[Cite as State v. Bond,
2025-Ohio-360.]
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
: Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
-vs- :
:
JABRIL BOND : Case Nos. 2024-CA-0009
: 2024-CA-0010
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas, Case Nos. 2023 CR 0362 N &
2023 CR 0752 N
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: February 3, 2025
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
MEGAN HOBART JOSEPH C. PATITUCE
38 South Park Street CATHERINE MEEHAN
Mansfield, OH 44902 16855 Foltz Industrial Parkway
Strongsville, OH 44149
Richland County, Case Nos. 2024-CA-0009 & 2024-CA-0010 2
King, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Jabril Bond appeals the February 14, 2024 judgment
of conviction and sentence of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff-
Appellee is the State of Ohio. We affirm the trial court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} This matter involves two Richland County criminal case numbers, 23CR362
and 23CR752.
{¶ 3} Case number 23CR752 involved a traffic stop of Bond's vehicle on January
25, 2023. A probable cause search of the vehicle yielded promethazine with codeine.
{¶ 4} Case number 23CR362 involved a traffic stop of a black Ford truck driven
by Bond on April 18, 2023. Officer Justin Cikity of the Mansfield Police Department
initiated the traffic stop. The area where Bond was operating the vehicle is a high-crime
area. Officer Cikity's attention was drawn to the Ford due to Bond's erratic, evasive, high-
speed driving as it approached Cikity from the opposite direction. Cikity could not see into
the truck at the time because the window tint was too dark and therefore did not know
who was driving or if there were any passengers. Cikity turned around, relocated the
vehicle and began following it. When Bond failed to stop at a stop sign, Cikity attempted
to initiate a traffic stop as Bond approached a red traffic light. Bond gave no indication he
was going to pull over. As Bond continued on, however, he had to pull into a gas station
as the road ahead was closed preventing him from going farther. Bond parked the truck
next to a gas pump.
{¶ 5} Cikity called for backup. Given Bond's erratic and evasive behavior Officer
Cikity was concerned for the safety for members of the general public at and near the gas
Richland County, Case Nos. 2024-CA-0009 & 2024-CA-0010 3
station, the officers en route, and himself. He did not know who was in the truck or what
had happened before the stop to cause Bond to operate the truck in such a manner.
{¶ 6} Officer Cikity used his public address system to order Bond to put all of the
truck windows down. Bond put his own window down, but only a few inches. Cikity could
tell there was more than one person in the truck, but could not tell how many. He ordered
all the occupants of the vehicle to put their hands outside the vehicle, but none did. Cikity
drew is weapon. Bond eventually put one hand out the window while he did something
with his cell phone with the other. This coupled with Bond's and his passenger's non-
compliance further made Cikity feel his safety and that of those present at the gas station
was in jeopardy.
{¶ 7} Officer Cikity then recognized Bond due to previous encounters with him.
He also knew others would be showing up at Bond's request as he has called family
members to traffic stops in the past and his mother had to be detained at one of those
stops. This presented yet additional safety concerns for Cikity.
{¶ 8} Four minutes into the stop Bond and his passengers were still failing to
comply with simple orders. Four and a half minutes into the stop, one passenger finally
put their hands outside the vehicle as directed. Six minutes into the stop Bond finally
exited the truck as directed. Shortly before Bond exited the truck, backup arrived including
officer Jacob Rietschlin and his canine Mekel.
{¶ 9} Eight and a half minutes into the stop Bond's passenger, Anthony Reed
exited the truck. At approximately the same time, Bond's sister and mother arrived at the
scene and pulled in front of Bond's truck again complicating safety concerns for the
officers involved. Nine minutes into the stop a third individual, Khiren Willis exited the
truck. All three men got out of the truck holding cell phones.
Richland County, Case Nos. 2024-CA-0009 & 2024-CA-0010 4
{¶ 10} Officers then approached the truck to make sure there were no other
passengers. Cikity directed Rietschlin to walk canine Mekel around the truck and Mekel
alerted to the presence of narcotics. A subsequent search of the vehicle yielded large
quantities of methamphetamine, fentanyl, and crack cocaine behind the dashboard as
well as burnt marijuana in plain view.
