[Cite as State v. Chuppa,
2025-Ohio-3117.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2025-L-009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Criminal Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas
LINDA A. CHUPPA,
Trial Court No. 2024 CR 000830
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: September 2, 2025
Judgment: Affirmed
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Kristi L. Winner, Assistant Prosecutor,
Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH
44077 (For Plaintiff- Appellee).
Eric M. Levy, The Law Office of Schlachet and Levy, Terminal Tower, Suite 2200, 50
Public Square, Cleveland, OH 44113 (For Defendant-Appellant).
ROBERT J. PATTON, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Linda A. Chuppa (“Chuppa”), appeals from the
judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas sentencing Chuppa to a mandatory
indefinite prison term of two to three years as a result of her no contest plea to, and
subsequent conviction of, aggravated possession of drugs, a felony of the second degree,
in violation of R.C. 2925.11 with an accompanying forfeiture specification. Chuppa
appeals from the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress evidence seized after an
investigatory stop and warrantless search of her vehicle.
{¶2} Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it determined
that law enforcement officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct an
investigatory stop of Chuppa’s vehicle. We also conclude that law enforcement officers
had probable cause under the circumstances to search Chuppa’s vehicle under the
automobile exception to the search warrant requirement. Officers were participating in an
ongoing drug investigation. During their investigation, officers conducted a controlled buy
of narcotics from a target of their investigation, a third party identified as Briana McName
(“McName”). The controlled buy occurred in a Target parking lot. After the transaction,
McName, who resided in another county, drove to a Dollar General parking lot. Shortly
after the controlled buy, officers observed Chuppa approach and enter McName’s vehicle.
Given the close proximity of the time, approximately 30 minutes, between the controlled
buy and McName’s meeting with Chuppa, the similarities between the separate
encounters, and the training and experience of the law enforcement officers involved, we
conclude that officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of the
vehicle and had probable cause to believe illegal drugs were inside Chuppa’s vehicle.
{¶3} We also conclude that the trial court properly denied Chuppa’s motion to
suppress her statements made to law enforcement after her arrest. Chuppa did not
identify any incriminating statements that were made to law enforcement. Moreover, as
we have concluded the investigatory stop and search of the vehicle were lawful, Chuppa’s
statements cannot be deemed “fruit of the poisonous tree.”
{¶4} Therefore, the trial court's factual findings are supported by the record and
the trial court properly applied the law. The trial court properly denied Chuppa’s motion to
suppress.
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{¶5} Thus, the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Substantive and Procedural History
{¶6} On July 9, 2024, the Lake County Grand Jury, by secret indictment, charged
Chuppa with one count of aggravated possession of drugs, to wit: 112.95 grams of
methamphetamine, a felony of the second degree, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), with
an accompanying forfeiture specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.1417 and R.C. 2981.04.
Appellant was arraigned on July 15, 2024, and bond was set at $50,000 cash, surety, or
10 percent.
{¶7} On September 13, 2024, the State filed a motion for a bond review hearing
after discovering Chuppa had left Ohio without the trial court’s permission, in violation of
the conditions of her bond. A hearing was held on the State’s motion on September 18,
2024. The trial court granted the motion and revoked Chuppa’s bond.1
{¶8} On October 1, 2024, Chuppa filed her motion to suppress after receiving
leave to file from the trial court. Chuppa argued in her motion that officers lacked
reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle, that officers lacked probable cause to search
her vehicle, and that her statements made after her arrest should be suppressed.
{¶9} A suppression hearing was held on October 24, 2024. On October 28, 2024,
the trial court denied Chuppa’s motion to suppress.
{¶10} On November 18, 2024, Chuppa appeared with counsel, waived her
constitutional rights, and entered a plea of no contest to Count 1, aggravated possession
of drugs, a felony of the second degree, in violation of R.C. 2925.11, with a forfeiture
1. Chuppa later filed a motion to reconsider bond on September 27, 2024. The trial court granted Chuppa’s
motion, over the State’s objection, and reinstated the $50,000 bond on October 18, 2024.
