[Cite as Hasbrook v. Hasbrook,
2025-Ohio-418.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
VAN WERT COUNTY
MILLARD A. HASBROOK,
CASE NO. 15-24-08
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
RUTH E. HASBROOK, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
Appeal from Van Wert County Common Pleas Court
Domestic Relations Division
Trial Court No. DV-24-01-004
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: February 10, 2025
APPEARANCES:
Millard Arthur Hasbrook, Appellant
Angela M. Elliott for Appellee
Case No. 15-24-08
WALLAMOWSKI, J.
{¶1} Petitioner-appellant Millard Hasbrook (“Appellant”) brings this appeal
from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Van Wert County, Domestic
Relations Division overruling his objections to the magistrate’s decision to deny his
petition for a domestic violence civil protection order (“CPO”) filed against
respondent-appellee Ruth Hasbrook (“Appellee”). On appeal Appellant claims that
1) the magistrate was biased, 2) the trial court should have instructed him how to
proceed properly as he was acting pro se, and 3) the evidence supports his request
for a CPO. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
{¶2} This appeal stems from the denial of Appellant’s petition for a domestic
violence CPO. On January 10, 2024, Appellant petitioned the court for a CPO
alleging that Appellee, his then wife, had committed domestic violence against him
by hitting him in the face and by kicking him when they were in their bed. Doc. 1.
Appellant also claimed that Appellee was a danger to the children1 and herself. Doc.
1. A hearing was held on April 19, 2024. On April 24, 2024, the magistrate issued
a recommendation denying the petition for the CPO. Doc. 19. Appellant filed
1
During the pendency of this matter, the couple only had one child. At the time of the hearing, Appellee was
pregnant with their second child. “Under the plain language of R.C. 3113.31, a viable fetus is outside the
statutory definition of persons entitled to seek relief” via a CPO. Smith v. Martin, 2009-Ohio-3440 (10th
Dist.). Since the purpose of a CPO is to require a respondent to stay away from the petitioner, it would be
impossible to require a pregnant mother to stay away from the viable fetus.
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objections to the magistrate’s recommendations. Doc. 21. On July 2, 2024, the trial
court overruled the objections and denied the petition for a CPO. Doc. 31.
Appellant appealed from this judgment and on appeal raises the following issues on
appeal.2
1. The trial court abused its discretion in denying the petition for a
CPO.
2. The trial court demonstrated bias against Appellant.
3. The trial court failed to consider Appellee’s motives for her
behavior.
4. The trial court failed to consider Appellee’s recollection and
“inadequate defense of unconsciousness” regarding the second
alleged incident.
5. The trial court failed to address Appellee’s dangerous driving with
the child in the car.
6. The trial court failed to address Appellee’s neglect of the child.
7. The trial court failed to ensure procedural fairness.
{¶3} We initially note that Appellant’s brief does not set forth specific
assignments of errors, instead merely presenting arguments. An appellate brief must
contain “a statement of the assignments of error presented for review with reference
to the place in the record where each error is reflected.” App.R. 16(A)(3).
Appellant’s brief does not do so. However, in the interest of justice, we will
2
Appellant filed his brief pro se. The brief does not contain specified assignments of error, but does raise
several issues in the argument.
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consider the arguments raised in Appellant’s brief. As the arguments are related,
we will address them together.
Standard of Review
{¶4} A person may seek relief from domestic violence by filing a petition
with the trial court for a CPO. R.C. 3113.31(C). The petition must contain 1)
allegations that the respondent engaged in domestic violence against a family
member, including a description of the behavior alleged; 2) the relationship between
the respondent and the petitioner or victim if not the petitioner; and 3) a request for
relief. R.C. 3113.31(C). “Domestic violence” is defined as either recklessly causing
or attempting to cause bodily injury or placing another person in the household by
the threat of force in fear of imminent serious physical harm. R.C. 3113.31(A)(1).