{¶ 11} As a result of these events, the Richland County Grand Jury returned an
indictment charging Bond with one count each of trafficking in a fentanyl-related
compound, a felony of the first degree, possession of a fentanyl-related compound, a
felony of the first degree, trafficking in cocaine, a felony of the first degree, aggravated
trafficking in drugs, a felony of the second degree, possession of cocaine, a felony of the
first degree, possession of drugs, a felony of the second degree, and participation in a
criminal gang, a felony of the second degree.
{¶ 12} Bond entered pleas of not guilty and filed a motion to suppress in both case
numbers. However, Bond later withdrew his motion to suppress in case 2023 CR 0752
involving possession of promethazine with codeine.
{¶ 13} On December 22, 2023, a hearing was held on Bond's remaining motion to
suppress and the above outlined facts were elicited. Bond argued the stop was
unconstitutionally expanded and the truck unconstitutionally searched. He further argued
the canine sniff was improper because Officer Rietschkin touched the exterior of the truck
during the search and the dog's nose entered an open window at Rietschkin's direction.
At the conclusion of the hearing the parties were directed to submit written closing
arguments. On January 12, 2024 the trial court issued its judgment overruling Bond's
motion to suppress.
Richland County, Case Nos. 2024-CA-0009 & 2024-CA-0010 5
{¶ 14} On February 12, 2024, Bond entered pleas of no contest as charged in each
case. He was sentenced to an aggregate total of 20 to 25 years incarceration.
{¶ 15} Bond timely filed an appeal and the matter is now before this court for
consideration. He raises five assignments of error as follow:
I
{¶ 16} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT OFFICER CIKITY
DID NOT EXTEND THE TRAFFIC STOP BEYOND ITS ORIGINAL SCOPE IN ORDER
TO CONDUCT A K9 SNIFF."
II
{¶ 17} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE K9 SEARCH WAS
PROPER, DESPITE THE OFFICER TOUCHING THE VEHICLE IN ORDER TO
FACILITATE THE SEARCH, AND THE K9 ENTERING CONSITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED SPACE."
III
{¶ 18} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE K9 INDICATED
STABLISHING PROBABLE CAUSE TO ALLOW A SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE."
IV
{¶ 19} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO EXPLAIN THE
EFFECT OF A NO CONTEST PLEA DURING THE CRIM.R. 11 PLEA COLLOQUY. "
V
{¶ 20} "APPELLANT’S PLEA WAS NOT KNOWING, INTELLIGENT, OR
VOLUNTARY.
Richland County, Case Nos. 2024-CA-0009 & 2024-CA-0010 6
I
{¶ 21} In his first assignment of error, Bond argues the traffic stop was
impermissibly extended beyond its original scope in order to conduct a canine sniff. We
disagree.
Standard of Review
{¶ 22} There are three methods of challenging on appeal a trial court's ruling on a
motion to suppress. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court's findings of fact. In
reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether said
findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio
St.3d 19 (1982); State v. Klein,
73 Ohio App.3d 486 (1991); State v. Guysinger,
86 Ohio
App.3d 592 (1993). Second, an appellant may argue the trial court failed to apply the
appropriate test or correct law to the findings of fact, in which case an appellate court can
reverse the trial court for committing an error of law. State v. Williams,
86 Ohio App.3d
37,
619 N.E.2d 1141 (1993). Finally, assuming the trial court's findings of fact are not
against the manifest weight of the evidence and it has properly identified the law to be
applied, an appellant may argue the trial court has incorrectly decided the ultimate or final
issue raised in the motion to suppress. When reviewing this type of claim, an appellate
court must independently determine, without deference to the trial court's conclusion,
whether the facts meet the appropriate legal standard in any given case. State v. Curry,
95 Ohio App.3d 93 (1994); State v. Claytor,
85 Ohio App.3d 623 (1993);
Guysinger, supra.
As the United States Supreme Court held in Ornelas v. U.S.,
517 U.S. 690 (1996), "... as
a general matter determination of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be
reviewed de novo on appeal."
