Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

2025 Ohio 3111

State v. Venters

Ohio Court of Appeals

Decided September 2, 2025

Ohio Court of Appeals · decided 2025-09-02

Appellant's conviction for gross sexual imposition was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant's actions in moving and restraining the victim's legs with his arm so that he could reach under her clothing to touch her pubic area was sufficient "force" for the offense of gross sexual imposition. Appellant's 18-month prison term was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law.

Applies OH 2929 § 2929.20

Relies on State v. Thompkins · State v. Jenks · State v. Dehass

Decided 2025-09-02

[Cite as State v. Venters, 
2025-Ohio-3111
.]




                                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

                           TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

                                              WARREN COUNTY




 STATE OF OHIO,                                     :

        Appellee,                                   :     CASE NO. CA2024-10-064

                                                    :           OPINION AND
     - vs -                                                   JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                                    :             9/2/2025

 AARON J. VENTERS,                                  :

        Appellant.                                  :




     CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                          Case No. 23CR41180


David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kirsten A. Brandt, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Johnna M. Shia, for appellant.




                                               OPINION

        HENDRICKSON, P.J.

        {¶ 1} Appellant, Aaron J. Venters, appeals from his conviction and sentence in

the Warren County Court of Common Pleas for gross sexual imposition. For the reasons

discussed below, we affirm his conviction and sentence.
                                                                                  Warren CA2024-10-064

        {¶ 2} On November 20, 2023, appellant was indicted on one count of gross

sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1), a felony of the fourth degree, one

count of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), a felony of the first degree, and one count

of sexual battery in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(5), a felony of the third degree. The

charges arose out of an incident that occurred at appellant's home in Franklin, Warren

County, Ohio on February 27, 2023, involving appellant's 13-year-old stepdaughter,

Britney.1 On that date, appellant was alleged to have grabbed Britney's legs, rubbed his

hands up and down her legs, including her upper thighs, and reached under Britney's

shorts and underwear to touch her pubic area and place his thumb between the lips of

her vagina.

        {¶ 3} Appellant pled not guilty to the charges and a two-day jury trial commenced

on July 22, 2024. At trial, the State presented testimony from Britney, Britney's half-sister

Tiffany, Tiffany's aunt, Aunt J., and Franklin Police Detective Amanda Myers. Appellant

called Britney's mother (hereafter "Mother") and Britney's sister, Lisa, as defense

witnesses. Both the State and the defense presented as evidence text messages that

had been exchanged between the various family members on the date of the incident and

the months that followed. These messages included texts exchanged by Britney and

Mother, Britney and Lisa, Britney and Tiffany, Tiffany and Lisa, and messages from Britney

to "Rick," a family friend. From the testimony and exhibits introduced into evidence, the

following facts were established.

        {¶ 4} Britney has two full siblings, Lisa and Ian, and a half-sibling, Tiffany. Prior to

Mother marrying appellant, all four siblings lived with Mother in Middletown, Ohio. Mother


1. To protect the victim's privacy and for purposes of readability, pseudonyms have been used to refer to
the victim, the victim's siblings, and one of the sibling's paternal aunts. See State v. Napier, 2024-Ohio-
1837, ¶ 3, fn. 1 (12th Dist.); In re A.P., 
2022-Ohio-3181, ¶ 2, fn. 1
 (12th Dist.). See also Ohio Const., art. I,
§ 10a(A)(1) (requiring that victims in the criminal and juvenile justice systems "be treated with fairness and
respect for the victim's safety, dignity and privacy").
                                                        -2-
                                                                  Warren CA2024-10-064

was a self-described "party mom," who often left the children home alone unsupervised

while she was out drinking at night. After she met appellant, Mother claimed her behavior

changed. She testified she got sober and started being stricter with the children. She

married appellant and she and the children went to live with appellant in his home in

Franklin, Ohio.

       {¶ 5} By February 2023, only Britney remained living with appellant and Mother.

Mother's other children had gone to live with various family members. Appellant had a

son who would stay over at appellant's home on weekends.

       {¶ 6} On February 27, 2023, thirteen-year-old Britney arrived home to an empty

house after finishing an eighth-grade school day. Britney explained that she typically got

home from school around 3:00 p.m., and that appellant would come home from work

about 10 to 15 minutes later. Mother worked evening shifts at her job, until 10:30 or 11:00

p.m.

       {¶ 7} When Britney got home on February 27, 2023, she went into her bedroom

to play video games. Appellant came home and entered her bedroom, holding a jar of

moonshine that he was drinking. After talking to Britney about the moonshine, he left and

she continued playing video games. Later that evening, Britney took a shower and got

dressed in "very loose . . . very big" basketball shorts, a big T-shirt that hung below her

hips, underwear, and a bra. Appellant had urged her to hurry up and get dressed because

he had ordered a pizza and he did not want her to give the pizza man "a show."

