[Cite as State v. Taylor,
2025-Ohio-353.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
State of Ohio, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 19AP-396
v. : (C.P.C. No. 17CR-3590)
Damon L. Taylor, : (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Defendant-Appellant. :
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on February 4, 2025
On brief: [Shayla D. Favor], Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth
L. Gilbert, for appellee.
On brief: Carpenter Lipps & Leland, L.L.P., Kort
Gatterdam, Erik P. Henry, and David F. Hanson, for
appellant.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas,
ON REMAND from the Supreme Court of Ohio
BEATTY BLUNT, J.
{¶ 1} This appeal comes to us on remand from the Supreme Court of Ohio,
following that court’s reversal of our decision overruling defendant-appellant, Damon L.
Taylor’s, first assignment of error but sustaining his second and third assignments of error
and reversing his conviction. See State v. Taylor, 2024-Ohio-1752, reversing State v.
Taylor,
2022-Ohio-2877 (10th Dist.) (“Taylor I”). The Supreme Court reversed our
judgment in Taylor I as to Taylor’s second and third assignments of error, concluding that
our decision erred by determining that the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas lacked
jurisdiction to convict Taylor of felony murder, see Taylor I at ¶ 20, and that we further
erred by determining that Taylor’s due process right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution was violated when he was interrogated outside the
No. 19AP-396 2
presence of his counsel. Id. at ¶ 26, 28. The Supreme Court remanded this case to this
court to consider Taylor’s fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth assignments of
error, which this court had previously declined to address as moot. See Taylor I at ¶ 33-34.
{¶ 2} Taylor had appealed from the May 28, 2019 judgment of the Franklin County
Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to an 18 years to life aggregate term of incarceration
following a jury verdict of guilty of felony murder with a firearm specification. Taylor
asserted nine assignments of error with the trial court’s judgment. Pursuant to the
Supreme Court’s mandate, we must address his six remaining assignments of error:
[IV.] The trial court abused its discretion by allowing
testimony regarding Snapchat from a witness when there was
a lack of foundation and lack of qualification of the testifying
witness contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Ohio and
United States Constitutions.
[V.] The prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing
argument resulting in a denial of appellant’s right to Due
Process.
[VI.] The trial court erred in providing a limiting instruction
regarding law enforcement’s interrogation tactics.
[VII.] Appellant was deprived of the effective assistance of trial
counsel in violation of appellant’s rights under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Section 10 and 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.
[VIII.] The trial court violated appellant’s rights to due process
and a fair trial when it entered a judgment of conviction based
on insufficient evidence and against the manifest weight of the
evidence in violation of appellant’s rights under the United
States and Ohio Constitutions.
[IX.] The imposition of an indefinite prison sentence of 15
years to life for murder violated the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
(Capitalization omitted.) We previously summarized the facts of Taylor’s case as follows:
The facts at trial indicated that late in the evening of April 14,
2016, Taylor either stole or borrowed his mother’s car, which
happened to contain his stepfather Michael Jackson’s firearm,
a Smith & Wesson MP40 semiautomatic pistol. Taylor met up
with his friend (and his sister Dasha’s boyfriend) Damion
Wade, went to the home of his two sisters Dasha and Asha on
Commons Road, and drank and smoked marijuana with Wade
and Asha. At some point Taylor became agitated about the loss
of a chain that he owned and apparently believed that it had
No. 19AP-396 3
been stolen by [Enrique] Straughter, whom he had considered
a friend. Straughter lived in the same apartment complex as
Dasha and Asha, on Lavenham Road, which is well within
walking distance of Commons Road.
Shortly after midnight on April 15, 2016, Reynoldsburg police
were called to Lavenham on report of a shooting. They
discovered Straughter on the ground with gunshot wounds, at
the time still alive and struggling to breathe. He was
pronounced dead shortly thereafter. Crime scene investigators
examining the immediate area found three .40 caliber shell
casings, four unfired .40 caliber bullets, a broken pistol slide
rail, two red Nike Jordan sandals, and an electronic Chevrolet
key fob. (See State’s Ex. B to Bindover Hearing.) The key fob
triggered the locks of a Chevy Malibu awkwardly parked about
200 feet away. The car belonged to Taylor’s mother, who [had]
reported the car stolen at approximately 3:30 a.m. on April 15,
2016 and also reported Taylor himself as missing since 11:45
the prior evening. She apparently followed up with the police
to report that Taylor had not reported to school on April 15
either.
