[Cite as State v. Vanpernis,
2025-Ohio-365.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAWRENCE COUNTY
State of Ohio, : Case No. 24CA9
Plaintiff-Appellee, : DECISION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
v. :
Randall W. Vanpernis, :
Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED 2/03/2025
______________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Stephen E. Palmer, Palmer Legal Defense, Columbus, Ohio, for appellant.
Brigham M. Anderson, Lawrence County Prosecuting Attorney, and Andrea M.
Kratzenberg, Lawrence County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Ironton, Ohio, for
appellee.
______________________________________________________________________
Hess, J.
{¶1} Randall W. Vanpernis appeals the judgment of the Lawrence County Court
of Common Pleas denying his petition for postconviction relief without a hearing following
his convictions on two counts of gross sexual imposition. He raises two assignments of
error. First, he contends that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard of review
when it denied his petition without conducting a hearing under R.C. 2953.21(D). Second,
he contends that the trial court erred when it denied his petition on the merits without a
hearing.
{¶2} We find that the trial court applied the correct standard of review when it
analyzed Vanpernis’s petition. The trial court determined that there were no substantive
grounds for relief for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim by considering the entirety
Lawrence App. No. 24CA9 2
of the record from the trial court proceedings, as well as the parties’ postconviction
submissions, and found that the record on its face disproved his claim. The trial court
determined that the record demonstrated that Vanpernis could show no prejudice from
the alleged deficiencies of counsel. The trial court did not require Vanpernis to
“definitively” establish prejudice. Vanpernis’s claim of ineffective assistance did not
depend on the factual allegations made outside the record by his expert witnesses
concerning his interview with law enforcement. Rather, it was disproved by the
factfinder’s1 specific statement that it was the credibility of the victim’s in court testimony
and lack of credibility of Vanpernis’s in court denials that supported the factfinder’s guilty
verdicts. The law enforcement interview played little to no role in the verdict and was not
identified as persuasive evidence in the factfinder’s written decision rendering guilty
verdicts.
{¶3} We also find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed
Vanpernis’s petition without a hearing. Competent and credible evidence supports the
trial court’s findings. We overrule the assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
{¶4} The Lawrence County grand jury indicted Vanpernis on two counts of gross
sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), a third-degree felony. He pleaded
not guilty, waived a jury trial, and the matter proceeded with a bench trial.
1 To avoid confusion, when appropriate we refer to the trial court that reviewed his petition for postconviction
relief as the “trial court” and the trial court that served as the factfinder in his underlying criminal bench trial
as the “factfinder.”
2The facts and procedural history come, in part, from our prior decision in Vanpernis’s direct appeal. State
v. Vanpernis, 2022-Ohio-4563, ¶ 2-6 (4th Dist.).
Lawrence App. No. 24CA9 3
{¶5} The victim’s mother testified that in mid-December 2020, she became
aware through conversations with neighbors that Vanpernis may have been engaged in
inappropriate sexual activity with the victim, 11-year-old O.B. Law enforcement officials
were notified.
{¶6} Detective Sergeant Bollinger and Sergeant Chaffins conducted a video and
audiotaped interview of Vanpernis and it was introduced at trial. Initially, Vanpernis
admitted to “cuddling on the couch” with O.B. Then Vanpernis stated that O.B. physically
grabbed his penis while they were watching a movie, and he pushed her off him and told
her to leave him alone. Vanpernis also stated that O.B. would be “rubbing around on me
big time” but he denied putting his hands in her pants. He denied touching O.B.’s vagina
skin-to-skin and stated that he did not touch it “with intention.” Vanpernis stated that O.B.
would stretch up, cuddle up, and try “to get my hand on her where she wants it.” He
admitted that O.B. was rubbing her vagina on his hand, but it was not skin-to-skin. When
asked, “So when you told [Detective Bollinger] about how, about how the most you’d ever
rubbed it [O.B.’s vagina] thru her clothes was for about a second or two, is that the truth?”