       {¶ 8} After Britney got dressed, appellant came inside her bedroom to tell her the

room was dirty. As Britney started to clean her bedroom, appellant began talking to her

about how he previously had cancer and had to have his testicles removed. He also asked

her if one of his shirts, which was hanging in her closet, had her "boob juices" on it. The

pizza arrived, and Britney went into the kitchen to eat. Appellant followed Britney, asking

                                             -3-
                                                                  Warren CA2024-10-064

her if she "could handle the moonshine that he was drinking." He said, "I bet you can't

handle it" and offered her the jar. Britney declined the offer and went back into her

bedroom to continue cleaning. Appellant once again followed her, continuing to talk about

having cancer and the removal of his testicles. Britney testified the conversation was

"awkward" since she and appellant never talked to one another. Britney left her room and

went into the living room, sitting down on the sectional. Appellant followed her into the

living room and sat in his recliner next to the sectional.

       {¶ 9} Appellant continued to engage in awkward conversation, telling Britney

about how he had to explain to his mother a picture taken of him "holding a stripper's

boobs." He then offered to sign a paper from the school that Britney had received after

getting into trouble for vaping and marijuana use. Britney testified that by that point in

time, appellant had already drunk about one-half of the jar of moonshine. Britney took a

picture of appellant drinking with her cellphone to send a "Snapchat streaks" photograph.

She then made a joke about appellant, which prompted him to get up out of his recliner

and move to the sectional, on the right side of her.

       {¶ 10} As Britney sat with her back against the sectional's armrest, appellant

grabbed her legs and put them over his lap, holding Britney's legs with his right arm.

Appellant started rubbing her legs with his left hand, moving his hand inside her shorts

and commenting about how her legs were "prickly at the bottom but smooth at the top."

Britney reacted by moving, bringing her legs up and hugging her knees to her chest.

Appellant put his head between her legs and said, "Don't smash me." He then continued

to tell her how smooth her legs were at the top. Appellant pulled Britney's legs back down

and, with his right arm, held her legs down. Britney testified appellant was holding them

"tighter" than before. Once again appellant started rubbing her legs with his left hand, but

this time he went further up her shorts, reaching under her underwear and touching her

                                              -4-
                                                                   Warren CA2024-10-064

vagina. Britney testified appellant cupped her pubic area with his fingers, with his thumb

going between the lips of her vagina. Appellant did not squeeze his hand, and his thumb

"did not go in" her vagina.

       {¶ 11} While appellant was cupping her vagina, appellant told Britney, "Don't worry,

I won't hurt you." Britney testified appellant's actions made her "scared and [she] didn't

know what to do." She stated she tried to pull away but was not able to "at first." However,

she was eventually able to move away from appellant. Britney pushed her legs away from

appellant's arm and he let go, removing his thumb from the lips of her vagina and his

hand out from beneath her shorts.

       {¶ 12} Britney ran outside to the back patio and tried calling Mother. Mother did not

answer so Britney sent a text message that it was an emergency. She texted Mother,

"Mom I gotta tty [talk to you] when [yo]u get home" and informed Mother that appellant

was doing something that made her "uncomfy." She told Mother, "I'm [a]bout to cry."

Britney testified that Mother ended up calling her, and she told Mother "all that [appellant]

was doing [that] night." She mentioned "he was drunk and being weird and put hands up

my pants." Mother's response was, "I promise he didn't mean nothing. [I] swear [B.G.]

had done worst [sic] to me and he is my real father!!" Britney explained Mother had been

referring to B.G.'s sexual abuse of Mother, his biological daughter.

       {¶ 13} Via text message, Mother acknowledged that on February 27, 2023,

appellant had "drank a lot, he admitted it." Mother advised Britney to go in her bedroom

and "stay out of [appellant's] way and leave him alone." She texted, "just stay in there"

and "[p]retend your [sic] asleep."

       {¶ 14} When Britney went into her bedroom, appellant followed her. He only left

the room after realizing Britney was on the phone with Mother, acting as if he had entered

the bedroom to retrieve the family's puppy. Appellant went to his own bedroom, where he

                                              -5-
                                                                     Warren CA2024-10-064

remained for the remainder of the evening.

