rutledge remained in the backseat of the
cruiser and he sent some text messages on his phone, then took another phone call.
On the second call, the caller can be heard asking Rutledge “They took the trippies?”
(State’s Ex. 1A). Rutledge responded indicating that yes, the “trippies” were gone,
and he was going to be in serious trouble. Sergeant Cook testified that “trippies”
was slang often associated with psychedelics or stimulants, but he was not familiar
with it being used as a word for marijuana.
{¶20} The recordings from the cruiser and Sergeant Cook’s body camera
were played at trial and introduced into evidence. In addition, the parties stipulated
to chain of custody of the tablets and that the tablets contained methamphetamine.
{¶21} Tavis indicated through counsel that she would be invoking her Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination and that she would not answer any
substantive questions.
{¶22} Although Rutledge argued that he did not have constructive possession
of the tablets in his trunk, the jury found him guilty as charged.
Analysis
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{¶23} Rutledge argues that the factfinder erred by determining that he
constructively possessed the methamphetamine tablets in his trunk. He argues both
that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was in constructive possession
of the tablets in his trunk, and that the factfinder’s determination was against the
weight of the evidence. To support his argument, he contends that he was not driving
the vehicle at the time of the stop. He also contends that there were no markings on
the package that directly connected him to the tablets. Further, he argues that the
driver of the vehicle—Tavis—was not sufficiently investigated.
{¶24} In order to address Rutledge’s argument, we must review the
definitions of “possession” and “constructive possession.” Revised Code
2925.01(K) defines possession as “having control over a thing or substance, but may
not be inferred solely from mere access to the thing or substance through ownership
or occupation of the premises upon which the thing or substance is found.”
{¶25} It is well established that “[p]ossession of drugs can be either actual or
constructive.” State v. Bustamante, 2013-Ohio-4975, ¶ 25 (3d Dist.). Unlike direct
possession, a person has constructive possession if he is “able to exercise dominion
and control over an item, even if [the individual] does not have immediate physical
possession of it[.]” State v. Brooks,
2012-Ohio-5235, ¶ 46 (3d Dist.). For
constructive possession to exist, “[i]t must also be shown that the person was
conscious of the presence of the object.” State v. Hankerson,
70 Ohio St.2d 87
(1982). Constructive possession can be established by circumstantial evidence
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alone. Bustamante at ¶ 25. The issue of whether a person charged with drug
possession knowingly possessed a controlled substance is to be determined from all
the attendant facts and circumstances available. State v. Teamer,
82 Ohio St.3d 490,
492 (1998).
{¶26} At trial, the State established that the tablets containing
methamphetamines were located in the trunk of Rutledge’s vehicle. Although
Rutledge was not driving at the time of the traffic stop, he was the registered owner
of the vehicle and he was present during the traffic stop. In addition, the trunk
contained items belonging to Rutledge, including prescription pills and marijuana
purchased from a Michigan dispensary.
{¶27} Moreover, the backseat cruiser camera from Sergeant Cook’s vehicle
recorded multiple statements that Rutledge made that indicated he was aware of the
presence of the methamphetamine. As soon as Sergeant Cook started searching the
trunk, Rutledge stated that he needed a miracle. Then, after Sergeant Cook removed
the bag with the pressed tablets, Rutledge could be heard saying that it was over for
him. Rutledge also took a phone call from a male individual who asked Rutledge if
the police took the “trippies.” Rutledge responded that the police did take them.
{¶28} Based on the evidence presented, we find that, when looking at the
evidence in a light most favorable to the State as we are directed on review, there
was sufficient evidence presented for a factfinder to determine that Rutledge
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constructively possessed the methamphetamines. Therefore his second assignment
of error is overruled.
{¶29} Turning to Rutledge’s first assignment of error, and his argument that
his conviction was against the weight of the evidence, Rutledge argues that the
methamphetamines were not within reach of him and that the State did not do any
investigation into Tavis to determine if the methamphetamines were actually hers.
{¶30} Contrary to Rutledge’s argument, which omitted any reference to his
statements in the backseat of the cruiser, his statements indicate an awareness of the
methamphetamines in his trunk, particularly given the timing that the statements
were made. The methamphetamines were also in Rutledge’s vehicle, in his trunk,
with some of his other things.
{¶31} When combining all of these facts, we do not find that this is one of
the rare cases where the factfinder clearly lost its way or that a manifest miscarriage
of justice was created. This is particularly true given that the cases cited by Rutledge
in his brief do not support a reversal here.
{¶32} For example, Rutledge cites State v. Johnson, 2025-Ohio-713 (3d
Dist.), wherein we determined that the evidence supported a drug possession
conviction where a defendant was the driver of a vehicle with drugs in it and, inter
alia, the defendant made a reference that the charges could not be put on the girl in
the vehicle who grabbed the drugs and put them into her pants. The girl testified that
she was unaware who the drugs belonged to, but she was afraid they would be
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uncovered. After examining all the facts and circumstances, we affirmed the drug
possession conviction, even when the drugs were found on the person of another
individual in the vehicle. These facts would actually support an affirmance here
because the case analyzes the totality of the circumstances to determine constructive
possession.
{¶33} Rutledge also cites State v. Voll, 2012-Ohio-3900 (3d Dist.), wherein
we affirmed a possession of drug paraphernalia conviction. Voll involved
constructive possession of a “crack pipe” that was between multiple people on the
backseat of a vehicle. We determined that the evidence supported that Voll was in
constructive possession of the pipe based on all the facts and circumstances. Voll is
thus another case that directs us to look at all the circumstances surrounding
potential possession and it does not support a reversal here.
{¶34} Finally, Rutledge cites State v. Carpenter, 2019-Ohio-58 (3d Dist.), as
supporting reversal, but that case dealt with, inter alia, drug possession in a
residence and it is even less relevant than the prior cases, particularly given that
Carpenter also resulted in an affirmance. Rutledge has cited no case authority
wherein an appellate court has determined in circumstances similar to the case sub
judice that a conviction was against the weight of the evidence.
{¶35} In sum, after reviewing the record, we find that Rutledge has not
established that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Therefore, his first assignment of error is overruled.
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Conclusion
{¶36} Having found no error prejudicial to Rutledge in the particulars
assigned and argued, his assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the
Hancock County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
ZIMMERMAN and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby
rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the
judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.
27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the
proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
Juergen A. Waldick, Judge
William R. Zimmerman, Judge
John R. Willamowski, Judge
DATED:
/jlm
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