Vanpernis responded, “The whole truth.” Later in the interview, Detective Bollinger states,
“Okay, but you’re bullshitting us. You’re not tell us … everything that happened with
[O.B.].” Vanpernis responded, “I told you I rubbed her.” Vanpernis stated that he rubbed
O.B.’s vagina over her pajama shorts for “about a half of a second. And that’s as far as I
ever went.” Vanpernis also admitted that O.B.’s pajama shorts were short and he was
rubbing skin-to-skin on her leg. Finally, Vanpernis admitted to rubbing O.B.’s vagina:
Bollinger: How many times did you rub her bare vagina?
Vanpernis: One time, not with my bare hands.
Lawrence App. No. 24CA9 4
Bollinger: No, don’t tell me, you know that that’s bad.
Vanpernis: I should have waited until you finished your question.
Bollinger: Yeah, but, no, you did rub her bare vagina. But was it only once,
or was it a bunch of times?
Vanpernis: There was not much [sic] of times, no.
Bollinger: One time?
Vanpernis: One time, yeah.
{¶7} O.B. testified that Vanpernis taught her how to search for pornography on
the Internet and that he touched her inappropriately. She testified that Vanpernis touched
her vagina with his hand and that this touching occurred on multiple occasions on the
living room couch, her room, and his room. She testified that Vanpernis touched her
vagina with his hand inside her pajamas. O.B. also testified that Vanpernis would force
her to touch his penis with her hand and move it back and forth, which was something
that she watched happen in videos.
{¶8} At the close of the State’s case, Vanpernis made a Crim.R. 29(A) motion
for a judgment of acquittal, which the trial court denied. Vanpernis testified in his own
defense and denied that he ever touched O.B. inappropriately. The judge found him guilty
as charged. The trial court sentenced him to a consecutive total of 108 months in prison
and ordered him to register as a Tier II Sexual Offender.
{¶9} On appeal, Vanpernis raised one assignment of error contending that there
was insufficient evidence to support the “sexual conduct” element of the crime, which we
rejected and affirmed his conviction. State v. Vanpernis, 2022-Ohio-4563 (4th Dist.).
{¶10} Vanpernis filed a timely petition for postconviction relief in which he
contended he had ineffective assistance of trial counsel and raised two separate grounds
Lawrence App. No. 24CA9 5
for relief. He argued that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel did not file a
motion to suppress challenging the admissibility of his statements to law enforcement. He
argued that the interrogation techniques used by law enforcement resulted in an
involuntary confession and his trial counsel’s decision not to file a motion to suppress fell
below the normal and reasonable standards of practice. Vanpernis also contended that
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain experts to support a motion to
suppress. Vanpernis argued that his statements during the interview “were critical to the
case and formed the basis for his convictions.”
{¶11} The State asked the trial court to dismiss the petition without a hearing
because Vanpernis failed to present substantial grounds for relief. It argued that
Vanpernis failed to present allegations sufficient to state a constitutional claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel because the decision about whether to hire an expert is
within the sound discretion of trial counsel and constitutes a trial tactic and strategy. The
State argued that rather than retain an expert on “forensic interviewing and the potential
for ‘false confessions,’ ” Vanpernis’s trial counsel’s strategy was “to directly attack the
investigating officers’ treatment of the defendant on cross examination.” In sum, the State
argued, “[t]hat counsel chose to address the topic on cross exam instead of retaining
some ‘expert’ does not amount to a deprivation of rights to the defendant. It was a
strategic determination and should be regarded as such.”
{¶12} The trial court dismissed Vanpernis’s petition without a hearing.
The Court does not find the defendant’s petition on its face to raise claims
that his convictions are void or voidable on constitutional grounds that
depend on factual allegations that cannot be determined by examination of
the files and records of the case. In this specific case, the record, on its face,
disproves the petitioner’s claim.
