[Cite as State v. Miller,
2025-Ohio-339.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ASHTABULA COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2024-A-0061
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Criminal Appeal from the
-v- Court of Common Pleas
NOAH A. MILLER,
Trial Court No. 2024 CR 00118
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION
Decided: February 3, 2025
Judgment: Affirmed
April R. Grabman, Ashtabula County Prosecutor, and Calvin Nguyen, Assistant
Prosecutor, 25 West Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 44047 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Rhys B. Cartwright-Jones, 42 North Phelps Street, Youngstown, OH 44503 (For
Defendant-Appellant).
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Noah A. Miller, appeals the judgment of the Ashtabula County
Court of Common Pleas that sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of 54 months
following his guilty pleas to two counts of gross sexual imposition.
{¶2} Appellant raises a single assignment of error, contending that the trial court
erred by imposing a maximum sentence without adequately considering the purposes of
felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors under
R.C. 2929.12.
{¶3} Having reviewed the record and the applicable law, we find Appellant’s
assignment of error to be without merit. Appellant’s sentences are not clearly and
convincingly contrary to law because the record reflects that the trial court expressly
considered R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the
Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas.
Substantive and Procedural History
{¶4} On March 15, 2024, the Ashtabula County Grand Jury indicted Appellant on
five felony counts of gross sexual imposition involving his minor daughter. In counts one
and two, Appellant was charged with third-degree felonies in violation of R.C.
2907.05(A)(4) and (C)(2) for offenses that allegedly occurred on or about March 1 through
May 24, 2023, when the victim was 12 years old. In counts three, four, and five, Appellant
was charged with fourth-degree felonies in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1) and (C)(1) for
offenses that allegedly occurred on or about May 25 through October 31, 2023, when the
victim was 13 years old. Appellant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
{¶5} On May 28, 2024, the parties entered into a plea agreement in which
Appellant agreed to plead guilty to counts one and three in exchange for the State’s
dismissal of counts two, four, and five. The parties agreed to a presentence investigation
(“PSI”) and to argue sentence. The trial court held a plea hearing and engaged in a
colloquy with Appellant pursuant to Crim.R. 11. Following the colloquy, the trial court
accepted Appellant’s oral pleas of guilty to counts one and three and found him guilty.
The court set the matter for sentencing and ordered a PSI.
{¶6} On June 18, 2024, Appellant filed a sentencing memorandum requesting
no actual incarceration. Appellant asserted the following factors in mitigation: (1) he did
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not use force or coercion in connection with his offenses; (2) he brought his wrongdoing
to the attention of others; (3) he has no prior convictions; (4) he has the support of his
wife; (5) he obtained a psychological evaluation at his expense, and the psychological
report attached to his memorandum indicates he has a low risk of reoffending; (6) he is
very remorseful; (7) he is gainfully employed; (8) he is “Old Order Amish” and has the
support of his community; (9) he participates in the STOP program and counseling; and
(10) he has already received “peripheral forms of punishment.”
{¶7} On the same date, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. Appellant made
a statement on his own behalf. Over the State’s objection, defense counsel read into the
record a statement from the victim requesting that her father not be sent to prison.
Defense counsel expressed the support of Appellant’s wife and presented testimony from
the chairperson of the support team formed by Appellant’s church. Defense counsel also
made a statement on Appellant’s behalf reiterating the factors from his sentencing
memorandum.
{¶8} In response, the State disputed whether the victim’s recommendation
should be afforded weight, stating that “it would not be uncommon that a child may still
love a parent.” The State also disagreed with the defense on the issue of force, stating
that the victim was not able to consent due to her age. The State did not recommend any
particular sentences.
{¶9} The trial court stated that it considered the purposes and principles of the
sentencing statutes, the recidivism and seriousness factors, and all documents and
testimony. The court noted that Appellant did not have a criminal history, had led a law-
abiding life for a significant number of years, and had shown genuine remorse. However,
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the court also noted that the offenses were serious, were sexual in nature, and involved
a young victim who is Appellant’s daughter. The trial court found that community control
would demean the seriousness of Appellant’s conduct and its impact upon the victim and
would not adequately protect the public. Therefore, the court found that a sentence of
imprisonment was commensurate with the seriousness of Appellant’s conduct and did not
place an unnecessary burden on the State. The trial court sentenced Appellant to prison
terms of 54 months on count one and 14 months on count three, to be served
concurrently, for an aggregate prison term of 54 months.
{¶10} Appellant timely appealed, raising a single assignment of error.
Assignment of Error and Analysis
{¶11} Appellant’s sole assignment of error states:
{¶12} “The trial court erred by imposing a maximum sentence without adequately
considering the statutory mitigating factors and the purposes of felony sentencing under
R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12.”
