[Cite as Kovacic v. Wickliffe,
2025-Ohio-3195.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY
DANIEL EDWARD KOVACIC, CASE NO. 2025-L-028
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Civil Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas
CITY OF WICKLIFFE, et al.,
Trial Court No. 2024 CV 001255
Defendants-Appellees.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: September 8, 2025
Judgment: Affirmed
Daniel Edward Kovacic, pro se, Reg. No. 7962750, Northeast Ohio Correctional Center,
2240 Hubbard Road, Youngstown, OH 44505 (Plaintiff-Appellant).
David L. Harvey, III and Matthew B. Abens, Harvey + Abens Co., L.P.A., 19250 Bagley
Road, Suite 102, Middleburg Heights, OH 44130; and Jeremy D. Iosue, Stefanik Iosue
& Associates, LLC, 1109 Carnegie Avenue, 2nd Floor, Cleveland, OH 44115 (For
Defendants-Appellees, City of Wickliffe, Wickliffe Police Department, Mayor Joseph
Sakacs, Randy Ice, Chief Jonathon Bush, Lieutenant James Coolick, Patrolman
Anthony Didona, Sergeant Mark Sopko, Kristen Fitch, Patrolman Blair, Lieutenant David
Krivacic, Patrolman Daniel Rosen, Police Dispatcher Donald Stein).
Matthew J. Cavanagh, McDonald Hopkins, LLC, 600 Superior Avenue, East, Suite 2100,
Cleveland, OH 44114 (For Defendants-Appellees, David Hughes, Gray Local Media,
and Brian Koster).
Kevin T. Shook, Frost Brown Todd, LLP, One Columbus Center, 10 West Broad Street,
Suite 2300, Columbus, OH 43215 (For Defendants-Appellees, Paul J. Perozeni, Nicole
Nichols, Jordan Unger, Maya Morita, and Jodie Heisner).
Steven A. Friedman and Elizabeth A. Safier, Squire Patton Boggs, LLP, 1000 Key
Tower, 127 Public Square, Cleveland, OH 44114 (For Defendants-Appellees, Micki
Byrnes, Bri Buckley, and Jonathon Adkins).
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Daniel Edward Kovacic, appeals the judgment dismissing his
complaint as amended. We affirm.
{¶2} On August 16, 2024, Kovacic filed a civil complaint against the city of
Wickliffe, the Wickliffe Police Department, four specified individuals at certain news
organizations (the “news media defendants”), and “any John/Jane Doe’s.” Pursuant to
Kovacic’s complaint, on August 17, 2023, the Wickliffe Police Department received
reports that a man had exited Kovacic’s apartment, fired a gun approximately four times,
and then returned inside his apartment with a female. Officers arrived at the scene and
conducted a five-hour stakeout of Kovacic’s apartment. Thereafter, Kovacic alleged that
the police officers reported that he had “barricaded” himself inside his home with a female
during a “standoff.” Kovacic maintained that the news media published information from
the police reports. However, Kovacic maintained that the officers’ statements were false,
as police had been advised when they arrived at the scene that Kovacic was sleeping in
his apartment and unaware of the officers’ presence. Kovacic attached portions of police
records and news media reports to his original complaint.
{¶3} Subsequently, several defendants moved to dismiss the original complaint.
On September 26, 2024, Kovacic moved to amend his complaint and for an extension of
time to respond to the motions to dismiss. The trial court granted Kovacic’s motion for
leave to amend his complaint and denied his motion for leave to respond to the motions
to dismiss as moot.
{¶4} On October 18, 2024, Kovacic filed his amended complaint. The amended
complaint named several additional defendants, including news media defendants and
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Case No. 2025-L-028
individuals associated with the city of Wickliffe and its police department (“the individual
Wickliffe defendants”). The caption of the amended complaint also included “John or Jane
Does.” Kovacic again attached several documents to his amended complaint, including
the Wickliffe Police Department dispatch report and portions of copies of stories published
by the news media defendants related to the incident.
