[Cite as State v. Ogletree,
2025-Ohio-371.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 113913
v. :
ANTONIO OGLETREE, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 6, 2025
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-23-686904-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Brittany Stipich, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
Francis Cavallo, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
WILLIAM A. KLATT, J.:
Defendant-appellant Antonio Ogletree (“Ogletree”), appeals his
conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural History
On November 29, 2023, Ogletree was indicted on five counts based
upon acts that allegedly occurred between Ogletree and his girlfriend, M.C., on
November 16, 2023: aggravated burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(1), felonious
assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), felonious assault in violation of R.C.
2903.11(A)(2), and two counts of strangulation in violation of R.C. 2903.18(B)(2).
The burglary and felonious assault charges included notice-of-prior-conviction and
repeat-violent-offender specifications. Ogletree pleaded not guilty to all charges on
December 4, 2023.
On March 12, 2024, Ogletree voluntarily waived his right to a jury
trial, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. The trial court heard testimony from
M.C. and Officer Brittany Vajusi (“Officer Vajusi”); Ogletree did not provide any
testimony on his own behalf.
M.C. testified that on the day in question, she and Ogletree lived
together in her apartment. M.C. picked up Ogletree from work around 5:30 p.m.,
and they returned home. At the apartment, M.C. informed Ogletree that due to
information she found on his phone four days previously, she did not believe their
relationship was going to work. M.C. told Ogletree “he could stay but he wasn’t going
to like [her] if he did stay. And [she] didn’t want to be with him or whatever.” Tr.
12. According to M.C., following her conversation with Ogletree, she was lying on
the couch when Ogletree jumped on top of her, grabbed her phone, slammed it on
the floor, and left the apartment. M.C. stated she was not injured during that
encounter.
M.C. testified that she wanted Ogletree to pay for her broken phone
so she “kind of went after him.” Tr. 14. M.C. followed Ogletree in her car, persuaded
Ogletree to enter her car, and as they headed back to her apartment, Ogletree exited
the vehicle. M.C. stated she thought to herself that she should leave Ogletree alone
before he hurt her and, therefore, she parked in a nearby parking lot for 30-60
minutes before returning to her apartment.
Upon returning home, M.C. found Ogletree naked on the edge of the
upstairs bathtub. M.C. stated that Ogletree must have climbed in through the
window because he did not have a key to the apartment and she had locked the door
when she left the apartment. M.C. further stated that Ogletree moved to the upstairs
bedroom and laid down on the bed while M.C. informed him that she wanted him
to leave. M.C. kicked the bed, Ogletree stood up, and M.C. found herself seated on
the bed. M.C. testified that Ogletree used his hands to try and choke her, causing
her to gasp for air, and he pulled on her leg.
According to M.C., Ogletree eventually walked downstairs and sat on
the couch, and M.C. followed him but remained standing on the stairs. M.C. stated
that in response to her comments, Ogletree jumped up from the couch and started
choking her a second time. M.C. said she stabbed Ogletree with scissors, and
Ogletree then stabbed M.C. in the face. M.C. did not know whether Ogletree used
her scissors or another object to cut her face: “And [Ogletree], I don’t know, he took
something out of his pockets, took it out of my hand, but he stabbed me on my face.”
Tr. 21. M.C. could not identify the object used to cut her face but she stated she
required six stitches and the hospital supposedly told her that she had “a three-
centimeter brain aneurism blood clot, something in [her] head.” Tr. 21. Per M.C.,
after Ogletree cut her face, he returned to the couch and said “Now you got a reason
to not f--k with me no more” and told M.C. that the maintenance man would find
her in the apartment. M.C. interpreted those comments as a threat to kill her.
Per M.C., Ogletree then left the apartment on foot and headed to his
sister’s house on Capers Avenue. M.C. drove to Ogletree’s sister’s house where she
arrived before Ogletree. M.C. testified that she saw Ogletree walking up the street
and she attempted to strike him with a snow brush but Ogletree pushed her to the
ground with such force that she tore a ligament in her pelvis. M.C. stated that
Ogletree then entered his sister’s house and locked the door. M.C. encountered
security for the apartment complex who contacted the police and EMS who
responded to the scene. M.C. further stated that Ogletree was intoxicated during the
events in question.
The security camera recording, which depicts the events outside of
the Capers Avenue apartment, was played at trial. The recording shows M.C.
throwing items from her vehicle’s trunk — fishing rods and a grill — and smashing
them on the ground. Ogletree then approached M.C., and M.C. attempted to strike
Ogletree with a snow brush. Ogletree initially walked away, and he then approached
M.C. and threw her to the pavement before he entered the Capers Avenue
apartment.