       {¶ 15} At the same time Britney was sending text messages to Mother, she was

also sending messages to her older sister Lisa, then 17 years old, and to a family friend,

Rick, to ask for help. To Rick, she texted, "Can [you] please come get me. Mom's at work

and [appellant's] being weird. Please. . . . I'm scared." She sent similar messages to Lisa,

stating, "[Lisa] please come over here. Please. [Appellant's] being weird. . . . He's drunk

and he was tryna touch all on me earlier. . . . And he keeps coming in here and laying in

my bed. . . . He was putting his hands up my pants . . . . And he kept putting my legs over

his legs and rubbing on my thighs." Lisa responded to the texts by stating that Britney

should go in her room, lock it and sit in front of the door. Lisa then stated appellant "prolly

[sic] thought you were mom" and that she was "just as scared as [yo]u are." Lisa advised

Britney to call Rick and tell him what was going on so that he could come get her. Lisa

then advised "Moms [sic] on her way. Sit tight." Neither Lisa nor Rick came to Britney's

aid that evening.

       {¶ 16} Eventually, Mother came home from work. She addressed appellant's

behavior by asking him why it was okay for him to get drunk around Britney when Mother

was not permitted to get drunk around his son. Later that evening, Mother said something

to appellant in front of Britney about his behavior towards her and appellant apologized

to Britney.

       {¶ 17} Mother did not want Britney talking about appellant's actions with others,

and she made Britney delete the text messages she had sent to Mother, Rick, and Lisa

about the incident. Britney did so, but only after she had taken screenshots of the

messages. Though she did not send Lisa any more messages about the event that day,

she spoke with Lisa in person about appellant's actions. Despite the fact that both Mother

and Lisa had been informed of the sexual abuse, neither contacted the police. Britney

                                               -6-
                                                                    Warren CA2024-10-064

testified she did not go to the police because Mother would have been "very angry with

[her] if [she] told anybody anything."

       {¶ 18} In the days that followed, Lisa told her and Britney's half-sister, Tiffany,

about what had occurred between appellant and Britney. Tiffany lived with her paternal

aunt, Aunt J., in Columbus, Ohio. Tiffany reached out to Britney and the two exchanged

text messages with one another about the incident. Britney informed Tiffany that appellant

had gotten drunk, tried to get her to drink with him, followed her around the house "talkin[g]

[a]bout boobs and how he has no balls," grabbed her legs and put them over his, and

talked about how her legs were "prickly down [t]here" and "smooth up" on her thigh before

sticking his hands up her shorts and putting his hands on her "cooch." Britney texted

Tiffany that appellant told her, "don't be scared I won't hurt you" when touching her. Britney

explained to Tiffany that she had called Mother to inform her about appellant's actions but

Mother "didn't even wanna come home" and "barely even yelled" at appellant. Britney

also told Tiffany that Mother "won't let me talk to anybody about it."

       {¶ 19} Britney and Tiffany ended up talking to one another on the phone about

appellant's actions. When Britney spoke about the incident, Tiffany noticed Britney's

demeanor changed. Britney became upset and started crying. Following the phone call

with Britney, Tiffany spoke with Aunt J. about appellant's actions.

       {¶ 20} After Aunt J. learned of the incident, Aunt J. and Tiffany drove to the Franklin

Police Department to report appellant's sexual abuse of Britney. That night, the police,

along with Children Services, went to appellant's home and removed Britney from

Mother's and appellant's care. Aunt J. took custody of Britney. Britney testified she felt

"relieved" when she was removed from Mother's care and home as she had not "fe[lt]

safe" and Mother "was not very, a very good mom."

       {¶ 21} On March 27, 2023, Britney was interviewed at the Child Advocacy Center

                                              -7-
                                                                         Warren CA2024-10-064

by a trained forensic interviewer. Following that interview, Britney turned her cellphone

over to law enforcement, who conducted a forensic analysis of the device. Text messages

that were recovered from Britney's cellphone from February 27, 2023 to March 27, 2023

were admitted into evidence.

       {¶ 22} While Britney was living with Aunt J., Mother sent text messages to Britney

telling her that "all you do is lie, lie, lie." Lisa accused Britney of being "mentally ill." Both

Mother and Lisa pushed Britney to recant the sexual abuse allegations she made against

appellant, asking Britney to claim that she "made it all up and nothing ever happened."

Tiffany testified she saw various text messages sent by Lisa and Mother asking Britney

to say that she lied about the sexual abuse. However, those messages were later deleted.

