[Cite as Janson v. Janson,
2025-Ohio-3092.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
GREENE COUNTY
CHARLES JANSON :
: C.A. No. 2025-CA-3
Appellant :
: Trial Court Case No. 1998 DR 0063
v. :
: (Appeal from Common Pleas CourtCYNTHIA JANSON NKA SHAW : Domestic Relations)
:
Appellee : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY &
: OPINION
...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on August 29, 2025, the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
CHRISTOPHER B. EPLEY, PRESIDING JUDGE
TUCKER, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur.
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OPINION
GREENE C.A. No. 2025-CA-3
RONALD P. KELLER, Attorney for Appellant
DAVID S. PETERSON, Attorney for Appellee
EPLEY, P.J.
{¶ 1} Charles Janson appeals from the judgment of the Greene County Court of
Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, after it found him in contempt for not
complying with a court order requiring him to purchase and carry a term life insurance policy
for his ex-wife Cynthia Janson (n.k.a. Cynthia Shaw). For the reasons that follow, the
judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} Charles and Cynthia were married in September 1975, but in January 1998,
Charles filed for divorce. They converted the divorce pleading into a dissolution, and a
separation agreement was incorporated. Article 12 of the agreement, entitled “Pension,”
read:
The parties agree that Wife shall receive 50% of all pensions earned by the
Husband during the course of their marriage. This includes but is not limited
to 50% of the disposable retired pay received by the Husband from the
United States Air Force. If at any time the Husband’s military pension is
merged into a Civil Service retirement, the Wife shall be entitled to an
amount from the Civil Service retirement, equal that which she would have
been entitled to from the Husband’s military pension.
The Husband shall purchase a Term Life Insurance Policy in the amount of
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$100,000 naming the wife, Cynthia Janson, as his irrevocable beneficiary
of said policy.
{¶ 3} In the summer of 2003, Cynthia filed a show cause motion, alleging that Charles
was in contempt for failing to maintain the $100,000 life insurance policy to which he had
agreed in the separation agreement. In January 2004, an agreed entry was filed, which
stated the following:
1. The respondent Charles Janson has attained a level Term Life Policy,
Grange Life Insurance Policy # [redacted] for $100,000 death benefit.
He shall maintain the policy and pay timely premiums to maintain former
spouse, Cynthia Janson[,] as irrevocable beneficiary in an amount not
less than $100,000. Cynthia Janson shall execute any forms to grant her
access to the policy.
2. The Movant will release any claim to Survivor Benefits in the
Respondent’s military retirement. Cynthia Janson shall sign any forms
necessary to release her claim to said Survivor Benefits.
{¶ 4} In April 2024, Cynthia filed a motion to show cause and for attorney fees,
alleging that Charles failed to renew the Grange life insurance policy of which she was the
beneficiary. She asserted that because the policy has lapsed and Charles has remarried, if
he were to die, she would receive nothing. After briefing from both sides, the trial court found
Charles in contempt and ordered that he obtain a term life insurance policy with a death
benefit of $100,000 and name Cynthia as the irrevocable beneficiary. He was further ordered
to maintain the policy until the death of one of the parties.
{¶ 5} Charles appealed. His assignment of error contends that the trial court’s
contempt order was an abuse of discretion and against the manifest weight of evidence.
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II. Separation Agreement and Contempt
{¶ 6} A petition for dissolution of a marriage must have attached a separation
agreement signed by the parties. R.C. 3105.63(A)(1). The separation agreement is a
contract, and if the trial court approves the agreement at a hearing on the petition, “it shall
grant a decree of dissolution that incorporates the separation agreement.” R.C. 3105.65(B).
The statute further provides that “[t]he court has full power to enforce its decree.” The
enforcement mechanism is a contempt proceeding in the court that issued the order. Smith
v. Smith, 2010-Ohio-31, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 7} “A prima facie case of civil contempt is made when the moving party proves
both the existence of a court order and the nonmoving party’s noncompliance with the terms
of the order.” Jenkins v. Jenkins, 2012-Ohio-4182, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.), quoting Wolf v. Wolf,
2010-Ohio-2762, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.).
{¶ 8} A person who is guilty of “‘[d]isobedience of, or resistance to, a lawful writ,
process, order, rule, judgment, or command of a court or officer,’” may be punished for
contempt. Smith at ¶ 15, quoting R.C. 2705.02(A). “Each of those matters is a coercive
pronouncement by or on behalf of a court that imposes a specific duty to act or refrain from
acting on the person or persons to whom it is directed.”
Id.
{¶ 9} A trial court’s decision to find a party in contempt is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Barton v. Barton, 2017-Ohio-980, ¶ 98 (2d Dist.). To constitute an abuse of
discretion, a trial court’s action must be arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. Ojalvo
v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State Univ.,
12 Ohio St.3d 230, 232 (1984). A court’s decision is
unreasonable “if there is no sound reasoning process that would support that decision. It is
not enough that the reviewing court, were it deciding the issue de novo, would not have
found that reasoning process persuasive.” AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community
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Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990).
{¶ 10} In this case, Charles argues that the relevant part of the separation
agreement—that he shall purchase a $100,000 term life insurance policy naming Cynthia
as his irrevocable beneficiary—does not contain a timeframe during which he is required to
maintain the life insurance policy. He also points to the 2004 agreed entry which states that
“[h]e shall maintain the policy and pay timely premiums to maintain former spouse, Cynthia
Janson as irrevocable beneficiary,” for the same idea: because there is no timeframe
mentioned, he is free to discontinue paying into the plan whenever he pleases.
{¶ 11} We see it differently. First, we turn to the terms of the 2004 agreement which
state that Charles “shall maintain the policy and pay timely premiums to maintain former
spouse Cynthia Janson as irrevocable beneficiary[.]” (Emphasis added). Here we see
“maintain” used twice, and each instance has a distinct meaning. The first “maintain” means
“to continue something.” Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). The second means “to
support someone financially; especially to pay alimony to.” Id. Given the context, Charles
was to continue paying for the required life insurance policy to support his ex-wife as the
beneficiary. Because there was no time limit placed on the payments, the trial court found
(and we agree) that a timeframe had not been intended, and Charles is required to maintain
the policy until the death of one of parties.
{¶ 12} This finding is further supported by the consideration Cynthia gave for the life
insurance policy. Although the 2004 agreed entry required Charles to maintain a life
insurance policy for Cynthia, she released “any claim to Survivor Benefits in the
Respondent’s military retirement.” Cynthia obtained the benefit of the $100,000 life
insurance policy in exchange for relinquishing her claim to Charles’s Air Force survivor
benefits.
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{¶ 13} Finally, the parties’ express inclusion of definite timeframes in other provisions
of their agreement reveals the indefinite nature of Charles’s life insurance obligation to
Cynthia, where no such limitation was stated. In Section 14 of the original 1998 separation
agreement, the parties stipulated that while their children were minors, Charles was to
provide life insurance naming the children as beneficiaries. Absent any limitation to the
duration of Charles’s duty to maintain life insurance for Cynthia, the parties demonstrated
that his obligation was to continue indefinitely.
{¶ 14} Based on the terms of the agreement, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it found Charles in contempt for his failure to maintain the life
insurance policy. His assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 15} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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TUCKER, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur.
