[Cite as State v. Wright,
2025-Ohio-3176.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WILLIAMS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. WM-24-014
Appellee Trial Court No. 23-CR-77
v.
Ron E. Wright DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: September 5, 2025
…
Katherine J. Zartman, Williams County Prosecuting Attorney, and,
Emil G. Gravelle, III, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Joseph Sobecki, for appellant.
…
SULEK, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant Ron E. Wright appeals the judgment of the Williams County
Court of Common Pleas, convicting him of three counts of grand theft, sentencing him to
a total prison term of 34 months, and ordering him to pay nearly $51,649.44 in
restitution. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In the spring of 2022, Wright entered into an agreement with Gregory
Reiman, the owner of Bryan Auto Depot, to construct a building addition. Reiman wrote
a $25,000.00 check to Wright in April 2022, and another in May 2022. Wright cashed
the checks and dug a trench, but did not perform any other meaningful work.
{¶ 3} Related to this construction project, Wright rented a trailer and mini
excavator from Black Swamp Equipment, LLC (“Black Swamp”). He did not return the
equipment. Black Swamp located the equipment four days later when an unrelated
business contacted Black Swamp asking why the equipment was parked in that business’s
lot.
{¶ 4} From these allegations, the Williams County Grand Jury indicted Wright on
three counts of grand theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(2) and (B)(2), felonies of the
fourth degree. Counts One and Two pertained to the two $25,000.00 checks written in
April and May, respectively. Count Three pertained to the unreturned equipment from
Black Swamp.
{¶ 5} On April 24, 2024, Wright entered into an agreement with the State whereby
he would plead guilty to Counts One and Two and enter an Alford plea to Count Three.
In exchange, the State agreed to recommend that the sentences for the offenses be served
concurrently to one another and concurrent to a prison term that he was serving in
Indiana from which he did not expect to be released until 2030. Additionally, the parties
both agreed and reserved the right to present evidence as to an appropriate amount of
restitution.
{¶ 6} The trial court accepted Wright’s pleas, found him guilty, and continued the
matter for the preparation of a presentence investigation report.
2.
{¶ 7} At the restitution and sentencing hearing, the State presented the testimony
of Gregory Burkholder on behalf of Black Swamp. Burkholder introduced an invoice
showing that Wright owed $1,509.44 for keeping the equipment beyond the initial rental
period and for the cost of picking up the equipment from where Wright had left it.
Wright objected to the invoice on the grounds that he had not received it in discovery.
The trial court overruled his objection.
{¶ 8} The State also called Reiman to testify regarding the two $25,000.00 checks
that he wrote, copies of which were entered into evidence. Reiman further testified
regarding a $140.00 bill that he paid to Oberlin for dumping dirt from the trench that
Wright had dug.
{¶ 9} Having heard the parties’ arguments on restitution, the trial court moved to
sentencing.
{¶ 10} The State argued for a prison term in light of Wright’s criminal history and
his pattern of similar crimes. It acknowledged its prior plea agreement and recommended
that any prison term be served concurrently to the sentence from Indiana. Contrary to the
plea agreement, the State did not recommend that any prison sentences from the present
case be served concurrently to each other. Notably, however, it also did not recommend
that they be served consecutively.
{¶ 11} Upon considering the arguments of the State, defense counsel, and Wright,
the trial court ordered Wright to serve a prison term of 17 months on Count One, 17
months on Count Two, and 12 months on Count Three. It ordered the sentences for
Counts One and Two to be served consecutively to one another, but concurrently with the
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sentence for Count Three, for a total prison term of 34 months. It further ordered the
sentences to be served consecutively to the Indiana prison term. In addition, the trial
court ordered Wright to pay $50,140.00 in restitution to Reiman and $1,509.44 in
restitution to Black Swamp.
{¶ 12} Shortly after sentence was imposed, the trial court recalled the case because
defense counsel noted that the trial court did not make any findings relative to its decision
to impose consecutive sentences. Rather than appeal the issue, defense counsel, in a self-
described act of good faith, thought it best to bring the court back into session so it could
make the necessary findings.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 13} Wright timely appeals from his judgment of conviction, asserting four
assignments of error for review:
1. The State violated the terms of the plea agreement by failing to
request that each count be served concurrently with each other.
2. The State violated the terms of the plea agreement by undercutting
it after offering a less than neutral recitation of the part of the agreement
that it followed.
3. The State committed a Brady violation by withholding Victim 2’s
final invoice.