Based on this evidence, Reynoldsburg police obtained a search
warrant for the apartment belonging to Taylor’s two sisters.
When they arrived at the apartment to execute the warrant,
Taylor was there. It is unclear whether Taylor was arrested
before or during the search of the apartment, but
notwithstanding, police seized several cell phones from the
apartment, one of which tied to a Bluetooth device and
identified as “Damon Taylor.” Police were eventually able to
extract several Snapchat photos from this phone—one [of] the
photos, time-stamped on April 14, 2016 at 11:33 p.m., shows a
hand holding a Smith & Wesson pistol inside a Chevrolet, and
another photo, taken at 10:55 a.m. on April 15 depicts Taylor
laying back on a couch with his hand across his chest, and is
captioned: “They tryna take me for murda.” (State’s Ex. C2 and
C4 to Bindover Hearing.)
...
Subsequent DNA tests on the gun rail were found to contain a
two-person DNA mixture, and the major contributor was
identified as Straughter, while the minor contributor was
identified as Taylor. (Apr. 12, 2019 Tr. at 1085.)
...
[O]n June 30, 2017 Taylor was indicted by the general division
of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas for aggravated
murder, purposeful murder, and felony murder by felonious
assault, each with a three-year gun specification. Following a
No. 19AP-396 4
trial, Taylor was found guilty by a jury of felony murder by
felonious assault with gun specification, and was found not
guilty of the two other charges and specifications. On May 28,
2019, the trial court sentenced Taylor to 15 years to life plus 3
mandatory and consecutive years on the gun specification, for
an aggregate sentence of 18 years to life.
Taylor I at ¶ 2-4, 9. Taylor’s six remaining assignments of error assert error in the trial and
sentencing proceedings, and we will address each assigned error in turn.
{¶ 3} In his fourth assignment of error, Taylor asserts that the trial court erred by
admitting, over a continuing objection, the testimony of former Reynoldsburg Police
Detective Brian Marvin regarding Snapchat and the data extracted from one of the phones
seized during the execution of the search warrant. Defense counsel argues that Marvin
lacked specialized training and education that would allow him to speak as an expert on
Snapchat or cellphones and how their systems and software work, and that no foundation
had been laid for such testimony. Notwithstanding, the trial court permitted Marvin to
testify generally regarding the extraction of data using the Cellebrite extraction software,
specifically pictures and Snapchat messages, the general process as to how that data was
stored on a phone, and how, where, and for how long the Snapchat application and the
Samsung phone it was extracted from stored that data. The trial court gave a limiting
instruction to the jury—without objection—in conjunction with Marvin’s testimony:
Certain times people can give opinions or describe things based
upon experience, knowledge, training. They’re called experts.
Okay? The question becomes here, the fight between [Taylor
and the state] is, is he really an expert. Well, about anybody that
can give an opinion that aids and assists the jury can be an
expert, but you guys determine what value it becomes. You base
it upon his experience, upon his training, what he’s done, has
he testified before about it, those types of issues, and you
determine what value, if any, to give to his testimony.
(Apr. 10, 2019 Tr. at 652-53.) Defense counsel summarized his objection to Marvin’s
testimony as follows:
I don’t have a problem with him coming in and testifying for
the purpose of why he’s supposed to be testifying, which is I
extracted the information from this phone with this software
program which I am familiar with and have had training,
Cellebrite, and these are the results. Going beyond that, talking
about how an application works and the intentions of the
No. 19AP-396 5
developer and/or how a cell phone works is way beyond his
area of . . . knowledge.
(Apr. 10, 2019 Tr. at 683.) Notably, defense counsel specifically stated that “[t]he
documents are not what I have a problem with. Him testifying to the documents is not the
problem. It’s the—the going beyond that and testifying to the interworkings [sic] of a cell
phone and an app. . . . I think it unfortunately will lead the jury to give him more credibility
and it will bolster his testimony based on knowledge that he is proposing that has not --
there’s not been a foundation laid. That -- there’s my record.” (Apr. 10, 2019 Tr. at 688.)