{¶13} R.C. 2929.11(A) sets forth the “overriding purposes of felony sentencing,”
which are “to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others, to punish
the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the offender using the minimum
sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an
unnecessary burden on state or local government resources.” A sentencing court “shall
be guided by the overriding purposes.” Id. In addition, the sentence “shall be reasonably
calculated to achieve the three overriding purposes of felony sentencing . . . ,
commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and
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its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes
committed by similar offenders.” R.C. 2929.11(B).
{¶14} R.C. 2929.12(A) grants discretion to the sentencing court to determine the
most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing. In
exercising that discretion, the court is required to consider the factors in R.C. 2929.12(B)
and (C) regarding the seriousness of the conduct and the factors in R.C. 2929.12(D) and
(E) regarding the likelihood of the offender’s recidivism Id. The court may also consider
any other factors that are relevant to achieving the purposes and principles of sentencing.
Id.
{¶15} The standard of review for felony sentences is governed by R.C.
2953.08(G)(2), which provides:
The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this section
shall review the record, including the findings underlying the sentence or
modification given by the sentencing court.
The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence
that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand
the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate court’s
standard of review is not whether the sentencing court abused its
discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized by this
division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under
division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section
2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever,
if any, is relevant;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
{¶16} In State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, the Supreme Court of Ohio explained
the application of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) in relation to R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. The
Jones Court determined that R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 are not among the statutory
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provisions listed in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a). Id. at ¶ 28. Therefore, contrary to the Court’s
prior “dicta” in State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) does not
provide a basis for an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based on the lack
of support in the record for the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Id.
at ¶ 29.
{¶17} Although R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) permits an appellate court to review
whether a sentence is “otherwise contrary to law, the Jones Court determined that this
phrase is not “equivalent” to “an appellate court’s conclusion that the record does not
support a sentence under R.C. 2929.11 or 2929.12.” Id. at ¶ 34. Thus, the Jones Court
held that “[n]othing in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) permits an appellate court to independently
weigh the evidence in the record and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court
concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.”
Id. at ¶ 42.
{¶18} Appellant argues that his “maximum sentence” was “otherwise contrary to
law” because the trial court “did not properly weigh the statutory factors.” Specifically,
Appellant argues that the trial court “disregarded significant mitigating evidence,”
including Appellant’s “lack of prior criminal history, genuine remorse, and strong
community support.”
{¶19} As an initial matter, neither of Appellant’s sentences was a “maximum”
sentence. Count one was a third-degree felony that carried a maximum prison sentence
of 60 months. R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a). Appellant was sentenced to 54 months. Count
three was a fourth-degree felony that carried a maximum prison sentence of 18 months.
R.C. 2929.14(A)(4). Appellant was sentenced to 14 months to be served concurrently.
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{¶20} Appellant relies on two appellate court decisions in support of his “contrary-
to-law” argument: State v. Arnold, 2010-Ohio-3125 (5th Dist.), and State v. Watkins,
2010-Ohio-740 (2d Dist.). However, neither case supports Appellant’s position. In
particular, Appellant misstates the Arnold court’s determinations. Contrary to Appellant’s
assertions, the Arnold court found no error and affirmed the defendant’s sentences. Id.
at ¶ 58-60. In addition, both appellate courts reviewed the defendant’s sentence under
an abuse-of-discretion standard, which the Supreme Court of Ohio later abrogated in
Marcum,
2016-Ohio-1002, at ¶ 10 (“we hold that appellate courts may not apply the
abuse-of-discretion standard in sentencing-term challenges”). Further, both decisions
pre-date Jones and, thus, do not reflect current Ohio law.
{¶21} Appellant’s argument essentially asks this Court to reweigh the evidence
and determine that his sentences are inconsistent with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.
Pursuant to Jones, this Court is not permitted to do so. A “trial court is not required to
give any particular weight or emphasis to a given set of circumstances; it is merely
required to consider the statutory factors in exercising its discretion.” State v. DelManzo,
2008-Ohio-5856, ¶ 23 (11th Dist.). A sentencing court fulfills its duties under R.C.
2929.11 and 2929.12 by stating that it considered them. State v. DeLuca, 2021-Ohio-
1007, ¶ 18 (11th Dist.).
{¶22} Here, the trial court expressly stated that it considered the purposes and
principles of sentencing and the recidivism and seriousness factors. Although not
required to do so, the trial court discussed several statutory factors on the record.
Specifically, the trial court found that Appellant did not have a criminal history, had led a
law-abiding life for a significant number of years, and had shown genuine remorse but
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also that the offenses were serious, sexual in nature, and involved a young victim who
is Appellant’s daughter. Accordingly, Appellant’s sentences are not clearly and
convincingly contrary to law.
{¶23} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is without merit.
{¶24} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of
Common Pleas is affirmed.
ROBERT J. PATTON, P.J.,
MATT LYNCH, J.,
concur.
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