[Cite as State v. Howell,
2025-Ohio-3255.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250106
TRIALNOS. 24/TRC/26169/A/B
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
vs. :
KATHY HOWELL, :
JUDGMENT ENTRY
Defendant-Appellee. :
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, the briefs, and arguments.
For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial
court is reversed and the cause is remanded.
Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal,
allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24.
The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the
Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial
court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk:
Enter upon the journal of the court on 9/10/2025 per order of the court.
By:_______________________
Administrative Judge
[Cite as State v. Howell, 2025-Ohio-3255.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250106
TRIAL NOS. 24/TRC/26169/A/B
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
vs. :
KATHY HOWELL, :
OPINION
Defendant-Appellee. :
:
:
:
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 10, 2025
Emily Smart Woerner, City Solicitor, William T. Horsley, Chief Prosecuting Attorney,
and Chase O. McGary, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Lora Peters, Assistant
Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellee.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
KINSLEY, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant the City of Cincinnati, State of Ohio (“the City”)
appeals the judgment of the Hamilton County Municipal Court granting defendant-
appellee Kathy Howell’s motion to suppress following her arrest for operating a motor
vehicle while intoxicated (“OVI”). In granting the motion, the trial court concluded
that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe that Howell was the driver
of a vehicle that crashed into several other cars. We reach the opposite conclusion on
appeal. We accordingly reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the matter to
the trial court for consideration of the remaining issues raised in Howell’s motion to
suppress.
Factual and Procedural History
{¶2} On September 21, 2024, Howell was charged with one count of OVI in
violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and one count of failure to maintain reasonable
control of a vehicle in violation of R.C. 4511.202(A).
{¶3} Howell subsequently moved to suppress both her arrest and evidence
gathered at the scene, arguing that (1) the arresting officer failed to conduct field
sobriety testing in compliance with National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(“NHTSA”) standards, (2) the arresting officer solicited statements from Howell in
violation of her right against self-incrimination, and (3) Howell was arrested absent
probable cause that she was intoxicated.
{¶4} The trial court conducted a hearing on Howell’s motion to suppress on
December 12, 2024. Officer Christopher Ward of the Cincinnati Police Department
was the only witness to testify.
{¶5} Ward explained that he responded to an address on Spring Grove
Avenue where a motor vehicle accident had occurred in front of the Yacht Club. Ward
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
surmised that Howell’s vehicle had turned sideways and crashed into the back of
another vehicle that had then been pushed into two other cars, resulting in a four-car
accident. The cars in front of Howell’s were parked on a curb. All four vehicles were
damaged.
{¶6} Several car owners were outside of the Yacht Club, so Ward obtained
identification from them. He then observed Howell sitting in a chair about ten yards
away from the accident. Ward asked Howell for her license and insurance. Howell
attempted to locate her documentation from the car that had initiated the crash, but
she was unsuccessful. Ward asked Howell where she was coming from, and she said
Columbus.
{¶7} Ward testified that he smelled a strong odor of alcohol when he first
approached Howell. He also observed that Howell stumbled and slurred her speech.
It was dark outside, so Ward was unable to make any observations about the condition
of Howell’s eyes. Howell eventually disclosed that she had consumed one drink that
night prior to coming from Columbus. Howell was able to provide her name and
birthdate to Ward but had trouble with her social security and phone numbers. Ward
asked Howell if she had been driving the car, but the City did not elicit her answer to
that question from Ward, and Ward did not provide it. After gathering Howell’s
information, Ward asked her to perform field sobriety testing, including the walk-and-
turn test and the one-leg stand test (“OLS”). Based upon his experience and training,
Ward opined that he believed that Howell was intoxicated due to the smell of alcohol,
slurred speech, and her performance on the OLS.
{¶8} Following Ward’s testimony, the trial court ordered the parties to brief
the question of whether Ward had probable cause to arrest Howell. The trial court
expressed its concern that although Ward asked Howell whether she was driving the
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
vehicle, the prosecution did not elicit the answer. The trial court also ordered briefing
as to whether the instructions Ward gave Howell for the OLS test were in compliance
with NHSTA standards.
{¶9} In her posthearing brief, Howell emphasized the absence of evidence
establishing probable cause that she was the driver of the vehicle. She also argued that
the OLS instructions were administered outside of the NHTSA standards. The City
disagreed, contending that the evidence presented at the suppression hearing
supported the inference that Howell operated the car that crashed on Spring Grove
Avenue.