       {¶ 23} At one point, Britney sent the following text message to Lisa:

               Okay so what do u say? do i just go "mom please help me,
               everything i said was a lie, i was just angry with you and
               [appellant] because i kept getting in trouble and getting yelled
               at. i didn't know it would get this far. i hate it here, these people
               are no good here, everytime [sic] i talk about you they try to
               turn me against you saying you're a piece of shit and they
               always try to turn me against rick too. they won't ever let me
               speak for myself, everytime [sic] court comes [Tiffany] and
               [Aunt J.] speak more than me. every [sic] since i've moved
               here my mental health has gone bad. [Tiffany] tried countless
               times to get me to do drugs with her. my education is
               decreasing, i don't feel happy anymore. [Appellant] never did
               anything to me mom it was all a lie, im so sorry mom, i regret
               ever making all this up i let it go too far. i let my anger get the
               best of me again mom im sorry, please help me. i didn't want
               to say it sooner because i didn't want everyone to look at me
               differently so I just let it get worse. it was all i lie i made it all
               up. i'm sorry."

               or do I switch it up

According to Britney, a similar message had been sent to her by Lisa, with instructions to

"make it sound more like [you]" before sending it to Mother. Britney testified she sent the

                                                 -8-
                                                                 Warren CA2024-10-064

message back to Lisa, asking if the wording of the message is what Lisa wanted her to

say or if she should "switch it up" and say something else. However, Britney testified she

never ended up sending the message to Mother, because the contents of that text

message were a lie.

       {¶ 24} On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Britney about the

recanting text message she sent Lisa and questioned Britney's propensity for

untruthfulness. Defense counsel elicited testimony that Britney had smoked pot, stolen

money, told lies in the past, and had "catfished" others by using a photograph of one of

Tiffany's friends and pretending to be someone else online. Britney explained she

catfished people using another's photograph because she "did not think [she] was very

pretty or loved."

       {¶ 25} Mother testified that Britney "constantly lied," explaining that Britney had

lied about the catfishing incidents and once lied about a family friend having cancer.

Mother testified that Britney had also stolen $600 from a family friend. Mother

acknowledged that Britney had learned to steal from her, as she had taught Britney to

steal prescription drugs from a family friend during her "party mom" days.

       {¶ 26} Mother testified that when Britney communicated with her on February 27,

2023 about the incident with appellant, Britney never mentioned appellant had sexually

assaulted her. Rather, Mother claims Britney only complained about appellant drinking.

Mother admitted she sent the following text to Britney: "I promise he didn't mean nothing.

[I] swear [B.G.] had done worst [sic] to me and he is my real father!! If you have to be

mean be mean but honestly I don't think he meant nothing by it." However, Mother denied

she sent the text in response to Britney's sexual abuse claims. Rather, Mother testified

she sent the message because she thought appellant was "just being drunk and

disorderly," behavior she was familiar with because her own father, B.G., would get drunk

                                            -9-
                                                                  Warren CA2024-10-064

and "freak [her] out." Mother denied that she told Britney to recant or take back the sexual

abuse accusations she made against appellant. She claimed she never "talk[ed] about

any of this with [Britney]."

       {¶ 27} Lisa testified that after she received Britney's texts on February 27, 2023

telling her about appellant's actions, she called Mother and told Mother she needed to get

home. Initially, she claimed she only told Mother that Britney mentioned being drunk and

"weird" and did not relay the sexual abuse allegations. However, she later testified that

the incident was "over a year ago. I don't remember anything from that night."

       {¶ 28} Lisa testified that Britney was a "pathological liar" who, like their other

siblings, did not like appellant because he "straighten[ed] up" Mother's behavior, causing

Mother to become a stricter parent. Lisa denied that she ever asked Britney to recant the

sexual abuse allegations made against appellant or that she ever sent Britney a text

message telling Britney what to say to recant the allegations. Rather, Lisa claims that

Britney drafted and sent her a text message recanting on her own. She claims the

message was sent a couple days after Britney called her on the phone, crying and saying

she "doesn't want to ruin [appellant's] life anymore. And that none of that ever happened."

       {¶ 29} After considering the foregoing testimony and evidence, the jury found

appellant guilty of gross sexual imposition but not guilty of rape and sexual battery. The

trial court ordered a presentence investigative ("PSI") report and set the matter for

sentencing. On September 11, 2024, after being read a statement from the victim, hearing

from the State, appellant, and defense counsel, reviewing the PSI, and considering

relevant sentencing statutes, the trial court imposed an 18-month prison sentence on

appellant, designated him a Tier I sex offender, and advised him he was subject to five

years of mandatory postrelease control.

       {¶ 30} Appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, raising three assignments

                                             - 10 -
                                                                   Warren CA2024-10-064

of error for review. As the first and second assignments of error are related, we address

them together.

         {¶ 31} Assignment of Error No. 1:

         {¶ 32} [APPELLANT'S] CONVICTION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT

EVIDENCE.

         {¶ 33} Assignment of Error No. 2:

         {¶ 34} [APPELLANT'S] CONVICTION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE MANIFEST

WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

         {¶ 35} In his first and second assignments of error appellant argues his conviction

for gross sexual imposition was not supported by sufficient evidence and was against the

manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant contends Britney was not a credible witness

and the weight of the evidence demonstrates she made up the sexual abuse allegations.