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Case No. 2025-L-009
specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.1417 and R.C. 2981.04. The State presented the
following factual basis for the charges:
The evidence would show on August 2nd of 2023 in Lake
County, Ohio the Lake County Narcotics Agency was
conducting an investigation. As a result of that[,] a traffic stop
was performed where the defendant Linda Chuppa was the
driver and sole occupant of the vehicle. The search of the
vehicle found that in an oven mitt that she had purchased prior
to obtaining the drugs, there was a large bag of
methamphetamine. It was sent to the Lake County crime lab,
confirmed to be methamphetamine in the amount of 112.95
grams. The defendant had obtained and possessed that
methamphetamine that day which was more than 5 times bulk
less than 50 times bulk.
In a subsequent interview with Narcotics agents the defendant
admitted that she paid $800.00 for those drugs and provided
the text messages which showed her coordinating the
purchase of those drugs that day.
{¶11} The trial court accepted Chuppa’s plea and found her guilty. A presentence
investigation (“PSI”) was ordered. The following day, on November 19, 2024, Chuppa’s
bond was revoked due to a positive drug screening.
{¶12} On December 19, 2024, the trial court sentenced Chuppa to a mandatory
prison term of a minimum of two (2) years up to a maximum of three (3) years on Count
1. The trial court also ordered the drugs forfeited pursuant to R.C. 2981.12, R.C. 2981.13,
and R.C. 3719.11(A). The mandatory fines were waived.2 Finally, the trial court denied
counsel’s oral motion to stay Chuppa’s sentence pending appeal.
The Appeal
{¶13} Chuppa timely appeals and raises a single assignment of error for review:
[1.] The trial court erred when after a hearing it denied
appellant Chuppa's motion to suppress evidence obtained
2. An amended sentencing entry was filed December 23, 2024. The amended entry correctly noted that
Chuppa entered a plea of no contest.
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Case No. 2025-L-009
after an illegal stop, search, and seizure conducted where law
enforcement never witnessed appellant engage in any illegal
conduct and the stop was made absent reasonable suspicion
and the search absent probable cause. (T.r. Vol. III, 9-39);
(Docs. 79, 88, 100).
{¶14} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law
and fact.” State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. “[T]he trial court assumes the role of
trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate
the credibility of witnesses.”
Id. citing State v. Mills,
62 Ohio St. 3d 357. We must accept
the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence, and
then independently decide whether those facts satisfy the applicable legal standards
without deference to the trial court’s decision.
Id. “Once an appellate court determines
whether the trial court's factual findings are supported by the record, the court must then
engage in a de novo review of the trial court's application of the law to those facts.” State
v. Eggleston,
2015-Ohio-958, ¶ 18 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Lett,
2009-Ohio-2796, ¶ 13
(11th Dist.), citing State v. Djisheff,
2006-Ohio-6201, ¶ 19 (11th Dist.).
{¶15} At the suppression hearing, the State presented one witness, Lieutenant
Brad Kemp (“Lt. Kemp”), and two exhibits, the video of Chuppa’s interview with police
(“State’s Exhibit 1”) and the signed Miranda warnings form, (“State’s Exhibit 2”). The
following testimony was presented at the suppression hearing:
{¶16} On August 2, 2023, Lt. Kemp of the Lake County Narcotics Agency
(“LCNA”) was assisting Special Agent 95 in a surveillance detail relating to an ongoing
investigation of Briana McName (“McName”) for drug trafficking.