The trial court overruled the objection, indicating that it thought that Marvin had displayed
some specialized experience that could aid and benefit the jury, that the testimony was
admissible under Evid.R. 702, that Taylor’s objection was largely cross-examination
material as to the strength of Marvin’s experience and knowledge, that he did not “feel
you’ve demonstrated a prejudice at this point in time,” id., and that it was “all weight and
credibility as far as I’m concerned.” (Apr. 10, 2019 Tr. at 683, 688.)
{¶ 4} The decision to admit or exclude evidence lies in the sound discretion of the
trial court. See, e.g., State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 180 (1987).
Expert-witness testimony is generally admissible “if it will
assist the trier of fact in search of the truth.” Evid.R. 702
permits a witness to testify as an expert if (1) the “testimony
either relates to matters beyond the knowledge or experience
possessed by lay persons or dispels a misconception common
among lay persons[;]” (2) the witness “is qualified as an expert
by specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education regarding the subject matter of the testimony[;]” and
(3) the “testimony is based on reliable scientific, technical, or
other specialized information.”
State v. McKelton, 2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 161, quoting State v. Koss,
49 Ohio St.3d 213, 216
(1990) and Evid.R. 702.
{¶ 5} The state observes that other districts have admitted testimony similar to
Marvin’s as both expert testimony and lay testimony. See generally State v. Hemmelgarn,
2019-Ohio-2034, ¶ 30-36 (2d Dist.) (discussing admission of Cellebrite testimony by expert
witnesses and lay witnesses and collecting cases). It further argues that even if Marvin
provided testimony regarding the technology of cellphones, that testimony was not
prejudicial. Taylor responds that Marvin’s testimony fails the first two prongs of the
McKelton test, in that the testimony went beyond the knowledge or experience possessed
No. 19AP-396 6
by laypersons, that he did not disclose any training he received on Snapchat or operating
systems on phones, and that the trial court’s instruction only served to bolster his
credibility.
{¶ 6} In Hemmelgarn, the Second District held:
[W]e see no error in the trial court allowing [the witness] to give
lay-witness testimony about his use of the Cellebrite program.
A lay witness may testify about opinions or inferences that are
“(1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2)
helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue.” Evid.R. 701. In the present
case, most of [the witness]’s testimony did not even involve
opinions or inferences. He simply testified, factually, about
extracting data from Hemmelgarn’s phone using the Cellebrite
program and listing that data in a generated report. All
witnesses may testify as to facts within their personal
knowledge. Evid.R. 602. To the extent that [the witness] did
offer “opinion” testimony, he essentially opined that Cellebrite
copies data from a phone. He based this “opinion” on
knowledge he acquired through his own use of the program.
[The witness]’s testimony did not require a specialized
understanding of the Cellebrite program, as the idea that data
can be extracted from a cell phone is familiar to most people.
Finally, to the extent that [the witness] arguably conducted any
“analysis” of the data, he merely testified that a generated
report showed content that had been extracted from the phone
and content that had been deleted prior to examination.
Hemmelgarn at ¶ 34-35. See also State v. Calhoun,
2017-Ohio-8488, ¶ 33-36 (8th Dist.);
State v. Shine,
2018-Ohio-1972, ¶ 98-99 (8th Dist.) (finding that officer testimony
regarding data extracted from a phone using Cellebrite was admissible expert testimony).
{¶ 7} We find Hemmelgarn persuasive, and believe it directly applies to Taylor’s
case. Marvin was properly qualified as an expert as to the extraction of cellphone data using
Cellebrite, and insofar as he testified as to the workings of Snapchat, he testified that it was
based on “exposure through cases and through personal use.” (Apr. 10, 2019 Tr. at 651.)
Our review of his testimony regarding the storage of images on cellphones, how those
phones interact with Snapchat, and how those images could be retrieved using Cellebrite
was limited to providing a very general understanding to the jury of how cellphone data is
stored and can be extracted, much like the testimony approved in Hemmelgarn. And
Taylor’s trial counsel explicitly waived any objection to the instruction he now argues
prejudiced him. (Apr. 10, 2019 Tr. at 653.)