He further contends that even if Britney's testimony is believed, the State failed to present

any evidence that he purposely compelled her to submit to his touch by force or threat of

force.

         {¶ 36} Whether the evidence presented at trial is legally sufficient to sustain a

verdict is a question of law. State v. Thompkins, 
78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386
 (1997); State v.

Grinstead, 
2011-Ohio-3018
, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.). When reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence underlying a criminal conviction, an appellate court examines the evidence in

order to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind

of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Paul, 
2012-Ohio-3205
, ¶ 9

(12th Dist.). Therefore, "[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks, 
61 Ohio St.3d 259
 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

                                              - 11 -
                                                                            Warren CA2024-10-064

        {¶ 37} A manifest weight of the evidence challenge, on the other hand, examines

the "inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered at a trial, to support

one side of the issue rather than the other." State v. Barnett, 
2012-Ohio-2372
, ¶ 14 (12th

Dist.). To determine whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence,

the reviewing court must look at the entire trial record, weigh the evidence and all

reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether

in resolving the conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created

such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new

trial ordered. State v. Graham, 
2009-Ohio-2814
, ¶ 66 (12th Dist.). "While appellate review

includes the responsibility to consider the credibility of witnesses and weight given to the

evidence, 'these issues are primarily matters for the trier of fact to decide.'" State v.

Barnes, 
2011-Ohio-5226
, ¶ 81 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Walker, 
2007-Ohio-911, ¶ 26

(12th Dist.). An appellate court, therefore, will overturn a conviction due to the manifest

weight of the evidence only in extraordinary circumstances when the evidence presented

at trial weighs heavily in favor of acquittal. 
Id.,
 citing Thompkins, 
78 Ohio St.3d at 387
.

        {¶ 38} Appellant was convicted of gross sexual imposition in violation of former

R.C. 2907.05(A)(1), which provided that "[n]o person shall have sexual contact with

another, not the spouse of the offender . . . when . . . [t]he offender purposely compels

the other person . . . to submit by force or threat of force."2 "Sexual contact" is defined as

"any touching of an erogenous zone of another, including without limitation the thigh,

genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, if the person is a female, a breast, for the purpose of

sexually arousing or gratifying either person." R.C. 2907.01(B). "Force" is "any violence,

compulsion, or constraint physically exerted by any means upon or against a person or



2. Effective August 9, 2024, R.C. 2907.05(A)(1) was modified by the legislature to remove the phrase "not
the spouse of the offender." See 2023 H.B. No. 161.
                                                   - 12 -
                                                                     Warren CA2024-10-064

thing." R.C. 2901.01(A)(1).

       {¶ 39} "'[F]orce need not be overt and physically brutal.'" State v. Eskridge, 
38 Ohio St.3d 56, 58
 (1988), quoting State v. Fowler, 
27 Ohio App.3d 149, 154
 (8th Dist. 1985).

The use of "[t]he word 'any' specified in the definition of 'force' recognizes that various

crimes upon various victims require different degrees and manners of force." State v.

Umphries, 
2012-Ohio-4711, ¶ 17
 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Sullivan, 
1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 4859
, *10 (8th Dist. Oct. 7, 1993). As it relates to sexual offenses committed

against children, the amount of force necessary to commit the offense "depends upon the

age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to each other." 
Eskridge at 56
,

paragraph one of the syllabus. See also State v. Garrett, 
2009-Ohio-5442
, ¶ 60 (12th

Dist.); State v. Moore, 
2025-Ohio-712, ¶ 20-21
 (3d Dist.).

       {¶ 40} "Courts have found the element of force satisfied when the state presented

evidence that the defendant manipulated or moved the victim's body or clothing . . . ."

State v. Fouts, 
2016-Ohio-1104, ¶ 78
 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Burton, 
2007-Ohio-1660

(4th Dist.). In Fouts, there was "uncontroverted evidence of force" where the victim

testified that the defendant "held his arms around her and pulled down her shirt, moved

her hair, and kissed her against her will." Id. at ¶ 82. In Burton, sufficient evidence of force

was found where the defendant "exercised some physical force over the victim by

manipulating the victim's clothing and sleeping body into a position that facilitated the

sexual conduct. This physical manipulation required force, however minimal, beyond that

inherent in the . . . [sexual offense] itself." 
Burton at ¶ 42
. In another case, sufficient

evidence of force was found where a defendant "took [the victim's] arms in one hand and

held them so that she could neither leave nor defend herself . . . [before the] defendant

took his free hand and inserted his fingers into her vagina." In re P.M., 
2006-Ohio-5917, ¶ 18
 (8th Dist.). The "force" element of a gross sexual imposition offense has also been

                                              - 13 -
                                                                   Warren CA2024-10-064

found sufficient where testimony showed "continuing physical contact when [the victim]

moved her legs away on the couch and repeatedly tried to push the Defendant's hands

away while he held her thighs when she was in the chair." State v. Gullickson, 
1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2031
, *7-8 (9th Dist. May 14, 1997).