{¶17} During the surveillance detail, Lt. Kemp observed a confidential informant
make a controlled buy of narcotics from McName. The transaction occurred in the Target
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Case No. 2025-L-009
parking lot located in the City of Willoughby. McName did not exit the vehicle. The
confidential informant entered the passenger side of McName’s vehicle and purchased
three “eight balls,” or approximately 3.5 grams of crack cocaine, methamphetamine, and
heroin for $400. The exchange lasted approximately four minutes. After purchasing the
narcotics, the confidential informant returned to his vehicle and relinquished the drugs to
Special Agent 95.
{¶18} After the controlled buy, the surveillance detail followed McName to see if
she would meet anyone else. Without losing sight of McName, officers observed her
vehicle pull into the parking lot of the Dollar General in Shoregate Plaza located in
Willowick. McName did not exit her vehicle. According to Lt. Kemp, this led officers to
believe McName could be meeting someone else.
{¶19} Approximately fifteen minutes after parking in the Dollar General lot, Lt.
Kemp observed a white female, later identified as Chuppa, exit the Dollar General store
with a yellow bag and approach McName’s vehicle. Chuppa entered the passenger side
of the vehicle. McName and Chuppa were in the vehicle for approximately fifteen minutes,
before Chuppa exited the car with the yellow bag and returned to her vehicle.
{¶20} Lt. Kemp testified that the Willowick Police Department was contacted to
assist in a traffic stop of a potential drug deal. While Lt. Kemp could not observe
McName’s or Chuppa’s movements inside the vehicle, Lt. Kemp testified that he believed,
given the circumstances, that a drug deal took place, including the similarities between
the controlled buy and the encounter between Chuppa and McName.
{¶21} Officer Brian O’Toole of the Willowick Police Department initiated an
investigatory stop of Chuppa’s vehicle. Chuppa was the sole occupant. Lt. Kemp and
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Case No. 2025-L-009
Director Pat Hengst were on scene at the time of the stop and conducted a search of the
vehicle due to the officers’ belief that a drug transaction took place between McName and
Chuppa. Inside the yellow Dollar General bag was an oven mitt along with a box
containing approximately four ounces of methamphetamine. According to Lt. Kemp,
Chuppa denied that the drugs were hers.
{¶22} Chuppa was arrested and taken to the Willowick Police Department and
interviewed by Lt. Kemp and Special Agent 95. Lt. Kemp asked for some basic
background information such as, Chuppa’s address, birth date, social security number,
cell phone number, physical characteristics, employment, education, and the names of
Chuppa’s family members. Chuppa was also asked about past drug use and prior
convictions. Chuppa admitted she previously used “weed,” cocaine, and
methamphetamine. Chuppa was then read her Miranda rights. Chuppa indicated that she
understood her rights, signed the LCNA Miranda Warning form, and subsequently
admitted that she purchased the drugs from McName for $800.
{¶23} The trial court concluded, based on the totality of the circumstances, that
“Lt. Kemp had reasonable suspicion that a drug transaction had taken place between
McName and [Chuppa] and that the investigative stop . . . was constitutional.” The trial
court further concluded that Lt. Kemp had probable cause to believe that Chuppa’s
vehicle contained drugs purchased from McName in the Dollar General parking lot, and
that the search of Chuppa’s vehicle was permissible under the automobile exception of
the search warrant requirement. Finally, as to the statements Chuppa made to Lt. Kemp
after her arrest, the trial court determined that Chuppa failed to identify any incriminating
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Case No. 2025-L-009
statements made prior to receiving her Miranda warning and that the statements were not
the “fruit of the poisonous tree.”
{¶24} In her sole assignment of error, Chuppa argues that the trial court erred
when it denied her motion to suppress and determined that: 1) officers had reasonable
suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of her vehicle, 2) officers had probable cause
to search her vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception to the search warrant
requirement, and 3) her statements were not “fruit of the poisonous tree.” We address
each claim below.
Investigatory Stop
{¶25} Chuppa first argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that officers
had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop her vehicle where officers did not personally
witness Chuppa “engaging in any activity which would give rise to a belief she was
engaged in a drug transaction.” We disagree.
