[Cite as State v. Knauff,
2025-Ohio-3046.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ROSS COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
: Case No. 23CA29
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
:
v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT
: ENTRY
JOSHUA KNAUFF, :
: RELEASED: 08/21/2025
Defendant-Appellant. :
APPEARANCES:
Brian A. Smith, Brian A. Smith Law Firm, LLC, Fairlawn, Ohio, for appellant.
Jeffrey C. Marks, Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, Chillicothe, Ohio for
appellee.
Wilkin, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from a Ross County Court of Common Pleas
judgment entry that sentenced Joshua Knauff (“Knauff”) to an aggregate, 15-year
prison sentence for pleading guilty to three counts of kidnapping, which were
first-degree felonies and three counts of felonious assault, which were second-
degree felonies.
{¶2} In his sole assignment of error, Knauff asserts that a portion of his
sentence is contrary to law because the court failed to advise him of his eligibility
for earned days of credit pursuant to R.C. 2967.193. Knauff prays for this court
to modify his sentence to indicate that he is eligible for days of credit under R.C.
2967.193, or remand this matter for the trial court to make that modification.
Ross App. No. 23CA29 2
Because we find that Knauff’s sentence is not contrary to law, we overrule his
assignment of error and affirm his sentence.
BACKGROUND
{¶3} On January 27, 2023, the State charged Knauff with eight counts of
kidnapping, which were first-degree felonies; three counts of rape, which were
first-degree felonies; four counts of felonious assault, which were second-degree
felonies; and one count of abduction, which was a third-degree felony.
{¶4} During an October 23, 2023 hearing, Knauff pleaded guilty to three
counts of kidnapping and three counts of felonious assault. The State dropped
the remaining charges. Immediately after Knauff’s guilty plea, the court
sentenced him to eight years in prison for each of the three kidnapping counts,
and seven years in prison for each of the three assault counts. The court
ordered the prison terms for the kidnapping to run concurrently, and the prison
terms for assault to run concurrently. However, the court ordered the prison
terms for kidnapping and the prison terms for felonious assault to be served
consecutively, for an aggregate prison term of 15 years, which was an agreed
sentence. Knauff appeals his sentence.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE PORTION OF THE TRIAL COURT’S SENTENCE, FAILING
TO ADVISE APPELLANT OF HIS ELIGIBILITY FOR EARNED
DAYS OF CREDIT ON HIS SENTENCE, PURSUANT R.C.
2967.193, WAS CONTRARY TO LAW.
{¶5} Knauff maintains that his sentence should be modified because it is
contrary to law. Knauff claims that he should be eligible to receive earned days
of credit (aka good-time credit) under R.C. 2967.193. He argues that the “plea
Ross App. No. 23CA29 3
form” that he signed stated that the prison term imposed “will be served without
good time credit.” He claims that at his sentencing the trial court was required to
inform him on the record that he was eligible for earned days of credit pursuant to
R.C. 2967.193, but it failed to do so.
{¶6} Knauff acknowledges that his guilty plea involved an agreed
sentence, which typically cannot be appealed. However, Knauff asserts that
even agreed sentences are appealable, if they are contrary to law. Knauff claims
that his “plea form” erroneously stated that his prison sentence would not be
eligible for earned credit under R.C. 2967.193. Because of this error, he claims
that the court was required to advise him of his eligibility for earned credit but
failed to do so. Because of these errors, Knauff claims that portion of his
sentence is contrary to law making it subject to appeal even though it was an
agreed upon sentence. Therefore, Knauff maintains that portion of his sentence
should be modified to indicate that he is eligible for good-time credit pursuant to
R.C. 2967.193.
{¶7} In response, the State maintains that the trial court did not err in
sentencing Knauff. The State claims that because the sentence was agreed to
by the parties, it is not subject to appeal pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(D)(1). Further,
the State asserts that it is the Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections that
determines a prisoner’s eligibility for, and applies earned credit, not the court.
Finally, the State claims that the law does not require the court to inform a
defendant regarding their eligibility for earned credit. Therefore, the State urges
this court to reject Knauff’s argument and affirm Knauff’s sentence.
Ross App. No. 23CA29 4
Law
Standard of Review
{¶8} “R.C. 2953.08(A)(4) provides that: ‘In addition to any other right to
appeal and except as provided in division (D) of this section, a defendant who is
convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony may appeal as a matter of right the
sentence imposed upon the defendant on one of the following grounds: … (4)
The sentence is contrary to law.’ ” State v. McFarland, 2023-Ohio-3499, ¶ 13
(4th Dist.). However, R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) provides that “[a] sentence imposed
upon a defendant is not subject to review under this section if the sentence is
authorized by law, has been recommended jointly by the defendant and the
prosecution in the case, and is imposed by a sentencing judge.”
Id.
Consequently, if an imposed, agreed sentence is ‘contrary to law[,]’ [it] is
appealable by a defendant[.]” State v. Underwood,
2010-Ohio-1, ¶ 16.