{¶5} Thereafter, the named defendants moved to dismiss the amended
complaint and to stay discovery until the trial court’s ruling on the motions to dismiss. The
trial court granted the motion to stay discovery pending ruling on the motions to dismiss.
{¶6} On November 8, 2024, Kovacic filed a “motion to request for
interrogatories,” which also contained a request for production of documents. The
defendants opposed the motion. Kovacic then filed a “motion in opposition to defendants’
motion to dismiss and motion to stay discovery.” Thereafter, the trial court denied
Kovacic’s November 8, 2024 motion and adhered to its previous ruling that all discovery
be stayed pending ruling on the motions to dismiss. On January 17, 2025, Kovacic
renewed his motion for discovery.
{¶7} The trial court ruled on the pending motions in a judgment entry filed on
February 14, 2025. Therein, the court granted the motions to dismiss and dismissed the
amended complaint in its entirety. The court concluded that Kovacic’s renewed motion
for discovery was moot.
{¶8} On appeal, Kovacic assigns five errors for our review.1 The first four
assigned errors challenge the trial court’s dismissal of his complaint:
1. Kovacic’s statement of his assignments of error contained two assigned errors designated as
assignments of error number “2.” Kovacic does not argue the first of these two assigned errors in the body
of the brief. See App.R. 16(A)(3) and (A)(7) (An appellant’s brief shall include “[a] statement of the
assignments of error presented for review, with reference to the place in the record where each error is
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Case No. 2025-L-028
1. The trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiff-Appellant’s
complaint on statute of limitations grounds, where Plaintiff
was denied discovery necessary to identify the individual
defendants and properly amend under Civ.R. 15(D) and
15(C).
...
2. The trial court erred in concluding that the challenged
statements were “substantially true,” despite clear factual
inaccuracies that materially altered the impression conveyed
to the public and caused reputational harm.
3. The trial court erred by finding that the defendants’
statements were protected under the doctrine of qualified
privilege, despite allegations and evidence of actual malice
and reckless disregard for the truth.
4. The trial court erred in granting political subdivision
immunity under R.C. 2744.03, where Plaintiff alleged facts
sufficient to demonstrate malicious purpose, bad faith, and
conduct outside the scope of official duties.
{¶9} “‘An appellate court’s standard of review for a trial court’s actions regarding
a motion to dismiss is de novo.’” Kolkowski v. Ashtabula Area Teachers Assn., 2022-
Ohio-3112, ¶ 19 (11th Dist.), quoting Bliss v. Chandler, 2007-Ohio-6161, ¶ 91 (11th Dist.).
“In reviewing a Civ.R 12(B)(6) ruling, any allegations and reasonable inferences drawn
from them must be construed in the nonmoving party’s favor.” Kolkowski at ¶ 19, citing
Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp. v. McKinley,
2011-Ohio-4432, ¶ 12. “‘[I]t must appear
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would
entitle the plaintiff to the relief sought.’” Kolkowski at ¶ 19, quoting
McKinley at ¶ 12. “A
reflected,” and “[a]n argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment
of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the authorities,
statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies.” As Kovacic argues only the second of the listed
assignments of error number “2” in the body of the brief, we confine our review accordingly.
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Case No. 2025-L-028
copy of any written instrument attached to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all
purposes.” Civ.R. 10(C).
{¶10} The trial court dismissed the claims against the various defendants on
separate grounds as follows. With respect to the Wickliffe Police Department, the trial
court determined that it was not a legal entity capable of being sued. Regarding the city
of Wickliffe, the trial court concluded that political subdivision immunity warranted
dismissal of the claim against it because R.C. 2744.02 does not except claims for
defamation from immunity. Regarding the claims against the individual Wickliffe
defendants, the court dismissed the claims as time-barred by the statute of limitations.
The court dismissed the claims against certain news media defendants because they did
not identify Kovacic by name, address, photograph, or physical description. The court
dismissed the claims against the remaining news media defendants based on the fair
reporting privilege.
{¶11} In his first assigned error, Kovacic maintains that the trial court erred in
dismissing his claims based on the statute of limitations.