{¶26} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Sections 10 and 14 of the Ohio Constitution, prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures. A police officer who lacks probable cause to arrest may, consistent with the
Fourth Amendment, make an investigatory stop, including a traffic stop, of a person if the
officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is or is about to be engaged
in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see Navarette v. California,
572 U.S.
393, 396 (2014); see also State v. Tidwell,
2021-Ohio-2072, ¶ 19.
{¶27} “An investigatory traffic stop . . . is a brief, minimally intrusive response that
enables a law-enforcement officer with at least reasonable suspicion that a crime is being
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Case No. 2025-L-009
or is about to be committed to obtain more information that can quickly confirm or dispel
the officer's suspicion.” Tidwell at ¶ 48.
{¶28} As the Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized, “[p]recisely defining
‘reasonable suspicion’ is not possible, and as such, the reasonable-suspicion standard is
‘“not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”’” State v. Hawkins,
2019-Ohio-4210, ¶ 20, quoting Ornelas v. United States,
517 U.S. 690, 695-696 (1996),
quoting Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983).
The reasonableness of a Terry stop “depends on a balance
between the public interest and the individual’s right to
personal security free from arbitrary interference by law
officers.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S 873, 878,
95 S.Ct. 2574,
45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). The level of suspicion
required to meet the reasonable-suspicion standard “is
obviously less demanding than that for probable cause” and
“is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a
preponderance of the evidence” but is “something more than
an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch.”’”
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7,
109 S.Ct. 1581,
104
L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), quoting
Terry at 27.
Hawkins at ¶ 20. Accordingly, reasonable suspicion is inherently fact sensitive and
dependent.
{¶29} When determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct
a Terry stop, “the ‘totality of circumstances’ must be considered and ‘viewed through the
eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events
as they unfold.’” Id. at ¶ 21, quoting State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88 (1991).
“Reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop ‘is dependent upon both the content of information
possessed by police and its degree of reliability.’” Tidwell,
2021-Ohio-2072, at ¶ 20,
quoting Alabama v. White,
496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). “‘Both factors—quantity and
quality—are considered in the “totality of the circumstances—the whole picture,” …, that
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Case No. 2025-L-009
must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion.’
[White], quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). Police officers may
‘draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and
deductions about the cumulative information available to them that “might well elude an
untrained person.”’ United States v. Arvizu,
534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002), quoting
Cortez at
418.”
Tidwell at ¶ 20. Therefore, a court must look at the whole picture through the eyes
of reasonable and prudent police officer when determining whether reasonable suspicion
exists to support a stop.
{¶30} “‘A determination that reasonable suspicion exists, however, need not rule
out the possibility of innocent conduct.’ [Arvizu] at 277. In permitting detentions based on
reasonable suspicion, ‘Terry accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people.’
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126,
120 S.Ct. 673,
145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000).” Hawkins,
2019-Ohio-4210, at ¶ 22. In other words, law enforcement officers do not need proof of
an unlawful action to conduct a stop.
{¶31} Chuppa cites State v. Kaine, 2008-Ohio-5486 (8th Dist.), in support of her
position that law enforcement officers lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct
an investigatory stop. In Kaine, officers were conducting drug surveillance in a Walgreen's
parking lot located in an area of high drug activity. Id. at ¶ 3. A Ford Explorer entered the
parking lot and parked in a space away from the store. The driver did not exit the vehicle
and officers became suspicious. A second vehicle entered the parking lot. A male exited
the second vehicle and entered the Ford Explorer. After approximately thirty seconds, the
male exited the Ford Explorer and returned to the second vehicle. The detective was not
able to observe the activity within the Ford Explorer. Id. The Ford Explorer exited the
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Case No. 2025-L-009
parking lot and law enforcement officers conducted an investigatory stop of the vehicle.