4. The trial court violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution by sentencing Wright to consecutive sentences for
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Counts One and Two because they are allied offenses of similar import that
should merge at sentencing.
III. Analysis
A. Breach of the Plea Agreement
{¶ 14} Wright’s first and second assignments of error both pertain to the State’s
performance of its obligation under the plea agreement and will therefore be discussed
together.
{¶ 15} A plea agreement is considered a contract between the State and a criminal
defendant and is subject to general contract law. State v. Watkins, 2016-Ohio-5756, ¶ 8
(6th Dist.), quoting State v. Liskany,
2011-Ohio-4456, ¶ 190 (2d Dist.). Accordingly, if
one side breaches the agreement, the other side is entitled to either rescission or specific
performance of the plea agreement. State v. Walker,
2006-Ohio-2929, ¶ 13 (6th Dist.),
citing Santobello v. New York,
404 U.S. 257 (1971). See State v. Fenderson, 2015-Ohio-
565, ¶ 20-21 (6th Dist.) (Where specific performance was a viable option, the court
ordered a remand for resentencing.).
{¶ 16} In his first and second assignments of error, Wright argues that the State
breached the plea agreement when it failed to recommend that the prison sentences on
Counts One, Two, and Three be served concurrently to one another. Furthermore,
Wright argues that the State breached the spirit of the plea agreement when it argued for a
prison term, asking for him “to be punished significantly enough for him to finally get it
through his head that he needs to stop defrauding people who trust him” and requesting
“that [the trial court] order him to serve a prison term, mainly because of his history of
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these types of offenses. And the fact that he is a danger to society, not in the way that we
usually think of it, as violent danger to society, but he is an economic danger to our
citizens and our society. So I request that full restitution to both of the victims and a
prison term.”
{¶ 17} Wright, however, did not object to the State’s purported breach. Where a
defendant fails to object to the State’s breach of the plea agreement, the alleged error is
forfeited, and an appellate court reviews for plain error only. State v. Vasquez, 2024-
Ohio-2496, ¶ 25 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Hansen, 2012-Ohio-4574, ¶ 15 (7th Dist.);
Puckett v. U.S.,
556 U.S. 129 (2009). Crim.R. 52(B) provides that “[p]lain errors or
defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the
attention of the court.” To demonstrate plain error, Wright must show “that an error
occurred, that the error was obvious, and that there is a reasonable probability that the
error resulted in prejudice, meaning that the error affected the outcome. . .” State v.
Echols,
2024-Ohio-5088, ¶ 50, citing State v. Knuff,
2024-Ohio-902, ¶ 117. “Plain error
should be noticed only ‘with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and
only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’”
Id., quoting State v. Clayton,
62 Ohio
St.2d 45, 47 (1980), quoting State v. Long,
53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph three of
the syllabus.
{¶ 18} This court has recently examined whether the State’s failure to comply with
a plea agreement constitutes plain error.
{¶ 19} In State v. Roby, 2022-Ohio-223 (6th Dist.), this court held that the State’s
failure to remind the trial court that it was not recommending a prison term was not plain
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error. There, Roby pleaded guilty to aggravated possession of drugs and illegal
conveyance of drugs. Id. at ¶ 4. In exchange, the State agreed to recommend that if a
prison sentence would be imposed on the illegal conveyance charge that it be capped at
18 months, but it confirmed that it was “not recommending a prison term.” Id. at ¶ 4-5.
At sentencing, the State recommended “as to the . . . the illegal conveyance [case], . . .
that there would be a cap of eighteen months . . . [but] [o]ther than that there have been
no promises made . . . and we would leave [Roby’s sentence] up to the sound discretion
of the Court.” Id. at ¶ 8. The trial court sentenced Roby to 36 months in prison on the
illegal conveyance charge. Id. at ¶ 9.
{¶ 20} On appeal, Roby recounted that after it had imposed the sentence, the trial
court commented, “I would also indicate that the Court does recognize that there was a
recommendation of eighteen months from the State of Ohio.” Id. at ¶ 14. He argued that
the court sentenced him under the mistaken belief that the State was recommending
prison time, and the State violated “an affirmative obligation to remind the court that it
was not recommending a prison sentence.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 15.
