[Cite as State v. Cameron,
2025-Ohio-3192.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ASHTABULA COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2024-A-0103
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Criminal Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas
MALINDA DEE CAMERON,
Trial Court No. 2024 CR 00266
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: September 8, 2025
Judgment: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
April R. Grabman, Ashtabula County Prosecutor, and Dane R. Hixon, Assistant
Prosecutor, 25 West Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 44047 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Michael A. Partlow, P.O. Box 1562, 3435 Kent Road, Stow, OH 44224 (For Defendant-Appellant).
MATT LYNCH, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Malinda Dee Cameron, appeals the judgment of the Ashtabula
County Court of Common Pleas that sentenced her following a jury trial to an indefinite
prison sentence of a minimum of three years up to a maximum of four and one-half years
for felonious assault and a concurrent six-month prison sentence for domestic violence.
Because her convictions are allied offenses that should have been merged at sentencing,
we reverse the trial court’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
{¶2} On July 18, 2024, after she was bound over to the Ashtabula County Court
of Common Pleas by the Ashtabula County Court, Eastern Division, a grand jury indicted
Cameron on two counts: (1) felonious assault, a second-degree felony in violation of R.C.
2903.11(A)(1) and (D)(1)(a), and (2) domestic violence, a first-degree misdemeanor in
violation of R.C. 2919.25(A) and (D)(2).
{¶3} The case proceeded to a jury trial. The State’s evidence and witness
testimony revealed that on the evening of June 6, 2024, Cameron, her 70-year-old mother
and the victim, Bonnie Cameron (“Bonnie”), and Cameron’s friend, Dennis Bilek,
patronized two local bars in Williamsfield, Ohio. Bonnie testified that when they returned
home, Cameron pulled Bonnie out of the car, smashed her face into the vehicle, and told
Bonnie she was going to “kill her.” Cameron proceeded to claw Bonnie’s face, punch her,
and throw gravel at her. Two neighbors, a father and a son, heard Cameron yelling at
Bonnie. They walked over when they heard Cameron tell Bonnie that no one was going
to help her. They found Bonnie sitting on the ground with blood all over her face and tried
to deescalate the situation. The neighbors called the Ashtabula County Sheriff’s
Department, and paramedics transported Bonnie to the hospital where she was treated
for a broken nose, a bruised face, and a scratched neck. When asked by the deputies,
Cameron denied hitting her mother. Bilek similarly denied that Cameron attacked Bonnie.
The deputies observed Cameron had abrasions on her knuckles that were consistent with
striking someone; however, she told them she was injured from punching a vehicle. The
deputies ultimately arrested Cameron and transported her to jail. The State also
introduced photographs of Bonnie’s injuries and the deputies’ body camera videos.
{¶4} The defense presented the testimony of Bilek and Cameron. Bilek testified
that Bonnie’s behavior was erratic, and she would get violent without her medication. On
the evening of the incident, Bonnie did not want to leave the last bar to go home because
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of her mental condition. When they returned home, Cameron went to unlock the door to
the house, and Bonnie came up behind her and grabbed Cameron’s hair. Bonnie was
“screaming all kinds of off the wall stuff.” They both fell to the ground, and Bonnie hit her
face on the vehicle. Bilek did not observe Cameron scratching, kicking, or punching
Bonnie.
{¶5} Cameron testified that Bonnie started yelling at a little girl when they were
at the first bar. At the second bar, when it was time to leave, Bonnie grew argumentative
with Cameron, and she continued arguing with Cameron on the way home. Cameron
explained that her mother attacked her and pulled her hair when Cameron tried to unlock
the door to the house. Both she and her mother fell to the ground, and Cameron hurt her
knee. She denied punching, slapping, kicking, and/or scratching her mother. Cameron
“thought” she got the bruises on her knuckles of her left hand when she fell on the gravel,
and she admitted to lying to the deputies that she received the bruises by punching a car.
Cameron admitted her mother looked “like she got beat up.” Cameron did not tell the
deputies Bonnie had been violent because she did not want to “tell” on her mother.
{¶6} The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts.
{¶7} At a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Cameron to an indefinite
prison sentence of a minimum of three years up to a maximum of four and one-half years
on the count of felonious assault, and a concurrent, six-month prison sentence on the
count of domestic violence.
{¶8} Cameron raises two assignments of error for our review:
{¶9} “[1.] Appellant’s convictions are against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
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{¶10} “[2.] The trial court committed plain error by sentencing appellant on both
counts as the two charges are allied offenses of similar import.”
{¶11} In her first assignment of error, Cameron contends the manifest weight of
the evidence does not support the jury’s verdict because her version of the incident is
more credible than her mother’s and it was corroborated by Bilek. Cameron further
argues there is no evidence from which the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that she was the aggressor.
{¶12} “[W]eight of the evidence addresses the evidence’s effect of inducing belief.
In other words, a reviewing court asks whose evidence is more persuasive—the state’s
or the defendant’s?” State v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 25. “‘The court, reviewing the
entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility
of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly
lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must
be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997),
quoting State v. Martin,
20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). “When a court of
appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a ‘“thirteenth juror”’ and disagrees with
the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.”
Id., quoting Tibbs v. Florida,
457
U.S. 31, 42 (1982). “‘The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised
only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’”
Id., quoting
Martin at 175.