Upon searching the vehicle, cocaine was discovered under the front seat of Kaine’s
vehicle. Id. at ¶ 6
{¶32} The Eighth District Court of Appeals concluded:
[U]nder the circumstances, the detectives did not have the
requisite reasonable suspicion to stop the Ford Explorer.
There is no question the officers recognized some behavior
that was suspicious, but there was a lack of specific articulable
factors that would justify a stop for drug-related activity. The
detectives observed only the Ford Explorer parked in a highdrug area and the passenger of the second vehicle briefly
enter and then exit the Ford Explorer. No specific articulable
drug-related activity was observed
...
Here, the detectives did not observe any activity within the
Ford Explorer, and they did not observe any evidence of
drugs. They had no more than an inchoate hunch or suspicion
that a drug transaction had occurred. This court has
previously found a lack of reasonable suspicion in similar
cases where the officers fail to observe any drugs or
exchanges between motorists. See State v. Stewart,
Cuyahoga App. No. 88239, 2007–Ohio–1597; State v.
Delagraza (2001), 144 Ohio App.3d 474,
760 N.E.2d 860;
see, also, State v. Wagner–Nitzsche, Summit App. No.
23944, 2008–Ohio–3953. Considering the totality of the
circumstances, we find the trial court erred in determining the
detectives had reasonable suspicion to stop Kaine.
Kaine at ¶ 12-14.
{¶33} Chuppa also cites to State v. Jones, 70 Ohio App.3d 554 (2d Dist. 1990)
wherein the Second District Court of Appeals emphasized that “[a] person's mere
presence in an area of high crime activity does not suspend the protections of the Fourth
Amendment.”
Id. at 559. In Jones, officers did not point to any furtive behavior on the part
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Case No. 2025-L-009
of Jones or her passenger and possessed nothing more than an unarticulated hunch that
drug activity was occurring.
{¶34} The instant case is factually distinguishable from Kaine and Jones. Here,
officers conducted a controlled buy from McName, the subject of an ongoing drug
investigation, in the parking lot of Target. After McName completed her sale, she
proceeded to another location, the parking lot of Dollar General. Officers were familiar
with McName and knew she resided outside of Lake County. Given the close proximity in
time from the controlled buy, officers believed she may conduct another sale. Chuppa
was observed exiting the Dollar General store with a yellow shopping bag. She
approached McName’s vehicle in the Dollar General parking lot and got inside. After
approximately fifteen minutes, Chuppa exited McName’s vehicle and returned to her own
vehicle. While officers did not observe any activity within McName’s vehicle during the
second sale, given the similarities between the controlled buy a short time earlier and the
encounter between McName and Chuppa, officers had specific articulable facts regarding
possible drug activity sufficient to conduct an investigatory stop of Chuppa’s vehicle.
{¶35} Subsequent to Jones, the Second District Court of Appeals concluded that
officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. State v.
Hagler, 1999 WL 76786, *4 (2d Dist. Feb. 19, 1999).
In contrast to Jones, the stop in this case occurred as a result
of police surveillance in an area specifically targeted by citizen
complaints of open-air drug sales. After conducting
surveillance, the officers found activity consistent, in their
experience, with drug sales. In particular, the car in which the
drugs were found stopped first at one apartment where drugs
were reportedly being sold and then proceeded in a
suspicious manner, without lights, to the location of other
suspected drug activity. The occupants of the car then
engaged in what appeared to the officer to be a typical drug
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Case No. 2025-L-009
transaction, i.e., a quick stop with exchanges being made.
Under the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the trial
court that Officer Louderback had a reasonable and
articulable suspicion of criminal activity justifying the
temporary detention of the car and its occupants.
Hagler at *4.