{¶ 21} This court rejected Roby’s arguments. First, it determined that Roby did
not identify any authority that the State had a duty to correct the court’s comments made
after sentencing, and thus it held that the State did not breach the plea agreement. Id. at ¶
16. Further, this court determined that Roby could not establish “that the outcome of his
case would have been different if the State had ‘reminded’ the trial court of its
recommendation at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing.” Id. at ¶ 17. In its
reasoning, this court identified that the trial court “made an independent determination”
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that Roby’s conduct justified the maximum prison term, pointing to the trial court’s
statements that there was “no other way” to address Roby’s addiction but to impose the
maximum sentence, and its doubt that “community control would be effective” given that
“the recidivism factors are very high in this particular case.” Id. at ¶ 18. This court
concluded that “[t]here is no reason to believe that the trial court would have changed its
mind if the state had ‘reminded’ the court,” noting that even if the trial court was under
the misimpression that the State was recommending a prison term of 18 months, “it
rejected that recommendation by imposing the maximum sentences.” (Emphasis sic.) Id.
This court, therefore, held that the State’s failure to remind the trial court that it was not
recommending a prison term was not plain error. Id. at ¶ 19.
{¶ 22} In contrast, in State v. Vasquez, 2024-Ohio-2496 (6th Dist.), this court held
that the State’s recommendation of a 25-year prison sentence violated the terms of the
plea agreement and constituted plain error. In that case, Vasquez agreed to plead guilty
to one count of trafficking in drugs and five counts of sexual battery in two separate
cases. Id. at ¶ 3. The State, in exchange, agreed to dismiss several other charges and
agreed to recommend a total 15-year prison term between the two cases. Id. Prior to
accepting his plea, the trial court notified Vasquez that it was not bound by the
recommended sentence. Id. at ¶ 4.
{¶ 23} At the sentencing hearing, the State asked for a 10-year prison term in the
first case and a 15-year prison term in the second case, to be served consecutively, for a
total prison term of 25 years. Id. at ¶ 10-11. The trial court imposed a total prison term
of 25 years. Id. at ¶ 14.
8.
{¶ 24} On appeal, this court distinguished Roby, determining that the
recommended sentence was an integral part of the plea agreement, and that the State’s
recommendation of 25 years significantly deviated from the agreement. Id. at ¶ 34. As
to prejudice, it concluded, “it cannot be said that the State’s recommendation did not
contribute to the trial court’s sentence.” Id. This court, therefore, reversed Vasquez’s
convictions and remanded for resentencing. Id. at ¶ 36.
{¶ 25} Turning to the present case, plain error review requires this court to
examine whether there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would have imposed
the same sentence even if the State had made the recommendations required by the plea
agreement. In this case, no such reasonable probability exists.
{¶ 26} Here, Wright has an extensive criminal history, which the trial court
recounted before sentencing him, including convictions for check deception, forgery,
receiving stolen property, falsification and escape, fraud, false sales, home improvement
fraud, and theft and identity deception. The trial court went through Wright’s past and
indicated its difficulty in believing his professed contrition and explanation of his
offenses. The trial court also noted the role that Wright’s meth addiction played at the
time of the offense and the fact that he has spent around five years in prison for similar
offenses.
{¶ 27} Further, as in Roby, there is no reason to believe that the trial court would
have followed the recommendation and imposed concurrent sentences since it also
rejected the State’s recommendation for the sentences to be served concurrently to the
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Indiana term. This is in contrast to the factual situation in Vasquez, in which the trial
court imposed the exact sentence recommended by the State.
{¶ 28} The record demonstrates, therefore, that like Roby, and unlike Vasquez, the
trial court sentenced Wright upon its own consideration of the sentencing factors and not
the State’s recommendation. Consequently, because there is not a reasonable probability
that a different outcome would have occurred, the State’s failure to recommend internally
concurrent sentences is not plain error.
{¶ 29} Wright separately argues that the State breached the terms of the plea
agreement when it advocated for a prison sentence. He claims that he was induced to
plead guilty under the impression that he would serve no additional prison time from
these offenses. He thus contends that when the State argued for a prison sentence,
recommending that he be “punished significantly enough” to learn his lesson and
describing him as an economic danger to society, it violated the spirit of the plea
agreement.
{¶ 30} Nothing in the plea agreement, however, prevented the State from asking
for a prison term. Indeed, the plea agreement contemplated a prison term instead of
community control, just with the provision that the State would recommend the terms be
served concurrently. Furthermore, as discussed above, the trial court’s sentence was
reflective of its own assessment of Wright’s conduct. There is, thus, no reasonable
probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different if the State had
not argued for a prison term. Consequently, the State’s argument for a prison term did
not breach the plea agreement and was not plain error.