Officer Vajusi, a five-year veteran patrol officer with the Cleveland
Division of Police, testified that on November 16, 2023, she and her partner
responded to a call that a woman had been stabbed and the suspect was still on the
scene at Capers Avenue. Upon arrival at Capers Avenue, Officer Vajusi said she
observed M.C. in a highly emotional state directing the police to an apartment where
the male who allegedly assaulted her was staying. Officer Vajusi described M.C. as
having a lot of blood on her face and clothing and a “pretty severe injury to her left
temple” that required stitches. Tr. 41. Officer Vajusi further stated that M.C.
informed her that Ogletree caused the head injury while they were at her apartment
and a second incident occurred at the Capers Avenue site.
Officer Vajusi testified that upon entry into the Capers Avenue
apartment, the police found Ogletree who denied committing any offense and asked
the police to view the security camera’s surveillance footage.
Officer Vajusi wore a body camera during her interactions with M.C.
and Ogletree, and the recording was introduced at trial. In the recording, M.C.
stated that Ogletree carried knives and screwdrivers but not guns and he “stabbed
her with something.” M.C. described to Officer Vajusi the events that allegedly
occurred at her apartment and in the street outside Capers Avenue just as she
testified to at trial.
At the close of the State’s evidence, Ogletree presented a Crim.R. 29
motion, and the trial court granted the motion on aggravated burglary and denied it
in regard to all remaining counts. Following trial, the court found Ogletree guilty of
Counts 2 and 3, felonious assault — with notice-of-prior-conviction and repeat-
violent-offender specifications — and not guilty of strangulation. The court referred
Ogletree for a presentence-investigation report.
On April 9, 2024, the trial court heard from counsel for both parties.
Defense counsel asked the court to consider that M.C. followed Ogletree even after
he disengaged from the altercation and it was her acts that kept the “ongoing
complication going.” Defense counsel further attempted to minimize M.C.’s
injuries: “[M.C.’s] injuries were, although meeting the burden for felonious assault,
were — did not require extensive medical care and in the form of the laceration.” Tr.
64. The court sentenced Ogletree to three to four and one-half years of
imprisonment on Count 2 and three years on Count 3, with the sentences to be
served concurrently.
On May 9, 2024, Ogletree filed a timely notice of appeal presenting
two assignments of error:
Assignment of Error I: There was insufficient evidence produced at
trial to support a finding of guilty on all counts in violation of
appellant’s right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as Article 1 of
the Ohio Constitution.
Assignment of Error II: The court lost its way by finding the defendant
guilty against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Legal Analysis
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
A sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge requires a determination of
whether the State has met its burden of production at trial. State v. Hunter, 2006-
Ohio-20, ¶ 41 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 390 (1997).
An appellate court reviewing sufficiency of the evidence must determine “‘whether,
after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” State v. Leonard,
2004-Ohio-6235, ¶ 77, quoting State v. Jenks,
61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. With a sufficiency inquiry,
an appellate court does not review whether the State’s evidence is to be believed but
whether, if believed, the evidence admitted at trial supported the conviction. State
v. Starks,
2009-Ohio-3375, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), citing
Thompkins at 387. A sufficiency-
of-the-evidence argument is not a factual determination, but a question of law.
Id.
In a sufficiency inquiry we assume the State’s witnesses testified
truthfully and evaluate whether that testimony, along with any other evidence
introduced at trial, satisfies each element of the offense. In re D.R.S., 2016-Ohio-
3262, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.). The elements of an offense may be proven by direct evidence,
circumstantial evidence, or both. See, e.g., State v. Wells, 2021-Ohio-2585, ¶ 25 (8th
Dist.), citing State v. Durr,
58 Ohio St.3d 86 (1991). Direct evidence and
circumstantial evidence have “equal evidentiary value.”
Wells at ¶ 26, citing State v.
Santiago,
2011-Ohio-1691, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).
Ogletree argues that where M.C. produced a pair of scissors during
her interaction with Ogletree and she did not testify as to another weapon with
which Ogletree cut her temple, there was insufficient evidence to support the
charges of felonious assault. The State counters that sufficient evidence was
introduced in support of the felonious assault charges where M.C. testified that a
weapon was used during an emotionally heightened altercation in which Ogletree
threatened M.C.’s life and Ogletree used sufficient force to cause a serious head
injury to M.C.
The trial court convicted Ogletree on two counts of felonious assault
in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and 2903.11(A)(2). The relevant statute reads:
(A) No person shall knowingly do either of the following:
(1) Cause serious physical harm to another or to another’s unborn;
(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another or to another’s
unborn by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance.
R.C. 2903.11.