Lawrence App. No. 24CA9 6
Specifically, the trial court reviewed the evidence on the record and found that the
factfinder explicitly identified which evidence was credible and supported a guilty verdict
on both counts. Quoting portions of the factfinder’s decision, the trial court found that the
factfinder did not identify law enforcement’s interview of Vanpernis among the evidence
supporting the verdicts:
“The testimony offered during trial was the testimony of Barbara Truitt,
Investigator Chaffins, Detective Bollinger, the alleged child victim, and the
defendant. As the trier of fact, the court is entitled to believe all, parts, or
none of the testimony of the witnesses. The court had the opportunity to
view each witness and observe his or her demeanor, gestures, and voice
inflections. The court used these observations in weighing the credibility of
the testimony of each witness that offered testimony in this case.
Specifically, the court finds parts, but not all, of the entirety of the testimony
of the alleged child victim and the testimony of the defendant to be credible.
However, the credible testimony of the alleged child victim, and the
other credible testimony adduced at trial does support the court’s
finding and decision.” (emphasis added [by the trial court to the
factfinder’s decision]).
The trial court also found that the child victim’s testimony “provided details at trial which
were not addressed as part of the police interrogation and that “[i]rrespective of the police
interrogation, the court found portions of the testimony of the child and the defendant to
be credible.” The trial court found that the factfinder did not identify Vanpernis’s interview
with law enforcement as evidence used to support the verdict. Therefore, even if the
evidence presented in the petition were believed, the petition does not present
substantive grounds for relief because it fails to show prejudice. The victim’s testimony
was credible and sufficient to support the guilty verdicts.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶13} Vanpernis presents two assignments of error:
1. The trial court abused its discretion, applied incorrect legal standards,
and erroneously denied Vanpernis’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
Lawrence App. No. 24CA9 7
without conducting a hearing in violation of R.C 2953.21(D) and Due
Process of Law as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and comparable provisions
of the Ohio Constitution.
2. The trial court errored [sic] by denying Vanpernis’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on the merits without a hearing, thereby depriving him of
his Right to Due Process of Law and his Right to Effective Assistance of
Counsel in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and comparable provisions of the Ohio
Constitution.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard of Review for Postconviction Petitions
{¶14} In his first assignment of error, Vanpernis argues that the trial court
misapplied the standard for reviewing a postconviction relief petition as established by
the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Bunch, 2022-Ohio-4723. “We review a decision to
grant or deny a petition for postconviction relief, including the decision whether to afford
the petitioner a hearing, under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” State v. Hatton, 2022-
Ohio-3991, ¶ 38. However, whether a trial court has used the proper legal standard of
review is a question of law, which we review de novo.
Id. (“We review a decision to grant
or deny a petition for postconviction relief . . . under an abuse-of-discretion standard. But
whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain an untimely, second, or
successive petition for postconviction relief is a question of law, which we review de
novo.”); Brand v. Ogle,
2020-Ohio-3219, ¶ 9 (4th Dist.) (“The issue whether the trial court
applied the correct legal standard is a question of law we review de novo.”).
{¶15} The legal standard that applies to a petition for postconviction relief requires
a trial court to review the entirety of the record as well as the evidence filed by the parties
in the postconviction proceedings. If the record shows that the petitioner is not entitled to
Lawrence App. No. 24CA9 8
relief, the petition is dismissed. If the record does not disprove the petition’s claim, then
the trial court must proceed to a hearing on the petition under R.C. 2953.21(F).
In order to grant a hearing on a timely postconviction petition, the trial court
must “determine whether there are substantive grounds for relief.” R.C.
2953.21(D). If the petition “is sufficient on its face to raise an issue that the
petitioner's conviction is void or voidable on constitutional grounds, and the
claim is one which depends upon factual allegations that cannot be
determined by examination of the files and records of the case, the petition
states a substantive ground for relief.”
In determining whether the petition states a substantive ground for relief,
the trial court must consider the entirety of the record from the trial
proceedings as well as any evidence filed by the parties in postconviction
proceedings. If the record on its face demonstrates that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief, then the trial court must dismiss the petition. If the record
does not on its face disprove the petitioner's claim, then the court is required
to “proceed to a prompt hearing on the issues.”
(Citations omitted.)State v. Bunch, 2022-Ohio-4723, ¶ 23-24.