{¶9} The Supreme Court has recognized that “ ‘contrary to law’ [means] ‘in
violation of statute or legal regulations at a given time[.]’ ” State v. Jones, 2020-
Ohio-6729, ¶ 34, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 328 (6th Ed.1990). Therefore, “
‘a sentence is generally not contrary to law if the trial court considered the R.C.
2929.11 purposes and principles of sentencing as well as the R.C. 2929.12
seriousness and recidivism factors, properly applied post-release control, and
imposed a sentence within the statutory range.’ ” State v. Ogden, 2025-Ohio-
1168, ¶ 12 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Allen, 2021-Ohio-648, ¶ 14 (4th Dist.).
Ross App. No. 23CA29 5
Earned Credit
{¶10} “R.C. 2967.193 provides opportunities for inmates to earn credit
towards the satisfaction of his or her prison term ‘for participation in certain
programs.’ ” State v. Eitzman, 2022-Ohio-574, ¶ 28-33 (3rd Dist.), quoting R.C.
2967.193.
Under R.C. 2967.193, the department of rehabilitation and
correction is charged with determining the amount of credit earned
and awarding that credit to the prisoner. Likewise, the statute
authorizes the department to deny the prisoner the right to earn
credit or withdraw credits previously earned if it determines the
prisoner has violated prison rules.
Id., citing State v. Livingston,
2014-Ohio-1637, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.).
However, “there is nothing in R.C. 2967.193 or elsewhere in the law that
authorizes a court to limit an offender's ability to earn days of credit.” Livingston.
at ¶ 9.
{¶11} R.C. 2967.193(A)(2) and R.C. 2967.193(A)(3) set forth earned-
credit opportunities for inmates by participating in various prison programs. See
Eitzman, ¶ 36, citing former R.C. 2967.193(A)(1) and (2), now R.C.
2967.193(A)(2) and (3).
{¶12} An inmate is ineligible to earn credit under R.C. 2967.193(A)(3) if he
or she “is serving a . . a prison term for an offense of violence . . .” Knauff has
pleaded guilty to felonious assault and kidnapping, which are both offenses of
violence under R.C. 2901.02(A)(9)(a). Therefore, Knauff was ineligible to earn
credit under R.C. 2967.193(A)(3).
{¶13} However, R.C. 2967.193(A)(2) does not contain the same eligibility
limitations. The wording of R.C. 2967.193(A)(2) does not disqualify persons who
Ross App. No. 23CA29 6
are serving a sentence for an offense of violence from seeking earned credit
opportunities contained therein. Instead, subject to certain exceptions, “a person
confined in a state correctional institution . . . may provisionally earn . . . credit . .
. toward satisfaction of the person's stated prison term” if that person
“productively participates” in various programs “developed by the department of
rehabilitation and correction[.]” R.C. 2967.193(A)(2).
{¶14} The Third District Court of Appeals has held that if a trial court
issues a sentencing entry that incorrectly states that the appellant is not eligible
for earned credit under R.C. 2967.193 that portion of the sentence is clearly and
convincingly contrary to law. Eitzman, 2022-Ohio-574, ¶ 39-40 (3rd Dist.).
Therefore, the court vacated that portion of appellant’s sentence and remanded
the matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of correcting the judgment
entry. Id. at ¶ 40.
Analysis
{¶15} In the instant case, Knauff signed a “plea form” that contained
language that indicated “any prison term stated will be the term served without
good time credit.” Arguably, this language informed Knauff that any prison term
stated in the plea form does not include any good-time credit that he might earn.
In other words, it does not state that he is ineligible to earn credit under R.C.
2967.193 as he claims.
{¶16} Even assuming that this language does state that Knauff is ineligible
for good-time credit, we find it does not render his sentence contrary to law. In
Eitzman, the court found that the trial court’s sentencing entry contained
Ross App. No. 23CA29 7
language that incorrectly stated that the appellant was ineligible for earned credit
under R.C. 2967.193. The court reasoned that this language placed an improper
limitation on the appellant’s sentence making that portion of his sentence
contrary to law.
{¶17} In Knauff’s case, the language appeared in his plea form, not in his
sentencing entry. “[T]he axiomatic rule is that a court speaks through its journal
entries.” State v. Miller, 2010-Ohio-5705, ¶ 12. Therefore, unlike Eitzman, the
language placed no limitation on his sentence regarding earned credit under R.C.
2967.193. Rather, whether Knauff may earn credit pursuant to R.C. 2967.193 is
the responsibility of the Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections as required
by law, not the court.
{¶18} Therefore, we find that the trial court’s sentencing entry herein was
not contrary to law because it never purported to limit Knauff’s eligibility for good-
time credit.
CONCLUSION
{¶19} Accordingly, we overrule Knauff’s sole assignment if error and affirm
the trial court’s sentencing entry.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Ross App. No. 23CA29 8
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and the appellant shall
pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Ross County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL
HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS
COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the
bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to
file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency
of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at
the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the Appellant to
file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal
period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court
of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to
expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Abele, J. and Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: ____________________________
Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.