{¶10} On February 14, 2025, in open court, the trial court issued its decision
granting Howell’s motion to suppress. In doing so, the trial court declined the City’s
invitation to infer probable cause. Instead, it concluded that “it was never established
that Ms. Howell was operating the vehicle. Never established.” Because it found a lack
of probable cause to establish that Howell was the driver, the trial court did not
consider the question of whether the OLS test was conducted in compliance with the
NHTSA standards or whether probable cause existed to believe Howell was
intoxicated.
{¶11} The City appeals.
Analysis
{¶12} In its sole assignment of error, the City argues that the trial court erred
in holding that Ward lacked probable cause to arrest Howell. The City raises two
specific issues. First, the City argues that the trial court erred by engaging in an
excessively technical dissection of the facts and by focusing too heavily on the
prosecutor’s failure to solicit Howell’s answer to the question of whether she was
driving from Ward. Second, the City contends that the totality of the circumstances
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
supports the conclusion that Howell was appreciably impaired at the time she
operated the vehicle. Because the trial court confined its probable cause analysis to
the question of operation, we do the same here.
{¶13} In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept the
trial court’s factual findings if they are supported by competent, credible evidence, but
we review de novo the trial court’s application of the law to the facts. State v.
Thornton, 2018-Ohio-2960, ¶ 19 (1st Dist.).
{¶14} To determine whether an officer has probable cause to arrest an
individual for an OVI, we consider whether “at the moment of the arrest, the police
had sufficient information, derived from a reasonably trustworthy source of facts and
circumstances, sufficient to cause a prudent person to believe that the suspect was
driving under the influence.” (Cleaned up.) State v. Rice, 2017-Ohio-9114, ¶ 26 (1st
Dist.). This standard is objective, not subjective.
Id. The amount of evidence
necessary to support probable cause is less than would be necessary to support a
conviction. State v. Jackson,
2025-Ohio-2622, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.). In an OVI case, the
State is not required to present direct evidence of operation, but may satisfy the
element of operation through circumstantial evidence. See State v. Panzeca, 2020-
Ohio-4448, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.), citing State v. Colyer,
2013-Ohio-1316, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.).
{¶15} Here, the trial court reached the conclusion that, as a matter of law, the
City failed to establish that Howell was driving the vehicle. It did not make any specific
factual findings in this regard, nor do the parties challenge any of the trial court’s
factual determinations on appeal. As a result, we review de novo the trial court’s
holding that Howell was arrested absent probable cause of the element of operation.
{¶16} We see the answer to the question of whether probable cause supported
Howell’s arrest differently from the trial court. Under the reduced evidentiary
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
standard applicable at the probable cause stage, the City presented sufficient evidence
at the suppression hearing to support Ward’s belief that Howell was the driver of the
crashed vehicle. Howell admitted that she had driven from Columbus, supporting the
inference that she had been in the car that evening. Howell was also found in close
proximity to the vehicle after the crash, and when asked by Ward to provide
identification, she went to the specific crashed vehicle to retrieve it. These facts
suggest that Howell had in fact operated the vehicle that caused the accident. More
importantly, the evidence did not reveal the possibility of any other driver; there was
no one else on the scene claiming to have been in Howell’s car, nor did any of the
owners of the other vehicles mention another driver. A reasonably prudent person
presented with these facts would form a reasonable belief that Howell operated the
vehicle that crashed into the stationary cars.
{¶17} It is true that the City failed to elicit testimony from Ward as to whether
Howell admitted she was the driver at the scene. This certainly would have been
helpful in establishing probable cause if she in fact conceded that she operated the
vehicle. But there is no requirement that the City prove operation through an
admission or by eyewitness testimony. Circumstantial evidence that a person was
driving is sufficient to demonstrate the element of operation in an OVI case,
particularly at the probable cause stage. See Panzeca, 2020-Ohio-4448, at ¶ 13 (1st
Dist.). Circumstantial evidence established probable cause of operation here.
{¶18} We accordingly sustain the City’s sole assignment of error and reverse
the judgment of the trial court. We remand the cause to the trial court for
consideration of the remaining issues raised in Howell’s suppression motion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
CROUSE and NESTOR, JJ., concur.
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