Richland County, Case Nos. 2024-CA-0009 & 2024-CA-0010 7
{¶ 23} When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier
of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate the credibility
of witnesses. See State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 314 (1995); State v. Fanning,
1
Ohio St.3d 19, 20 (1982).
{¶ 24} Bond argues the trial court's factual findings were not supported by
competent, credible evidence and the evidence presented did not satisfy the relevant
legal standards.
Traffic Stops
{¶ 25} " '[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay a
motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or warning.' " State v. Elliot, 2019-
Ohio-4411 (5 th Dist.) ¶ 21 quoting State v. Batchili, 2007-Ohio-2204, ¶ 12 quoting State
v. Keathley,
55 Ohio App.3d 130, 131 (2nd Dist.1988). The scope and duration of a
routine traffic stop "must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification . . .and last no
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." State v. Latona, 2011-
Ohio-1253 ¶¶ 20-21 (5th Dist.) quoting Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); see
also, State v. Gonyou,
108 Ohio App.3d 369, 372 (6th Dist.1995). The measure of the
time period includes the time sufficient to run a computer check of the driver's license,
registration, and vehicle plates. State v. Elliot,
2019-Ohio-4411 ¶ 21 (5th Dist.) citing State
v. Bolden,
2004-Ohio-184 ¶ 17 (12th Dist.) citing Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 659
(1979). Additionally, " '[i]n determining if an officer completed these tasks within a
reasonable length of time, the court must evaluate the duration of the stop in light of the
totality of the circumstances and consider whether the officer diligently conducted the
investigation.' "
Id., quoting State v. Carlson,
102 Ohio App.3d 585, 598-599 (9th
Dist.1995), citing State v. Cook,
65 Ohio St.3d 516, 521-522 (1992), and United States v.
Richland County, Case Nos. 2024-CA-0009 & 2024-CA-0010 8
Sharpe,
470 U.S. 675 (1985). See also State v. Whitman,
2009-Ohio-5647 (5th Dist.);
State v. Woodson,
2008-Ohio-670 ¶ 21 (5th Dist.).
{¶ 26} A canine walk-around of a vehicle, which occurs during a lawful stop and
does not go beyond the period necessary to effectuate the stop does not violate the
individual's constitutional rights. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005). An officer
may not, however, extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent reasonable
suspicion, in order to conduct a dog sniff. Rodriguez v. U.S.,
575 U.S. 348 (2015). The
pertinent question is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues or
could have issued the initial ticket, but whether the dog sniff adds time to the stop.
Id.
Bond's Arguments
{¶ 27} Bond argues the trial court erred when it found the officers did not expand
the stop, but rather Bond's actions did. We disagree.
{¶ 28} First, in support of his argument that the stop was illegally expanded, Bond
cites State v. Brown, 2009-Ohio-3804 (6th Dist.). That matter, however, is factually
distinguishable from the instant matter. In Brown, the officer questioned the driver and
passenger separately and asked questions irrelevant to the purpose of the stop such as
the purpose of their travel, where they were going, when they would return, and if there
was cash or drugs in the vehicle. The Sixth District found these tactics impermissibly
expanded the scope of the stop. Id. 343. There is no similar circumstance here.
{¶ 29} We have reviewed the transcript and video evidence in this matter. Bond
was observed driving erratically and at high speeds in a high-crime area, failing to stop at
a stop sign and failing to stop within a reasonable time of Officer Cikity activating his siren
and overhead lights. Transcript of suppression hearing (T.) 11-13, State's exhibit 1A.