{¶12} R.C. 2305.11(A) provides a one-year period to bring suit for defamation. As
previously addressed, the statute of limitations served as the basis of the trial court’s
dismissal of the claims against the individual Wickliffe defendants who were not named
as parties in the original complaint. The challenged statements of the individual Wickliffe
defendants were made on August 17, 2023, and pursuant to Kovacic’s amended
complaint, were published by the news media defendants beginning on August 17 and
18, 2023. See Weidman v. Hildebrant, 2024-Ohio-2931, ¶ 22 (“When defamatory
statements are published in the media or otherwise offered in the marketplace of ideas
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Case No. 2025-L-028
or when the defamed person gains knowledge of the defamatory statements within the
statute-of-limitations period, the discovery rule [which may serve to toll the statute of
limitations] is not applicable.”). Kovacic did not name the individual Wickliffe defendants
until the filing of his amended complaint filed on October 18, 2024, outside the one-year
period from the date that his cause of action accrued.
{¶13} Kovacic maintains that his amended complaint should relate back to the
filing of his original complaint, August 16, 2024, pursuant to Civ.R. 15 because he
included any possible Jane and John Does in the caption of his original complaint.
{¶14} Civ.R. 15(C) and (D) provide:
(C) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or
defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to
be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates
back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment
changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates
back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the
period provided by law for commencing the action against
him, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received
such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be
prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2)
knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning
the identity of the proper party, the action would have been
brought against him.
The delivery or mailing of process to this state, a municipal
corporation or other governmental agency, or the responsible
officer of any of the foregoing, subject to service of process
under Rule 4 through Rule 4.6, satisfies the requirements of
clauses (1) and (2) of the preceding paragraph if the above
entities or officers thereof would have been proper defendants
upon the original pleading. Such entities or officers thereof or
both may be brought into the action as defendants.
(D) Amendments Where Name of Party Unknown. When
the plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant, that
defendant may be designated in a pleading or proceeding by
any name and description. When the name is discovered, the
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Case No. 2025-L-028
pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly. The
plaintiff, in such case, must aver in the complaint the fact that
he could not discover the name. The summons must contain
the words “name unknown,” and a copy thereof must be
served personally upon the defendant.
{¶15} In his original complaint, although Kovacic included John and Jane Does in
the caption, he did not claim that he was unable to discover the names of the individual
defendants or that the unnamed defendants had been personally served with a summons
directed to “name unknown,” as required by Civ.R. 15(D).
{¶16} On appeal, Kovacic argues that “strict technical compliance with Civ.R.
15(D) is not always required when justice so demands.”
{¶17} “Civil Rule 15(D) permits a plaintiff to name a fictitious defendant when the
plaintiff knows the identity and whereabouts of a defendant, but not the defendant’s
name.” Emory v. Bailey, 2024-Ohio-1955, ¶ 14 (5th Dist.), citing Erwin v. Bryan, 2010-
Ohio-2202. In Erwin at ¶ 31, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[a]lthough the plaintiff
may designate a defendant whose name is unknown by ‘any name and description,’ the
complaint must nonetheless sufficiently identify that party to facilitate obtaining personal
service on that defendant upon the filing of the complaint.” Accordingly, “Civ.R. 15(D)
does not authorize a claimant to designate defendants using fictitious names as
placeholders in a complaint filed within the statute-of-limitations period and then identify,
name, and personally serve those defendants after the limitations period has elapsed.”
Erwin at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶18} Here, it is undisputed that Kovacic failed to comply with the terms of Civ.R.
15(D). Thus, that division does not apply to allow Kovacic’s amended complaint to relate
back to the filing date of his original complaint.
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Case No. 2025-L-028
{¶19} Kovacic further maintains that Civ.R. 15(C) applies to allow his amended
complaint to relate back to the filing of his original complaint because he contends that
the parties added in his amended complaint had “actual knowledge and continuous
representation from the outset.”