{¶16} Vanpernis contended that his substantive ground for relief was a claim for
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
To establish that trial counsel was ineffective, a defendant must show that
counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defendant. Regarding the prejudice prong, the defendant
must prove that there is a “reasonable probability” that counsel's deficiency
affected the outcome of the defendant's proceedings. “A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” “When a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is
whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the
factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.”
(Citations omitted). Bunch at ¶ 26. Therefore, in determining whether the petition states
a substantive claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the trial court must consider
the entirety of the record and must dismiss the petition if the record on its face
demonstrates that counsel’s performance was not deficient or, if deficient, did not result
in prejudice.
Lawrence App. No. 24CA9 9
{¶17} At this stage of the proceeding where the trial court is determining whether
to grant a hearing on the petition, the petitioner is not required to “definitively” establish
either of the two prongs of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Bunch at ¶ 27. “[T]o
merit a hearing on a postconviction ineffective assistance claim, a petitioner must proffer
evidence outside the record that if true, would show that counsel was ineffective.”
Id.
{¶18} Vanpernis offered the opinions of two persons he asserts were interrogation
and psychological experts that, if permitted to testify in court under Evid.R. 702, would
have provided information helpful to a motion to suppress Vanpernis’s statements during
the law enforcement interview. The interrogation expert, Brian Leslie, provided an affidavit
in which he averred he would have assisted trial counsel with a suppression motion and/or
cross examination and would have discussed the Reid interrogation technique, the use
of the Reid technique during Vanpernis’s interview, and how the technique could result in
involuntary and unreliable statements. The psychological expert, John Tilley, provided a
psychological report, but did not submit affidavit testimony. In his report he stated that he
would have noted certain psychological variables that might have impacted Vanpernis’s
interaction with law enforcement. He opined that Vanpernis is a highly compliant
individual with attention deficient disorder, which enhances his likelihood of making false
statements to law enforcement.
{¶19} Vanpernis contends that the trial court applied the wrong standard because
it reviewed the evidence the factfinder identified as the evidence supporting its guilty
verdicts. He argues that he might not have even had a bench trial if his trial attorney had
retained experts. He might have decided to have his case tried by a jury. However, this
argument is entirely speculative. Vanpernis did not challenge or otherwise raise his
Lawrence App. No. 24CA9 10
decision to waive a jury trial in his postconviction petition. He cites no case law for his
proposition that the trial court’s review of his petition must be performed on a hypothetical
alternative record where the case is tried to a jury rather than judge. Additionally, there is
no basis to believe that a jury trial would have resulted in a different outcome. The trial
court did not use the incorrect standard when it reviewed the actual record in this case,
which included a bench trial.
{¶20} Vanpernis also contends that the trial court oversimplified that case by
focusing on the evidence the factfinder expressly stated supported the guilty verdicts: the
victim’s in court testimony and Vanpernis’s in court denials of wrongdoing. He contends
that even if the trial judge disregarded and did not consider Vanpernis’s recorded
interview with law enforcement, his petition presented sufficient evidence that, if believed,
warranted a hearing. In other words, Vanpernis contends that his law enforcement
interview could have been entirely disregarded by the factfinder and his petition would
still have warranted a hearing.
{¶21} Vanpernis’s argument ignores an important and separate component of the
standard of review – the trial court’s review of the record. Instead, he reiterates that he
believes his petition on its face raised viable claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
and that it relied on facts that cannot be determined from the record because it includes
expert opinions that were not part of the record. He ignores that in determining whether
the petition has raised on its face a viable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
trial court must review the entirety of the record from the trial court proceedings. If the
record on its face demonstrates that he is not entitled to relief – if it disproves his claim of
Lawrence App. No. 24CA9 11
ineffective assistance of counsel – either of the two prongs – the court must dismiss the
petition.
{¶22} Here the trial court applied the correct standard of review. It reviewed
Vanpernis’s petition, it reviewed the record, and it determined that because Vanpernis’s
interview with law enforcement was not identified by the factfinder as evidence that
supported the guilty verdict, then the interview had no persuasive value to the factfinder
and any efforts to suppress or undermine it with experts would have had no impact on the
outcome. Thus, even if everything stated in the petition were believed, it would have no
impact on the guilty verdicts because the factfinder based its verdicts on the victim’s
credible testimony and Vanpernis’s lack of credibility on the stand.
