[Cite as State v. White,
2025-Ohio-306.]
COURT OF APPEALS
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES:
Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. Michael D. Hess, J.
Hon. Jason P. Smith, J.
-vs- Judges Hess and Smith Sitting by
Assignment by the Supreme Court of
Ohio
PATRICIA JO WHITE Case No. 2024CA00044
Defendant-Appellant OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Appeal from the Stark County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 2023CR1792
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: January 29, 2025
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
KYLE L. STONE D. COLEMAN BOND
Prosecuting Attorney 116 Cleveland Avenue, N.W., Suite 600
Stark County, Ohio Canton, Ohio 44702
LISA A. NEMES
Appellate Division Chief
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
110 Central Plaza South, Suite 510
Canton, Ohio 44702-1413
Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00044 2
Hoffman, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Patricia Jo White appeals the judgment entered by the
Stark County Common Pleas Court convicting her following jury trial of
telecommunications harassment (R.C. 2917.21(A)(1) and/or (5)) and sentencing her to
seven months incarceration in the Stark County Jail. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of
Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} Officer Todd Gillilan has served on the Canton Police Department for 23
years. Since 2020, Officer Gillilan has held the role of mental health liaison, working to
address the high volume of mental health issues which present to Canton police and to
city officials.
{¶3} In July of 2023, Officer Gillilan was on bereavement leave. The police
captain called Officer Gillilan about Appellant, who was sending numerous emails on a
daily basis to the captain, the police chief, the safety director, the mayor, the sheriff, and
other city officials. The captain was concerned Appellant’s behavior was escalating,
which involves behavior related to a mental health issue. Appellant expressed concern
Aultman Hospital was engaged in child trafficking.
{¶4} When Officer Gillilan returned to work, he began investigating Appellant’s
behavior. He reviewed the emails and confirmed a link between Appellant and the email
address from which the emails were sent. Officer Gillilan emailed Appellant on July 15,
telling her if she did not stop making false accusations on social media platforms, she
would be charged with telecommunications harassment, as she had been in 2020.
Appellant’s behavior did not cease, and she began emailing Officer Gillilan.
Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00044 3
{¶5} Officer Gillilan attempted to get mental health assistance for Appellant, but
she declined assistance and refused to stop sending emails. Officer Gillilan continued
to inform Appellant repeated emails would result in charges, and expressed his belief she
needed help. Appellant questioned the officer’s qualifications to diagnose mental health
issues. She repeatedly emailed the officer asking what judge was signing her arrest
warrant so she could have her friends conduct research on the judge.
{¶6} A warrant for Appellant’s arrest was issued on July 19, 2023. Appellant
emailed Officer Gillilan throughout the day regarding warrants, probation, and questioning
how anyone could make her stop emailing government officials. Appellant continued to
complain about Aultman Hospital engaging in trafficking. Officer Gillilan repeatedly asked
Appellant to discontinue her emails to public officials.
{¶7} Appellant was arrested on July 20, 2023, and her cell phone was
confiscated to preserve evidence in the form of emails from the phone. Appellant was
released on July 21, 2023, and began emailing Officer Gillilan once again. She needed
contact numbers from her phone, and suggested the officer should “review his
paperwork.” She claimed she would go to the police station to file a report for her stolen
phone. She sent a series of emails concerning her claim her phone was stolen to Officer
Gillilan and other officials, stating she had not realized her arresting officer was a warlock
until after she was released. Appellant stated, “Sure got me going…I don’t think I’ve ever
screamed ‘shut your fucking mouth’ to a cop. I know how powerful I am as a witch…I
would likely bow to his powers however.” State’s Ex. 3C. She continued to send emails
referring to the biggest sting operation in human history. One email stated, “You people
really aren’t very smart when it comes to documentation. Seriously…you should move
Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00044 4
me, put me up in a luxury hotel…with a cute pool girl to look at…and then start figuring
this shit out. My guess is…if you don’t…exposure is coming soon. Might want to get in
front.” Id. Appellant suggested Officer Gillilan and others should turn themselves in to
“General Flynn,” to whom she claimed she tweeted a report of their psychological torture.
{¶8} Appellant was indicted by the Stark County Grand Jury with two counts of
telecommunications harassment. The first count related to her emails sent from July 1,
2023 through July 18, 2023. The second count related to her emails sent on or about
July 21, 2023, after she had been arrested and released. Both counts included a
specification of a prior conviction of telecommunications harassment.
{¶9} The case proceeded to jury trial in the Stark County Common Pleas Court.
The jury found Appellant not guilty of the charge of telecommunications harassment from
July 1, 2023 through July 18, 2023, but guilty of the charge related to conduct after her
arrest. The trial court convicted Appellant in accordance with the jury’s verdict, and
sentenced her to seven months incarceration in the Stark County Jail. It is from the March
5, 2024 judgment of the trial court Appellant prosecutes her appeal, assigning as error:
I. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUSTAIN A CONVICTION AGAINST THE APPELLANT, AND THE
CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED.