While Bond argues the sole purpose of the stop was to issue a traffic violation for running
Richland County, Case Nos. 2024-CA-0009 & 2024-CA-0010 9
the stop sign, Bond's behavior prior to the stop raised Cikity's suspicion that more was
afoot than a stop sign violation. T. 13. Moreover, Cikity could not issue a violation until
Bond cooperated which he failed to do until more than six minutes into the stop. Instead,
he failed to put both hands outside the vehicle as directed, called his family to come to
the scene, and was seen reaching for something inside the vehicle. T. 20-25, State's
exhibit 1A. The third and final person in the truck did not exit the truck until nine minutes
into the stop. The canine arrived six and a half minutes into the stop and alerted on the
vehicle eleven and a half minutes into the stop. T. 27. Officer Cikity testified a typical
traffic stop takes between 10 and 15 minutes to complete. T. 7. The traffic stop was not
delayed or expanded in order to bring a canine to the scene as Officer Rietschlin and
canine Mekel were already on the scene before all occupants of the Ford had exited the
vehicle. State's exhibits 1A, 3.
{¶ 30} Given the totality of the circumstances, we find the trial court did not err in
finding the stop was not unconstitutionally expanded and that Bond's own actions
increased officer suspicion that they were dealing with something more than a routine
traffic stop. Moreover, evidence presented by the state demonstrated the dog sniff did not
add time to the stop. Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.
II
{¶ 31} In his second assignment of error, Bond argues the trial court erred in
finding the canine sniff was proper because both the officer and the dog touched the
exterior of the truck and the dog trespassed into a constitutionally protected space by
putting its snout into the cabin of the truck at the direction of the officer. We disagree.
Richland County, Case Nos. 2024-CA-0009 & 2024-CA-0010 10
Fourth Amendment
{¶ 32} "The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Ohio
Constitution, Article I, Section 14, prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures." State v.
Emerson, 2012-Ohio-5047, ¶ 15. "This constitutional guarantee is protected by the
exclusionary rule, which mandates the exclusion at trial of evidence obtained from an
unreasonable search and seizure."
Id.
{¶ 33} Searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few specific and well-
established exceptions. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, (1967). "Once a
defendant demonstrates that he or she was subjected to a warrantless search or seizure,
the burden shifts to the state to establish that the warrantless search or seizure was
constitutionally permissible." State v. Roberts,
2006-Ohio-3665, ¶ 98. In order to employ
Fourth Amendment protections, a defendant must have a "constitutionally protected
reasonable expectation of privacy." Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967). The
United States Supreme Court has directed reviewing courts to consider a two-part test in
order to determine whether the Fourth Amendment is implicated. "First, has the individual
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search?
Second, is society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable?" California v.
Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986), citing
Katz at 360.
Dog Sniff
{¶ 34} The use of a drug detection dog does not constitute a "search" and an officer
is not required, prior to a dog sniff, to establish either probable cause or a reasonable
suspicion that drugs are concealed in a vehicle. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
An officer needs no suspicion or cause to run the dog around the stopped vehicle if he or
Richland County, Case Nos. 2024-CA-0009 & 2024-CA-0010 11
she does so contemporaneously with the legitimate activities associated with the traffic
violation.
Id. "A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no
information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to
possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment."
Id., 410.
Canine Mekel
{¶ 35} During the suppression hearing, Officer Rietschlin explained that Mekel was
trained for several purposes; article searches, narcotics, and apprehension. T. 68. He
explained Mekel was initially on scene for the purpose of protection and was overly
excited from serving that purpose. T. 80. In order to calm the dog and shift its attention
from protection mode to narcotics search mode, Rietschlin walked Mekel in a circle, then
approached the Ford and touched the corners, seams, and driver's side door handle in
order to redirect Mekel's focus from protection to search. T. 82-83. When Rietschlin
touched the driver's side door handle, Mekel very briefly put his front paws up onto the
door handle. State's Exhibit 3. Mekel then indicated to the presence of narcotics T. 105-
106. Additionally, burnt marijuana was observed in plain view. T. 32.
Bond's Arguments
{¶ 36} We first address Bond's argument that Canine Mekel put his snout into the
cabin of the Ford thereby intruding into a constitutionally protected space. We have
reviewed Officer Rietschlin's body-worn camera footage from this stop. We note that at
approximately 10:44 in the video, Rietschlin touches the Ford's driver's side door handle
to direct Mekel's attention to the truck. Mekel then stands on his hind legs and briefly puts
his front paws onto the driver's side door of the Ford. His snout reaches the outside of the
lower portion of the driver's side window which is rolled up approximately six inches. At
Richland County, Case Nos. 2024-CA-0009 & 2024-CA-0010 12
no point does any part of Mekel's body enter the cabin area of the Ford. State's Exhibit 3.