{¶23} The trial court did not apply an incorrect standard of review. It did not
improperly require Vanpernis to “definitively” establish his trial counsel’s deficiency or to
“definitively” establish prejudice at this stage of the proceeding. Bunch at ¶ 27. Rather, it
determined whether there were substantive grounds for relief by considering the entirety
of the record from the trial proceedings and the evidence submitted by the parties and
found that the record, on its face, demonstrated that Vanpernis was not entitled to relief
because the law enforcement interview was irrelevant to the guilty verdicts.
{¶24} Vanpernis contends that it “defies reasoning to suggest” his “incriminating
statements did not impact the outcome of the case.” However, he ignores the entirety of
the record. The 11-year-old victim came into court, took the witness stand, and testified
that Vanpernis taught her how to search for pornography on the internet, forced her to
touch his penis, and touched her vagina with his hand under her pajamas on multiple
occasions while the two were cuddling or watching videos. The factfinder observed her
Lawrence App. No. 24CA9 12
demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections. It used these observations in weighing the
credibility of her testimony and based its guilty verdict on her testimony as well as
Vanpernis’s in court testimony denying it all. The factfinder also stated that it witnessed
and weighed Vanpernis’s credibility in court in reaching its guilty verdict. Given this record,
we do not find that it “defies reasoning” for the factfinder to have found Vanpernis’s law
enforcement interview irrelevant or unremarkable. Contrary to Vanpernis’s argument, the
trial court did not “oversimplify” the evidence presented. The testimony of a single credible
witness is all that is required to support a guilty verdict. State v. Walker, 2022-Ohio-1684,
¶ 50 (10th Dist.).
{¶25} We overrule the first assignment of error.
B. Dismissal of Petition without a Hearing
{¶26} For his second assignment of error, Vanpernis contends that the trial court
erred by denying his petition for postconviction relief without a hearing. For his argument,
Vanpernis states that his first assignment of error raised this same error and that he is
raising it as a second assignment of error as an alternative argument on the merits.
Specifically, his brief states:
The first Assignment of Error raises these issues in the context of the trial
court’s denial of the Petition without a hearing. To the extent this Court
concludes the Decision properly denied the claims without a hearing,
Vanpernis raises the issues in this Assignment of Error, as if the trial court
denied relief on the merits. Accordingly, Vanpernis incorporates the factual
and legal arguments presented above and asserts that, for all the reasons
previously stated herein . . . he was deprived of effective assistance of
counsel . . . .
{¶27} To clarify, we interpret Vanpernis’s first assignment of error to be that the
trial court erred in denying his petition without a hearing because the trial court used the
wrong standard of review. We rejected that argument and found that the trial court did not
Lawrence App. No. 24CA9 13
wrongly dismiss his petition because it used the wrong standard of review. The trial court
used the correct standard of review when it dismissed his petition without a hearing. We
interpret his second assignment of error as contending that, assuming the trial court used
the correct standard of review, the trial court nevertheless abused its discretion when it
denied his petition without a hearing.
{¶28} “We review a decision to grant or deny a petition for postconviction relief,
including the decision whether to afford the petitioner a hearing, under an abuse-of-
discretion standard.” State v. Hatton, 2022-Ohio-3991, ¶ 38.
Generally, a trial court's decision to grant or to deny a R.C. 2953.21
postconviction petition should be upheld absent an abuse of discretion. “A
trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is unreasonable, arbitrary,
or unconscionable.” Also, reviewing courts should not overrule a trial
court's findings if competent and credible evidence supports those
findings. Additionally, a criminal defendant seeking to challenge a
conviction through a petition for postconviction relief is not automatically
entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Before granting an evidentiary hearing, a
trial court must consider the petition, supporting affidavits, documentary
evidence, files and records including the indictment, the court's journal
entries, the journalized records of the clerk of the court, and the court
reporter's transcript, to determine whether substantive grounds for relief
exist. R.C. 2953.21(C). If a court concludes that petitioner has failed to set
forth operative facts to establish substantive grounds for relief, no hearing
is necessary.