No. 19AP-396 7
{¶ 8} Even if we were to accept Taylor’s arguments, he does not identify how the
jury was misled by Marvin’s testimony, or what specific prejudice he could possibly have
suffered from that testimony. In accordance with Hemmelgarn, we cannot and do not
conclude that allowing Marvin to provide basic background information that may have
been somewhat beyond his specific expertise was erroneous. But even if we assume that it
was error, it was not prejudicial and does not constitute an abuse of the trial court’s
discretion. Taylor’s fourth assignment of error is therefore overruled.
{¶ 9} Taylor’s fifth assignment of error argues that the state committed misconduct
during its rebuttal argument, in that the state repeatedly overstepped the scope of his
closing argument. And there is no doubt that is true—the trial court warned the state no
less than four times that the argument was “getting a little far afield of the rebuttal,” see
Apr. 15-16, 2019 Tr. at 1494-95, 1497, 1500-01, 1502, and ultimately sustained Taylor’s
objection on this point. (Apr. 15-16, 2019 Tr. at 1005.) (“Sustained. You’re out of field.
Let’s wind it up.”).
{¶ 10} But as the state notes, “[t]he relevant question is whether the prosecutors’
comments ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial
of due process.’ ” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986), quoting Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo,
416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). The state correctly observes that the trial court’s
repeated involvement in the rebuttal argument, and its standard and repeated instruction
that closing arguments are not evidence, mitigated any potential prejudicial effect of the
state’s comments. And even without the trial court’s involvement, the state’s comments,
while argumentative and beyond the scope of Taylor’s closing, were not so prejudicial that
they denied Taylor’s right to a fair trial. Taylor’s fifth assignment of error is accordingly
overruled.
{¶ 11} Taylor’s sixth assignment of error asserts the court erred in its instructions to
the jury. During the playing of the video of Detective Doersam’s December 12, 2016
interrogation of Taylor, the trial court interrupted the video at timestamp 13:07:45 and
stated the following:
THE COURT: Let me explain something to the jury.
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, it’s constitutionally
permissible for police to -- during interrogation to use various
tactics. They don’t have to be truthful. So when these questions
No. 19AP-396 8
are being asked, we don’t know whether they’re true or not.
They’re part of the interrogation process. Okay?
Anything on the instruction?
[PROSECUTION]: Not from the State, Your Honor. No, thank
you.
THE COURT: Defense?
[DEFENSE]: I probably should preserve an objection for
record purposes.
THE COURT: Okay.
[DEFENSE]: Thank you.
THE COURT: Okay, continue on.
(Apr. 12, 2019 Tr. at 1252-53.) The state correctly argues in response that the trial court’s
description of deception as “part of the interrogation process” is an accurate statement of
law. (Apr. 12, 2019 Tr. at 1252.) See, e.g., In re B.D., 2020-Ohio-361, ¶ 32 (10th Dist.)
(citing Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298, 317 (1985), and State v. Steele,
2013-Ohio-2470,
¶ 22, and observing that a “number of cases from the United States and Ohio Supreme
Courts stand for the proposition that deception is a factor to consider in weighing whether
an interrogation was coercive, but that deception, on its own, will not necessarily render a
confession involuntary”). Given that the instruction itself is largely correct and, more
importantly, that Taylor has not argued on appeal that his statement was involuntary
because of police deception, it is not clear how this instruction could establish error on the
part of the trial court. Taylor’s sixth assignment of error is accordingly overruled.
{¶ 12} In his seventh assignment of error, Taylor argues that his trial counsel was
ineffective. To obtain a reversal on appeal for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must demonstrate both that defense counsel’s performance was deficient, and that
counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense. See generally Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). In assessing claims of counsel’s deficiency, “a court
must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial
strategy.’ ”
Id. at 689, quoting Michel v. Louisiana,
350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955). And in
evaluating whether the challenged action caused prejudice, this court must find that
counsel’s error was so serious that there is a reasonable probability it affected the outcome
No. 19AP-396 9
of the trial. See, e.g., State v. Bradley,
42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989). Here, Taylor asserts his
counsel was deficient by failing to request a specific limiting instruction and by ineffectively
cross-examining witnesses. He also asserts that the cumulative effect of these instances of
deficient performance deprived him of a fair trial.