       {¶ 41} In the present case, the State presented testimony establishing all the

essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, including the contested

element of "force." Britney testified she is not appellant's spouse; rather appellant is

married to her mother. She further testified that on the evening of February 27, 2023,

appellant manipulated her body by grabbing her legs, placing them over his own, and

holding them with his right arm and hand. He then began to rub his left hand up and down

her legs, commenting on the smoothness of her upper thighs and the "prickliness" of her

lower legs. Appellant moved his hand inside Britney's shorts to rub her right thigh, an

erogenous zone under R.C. 2907.01(B). When Britney moved her legs away, appellant

grabbed her legs and pulled them back down. He constrained Britney's legs by holding

them down "tighter" than before, thereby using force. While holding her legs with his right

arm, appellant used his left hand to start rubbing Britney's legs once again. Only this time,

appellant went further up Britney's shorts, reaching under her underwear and touching

her vagina, another erogenous zone. Britney testified appellant cupped her pubic area

with his fingers and put his thumb between the lips of her vagina. Appellant was using

such force to hold Britney's legs that Britney was initially unable to pull away from

appellant. She testified she could not get away "at first." However, Britney was eventually

able to move away, pulling her legs from appellant's arm, thereby requiring him to remove

his thumb from the lips of her vagina and pull his hand out from her shorts.

       {¶ 42} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of gross sexual imposition

                                             - 14 -
                                                                        Warren CA2024-10-064

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant's actions in grabbing Britney's legs and

restraining them with his arm so that he could rub her upper thighs and reach under her

shorts and underwear to touch her pubic area and vagina is sufficient to prove the force

necessary for the commission of the offense. The State, therefore, presented sufficient

evidence of gross sexual imposition and appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶ 43} Appellant maintains that even if there was sufficient evidence to support his

conviction, the conviction is nonetheless against the manifest weight of the evidence

because Britney's testimony is not credible. Appellant contends Britney recanted the

allegations made against him by texting Lisa that everything she had said was a lie and

had been made up because she was angry at Mother and appellant. Appellant further

maintains that Britney's trial testimony cannot be believed because Britney is a dishonest

individual, known for lying, catfishing people on the internet, and stealing money and

prescription drugs. He argues the weight of the evidence demonstrates that Britney lied

about the sexual touching because she was angry at him for stopping Mother's "party

mom" ways and encouraging Mother to be stricter with the children. Finally, he argues the

jury could not have found Britney credible, as they acquitted him on the rape and sexual

battery charges.

       {¶ 44} Although we review credibility when considering the manifest weight of the

evidence, we are cognizant that determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses and

the weight of the testimony are primarily for the original trier of fact. State v. Hollon, 2025-

Ohio-2725, ¶ 20 (12th Dist.); State v. DeHass, 
10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231
 (1967). "'The jury

is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice

inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of proffered testimony.'"

State v. Watson, 
2025-Ohio-883, ¶ 13
 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Fox, 
2009-Ohio-556, ¶ 18
 (12th Dist.). "[I]t [is] within the province of the jury, as the trier of fact, to take note of

                                                - 15 -
                                                                               Warren CA2024-10-064

any inconsistencies in the testimony and resolve them accordingly, believing all, part, or

none of each witness's testimony." State v. Lark, 
2018-Ohio-4940, ¶ 29
 (12th Dist.), citing

State v. Woodard, 
2017-Ohio-6941, ¶ 24
 (12th Dist.). "A conviction is not against the

manifest weight of the evidence simply because the trier of fact believed the testimony

offered by the prosecution." State v. Baker, 
2020-Ohio-2882, ¶ 31
 (12th Dist.).

        {¶ 45} The fact that the jury acquitted appellant of rape and sexual battery does

not mean the jury found that Britney was not a believable witness. Both the rape and

sexual battery offenses required the state to prove that appellant engaged in "sexual

conduct" with Britney, whereas the gross sexual imposition offense appellant was

convicted of only required proof of "sexual contact."3 Sexual conduct is defined in R.C.

2907.01(A) as

                vaginal intercourse between a male and female; anal
                intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons
                regardless of sex; and, without privilege to do so, the insertion,
                however slight, of any part of the body or any instrument,
                apparatus, or other object into the vaginal or anal opening of
                another. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete
                vaginal or anal intercourse.