We therefore reject Bond's contention that the dog physically intruded into his vehicle at
Ritschlin's direction without a warrant.
{¶ 37} As to the officer and the canine touching the exterior of the Ford, Bond cites
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) for the proposition that touching the exterior
of the truck constitutes an intrusion of a constitutionally protected area. But Jones did not
involve a canine free-air sniff nor merely briefly touching the exterior of a vehicle. Instead
Jones held that when the government attaches a GPS tracking device to a vehicle and
uses the device to monitor the vehicle's movements on public streets, the action
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.
Id. at 404.
{¶ 38} Bond also cites without discussion Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328,
a Michigan case involving parking enforcement officers "chalking" tires of parked cars in
order to determine how long they were parked in certain spaces. If vehicles were parked
past the designated limit in these spaces, officers issued parking tickets. Taylor received
several such tickets and sued the city alleging that chalking violated her Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. The city moved to dismiss the
action. The district court granted the city's motion, finding that, while chalking may have
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, the search was reasonable because
there is a lesser expectation of privacy with automobiles. On appeal, the city argued in
part that Taylor had a reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile.
Id. 334. The Sixth
Circuit disagreed and found chalking was a search and additionally stated: "the City
commences its search on vehicles that are parked legally, without probable cause or even
so much as "individualized suspicion of wrongdoing"—the touchstone of the
reasonableness standard. See Relford v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't, 390 F.3d
Richland County, Case Nos. 2024-CA-0009 & 2024-CA-0010 13
452, 458 (6th Cir. 2004) ("[A] search ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion
of wrongdoing."). Thus, we reject the City's contention that searching Taylor's vehicle was
reasonable based solely on its reduced expectation of privacy." Id.
{¶ 39} The facts of this matter are distinguishable from Taylor as the encounter
began with suspicion of wrongdoing and a valid traffic stop. As previously discussed,
Cikity's attention was first drawn to Bond due to his erratic, high speed, evasive driving in
a high crime area where Cikity had personally investigated shootings and drug activity. T.
9-11. Bond then failed to stop at a stop sign and failed to stop within a reasonable time
after Cikity activated his overhead lights and siren causing Cikity to call for backup. T. 13-
16. Once Bond did stop he initially refused to comply with simple orders, was seen doing
something with his cell phone, and reaching into the vehicle instead of putting his hands
outside the vehicle. T. 18-21.
{¶ 40} Officer Rietschlin arrived on scene with canine Mekel initially as back up
and basic protection. T. 78. Rietschlin then walked Mekel around the truck which required
no reasonable suspicion. Rietschlin testified his purpose in touching the exterior of the
truck was to assist in redirecting Mekel's focus from protecting officers to conducting a
free air sniff. T. 82-83. Unlike Taylor or Jones, no search was conducted through
Rietschlin or Mekel briefly touching the exterior of the truck. The search did not occur until
after the positive free-air sniff. We therefore find the trial court did not err in finding the
canine sniff was proper.
{¶ 41} The second assignment of error is overruled.
III
Richland County, Case Nos. 2024-CA-0009 & 2024-CA-0010 14
{¶ 42} In his third assignment of error, Bond argues the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress because testimony confirmed canine Mekel's lack of reliability. We
disagree.
{¶ 43} In Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2012), the United States Supreme Court
addressed how a court should evaluate probable cause based on an alert from a drug
detection dog when the defendant has challenged the dog's reliability. Id. at 1053. The
court rejected Florida's rigid test that required the state in every case to present
exhaustive evidence of reliability in favor of a more flexible, common-sense approach that
examines the dog's training. Id. In so doing, the court held that "evidence of a dog's
satisfactory performance in a certification or training program can itself provide sufficient
reason to trust his alert." Id. at 1057. However, the court noted that a defendant "must
have an opportunity to challenge such evidence of a dog's reliability, whether by cross-
examining the testifying officer or by introducing his own fact or expert witnesses." Id.