{¶5} The standard of review upon a challenge to a CPO depends upon the
nature of the challenge. Dietrich v. Dietrich, 2023-Ohio-4822 (4th Dist.). When
the issue before the trial court is whether the trial court should have granted or
denied a CPO, the standard of review is whether the decision is against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
Id. Appellate courts will not reverse a trial court’s decision
regarding the issuance of a CPO if there is some competent, credible evidence. J.R.
v. E.H.,
2017-Ohio-516 (10th Dist.). An appellate court will presume that the
findings of the trial court are correct as the trial court views the witnesses and weighs
the credibility of the parties’ testimony. Guthrie v. Long,
2005-Ohio-1541 (10th
Dist.). In order to grant a CPO in the case of domestic violence, “the trial court must
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find that petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that petitioner or
petitioner’s family or household members are in danger of domestic violence.”
Felton v. Felton, 1997-Ohio-302 at 42.
Analysis
{¶6} In this case, Appellant claims there were two instances of domestic
violence against him. The first was an allegation that Appellee struck Appellant in
the face with her hand. Appellee admitted that she struck him, but claimed it was
an accident. Tr. 50. The findings of fact described the incident as follows.
. . . [Appellant] was following [Appellee] around the house. Appellant
states that [Appellee] was angry at the time. At some point,
[Appellee] stopped and turned around while making a motion with her
hand. [Appellant] was close enough that [Appellee’s] hand made
contact with [Appellant’s] face. [Appellant] did not seek medical
treatment as a result. This occurred about ten months prior to the
filing of the Petition.
Doc. 19 at 1. The trial court found this did not meet the definition of domestic
violence or assault as it lacked the requisite intent to cause harm. The finding is
supported by the testimony of Appellee.
{¶7} The second incident occurred in 2023. Appellant claimed that Appellee
had kicked him while they were in bed. The findings of fact indicate as follows.
[Appellee] was in bed sleeping. [Appellant] had been up with the
minor child. [Appellant] climbed back into bed. It appears that
[Appellee] began to thrash about, as she was tangled in the covers. As
[Appellee] was thrashing about, [Appellee] kicked [Appellant’s]
Achilles/heel area with her foot. [Appellee] has no recollection of the
incident.
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Case No. 15-24-08
Doc. 19 at 1-2. Appellee testified that she did not really remember the incident
because she was half asleep. Tr. 18-19. She only recalled being tangled in the sheet
and her nightgown and kicking to get loose. Tr. 18. She only knew that she struck
Appellant when he told her the next morning. Tr. 17, 51. Although Appellant
testified that Appellee was awake and aware of what she was doing, the trial court
determines the credibility of the witnesses. The findings were supported by some
competent, credible evidence.
{¶8} Next Appellant claims that the trial court was biased against him and
“berated” him. However, Appellant claims that the evidence of this was in the
related custody case. That case is not before us on appeal and is therefore not subject
to our review. State v. Feemorlu, 2015-Ohio-4528 (3d Dist.) (Appellate courts may
only consider items in the record before the trial court) and App.R. 9(A). A review
of the record before this Court at this time does not show that the trial court exhibited
a bias against Appellant.
{¶9} Appellant argues that the trial court failed to consider Appellee’s
frustration when determining her motive for her actions. A review of the record
shows that this is not the case. The trial court considered the facts and determined
that Appellee lacked any intent to cause bodily injury or behaved in a reckless
manner which resulted in bodily injury. Doc. 31. Specifically, the trial court noted
that it agreed with the magistrate that the first incident was merely an accident rather
than an attempt to hit Appellant or cause him harm. Doc. 31 at 1. Similarly the trial
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court agreed that Appellee accidentally kicked Appellant while attempting to
untangle herself from bedding rather than an attempt to cause harm to Appellant.
Doc. 31 at 1. The trial court’s judgment entry stated that it agreed with the
conclusions of the magistrate and the magistrate’s findings of fact specifically noted
that for the first incident, Appellee was angry. The magistrate determined that
despite the anger, there was no intent to cause harm and the contact was accidental.