(Citations omitted.) State v. Rutherford, 2019-Ohio-3827, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.). This standard
is deferential. To find abuse of discretion, the decision must have been unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable. An unreasonable decision is unsupported by a sound
reasoning process. An arbitrary decision is made without regard to the facts or
circumstances. An unconscionable decision “affronts the sense of justice, decency, or
reasonableness.” State v. Kyles,
2024-Ohio-998, ¶ 22 (12th Dist.).
Lawrence App. No. 24CA9 14
{¶29} Vanpernis’s petition was based entirely upon his belief that there was a
reasonable probability that the successful suppression of his law enforcement interview
would have affected the outcome of the proceedings (i.e. “the factfinder would have had
a reasonable doubt respecting guilt”). Bunch at ¶ 26. He believes that without the law
enforcement interview, there was a reasonable probability he would have been found not
guilty.
{¶30} First, Vanpernis’s petition is premised upon the strategic decision whether
to use experts. “[T]he Supreme Court of Ohio has held that the decision whether to call a
witness ‘falls within the rubric of trial strategy and will not be second-guessed by a
reviewing court.’” Rutherford at ¶ 20, quoting State v. Treesh,
2001-Ohio-4.
Criminal cases will arise where the only reasonable and available defense
strategy requires consultation with experts or introduction of expert
evidence, whether pretrial, at trial, or both. There are, however, “countless
ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best
criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same
way.” Rare are the situations in which the “wide latitude counsel must have
in making tactical decisions” will be limited to any one technique or
approach. It can be assumed that in some cases counsel would be deemed
ineffective for failing to consult or rely on experts, but even that formulation
is sufficiently general that state courts would have wide latitude in applying
it. Here it would be well within the bounds of a reasonable judicial
determination for the state court to conclude that defense counsel could
follow a strategy that did not require the use of experts . . . .
From the perspective of . . . defense counsel . . . there were any number
of hypothetical experts—specialists in psychiatry, psychology, ballistics,
fingerprints, tire treads, physiology, or numerous other disciplines and
subdisciplines—whose insight might possibly have been useful. An attorney
can avoid activities that appear “distractive from more important duties.”
Counsel was entitled to formulate a strategy that was reasonable at the time
and to balance limited resources in accord with effective trial tactics and
strategies.
(Citations omitted.) Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 106–07 (2011).
Lawrence App. No. 24CA9 15
{¶31} The State, in its opposition to the petition argued that Vanpernis’s trial
counsel made the tactical decision to attack the reliability of Vanpernis’s statements
during the law enforcement interview by cross-examining law enforcement officials. The
State argued that trial counsel, “clearly structured his cross examination of Sgt. Chaffins
and Det. Sgt. Bollinger around the defense contention that the interview of the defendant
was unfair and that therefore his admissions to touching the child should be disregarded.
He addressed the issue of ‘false confessions’ directly with the investigating officers.” Our
review of trial counsel’s cross examination of the interviewing officers shows that trial
counsel raised extensive questions about the interview technique, the safeguards or lack
thereof against a false confession, and Vanpernis’s fatigue level and ADD. There is no
cause to believe that trial counsel’s strategy was unsuccessful or deficient given that the
factfinder stated that it considered trial counsel’s arguments “concerning the method and
manner in which the custodial interview was conducted. The court reviewed the video
interview keeping in mind the arguments and stated concerns of the defendant as well as
the admissible and credible testimony of witnesses which was offered during the trial.” As
a result, the factfinder did not cite the law enforcement interview as persuasive evidence
that supported its guilty verdicts.