{¶20} However, Civ.R. 15(C) “‘may not be employed to assert a claim against an
additional party while retaining a party against whom a claim was asserted in the original
pleading.’” Emory at ¶ 19, quoting Kraly v. Vannewkirk,
69 Ohio St.3d 627 (1994). “Thus,
Civil Rule 15(C) does not allow for the adding of a new party to an original action under
the relation back doctrine after the statute of limitations has expired.”
Emory at ¶ 19.
{¶21} Here, Kovacic’s amended complaint asserts claims against additional
parties—it does not substitute parties previously misidentified in the original complaint.
Accordingly, Civ.R. 15(C) is inapplicable.
{¶22} Therefore, Kovacic’s first assigned error lacks merit.
{¶23} In the arguments in support of Kovacic’s second, third, and fourth assigned
errors, it appears he is challenging the trial court’s determinations that the challenged
statements were “substantially true,” that the challenged statements by public employees
were not made with actual malice, and that the officers were acting within the scope of
their employment so as to provide them with immunity.
{¶24} However, the trial court did not address, much less base the dismissal of
Kovacic’s complaint on, any of these issues. Instead, as set forth above, the trial court
dismissed the claims against the individual Wickliffe defendants on the basis of the statute
of limitations; dismissed the claim against the Wickliffe Police Department because it was
not a legal entity capable of being sued; dismissed the claim against the city of Wickliffe
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Case No. 2025-L-028
on the basis of political subdivision immunity pursuant to R.C. 2744.02; dismissed the
claims against certain news media defendants because they did not identify Kovacic by
name, address, photograph, or physical description; and dismissed the claims against the
remaining news media defendants based on the fair reporting privilege.
{¶25} Accordingly, aside from the statute of limitations issue discussed above,
Kovacic has not challenged any of the trial court’s remaining bases for dismissal. “‘[O]ur
judicial system relies on the principle of party presentation, and courts should ordinarily
decide cases based on issues raised by the parties.’” Snyder v. Old World Classics,
L.L.C., 2025-Ohio-1875, quoting Epcon Communities Franchising, L.L.C. v. Wilcox Dev.
Group, L.L.C.,
2024-Ohio-4989, ¶ 15, citing Greenlaw v. United States,
554 U.S. 237, 243
(2008). “Under the principle of party presentation, ‘we rely on the parties to frame the
issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties
present.’”
Snyder at ¶ 4, quoting
Greenlaw at 243.
{¶26} Therefore, we will not proceed to review bases provided by the trial court
for dismissal that Kovacic does not challenge. Further, because Kovacic has not
demonstrated error in the trial court’s judgment, we will not proceed to review alternative
bases for dismissal. Therefore, Kovacic’s second, third, and fourth assigned errors lack
merit.
{¶27} In his fifth assigned error, Kovacic argues:
5. The trial court erred in denying Plaintiff-Appellant the
opportunity to conduct discovery prior to ruling on motions to
dismiss, resulting in prejudice and denial of due process.
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{¶28} As addressed above, the trial court dismissed the complaint in its entirety
pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Thus, the trial court was confined to the allegations contained
in the complaint when granting the motions to dismiss.
{¶29} Accordingly, discovery did not affect the trial court’s decision to dismiss the
complaint. Because we have not found error in the trial court’s dismissal of Kovacic’s
complaint, his fifth assigned error is moot.
{¶30} Last, although not separately assigned as error, Kovacic further argues in
the context of his fifth assigned error that the trial court’s dismissal of his claims should
have been without prejudice. However, this court has held that “a dismissal under Civ.R.
12(B)(6) operates as an adjudication on the merits and properly results in a dismissal with
prejudice.” (Citations omitted.) Grippi v Cantagallo, 2012-Ohio-5589, ¶ 13 (11th Dist.).
{¶31} Accordingly, to the extent that Kovacic challenges the trial court’s decision
to dismiss his complaint with prejudice, his fifth assigned error lacks merit.
{¶32} The judgment is affirmed.
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,
SCOTT LYNCH, J.,
concur.
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Case No. 2025-L-028
JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s assignments of error
lack merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Lake County
Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Costs to be taxed against appellant.
JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI
JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND,
concurs
JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH,
concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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