{¶13} Cameron’s argument is predicated on her version of events being more
credible than the State’s version. However, when assessing witness credibility, “[t]he
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choice between credible witnesses and their conflicting testimony rests solely with the
finder of fact and an appellate court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the
finder of fact.” State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 123 (1986). This is because the trier
of fact “is in the best position to observe and evaluate the demeanor, voice inflection, and
gestures of the witnesses.” State v. Dach,
2006-Ohio-3428, ¶ 42 (11th Dist.). “A fact
finder is free to believe all, some, or none of the testimony of each witness appearing
before it.” State v. Fetty,
2012-Ohio-6127, ¶ 58 (11th Dist.).
{¶14} We cannot say from our review of the record that the jury lost its way and
created a manifest miscarriage of justice by finding Cameron guilty. The State’s evidence
revealed the extent of Bonnie’s injuries, which the deputies testified were consistent with
assault. The neighbors found Bonnie, a 70-year-old woman, on the ground and Cameron
yelling over her. Cameron’s version of events was not consistent with the abrasions on
her knuckles or with Bonnie’s injuries. On the stand, Cameron admitted to lying about
her injured knuckles to the deputies, and Bilek admitted to lying about the number of
alcoholic drinks he had consumed after initially representing himself as the designated
driver. Cameron admitted that her mother looked “beat up.” Fundamentally, “a conviction
is not against the manifest weight of the evidence [merely] because the trier of fact
believed the state’s version of events over the defendant’s version.” State v. Ferrell,
2020-Ohio-6879, ¶ 59 (10th Dist.).
{¶15} Because we determine the jury’s verdict is supported by the manifest weight
of the evidence, Cameron’s first assignment of error is without merit.
{¶16} In her second assignment of error, Cameron contends the counts of
felonious assault and domestic violence should have merged for sentencing purposes
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since there was only one victim and one incident committed with one animus. The State
concedes these are allied offenses of similar import pursuant to R.C. 2941.25(A).
{¶17} Because Cameron failed to raise the issue of merger in the trial court, we
review for plain error. State v. Bailey, 2022-Ohio-4407, ¶ 7. “Under the plain-error
doctrine, intervention by a reviewing court is warranted only under exceptional
circumstances to prevent injustice.” Id. at ¶ 8. “To establish plain error, [the appellant]
must show that an error occurred, that the error was obvious, and that there is ‘a
reasonable probability that the error resulted in prejudice,’ meaning that the error affected
the outcome of the trial.” (Emphasis deleted.) State v. McAlpin,
2022-Ohio-1567, ¶ 66,
quoting State v. Rogers,
2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 22.
{¶18} “Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute two
or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information may contain counts
for all such offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one.” R.C. 2941.25(A);
State v. Whitfield, 2010-Ohio-2, ¶ 17 (a defendant may be indicted and tried for allied
offenses but may be sentenced on only one of the allied offenses).
{¶19} “[W]hen determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import
within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts must ask three questions when defendant’s
conduct supports multiple offenses: (1) Were the offenses dissimilar in import or
significance? (2) Were they committed separately? and (3) Were they committed with
separate animus or motivation? An affirmative answer to any of the above will permit
separate convictions. The conduct, the animus, and the import must all be considered.”
Bailey at ¶ 10, quoting State v. Earley,
2015-Ohio-4615, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Ruff, 2015-
Ohio-995, ¶ 31.
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{¶20} “Although determining whether R.C. 2941.25 has been properly applied is
a legal question, it necessarily turns on an analysis of the facts, which can lead to
exceedingly fine distinctions.” Id. at ¶ 11, citing State v. Johnson, 2010-Ohio-6314, ¶ 52
(“this analysis may be sometimes difficult to perform and may result in varying results for
the same set of offenses in different cases”), abrogated in part by Ruff at ¶ 1 (holding that
“offenses resulting in harm that is separate and identifiable are offenses of dissimilar
import” for purposes of merger under R.C. 2941.25(B)).
{¶21} Pursuant to R.C. 2919.25(A), the domestic violence statute, “[n]o person
shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to a family or household
member.” Pursuant to R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), the felonious assault statute, “[n]o person
shall knowingly . . . cause physical harm to another . . . .”
{¶22} Having reviewed the record, we agree with Cameron’s argument and the
State’s concession that the felonious assault and domestic violence offenses should have
been merged for sentencing. In this case, Cameron’s conduct involved a single victim
and was committed with a single animus in a single incident. Thus, we must reverse the
trial court’s sentence and remand for resentencing. See, e.g. State v. Brown, 2014-Ohio-
728, ¶ 3-7 (2d Dist.) (reversing and remanding for resentencing because the trial court
did not engage in merger analysis and the State conceded error); State v. Wilson, 2025-
Ohio-2296, ¶ 25-28 (3d Dist.) (remanding for resentencing because the defendant
committed the offenses of strangulation and domestic violence in a single act with a single
animus against a single victim and the State conceded error); State v. Cioffi, 2025-Ohio-
423, ¶ 10-11 (3d Dist.) (remanding for resentencing because the trial court should have
merged certain felonious assault and domestic violence offenses that were single acts
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committed with a single animus and resulted in the same harm). “The trial court must
merge the crimes into a single conviction and impose a sentence that is appropriate for
the offense chosen for sentencing . . . . The imposition of concurrent sentences is not the
equivalent of merging allied offenses.” State v. Damron, 2011-Ohio-2268, ¶ 17.
{¶23} The jury’s verdict is affirmed, and the sentencing judgment of the Ashtabula
County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and remanded for resentencing.
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,
SCOTT LYNCH, J.,
concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, it is the judgment and order of
this court that the jury’s verdict is affirmed, and the sentencing judgment of the Ashtabula
County Court of Common Pleas is reversed. This case is remanded for resentencing
consistent with the opinion.
Costs to be taxed against the parties equally.
JUDGE MATT LYNCH
JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND,
concurs
JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH,
concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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