Britney testified at trial that appellant's thumb, though between the lips of her vagina, "did

not go in," or penetrate, her vagina. Given such testimony, the jury was entitled to find

that the State failed to meet its burden of proving sexual conduct. However, the jury was

free to find that Britney's testimony credibly described sexual contact in appellant's

actions of rubbing her thigh, touching her pubic area, cupping her vagina, and placing his

thumb between the lips of her vagina.



3. Appellant was charged with sexual battery under former R.C. 2907.03(A)(5), which provided that "[n]o
person shall engage in sexual conduct with another, not the spouse of the offender, when . . . [t]he offender
is the other person's natural or adoptive parent, or a stepparent, or guardian, custodian, or person in loco
parentis of the other person." (Emphasis added.) The statute has since been amended to substitute "sexual
activity" for the term "sexual conduct."
                                                     - 16 -
                                                                  Warren CA2024-10-064

       {¶ 46} Britney's credibility and the veracity of her statements were challenged by

defense counsel on cross-examination and through Lisa's and Mother's testimony. Britney

was questioned about the text message she sent Lisa which allegedly recanted the

allegations she had made against appellant. Britney explained that the message had

been drafted and sent to her by Lisa, with instructions to modify the text to make it sound

more like her own words. Britney testified she only sent the message to Lisa to ask what

exactly Lisa and Mother wanted her to say. Britney indicated she never actually sent the

message to Mother because the contents of that message were a lie. Appellant had

touched her thighs and vagina on February 27, 2023.

       {¶ 47} Appellant's witnesses painted Britney as someone prone to lying and

deceitful behavior, pointing out that she had catfished others online, stolen money and

prescription drugs, and lied to Mother and others in the past. Lisa and Mother also

suggested Britney had falsely accused appellant of inappropriate sexual behavior out of

anger for the changes that he had made in Mother's life, which caused Mother to become

a stricter parent. Though Britney admitted on cross-examination that appellant has never

been "one of her favorite people," she denied that she had levied false accusations

against him. She testified that her trial testimony was the truth—appellant had grabbed

her legs, rubbed his hand up her thigh and under her shorts and panties to cup her vagina

and place his thumb between the lips of her vagina.

       {¶ 48} The jury chose to credit Britney's testimony, which was supported by text

messages produced from the evening in question. On the date of the incident, Britney

had texted Mother and Rick that appellant was doing something that made her feel

"uncomfy" and begged Rick to come get her because appellant was "being weird." She

texted Lisa, "please come over here. Please. [Appellant's] being weird. . . . He's drunk

and he was tryna touch all on me earlier. . . . And he keeps coming in here and laying in

                                            - 17 -
                                                                    Warren CA2024-10-064

my bed. . . . He was putting his hands up my pants . . . . And he kept putting my legs over

his legs and rubbing on my thighs." Weeks later, when texting Tiffiny about the incident,

Britney's account of the events did not change. Britney informed Tiffany that appellant

had gotten drunk, tried to get her to drink with him, followed her around the house "talkin[g]

[a]bout boobs and how he has no balls," grabbed her legs and put them over his, and

talked about how her legs were "prickly down [t]here" and "smooth up" on her thigh before

sticking his hands up her shorts and putting his hands on her "cooch." Britney's account

of the events remained consistent over time.

       {¶ 49} Based on the foregoing evidence, we find that the manifest weight of the

evidence supported appellant's conviction. The jury did not clearly lose its way in

concluding that appellant was guilty of gross sexual imposition. Accordingly, appellant's

second assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶ 50} Assignment of Error No. 3:

       {¶ 51} THE    IMPOSITION       OF THE       MAXIMUM       SENTENCE        WAS    NOT

SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.

       {¶ 52} In his third assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court erred by

imposing an 18-month prison term for his gross sexual imposition conviction. Appellant

argues the court should have imposed a community control sanction as he has never

been incarcerated and his only conviction is for a 1997 misdemeanor DUI. He further

maintains that the imposition of the maximum prison term for his fourth-degree felony

conviction "indicates that the trial court considered factors or considerations that are

extraneous to those that are permitted by R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 and failed to

consider the overall statutory principles and policies underlying felony sentencing."

       {¶ 53} A felony sentence is reviewed under the standard set forth in R.C.