Regarding the reliability of a canine search, the United States Supreme Court has held
that "[i]f a bona fide organization has certified a dog after testing his reliability in a
controlled setting, a court can presume (subject to any conflicting evidence offered) that
the dog's alert provides probable cause to search." Florida v. Harris,
568 U.S. 237, 246-
247 (2013).
{¶ 44} We first note that during the suppression hearing, counsel for Bond did
pose questions to Officer Rietschlin regarding Mekel's training and reliability. However,
Bond did not challenge Mekel's reliability or training in his written motion to suppress and
the trial court made no finings in its ruling regarding Mekel's training or reliability.
Judgment Entry, January 12, 2024.
Richland County, Case Nos. 2024-CA-0009 & 2024-CA-0010 15
{¶ 45} But even if Bond had properly raised the issue it would fail. In State v.
Nguyen, 2004-Ohio-2879 (6th Dist.) ¶ 55, the court stated that "proof of the fact that a
drug dog is properly trained and certified is the only evidence material to a determination
that a particular dog is reliable. Proof that a drug dog is properly trained and certified may
be established by means of testimony or through documentary proof." The court further
noted that a "new trend in some federal courts stresses that when the state demonstrates
that the drug dog is trained and certified, it negates any need to establish the reliability of
the challenged canine." Id. at ¶ 35.
{¶ 46} Bond does not dispute that the State presented evidence of Mekel's training
and certification. Instead he contends the dog was unreliable because Officer Rietschlin
testified Mekel cannot discern the difference between hemp, a non-controlled substance,
and marijuana, a controlled substance, and because Mekel had erroneously alerted or
failed to appropriately alert in the past.
{¶ 47} First, no hemp was found in this matter. As to marijuana, at the time of this
offense, marijuana was still a schedule I controlled substance. Thus, Mekel's inability to
distinguish between the two is irrelevant. As for erroneous or failed alerts, Officer
Rietschlin testified these occurred in a training environment, or in situations where there
was likely a residual odor due to a previous presence of narcotics. T. 97-99.
{¶ 48} Officer Rietschlin testified that Mekel alerted on the Ford truck indicating the
presence of narcotics. T. 105-106. Officer Rietschlin's body-worn camera footage was
played for the court and the court heard Rietschlin's recitation of Mekel's proper training
and certification thereby negating any argument as to the canine's reliability even if the
matter had been raised by trial counsel and addressed by the trial court. The third
assignment of error is overruled.
Richland County, Case Nos. 2024-CA-0009 & 2024-CA-0010 16
IV
{¶ 49} In his fourth assignment of error, Bond argues the trial court erred when it
failed to properly inform him of the effect of his no contest plea. We disagree.
{¶ 50} Crim.R. 11(B)(2) states a "plea of no contest is not an admission of
defendant's guilt, but is an admission of the truth of the facts alleged in the indictment,
information, or complaint, and the plea or admission shall not be used against the
defendant in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding." Crim.R. 11(B).
{¶ 51} The sentencing in this matter involved two cases, 23-CR-752 and 23-CR-
362. Before the sentencing hearing, Bond signed an "Admission of Guilt/Judgment Entry"
in each case. The final paragraph of each document indicated in part: "By pleading no
contest, I understand the court will decide my guilt based on a statement by the
prosecutor, in the indictment, or otherwise about the evidence that would have been
presented at trial on the offenses for which I was charged."
{¶ 52} During the plea hearing, the trial court began with case number 23-CR-752:
The Court: All right, then at this time on case 23-CR-752 as to the
one count of Possession of Drugs, a felony of the fifth degree, how
do you wish to plea?
Mr. Bond: No contest.
The Court: All right. Before I accept your no contest plea, Mr. Bond,
understand that a no contest plea is not an admission of guilt,
however, you are admitting the facts as charged in the indictment to
be true and accurate, do you understand that?
Richland County, Case Nos. 2024-CA-0009 & 2024-CA-0010 17
Mr. Bond: Yes, sir.