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{¶ 31} Accordingly, Wright’s first and second assignments of error are not well-
taken.
B. Brady Violation
{¶ 32} In his third assignment of error, Wright argues that the State committed a
Brady violation when it produced the Black Swamp invoice for the first time at the
restitution hearing.
{¶ 33} “In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that a state violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by
suppressing evidence favorable to the accused where the evidence is material to guilt.”
State v. Brown, 2024-Ohio-749, ¶ 30, citing Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
“To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate (1) that the evidence is
favorable to the defendant, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) that the
evidence was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the state, and (3) that the defendant
was prejudiced as a result.”
Id., citing Strickler v. Greene,
527 U.S. 263, 281-282 (1999).
“Evidence is material—or prejudicial—‘when there is a reasonable probability that, had
the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’”
Id., quoting Turner v. United States,
582 U.S. 313, 324 (2017).
{¶ 34} Here, Wright does not argue that the invoice is exculpatory regarding the
offense of grand theft. Instead, he argues that it was favorable to the defense because it
“shows beyond a reasonable doubt that Wright owes a specific amount to [Black
Swamp].” He suggests this is material because, had it been disclosed, he would not have
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contested the amount of restitution, which he contends undercut his strategy of taking
responsibility for his offenses and negatively impacted him at sentencing.
{¶ 35} Upon review, in addition to the invoice being neither exculpatory nor
impeaching and there being no evidence that it was “suppressed,” the State’s failure to
disclose the invoice prior to the restitution hearing was not a Brady violation for two
reasons.
{¶ 36} First, “[s]trictly speaking, Brady is not violated when disclosure occurs
during trial, even when disclosure surprises the defendant with previously undisclosed
evidence.” Brown at ¶ 31, quoting State v. Iacona,
93 Ohio St.3d 83, 100 (2001). Here,
the State disclosed the invoice during the restitution hearing.
{¶ 37} Second, Wright was not prejudiced as a result. Wright concedes that if the
invoice had been disclosed to him prior to the hearing, he would have stipulated to the
amount owed, which was ultimately what the trial court ordered as restitution. Thus, no
change in the outcome would have occurred. Further, his suggestion that he would not
have been sentenced as harshly if he did not contest restitution is pure speculation. Once
the invoice was introduced, Wright did not dispute the amount owed and his cross-
examination was extremely limited. In addition, his own testimony was limited to his
lack of intent to defraud Black Swamp and his explanation of why the equipment was not
returned. He did not suggest that he did not owe Black Swamp for failing to return the
equipment at the end of the rental period. Thus, his initial challenge of the specific
amount owed to Black Swamp did not meaningfully undercut his willingness to take
responsibility for his actions. Moreover, the trial court already considered his attempt to
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take responsibility but gave more weight to his history of similar criminal conduct. No
reasonable probability exists, therefore, that the trial court would have sentenced Wright
to a lesser sentence if the State had disclosed the invoice and Wright stipulated to the
restitution.
{¶ 38} Accordingly, the State did not commit a Brady violation. Wright’s third
assignment of error is not well-taken.
C. Merger
{¶ 39} In his fourth and final assignment of error, Wright argues that the trial court
should have merged the two offenses of grand theft pertaining to the two $25,000 checks.
He argues that the two offenses were not committed separately because they were both
derived from the same construction project.
{¶ 40} “R.C. 2941.25 codifies the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 10, Article 1 of the
Ohio Constitution, which prohibit multiple punishments for the same offense.” State v.
Rogers, 2022-Ohio-4126, ¶ 16 (6th Dist.). That section provides,
(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to
constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or
information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant
may be convicted of only one.
(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses
of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses
of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus
as to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such
offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.
R.C. 2941.25.
13.
{¶ 41} The test for determining whether allied offenses should be merged is well-
established:
As a practical matter, when determining whether offenses are allied
offenses of similar import within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts must
ask three questions when defendant’s conduct supports multiple offenses:
(1) Were the offenses dissimilar in import or significance? (2) Were they
committed separately? and (3) Were they committed with separate animus
or motivation? An affirmative answer to any of the above will permit
separate convictions. The conduct, the animus, and the import must all be
considered.