R.C. 2901.01(A)(3) defines physical harm to persons as any injury,
regardless of its gravity or duration. Serious physical harm to a person is
(a)Any mental illness or condition of such gravity as would normally
require hospitalization or prolonged psychiatric treatment;
(b)Any physical harm that carries a substantial risk of death;
(c)Any physical harm that involves some permanent incapacity,
whether partial or total, or that involves some temporary, substantial
incapacity;
(d)Any physical harm that involves some permanent disfigurement or
that involves some temporary, serious disfigurement;
(e)Any physical harm that involves acute pain of such duration as to
result in substantial suffering or that involves any degree of prolonged
or intractable pain.
R.C. 2901.01(A)(5). This court has consistently held that a victim who sustains an
injury that requires stitches has incurred serious physical harm for purposes of a
felonious-assault conviction. State v. Wilson, 2023-Ohio-218, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.),
quoting State v. Finley,
2019-Ohio-3891, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.), quoting State v.
Studgions,
2010-Ohio-5480, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Churchwell, 2007-Ohio-
1600, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.).
Ogletree does not argue the State failed to demonstrate M.C.
sustained physical harm or serious physical harm but contends that the State
introduced insufficient evidence to show the physical harm to M.C. was caused by a
deadly weapon. “‘Deadly weapon’ means any instrument, device, or thing capable
of inflicting death, and designed or specially adapted for use as a weapon, or
possessed, carried, or used as a weapon.” R.C. 2923.11(A). This court in State v.
Tripplett, 2023-Ohio-4644 (8th Dist.), explained the analysis applied to determine
what constitutes a deadly weapon:
“The test for whether something is a deadly weapon is not whether it in
fact inflicted a fatal injury, but whether it is capable of doing so.’” State
v. Grayson, 2021-Ohio-4312, ¶ 34 (8th Dist.). Generally, “a trier of fact
‘is permitted to infer the deadly nature of an instrument from the facts
and circumstances of its use.’” State v. Dean, 9th Dist. Lorain No.
18CA011290, 2019-Ohio-1391, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Vondenberg,
61
Ohio St.2d 285, 289,
401 N.E.2d 437 (1980). The size and composition
of the item wielded as a weapon is generally immaterial. “No item, no
matter how small or commonplace, can be safely disregarded for its
capacity to cause death when it is wielded with the requisite intent and
force.” State v. Moody, 5th Dist. Licking No. 09 CA 90, 2010-Ohio-
3272, ¶ 40, citing In re Smith, 142 Ohio App.3d 16,
753 N.E.2d 930 (8th
Dist.2001), and State v. Deboe, 62 Ohio App.2d 192,
406 N.E.2d 536
(6th Dist.1977). Thus, the legal test is not based on the outcome of the
assault, but rather the capability to turn the everyday item into and be
used as a deadly weapon. Generally, what constitutes a “deadly
weapon” is an issue for the trier of fact.
Id. at ¶ 20.
While an object on its own, such as a pair of scissors, may not
constitute a deadly weapon, “‘the manner of use of the instrument, its threatened
use, and its nature determine its capability to inflict death.’” State v. Berry, 2003-
Ohio-6642, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Deboe, 62 Ohio App.2d 192 (6th Dist. 1977). For
instance, a piece of wood with the words “whup ass stick number 1” written on its
face was a deadly weapon because the stick was of sufficient weight to knock the
victim to the ground and inflict bruising and multiple lacerations that required
medical attention and resulted in the victim suffering from headaches and blurred
vision. Berry at ¶ 13. Additionally, a shiny piece of metal constituted a “deadly
weapon” because the
jury could likely view a shiny piece of metal that was used to cut and
stab someone as being very similar to a knife. A knife is not presumed
to be a deadly weapon. Id. But Officer Ifft’s testimony and resulting
wound, especially when viewed in a light most favorable to the state,
could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the shiny piece of metal
was a deadly weapon. Officer Ifft’s wound required nine stiches to
close, some of which were deep in his arm. This demonstrated that the
shiny piece of metal penetrated deep into his arm and was capable of
causing a serious physical injury. Had appellant stabbed Officer Ifft in
the neck or chest, his injury could have been deadly.
State v. Burns, 2012-Ohio-2698, ¶ 30 (7th Dist.). See
Tripplett at ¶ 21. (The trier of
fact was permitted to draw an inference from Tripplett’s use of a bottle as a deadly
weapon where “the victim testified that she was repeatedly struck with the bottle
with sufficient force to cause serious physical harm. Tripplett then tried to ‘finish
[her] off’ by choking her to the point that she was ‘fading away.”’).