{¶36} The Tenth District Court of Appeals determined that “the evidence in the
record supports the trial court's conclusion that based on the totality of the circumstances,
information known to [officers] gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that appellant's vehicle
contained illegal drugs. State v. Adams, 2017-Ohio-7186, ¶ 35 (10th Dist.). The appellate
court noted that “the trial court heard witness testimony regarding the ongoing
investigation of a heroin trafficking ring, the officer's surveillance of Adams as he briefly
met with a known drug dealer under circumstances which caused him to believe that a
drug transaction had occurred, and the slight odor of marijuana detected on Adams's
person as Adams walked away from his vehicle.”
Id.
{¶37} In this case, the trial court determined that based on the totality of the
circumstances, Lt. Kemp had a reasonable suspicion that a drug transaction had taken
place between McName and Chuppa based on his extensive training and experience.
The trial court noted Lt. Kemp’s observation of the controlled buy with McName prior to
the encounter with Chuppa, and the fact that the circumstances of the controlled buy were
markedly similar to the encounter with Chuppa. While Lt. Kemp could not see inside of
the vehicle, the trial court determined that Lt. Kemp’s reasonable suspicion was not
negated.
{¶38} While not binding on this court, the United States District Court, S.D. West
Virginia, Charleston Division concluded in a factually similar case that officers had
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Case No. 2025-L-009
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of a defendant’s vehicle.
Richardson v. United States, 2019 WL 6211255, *7 (S.D.W.Va. July 8, 2019).3 In
Richardson, officers conducted a controlled buy from a known drug dealer at a residence
and later observed Richardson approach the same residence. Similarly to the controlled
buy, the defendant entered into residence and quickly exited to return to his vehicle.
Officers subsequently conducted an investigatory stop of Richardson’s vehicle when
Richardson crossed into Ohio.
{¶39} We conclude that the evidence in the record supports the trial court's
conclusion that based on the totality of the circumstances, officers had reasonable
suspicion to conduct the investigatory stop.
Search of the Vehicle
{¶40} Chuppa next argues that the trial court erred when it determined that law
enforcement officers had probable cause to search the vehicle under the automobile
exception of the search warrant requirement. Chuppa alleges that “there was absolutely
no evidence that would support a finding of probable cause by an objective law
enforcement officer.” We disagree.
{¶41} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” U.S. Const., amend. IV. Article I, Section 14
of the Ohio Constitution is virtually identical to this language, and it affords the same
protections. State v. Hoffman, 2014-Ohio-4795, ¶ 11. “The touchstone of both is
3. The federal district court was reviewing Richardson’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence
by a Person in Federal Custody under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 wherein Richardson argued that his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress based upon the alleged improper traffic stop.
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Case No. 2025-L-009
reasonableness.” State v. Brown, 2020-Ohio-5140, ¶ 8 (11th Dist.). See also State v. Ellis,
2025-Ohio-1014, ¶ 25 (11th Dist.).
{¶42} “[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” (Footnote omitted.)
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The State has the burden of showing
that the search fits within one of the defined exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement when a defendant moves to suppress evidence recovered during a
warrantless search. State v. Banks-Harvey,
2018-Ohio-201, ¶ 18.
{¶43} Evidence obtained by searches and seizures that violate the Fourth
Amendment must be excluded. State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 181, citing Mapp v.
Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to the states). “‘The primary
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to remove incentive from the police to violate the
Fourth Amendment.’” State v. Eggleston,
2015-Ohio-958, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.), quoting State
v. Casey,
2014-Ohio-2586, ¶ 29 (12th Dist.), citing Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383,
394, (1914) and Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 649 (1961); see also
Ellis at ¶ 25-27.
{¶44} One such exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception.
“Once a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains
contraband, he or she may search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well-
established automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” (Citations omitted.) State
v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51 (2000); see also State v. Welch,
18 Ohio St.3d 88, 91
(1985), citing Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 155-156 (1925) (“a warrantless
search of an automobile stopped by police officers who had probable cause to believe
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Case No. 2025-L-009
the vehicle contained contraband was not unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment”). There is no need to demonstrate that a “separate exigency” exists to justify
the search under the automobile exception. State v. Ivery, 2012-Ohio-1270, ¶ 23 (11th
Dist.), citing Maryland v. Dyson,
527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999). “‘If a car is readily mobile and
probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus
permits police to search the vehicle without more.’”