State v. Bailey, 2022-Ohio-4407, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Earley,
2015-Ohio-4615, ¶ 12,
quoting State v. Ruff,
2015-Ohio-995, ¶ 31. “The defendant bears the burden of
establishing his entitlement to the protection, provided by R.C. 2941.25, against multiple
punishments for a single criminal act.” State v. Washington,
2013-Ohio-4982, ¶ 18,
quoting State v. Mughni,
33 Ohio St.3d 65, 67 (1987); State v. Smith,
2023-Ohio-866, ¶
10 (6th Dist.).
{¶ 42} Whether offenses should be merged as allied offenses under R.C. 2941.25
is generally reviewed de novo. Bailey at ¶ 6. Wright, however, did not argue or preserve
the issue of merger before the trial court. Thus, the review is limited to plain error. Id. at
¶ 7, citing State v. Rogers,
2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 28 (“the failure to raise the allied offense
issue at the time of sentencing forfeits all but plain error.”).
{¶ 43} Here, the trial court did not err when it did not merge the two offenses. In
April, Wright received a $25,000 check that he cashed for which he performed very
limited work. Forty-five days later, Wright returned to Reiman and asked for an
additional $25,000. Regardless of whether the two requests for payment were related to
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the same contract, Wright made a separate decision to ask for each. Wright, therefore,
committed the two offenses separately.
{¶ 44} Accordingly, Wright’s fourth assignment of error is not well-taken.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 45} For the foregoing reasons, substantial justice has been done the party
complaining and the judgment of the Williams County Court of Common Pleas is
affirmed. Wright is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Christine E. Mayle, J.
JUDGE
Charles E. Sulek, P. J.
JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
CONCURS, AND WRITES JUDGE
SEPARATELY.
Zmuda, J., concurring.
{¶ 46} Because I agree with the majority’s conclusion in affirming but would
clarify the plain error analysis applied to a breach of plea agreement, relevant to Wright’s
first and second assignments of error, I write separately in concurrence.
{¶ 47} Wright argued the state breached the plea agreement by failing to
recommend the sentence for all three counts in his case be served concurrently to each
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other, as contained within the plea agreement. The state did not recommend the three
counts of the present case be served concurrently, and the trial court imposed an
aggregate, consecutive sentence in this case totaling 34 months. The trial court further
ordered Wright to serve the sentence in this case consecutively to the Indiana prison term.
Wright is due to be released in Indiana in 2030.
{¶ 48} In addressing Wright’s first and second assignments of error, the majority
correctly notes Wright’s failure to object in the trial court and our plain error review on
appeal. I write separately, however, to clarify this standard as it relates to the breach of a
plea agreement, consistent with my dissent in State v. Vasquez, 2024-Ohio-2496 (6th
Dist.).
{¶ 49} In reviewing the breach of a plea agreement for plain error, we must find
error, or a breach of the plea agreement, and that, but for the error the results of the
proceeding would have been different. State v. Roby, 2022-Ohio-223, ¶ 12 (6th Dist.). In
applying this test, the majority references State v. Vasquez,
2024-Ohio-2496 (6th Dist.),
and the additional factor considered in that case: whether the breach of the plea
agreement concerned an integral term of that agreement. I find this additional
consideration confuses plain error review.
{¶ 50} First, Wright’s lack of objection to the prosecutor’s breach of his plea
agreement undermines any argument that the promise within that agreement was an
integral part of Wright’s decision to enter a plea. State v. Liles, 2015-Ohio-3093, ¶ 23 (3d
Dist.). A defendant’s expectations related to the plea, moreover, are irrelevant to plain
16.
error review of the trial court’s sentencing determination, and whether the breach
influenced that determination.
{¶ 51} Plain error review requires consideration of the result of the prosecutor’s
breach, or whether the breach affected the resulting sentence. Considering the record, we
must determine whether the trial court was influenced by the prosecutor’s breach of the
promise contained within the plea agreement, or whether the trial court made an
independent determination regarding the sentence it imposed. Roby at ¶ 17-18. In State v.
Roby,
2022-Ohio-223, we reviewed the record and noted the trial court made an
independent determination before imposing a maximum prison term, considering the trial
court’s comments at sentencing, clearly articulating its reasoning. Plain error review
requires nothing more.
{¶ 52} As the majority notes, the trial court in Wright’s case conducted an
independent assessment of Wright’s case and his record before imposing sentence.
Therefore, I agree that the sentence in this case reflects the trial court’s own assessment
of Wright’s conduct. I agree that the prosecutor’s breach of the plea agreement did not
create an exceptional circumstance requiring notice of plain error to prevent a manifest
miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph three of the
syllabus.
{¶ 53} With this clarification, I respectfully concur.
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
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