Here, Ogletree allegedly cut M.C.’s face with an unknown object. M.C.
testified that Ogletree may have used the scissors she wielded at Ogletree or another
object he removed from his pocket — she was unable to identify the weapon and no
weapon was recovered at the scene or introduced at trial. M.C. informed Officer
Vajusi that Ogletree often carried a knife or screwdriver in his pocket. M.C. was
unable to state with any certainty the object that Ogletree used to cut her face but
the uncontroverted testimony was that M.C. sustained an injury to her face that
required six stitches at the emergency room. Additionally, M.C. testified about
Ogletree’s comments during the altercation that she interpreted as threats upon her
life.
Under the facts and circumstances presented at trial, the trier of fact
was permitted to draw an inference that Ogletree used a deadly weapon — whether
it was a pair of scissors or something he withdrew from his pocket — that he used to
cause serious physical harm to M.C. For the foregoing reasons, we overrule
Ogletree’s first assignment of error.
B. Manifest Weight of the Evidence
A manifest weight challenge questions the credibility of the evidence
presented and examines whether the State met its burden of persuasion at trial.
State v. Whitsett, 2014-Ohio-4933, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), citing Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d
380 at 387 (1997); State v. Bowden,
2009-Ohio-3598, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing
Thompkins at 390. A reviewing court “weighs the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in
resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created
such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a
new trial ordered.” State v. Martin,
20 Ohio App.3d 172 (1st Dist. 1983), paragraph
three of the syllabus. When considering an appellant’s claim that a conviction is
against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court of appeals sits as a “thirteenth
juror” and may disagree with the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.
Thompkins at 387, citing Tibbs v. Florida,
457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). A reversal on the
basis that a verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence is granted “only in
the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.”
Martin.
Ogletree contends that his convictions are against the manifest weight
of the evidence because M.C. lacked credibility. Specifically, Ogletree argues that
the trial court’s granting of his Crim.R. 29 motion on the burglary charges and
finding Ogletree not guilty of strangulation reflected the trial court’s determination
that M.C. was not credible and, by extension, her testimony on the felonious assault
charges also had to lack credibility. Ogletree concedes M.C. sustained a head injury
but argues that without testimony clearly identifying the weapon, the felonious-
assault convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Ogletree also
claims M.C. testified she was not injured by her own scissors but a “mysterious
item.” Appellant’s brief, p. 14.
We have previously addressed this court’s acceptance of the
factfinder’s decisions on credibility:
When we examine witness credibility, we must be mindful that “the
choice between credible witnesses and their conflicting testimony rests
solely with the finder of fact and an appellate court may not substitute
its own judgment for that of the finder of fact.” State v. Awan, 22 Ohio
St.3d 120, 123,
22 Ohio B. 199,
489 N.E.2d 277 (1986). The trier of fact
“is in the best position to observe the witnesses’ demeanor, voice
inflection, and mannerisms in determining each witness’s credibility.”
State v. Hughes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81768, 2003-Ohio-2307, ¶ 26.
Furthermore, a trier of fact is free to believe all, some, or none of the
testimony of each witness appearing before it. Iler v. Wright, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 80555, 2002-Ohio-4279, ¶ 25.
State v. Williams,
2019-Ohio-794, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.). Ogletree was charged with
aggravated burglary, felonious assault, and strangulation. The State had to provide
different elements for each of those offenses. Simply because the trier of fact found
M.C.’s testimony did not support the strangulation or burglary charges did not
establish that her testimony also failed to support the felonious assault allegations.
The factfinder here, the trial court, found M.C.’s testimony
demonstrated she sustained serious physical harm — stitches — caused by a deadly
weapon. M.C. did not testify, as Ogletree asserts, with certainty that he cut her with
an unknown object. M.C. testified that as Ogletree choked her, he either took
something from his pocket or took the scissors from her hand and stabbed her in the
face. M.C. testified about how she sustained the cut on her face and the need for
stitches, and Officer Vajusi testified that she observed the resulting blood and injury.
Ogletree also argues that M.C. repeatedly pursued, antagonized, and
aggravated him even after he attempted to remove himself from the situation and
she did not share this information with the police. In contrast to this argument,
M.C. clearly stated during trial that she pursued Ogletree both times after he left her
apartment. Additionally, Ogletree fails to cite any legal authority showing these acts
exonerate him from felonious assault charges.
After a thorough review of the record, and weighing all the evidence,
we cannot say that this is one of the rare cases in which the trier of fact lost its way.
Ogletree’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence and,
thus, we overrule his second assignment of error.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case
remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
_____________________
WILLIAM A. KLATT, JUDGE*
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
(*Sitting by assignment: William A. Klatt, J., retired, of the Tenth District Court
of Appeals.)