{¶32} Second, Vanpernis’s petition rests on several speculative statements. He
speculates that the trial court would have admitted the testimony of the expert witnesses
under Evid.R. 702. “Trial courts have broad discretion in determining the admissibility of
expert testimony, subject to review for an abuse of discretion.” Terry v. Caputo, 2007-
Ohio-5023, ¶ 16; Herard v. State, 390 So.3d 610, 622 (Fla. 2024) (trial court properly
excluded expert who would “have testified about false confessions and related ‘inherent
Lawrence App. No. 24CA9 16
problems’ with the ‘Reid Technique,’ a commonly used method of police interrogation . .
. aimed at extracting confessions and evaluating suspect credibility”); People v. Powell,
37 N.Y.3d 476, 487 (N.Y. 2021) (trial court did not abuse discretion in excluding testimony
of expert because defendant failed to meet his burden of establishing that expert's
testimony in the area of false confessions was “readily acceptable in the scientific
community”).
{¶33} Vanpernis speculates that, had the experts’ testimony been admitted, it
would have established that Vanpernis’s statements were coerced and should be
suppressed. Contra State v. Garrett, 518 P.3d 1276, *6 (Kan.App. 2022) (reversing trial
court’s conclusion that the defendant’s statements were involuntary and should have
been suppressed because “a single deceptive interrogation tactic viewed in isolation does
not establish coercion – it must be viewed alongside other factors to access the totality of
the circumstances”); United States v. Jacques,
744 F.3d 804, 812 (1st Cir. 2014) (the
exaggeration of evidence along with use of the Reid technique did not make a confession
involuntary); State v. Rejholec,
398 Wis.2d 729, 750 (Wis.App. 2021) (the defendant
“offers no authority concluding that the use of the Reid technique itself creates a coercive
environment”); Shelby v. State,
986 N.E.2d 345, 365-66 (Ind.App. 2013) (use of the Reid
technique did not render the confession involuntary).
{¶34} Finally, Vanpernis speculates that if his law enforcement interview had been
suppressed or if the experts would have testified at trial, there was a reasonable
probability that the trial judge would have found him not guilty. See Rutherford at 21 (“we
find no evidence to indicate that a false confession expert would have, in fact, created a
strong possibility of a different result at a bench trial); State v. Tapke,
2007-Ohio-5124, ¶
Lawrence App. No. 24CA9 17
54 (1st Dist.) (expert witness “testified extensively about the Reid technique and the jury
had an appropriate basis for not believing the confession. But it chose not to discredit it.”).
{¶35} It is this last contention that the trial court analyzed because it is the second
prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim – whether there was prejudice.3 We
agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Vanpernis failed to establish a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Competent and credible evidence in the record supports
that finding. The factfinder, when rendering the guilty verdicts, specifically identified which
evidence it relied upon to support the guilty verdicts. The victim and Vanpernis’s in court
testimony, along with their general demeanor allowed the factfinder to assess credibility
and determine that the victim’s testimony was credible and Vanpernis’s denials were not.
This rendered Vanpernis’s prior interview with law enforcement largely irrelevant, so
much so that it was not remarked upon favorably by the factfinder in the verdict.
“Generally, there is no prejudice where ‘compelling evidence’ remains to support the
conviction assuming the suppression motion would have been granted.” State v. Jackson,
2024-Ohio-1880, ¶ 23 (1st Dist.), appeal not allowed,
2024-Ohio-3313. The trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petition for postconviction relief without a
hearing.
{¶36} We overrule the second assignment of error.
3 “The failure to make either the deficiency or prejudice showing defeats a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Thus, ‘a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining
the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. … If it is easier to dispose
of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so,
that course should be followed.’ ” State v. Armor, 2017-Ohio-396, ¶ 44 (10th Dist.), quoting Strickland v.
Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984).
Lawrence App. No. 24CA9 18
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶37} We conclude that the trial court used the correct standard of review and did
not abuse its discretion when it dismissed appellant’s petition for postconviction relief
without a hearing. We overrule his assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Lawrence App. No. 24CA9 19
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that appellant shall pay the
costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
LAWRENCE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS to carry this judgment into
execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS
BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is
temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted.
The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of
Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay
is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day
period, or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of
Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of
the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the
appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such
dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY: ________________________
Michael D. Hess, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with
the clerk.