{¶ 13} Taylor first contends that his attorney should have requested a limiting
instruction regarding his pre-trial incarceration, which was brought forth in testimony
from two “jailhouse snitches.” Jerry Wolford and David Boyd both testified that Taylor
made incriminating statements to them while they were all incarcerated at the juvenile
detention center, and Taylor argues that his counsel should have requested a limiting
instruction that the evidence that he was incarcerated prior to trial was not permitted to be
used to infer guilt or that the presumption of evidence was overcome. The state argues that
we rejected a similar argument in State v. Jones, 2019-Ohio-2134 (10th Dist.):
[R]eference to the jail calls did not contravene the presumption
of innocence. When a defendant is being tried for aggravated
murder and other associated violent crimes, it is self-evident
that he or she has been arrested. Evidence about a defendant’s
arrest and ensuing custody does not contravene the
presumption of innocence. Moreover, while no specific
curative instruction was requested or provided, the trial court
fully explained the presumption of innocence in the jury
instructions.
Id. at ¶ 64, citing State v. Williams, 2003-Ohio-4164, ¶ 75. We believe Jones and Williams
control this case. While it would undoubtedly have been appropriate for defense counsel
to request and for the trial court to have provided a limiting instruction, the fact that the
jury was informed that Taylor was detained prior to trial was mitigated when the trial court
fully explained the presumption of innocence in its general instructions. (Apr. 15-16, 2019
Tr. at 1511-12.)
{¶ 14} Taylor next argues that his counsel ineffectively cross-examined witnesses
Jerry Wolford, Reynoldsburg Police Sergeant Kevin McDowell, Dasha Taylor, and
Reynoldsburg Police Detective Tim Doersam. As to Wolford, Taylor argues his counsel
“opened the door” to a redirect question that allowed an inference of guilt; as to McDowell,
Taylor argues that his counsel referred in a question to his April 15, 2016 interrogation,
which had been suppressed by the trial court (the state objected to the question and the
trial court ordered the jury to disregard it); as to Dasha Taylor, Taylor asserts that his
No. 19AP-396 10
counsel’s questioning was incompetent and allowed her to state that it was possible that he
left her apartment during the period of the shooting, something she had already ruled out
in the state’s direct examination; and as to Doersam, Taylor asserts his counsel “opened the
door” to an answer that allowed Doersam to refer to Taylor’s criminal history, another
question that allowed Doersam to answer that he had filed the charges against Taylor
(which Taylor asserts bolstered the detective’s belief in Taylor’s guilt), and that counsel
asked a question inviting Doersam to state that he believed Taylor had lied in his statement.
{¶ 15} Although these actions may be somewhat problematic in hindsight, even
taken together they do not establish that counsel’s performance was both objectively
unreasonable and that it was probable, but for that performance, the result of the trial
would have been different. Compare Strickland. In fact, we do not believe Taylor has
shown these decisions to be unreasonable. It was not unreasonable for counsel to believe
that he would obtain different answers from Dasha Taylor, given her testimony on direct
examination. Nor was it unreasonable for counsel to imply through his questioning of
Wolford that Taylor had told Wolford a story about the case based on the discovery Taylor
had received. Trial counsel’s improper question to McDowell was stricken by the trial court
and is not implicated in this analysis, but even so, defense counsel offered a reasonable
justification for the question at the time of trial—to elicit testimony that Taylor had
cooperated with police by turning over the key fob to his mother’s automobile. And
counsel’s questions to Doersam were justified by his follow-up questions at the time of trial,
as an attempt to establish that there was no evidence Taylor was involved in gang activity,
to establish that Doersam had not contacted defense counsel prior to charging and
interrogating Taylor, and to establish that Taylor’s conflicting versions of the facts were
given because of his fear of unjust prosecution. Given the strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of professional competence, we cannot
conclude that any of this questioning constitutes deficient performance, and we certainly
cannot conclude that Taylor was prejudiced by it.
{¶ 16} Finally, Taylor argues that all these instances of alleged deficient
performance, when taken all together, constitute prejudice. As support, he cites State v.
DeMarco, 31 Ohio St.3d 191 (1987), which recognizes the doctrine of cumulative harmless
error. But arguing that the cumulative effect of several instances of harmless error is
No. 19AP-396 11
prejudicial is not at all the same as arguing that the cumulative effect of several instances
of alleged deficient performance is prejudicial. Taylor has no support for extending
DeMarco in this fashion, even if he had shown that any of the instances of alleged deficient
performance constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. For all these reasons, Taylor’s
seventh assignment of error lacks merit and is overruled.