2953.08(G)(2). State v. Marcum, 
2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1
. Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2),

                                              - 18 -
                                                                    Warren CA2024-10-064

an appellate court can modify or vacate a sentence only if it clearly and convincingly finds

either of the following:

              (a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's
              findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division
              (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section
              2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;

              (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

As used in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b), the phrase "otherwise contrary to law" means "'in

violation of statute or legal regulations at a given time.'" State v. Jones, 
2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 34
, quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). See also State v. Bryant, 2022-Ohio-

1878, ¶ 22. "A sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law. where [a] trial court

'considers the principles and purposes of R.C. 2929.11, as well as the factors listed in

R.C. 2929.12, properly imposes postrelease control, and sentences the defendant within

the permissible statutory range.'" State v. Haruyama, 
2022-Ohio-4225, ¶ 8
 (12th Dist.),

quoting State v. Ahlers, 
2016-Ohio-2890, ¶ 8
 (12th Dist.).

       {¶ 54} "R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not permit an appellate court to conduct an

independent review of a trial court's sentencing findings under R.C. 2929.12 or its

adherence to the purposes of felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.11." (Emphasis added.)

Bryant at ¶ 21, citing 
Jones at ¶ 41-42
. Nothing within the statute permits an appellate

court to "independently weigh the evidence in the record and substitute its judgment for

that of the trial court concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance with R.C.

2929.11 and 2929.12." 
Jones at ¶ 42
. See also State v. Lopez-Cruz, 
2023-Ohio-257, ¶ 7

(12th Dist.). However, an appellate court is not prohibited from reviewing a sentence

"when the claim is that the sentence was imposed based on impermissible

considerations—i.e., considerations that fall outside those that are contained in R.C.

2929.11 and 2929.12." Bryant at ¶ 22. "[W]hen a trial court imposes a sentence based on

                                              - 19 -
                                                                   Warren CA2024-10-064

factors or considerations that are extraneous to those that are permitted by R.C. 2929.11

and 2929.12, that sentence is contrary to law." 
Id.

       {¶ 55} Following our review of the record, we find that appellant's sentence is not

contrary to law. The imposition of an 18-month prison term falls within the permissible

statutory range for a fourth-degree felony offense; see R.C. 2929.14(A)(4); and a five-

year mandatory term of postrelease control was properly imposed for the felony sex

offense. See R.C. 2967.28(A)(3) and (B)(1). In imposing appellant's sentence, the trial

court noted, both at the sentencing hearing and in its sentencing entry, that it had

considered the overriding purposes of felony sentencing in accordance with R.C. 2929.11

as well as the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12. Though

appellant believes a shorter prison term or even a community control sanction is a more

appropriate sentence given his limited criminal history, we are precluded from second-

guessing or independently weighing the evidence and substituting our judgment for that

of the trial court. See 
Jones at ¶ 42
.

       {¶ 56} Furthermore, appellant's argument that the trial court considered "factors or

considerations that are extraneous to those that are permitted by R.C. 2929.11 and R.C.

2929.12" is not supported by the record. Rather, the record reflects that when sentencing

appellant the trial court was focused on the facts of the underlying offense, the

seriousness of appellant's conduct, appellant's risk of recidivism, the need to protect the

public, and the need to punish the offender. In imposing the 18-month prison term, the

trial court stated the following:

              THE COURT: Well, I've considered the purposes – the
              purposes and principles of sentencing. The statements made
              here today, the pre-investigation report, the purposes are to
              protect the public from future crime by the offender and others.
              And to punish the offender using the minimum sanctions that
              the Court determines accomplish those purposes without

                                             - 20 -
                                                                    Warren CA2024-10-064

              imposing an unnecessary burden on the State or local
              government resources.

              The key that I'm focusing on at this point is protecting the
              public. It's one thing to have a trial. He was found not guilty of
              rape. He was found not guilty of [sexual battery]. A jury
              obviously carefully considered this and found him guilty of
              gross sexual imposition. He's offered no real remorse. He
              strikes me as indifferent about the whole thing. I'm sure it goes
              beyond that, but as far as in the courtroom, his demeanor, I
              think this is a mixture of excessive consumption of alcohol and
              his desire to abuse this child.

              Therefore, his sentence is 18 months.

As nothing in the record indicates appellant's sentence was based on impermissible

considerations, that is, considerations that fall outside those set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and

2929.12, we find no merit to appellant's argument. The sentence imposed by the trial

court was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law, and appellant's third assignment

of error is overruled.

       {¶ 57} Judgment affirmed.


       PIPER and SIEBERT, JJ., concur.




                                              - 21 -
                                                                  Warren CA2024-10-064



                           JUDGMENT ENTRY

       The assignments of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is
the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same
hereby is, affirmed.

      It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Warren County Court of Common
Pleas for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and
Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.

      Costs to be taxed in compliance with App.R. 24.


                                      /s/ Robert A. Hendrickson, Presiding Judge


                                      /s/ Robin N. Piper, Judge


                                      /s/ Melena S. Siebert, Judge




                                           - 22 -

/2025/ohio/3111 · .json · Public domain