II. THE APPELLANT’S CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED AS
THE CONDUCT OF APPELLANT WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED FREE SPEECH, AND R.C. 2917.21 CANNOT BE APPLIED
TO APPELLANT’S SPEECH IN THIS CASE.
Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00044 5
III. THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF HER RIGHTS UNDER THE 6TH AND 14TH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
I.
{¶10} In her first assignment of error, Appellant argues her conviction was not
supported by sufficient evidence. She specifically argues the State did not present
evidence she acted with purpose to harass Officer Gillilan, a necessary element of R.C.
2917.21(A)(1). While she concedes she continued to email Officer Gillilan after he told
her to stop, satisfying the elements of R.C. 2917.21(A)(5), she argues because she used
his professional and not his personal email address, he did not have the right to tell her
to stop sending emails.
{¶11} An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
is to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, paragraph two of
the syllabus (1991).
{¶12} Appellant was convicted of telecommunications harassment in violation of
R.C. 2917.21(A)(1) and/or (5):
(A) No person shall knowingly make or cause to be made a
telecommunication, or knowingly permit a telecommunication to be made
Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00044 6
from a telecommunications device under the person's control, to another, if
the caller does any of the following:
(1) Makes the telecommunication with purpose to harass, intimidate,
or abuse any person at the premises to which the telecommunication is
made, whether or not actual communication takes place between the caller
and a recipient;
(5) Knowingly makes the telecommunication to the recipient of the
telecommunication, to another person at the premises to which the
telecommunication is made, or to those premises, and the recipient or
another person at those premises previously has told the caller not to make
a telecommunication to those premises or to any persons at those
premises[.]
{¶13} Appellant first argues pursuant to R.C. 2917.21(A)(1), the State failed to
prove she sent emails to Officer Gillilan with purpose to harass, intimidate, or abuse him.
She argues her repeated emails were an attempt to communicate with him regarding her
concerns about child trafficking, and her need to recover her cell phone after her arrest.
{¶14} In support of her argument, Appellant cites State v. Golga, 2024-Ohio-1410
(9th Dist.). In that case, the defendant’s water was shut off for nonpayment. He called
the water department eight times over the course of 26 minutes, screaming, using
profanity, and demanding his water service be restored. The court found there was no
Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00044 7
evidence of purposeful intent to harass, intimidate, or abuse on the part of the defendant,
because his actual purpose was to have his water service restored. Id. at ¶8-10.
{¶15} The telecommunications-harassment statute “focuses on the caller rather
than on the content of the speech; it is the intent with which the call is made that
establishes the criminality of the conduct.” Id. at ¶6. The inquiry is not whether the
recipient was in fact abused, intimidated, or harassed by the telecommunication, but
whether the purpose of the caller was to abuse, intimidate, or harass the recipient. Id.
“A person acts purposely when it is the person's specific intention to cause a certain
result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature,
regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is the offender's specific
intention to engage in conduct of that nature.” R.C. 2901.22(A). “In the absence of direct
evidence, a defendant's intent to abuse, [intimidate], or harass may be established by the
surrounding facts and circumstances.” Golga at ¶6.
{¶16} Appellant was convicted of telecommunications harassment solely with
regard to emails sent beginning July 21, 2023, after her initial arrest. In the emails sent
after her arrest, while Appellant continued to maintain Aultman Hospital was engaged in
trafficking and inquired after her cell phone, her emails also accused her arresting officer
of being a warlock, referred to herself as a witch, accused police of engaging in a sting
operation, and threatened to expose the police with documentation unless she was put
up in a hotel with a cute pool girl to look at. She also claimed she had tweeted about
psychological torture on the part of police. From this evidence, the jury could find
Appellant acted with purpose to harass, intimidate, or abuse Officer Gillilan. We find the
conviction is supported by sufficient evidence.
Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00044 8
{¶17} Appellant also argues the officer did not have the right to tell her to stop
contacting him in his official capacity in regard to legitimate concerns or issues, and thus
the State did not present sufficient evidence to convict her under R.C. 2917.21(A)(5). We
disagree. As discussed above, Appellant concedes she continued to email the officer
after he told her to stop. However, her emails as set forth earlier in this opinion did not
all attempt to raise what she believed to be legitimate concerns over trafficking, warrants
for her arrest, and the return of her cell phone, but rather accused the police of witchcraft
and threatened action against the police if they did not put her up in a hotel. We find the
fact the emails were sent to Officer Gillilan’s professional email account rather than to his
personal email account to be a distinction without a difference in this case. Nothing in the
telecommunications harassment statute prohibits prosecution for contacting a public
official only in a professional capacity, if the defendant’s conduct otherwise meets the
definition of telecommunications harassment. We find the State presented sufficient
evidence from which the jury could find Appellant continued to email Officer Gillilan after
he requested she stop.