{¶ 17} In his eighth assignment of error, Taylor argues that his conviction was not
supported by sufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence
presented at trial. In State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus,
the Supreme Court of Ohio stated that regarding sufficiency, “[t]he relevant inquiry is
whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.”
Id., following Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307 (1979). By contrast,
determinations of credibility and weight of the testimony are primarily for the trier of fact.
State v. DeHass,
10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. The jury may
take note of inconsistencies at trial and resolve them accordingly, “believ[ing] all, part, or
none of a witness’s testimony.” State v. Raver,
2003-Ohio-958, ¶ 21 (10th Dist.), citing
State v. Antill,
176 Ohio St. 61, 67 (1964). Therefore, “[w]hen a court of appeals reverses a
judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence,
the appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the factfinder’s resolution
of the conflicting testimony.” State v. Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997),
superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds, and quoting Tibbs v. Florida,
457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). An appellate court considering a manifest weight challenge “may
not merely substitute its view for that of the trier of fact, but must review the entire record,
weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and
determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way
and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and
a new trial ordered.” State v. Harris,
2014-Ohio-2501, ¶ 22 (10th Dist.), citing
Thompkins
at 387. Appellate courts should reverse a conviction as being against the manifest weight
of the evidence only in the most “ ‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily
against the conviction.’ ”
Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin,
20 Ohio App.3d 172,
175 (1st Dist. 1983).
No. 19AP-396 12
{¶ 18} Given all the facts we have discussed, we have no doubt that the state
presented sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict. Moreover, there is nothing in the
record to indicate that the verdict was reached because of passion or prejudice, or was
otherwise improper, or that the jury lost its way in reaching the verdict. Accordingly,
Taylor’s eighth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 19} In his ninth assignment of error, Taylor contends his sentence for murder
violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as cruel and unusual
punishment, since he was 17 years old at the time of the shooting. In State v. Wade, 2020-
Ohio-5399 (10th Dist.), this court affirmed the imposition of a sentence equivalent to a full
life term on a defendant who was 16 years old at the time of the homicides in question:
[State v.] Long, [2014-Ohio-849], Miller [v. Alabama,
567 U.S.
460 (2012)], Montgomery [v. Louisiana
577 U.S. 190 (2016),]
and [State v.] Wade[, 2018-Ohio-976 (10th Dist.)] do not
require sentencing courts to reject life sentences for juvenile
offenders convicted of homicide; they simply require trial
courts to account for the youth of juveniles as a mitigating
factor when sentencing for murder. Here, the trial court
specifically stated that it had evaluated the defendant’s youth
and determined that an effective life without parole sentence of
172 1/2 years to life was appropriate punishment. We do not
believe that caselaw required the trial court to do more than
that, even if it would be a better practice to do so. Accordingly,
we conclude that the trial court did not err in its sentence, and
that Wade’s rights under the U. S. Constitution and the Ohio
Constitution to be free of cruel and unusual punishment were
not violated.
Wade, 2020-Ohio-5399, at ¶ 8.
{¶ 20} Taylor argues that the same principles enunciated in Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) and Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012) that we
reviewed in Wade apply to preclude “automatically sentencing a juvenile like Taylor to 15
years to life,” and contends that this constitutes plain error under Crim.R. 52(B).
(Appellant’s Brief at 60.) But Taylor does not argue that the trial court failed to consider
his youth in sentencing him and, more importantly, Taylor is automatically ineligible for
parole. The lack of that eligibility for parole is the crucial flaw upon which Montgomery
and Miller turn, and that flaw is simply not present in Taylor’s case. Accordingly, Taylor’s
Eighth Amendment argument lacks merit, and therefore his ninth assignment of error must
be overruled.
No. 19AP-396 13
{¶ 21} For all the foregoing reasons, Taylor’s six remaining assignments of error are
overruled. For the reasons stated herein and for the reasons stated in State v. Taylor, 2024-
Ohio-1752, the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas in this cause is
affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
DORRIAN and MENTEL, JJ., concur.