Id., quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron,
518 U.S. 938, 940, (1996), citing California v. Carney,
471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985).
“Because marijuana and other narcotics are easily and quickly hidden or destroyed, a
warrantless search may be justified to preserve evidence.” State v. Moore, 2000-Ohio-
10, ¶ 19.
{¶45} “In the context of an automobile search, probable cause has been defined
as ‘a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an
automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and
destruction.’” State v. Rath, 2023-Ohio-2118, ¶ 19 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Kessler,
53 Ohio St.2d 204, (1978), quoting
Carroll at 149. “‘The determination of probable cause
is fact-dependent and turns on what the officers knew at the time they conducted a
search.’ (Citation omitted.)”
Rath at ¶ 19, quoting State v. Huber,
2019-Ohio-270, ¶ 20
(11th Dist.).
{¶46} Here, the trial court determined that probable cause existed based on the
facts and what Lt. Kemp knew at the time, to believe that Chuppa’s vehicle contained
drugs that were purchased from McName in the Dollar General parking lot. We agree. At
the time of the search, officers observed a controlled buy between McName and another
individual in a Target parking lot. Officers knew McName resided in another county.
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Officers then observed McName travel to another parking lot, at the Dollar General store.
Chuppa exited the store with a yellow shopping bag. Similarly to the controlled buy,
officers observed Chuppa approach McName’s vehicle and enter on the passenger side.
After approximately 15 minutes, Chuppa exited the car with the yellow bag and returned
to her vehicle. Based upon the information known to officers, including the similarities and
proximity of the earlier controlled buy, officers had probable cause to believe that Chuppa
purchased drugs from McName and that those drugs were inside her vehicle.
{¶47} “‘[I]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it
justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object
of the search.’” Rath, 2023-Ohio-2118, at ¶ 19 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Vega, 2018-
Ohio-4002, ¶ 13, quoting United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982). Because
officers had probable cause to believe Chuppa’s vehicle contained drugs, officers could
search the contents of the vehicle, including the Dollar General bag Chuppa carried
during her encounter with McName.
{¶48} As such, the evidence in the record supports the trial court's conclusion that
officers had probable cause to search the vehicle in accordance with the automobile
exception to the search warrant requirement.
Chuppa’s Statements to Police
{¶49} Chuppa next contends that the trial court erred when it denied her motion
to suppress statements made to the police after her arrest.
{¶50} In the trial court in her motion to suppress, Chuppa argued, without
specificity, that her statements to police should be suppressed. The trial court determined
that Chuppa did not identify any incriminating statements that were made prior to
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receiving her Miranda rights. Further, Chuppa did not identify any incriminating
statements either in the court below or on appeal.
{¶51} Chuppa asserts, albeit briefly, that any statements made after her arrest
must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. Generally, “[i]f the seizure is unlawful,
any evidence obtained after the unlawful seizure must be suppressed as the ‘fruit of the
poisonous tree.” State v. Jones, 2010-Ohio-2854, ¶ 21 (10th Dist.), quoting Wong Sun v.
United States,
371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). As addressed above, the investigatory stop and
search of the vehicle were proper, thus, the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine is
inapplicable.
{¶52} As such, the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record. Upon
application of the law to the facts, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied
appellant’s motion to suppress evidence.
Conclusion
{¶53} Chuppa’s sole assignment of error is without merit. As such, the judgment
of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
MATT LYNCH, J.,
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,
concur.
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Case No. 2025-L-009
JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s assignment of error
is without merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Lake
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Costs to be taxed against appellant.
PRESIDING JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON
JUDGE MATT LYNCH,
concurs
JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI,
concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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Case No. 2025-L-009