{¶18} The first assignment of error is overruled.
II.
{¶19} In her second assignment of error, Appellant argues her conduct in
contacting Officer Gillilan with regards to her concerns about trafficking and the return of
her cell phone was constitutionally protected by the First Amendment.
{¶20} The State argues Appellant failed to raise this claim in the trial court. We
disagree. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss in the trial court. While the primary thrust
of the motion was the city of Canton was not a “person” within the meaning of the statute
Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00044 9
and therefore the indictment did not charge an offense, Appellant also argued in her
motion the First Amendment prohibited her prosecution for exercising her First
Amendment right to criticize police performance and express her opinions. We find
Appellant raised her First Amendment claim in the trial court, and we therefore do not
apply the plain error standard as argued by the State.
{¶21} Appellant argues the statute is unconstitutional as applied to her. In an as-
applied challenge, the challenger contends the statute's application violates his or her
constitutional rights under the circumstances of a particular case. United States v.
Christian Echoes Natl. Ministry, Inc., 404 U.S. 561, 565, (1972).
{¶22} In considering a claim R.C. 2917.21 was unconstitutionally overbroad on its
face, the Eighth District Court of Appeals discussed the purpose of the statute in relation
to the First Amendment:
Kronenberg argues that the “statute prohibits constitutionally
protected conduct that would otherwise be legal.” She contends that the
statute punishes a simple call for help and her right to free speech. We find
her argument unpersuasive. The statute operates to prohibit people from
purposely making abusive, threatening, or harassing telecommunications;
it does not restrict protected speech. See generally State v. Gibbs, 134 Ohio
App.3d 247,
730 N.E.2d 1027 (12th Dist. 1999) (finding R.C. 2917.21(A)(5)
is not unconstitutionally over broad, even though statute restricts person's
ability to make a telephone call). Indeed, Kronenberg does not have a
constitutionally protected right to make a telephone call for the purpose of
Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00044 10
harassing another person. R.C. 2917.21(B) is not over broad since the First
Amendment does not protect the type of activity that Kronenberg
committed.
{¶23} State v. Kronenberg, 2015-Ohio-1020, ¶ 38 (8th Dist.).
{¶24} In the instant case, Appellant was not prosecuted for the content of her
speech, nor was she prosecuted for exercising her right to complain or express a
constitutionally-protected opinion to a government official. Rather, she was prosecuted
for purposely making abusive, threatening, or harassing telecommunications. As in
Kronenburg, Appellant does not have a constitutionally protected right to send repeated
emails for the purpose of harassing Officer Gillilan.
{¶25} The second assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶26} In her third assignment of error, Appellant argues her trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to argue her conduct was constitutionally protected under the First
Amendment at trial, and for failing to move to suppress evidence of her mental health
issues.
{¶27} A properly licensed attorney is presumed competent. State v. Hamblin, 37
Ohio St.3d 153,
524 N.E.2d 476 (1988). Therefore, in order to prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must show counsel's performance fell below
an objective standard of reasonable representation and but for counsel’s error, the result
of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668,
104 S.Ct. 2052,
80 L.Ed.2d 674(1984); State v. Bradley,
42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d
Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00044 11
373 (1989). In other words, Appellant must show counsel’s conduct so undermined the
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having
produced a just result.
Id.
{¶28} Appellant first argues while counsel raised a First Amendment claim in her
motion to dismiss, counsel failed to pursue a First Amendment argument at trial, and
counsel’s failure to raise the issue at trial was ineffective. For the reasons set forth in our
discussion of Appellant’s second assignment of error, we find Appellant has not
demonstrated a reasonable probability of a change in the outcome had counsel raised a
First Amendment claim at trial.
{¶29} Appellant also argues counsel was ineffective for failing to move to
suppress Officer Gillilan’s testimony he was the mental health liaison for the City of
Canton, thus implying he is assigned to interact with people who are mentally ill, as well
as his testimony he found Appellant’s concerns were delusional ideations resulting from
mental illness.
{¶30} Appellant sets forth no legal theory on which the evidence should have been
suppressed. Appellant’s emails were admitted into evidence at trial, allowing the jury to
form its own conclusion as to whether they were delusional as testified to by Officer
Gillilan, or “legitimate concerns or criticism of the government,” as Appellant argues in her
brief. Appellant has not demonstrated had counsel moved to suppress all suggestion of
mental illness concerns in this case, the evidence would have been suppressed, nor has
she demonstrated in the absence of such evidence, the result of her trial would have been
different. We find Appellant has not demonstrated a reasonable probability of a change
Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00044 12
in the outcome had her counsel objected to all mention of mental illness in the instant
case.
{¶31} The third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶32} The judgment of the Stark County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
By: Hoffman, P.J.
Hess, J.
Smith, J. concur