The Court: All right. Then at this time the court will find the plea is
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently given.
{¶ 53} T. at 11-12.
{¶ 54} The trial court then immediately went on to case 23-CR-362 and accepted
Bond's no contest without repeating the effect of a no contest plea.
{¶ 55} Bond acknowledges the trial court properly informed him of the effect of his
no contest plea in case 23-CR-752, but argues that the trial court wholly failed to explain
the effect of his no contest pleas in case 23-CR-362. We disagree. The instant matter
involved one sentencing hearing wherein the trial court accepted pleas in two cases,
without interruption and moments apart. We find the trial court therefore properly informed
Bond of the effect of his no contest pleas and Bond cites no authority which would support
a conclusion to the contrary.
{¶ 56} The fourth assignment of error is overruled.
V
{¶ 57} In his final assignment of error, Bond argues his plea was not knowing,
intelligent, or voluntary because his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Specifically,
he argues the outcome would have been the same had he elected to proceed to a jury
trial and been found guilty as charged. He therefore argues he gained nothing by pleading
and was therefore denied the effective assistance of counsel. We disagree.
Ineffective Assitance
{¶ 58} To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
demonstrate: (1) deficient performance by counsel, i.e., that counsel's performance fell
Richland County, Case Nos. 2024-CA-0009 & 2024-CA-0010 18
below an objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) that counsel's errors
prejudiced the defendant, i.e., a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the
result of the trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–
688 (1984); State v. Bradley,
42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragraphs two and three of the
syllabus. "Reasonable probability" is "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome."
Strickland at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
{¶ 59} Defendants have a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel
during plea negotiations. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985). In the context of
pleas, "the mere fact that, if not for the alleged ineffective assistance, the defendant would
not have entered the guilty plea, is not sufficient to establish the necessary connection
between the ineffective assistance and the plea; instead, the ineffective assistance will
only be found to have affected the validity of the plea when it precluded the defendant
from entering the plea knowingly and voluntarily." State v. Whiteman,
2003-Ohio-2229
(11th Dist.) ¶ 24.
{¶ 60} We find the record demonstrates Bond was afforded a full Crim.R. 11
hearing and Bond does not argue otherwise. Transcript of sentencing (TS) 2-15. During
the hearing Bond indicated he understood the plea and its possible consequences and
that he was not threatened or induced into entering the plea. When asked if he was
satisfied with his counsel, the following exchange took place:
[Bond]: Not really. It's okay.
The Court: Well, it's not okay. You just indicated you're not satisfied.
I have to understand why.
Richland County, Case Nos. 2024-CA-0009 & 2024-CA-0010 19
[Bond]: I just feel like it…I don't know. I feel like a better job could
have been done.
The Court: Well, Mr. Sabol, I would indicate to you, has fought hard
and argued on your behalf and has presented motions to suppress
and done everything that he can up to this point I think short of going
to trial at this stage. That's what's left to do. I understand it may not
be the results you are seeking right now, but it is what it is at this
stage. So knowing that, does that change your opinion as to the
representation you have receive?
[Bond]: No, it's alright.
{¶ 61} TS 10-11.
{¶ 62} Here on appeal, Bond complains entering pleas was not beneficial to him.
But the record demonstrates that Bond would receive mandatory time regardless of
whether he entered pleas or lost at trial due to the nature of his offenses. TS 5-11. So
too, Bond did not receive a maximum sentence. If the trial court heard all of the facts at
trial, it is possible that Bond's sentence could have been longer yet.
{¶ 63} Bond's dissatisfaction with his sentence, standing alone, does not establish
his pleas were made any less than knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily. Nor does his
dissatisfaction establish either Strickland prong. Accordingly, the final assignment of error
is overruled.
Richland County, Case Nos. 2024-CA-0009 & 2024-CA-0010 20
{¶ 64} The judgment of conviction and sentence of the Richland County Court of
Common Pleas is affirmed.
By King, J.,
Hoffman, P.J. and
Baldwin, J. concur.