These findings show that the magistrate and the trial court did consider the
frustration of the Appellee when reaching the conclusions.
{¶10} Appellant also argues that the trial court did not consider “Appellee’s
recollection and inadequate defense of unconsciousness” concerning the allegation
she kicked him while they were in bed. A review of the findings of fact by the
magistrate and the judgment entry of the trial court show that Appellee’s mental
state was considered. The magistrate noted that Appellee had no recollection of the
incident. The testimony of Appellee was that she was half-asleep at the time and
was merely trying to free herself from being tangled in the sheets and her night
clothes. She did not even recall making any contact with Appellant until he told her
about it the next morning. The trial court believed Appellee’s version of what
occurred and determined there was no intent to commit harm. This was supported
by the testimony.
{¶11} Next Appellant claims that the trial court erred by failing to consider
Appellee’s “dangerous driving” with Appellant and/or the child in the car. A review
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of the record shows that Appellant presented evidence regarding one accident where
Appellee struck another vehicle while driving. Appellee was injured, but the child
was secure in his car seat and required no medical attention after being checked out
by the EMTs. Appellee did not require the child to be checked by a doctor, instead
allowing the child to leave with a family member, who happened to be one of the
EMTs on the scene. Appellant disagreed with this decision. The magistrate did
consider these facts and found that there was no evidence of any injuries to the child
or any harm resulting from the decision not to require the child to be checked at an
emergency room. Thus, Appellee’s driving was considered by the trial court.
{¶12} Appellant also claims that the trial court did not consider Appellee’s
“neglect” of their child. The alleged “neglect” was the failure to seek additional
medical attention for the child after the car accident as was discussed above. This
Court notes that “neglect” of a child is not the basis for a CPO under the statute.
“Domestic violence” means any of the following:
(a) The occurrence of one or more of the following acts against a
family or household member:
(i) Attempting to cause or recklessly causing bodily injury;
(ii) Placing another person by the threat of force in fear of imminent
serious physical harm or committing a violation of section 2903.211
or 2911.211 of the Revised Code;
(iii) Committing any act with respect to a child that would result in
the child being an abused child, as defined in section 2151.031 of the
Revised Code;
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(iv) Committing a sexually oriented offense.
R.C. 3113.31(A)(1). The review of the record shows that the magistrate fully
addressed this issue.
{¶13} Lastly, Appellant claims that he was denied procedural fairness
because he acted pro se. Procedural due process guarantees an affected individual
the right to some form of hearing with notice and an opportunity to be heard before
being divested of a right. Cleveland Bd. Of Edn. V. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542
(1985). “(D)ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). In
this case, Appellant does not point to anything in the record to demonstrate the
unfairness. Pro se litigants are held to the same standard as litigants represented by
counsel. Village at Galloway Run Condominium Association v. Taylor, 2024-Ohio-
2344 (10th Dist.). A review of the record shows that the magistrate was aware of
the difficulties of acting in a pro se manner and provided some guidance to
Appellant as to how to present his evidence and advised him to try a different way
to present the evidence he wished to present. Many times the objections of
Appellee’s counsel were overruled. Similarly, the trial court attempted to assist
Appellant by considering the arguments raised by Appellant in his objections
despite Appellant’s failure to clearly state specifically what his objections were.
Instead, Appellant merely argued why he disagreed with the findings of the trial
court. The record shows that Appellant was granted a hearing and was permitted to
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present his evidence and testimony. Thus he was not denied his procedural due
process.
{¶14} A review of the record shows that the magistrate fully considered the
arguments raised by Appellant. The testimony was given and the trial court
determined that Appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
Appellee had engaged in domestic violence under R.C. 3113.31. The findings of
fact and conclusions of law of the magistrate were supported by the evidence. The
trial court then properly reviewed the objections of the trial court. The trial court
specifically noted that it had reviewed all 117 pages of the transcript, the pleadings
and the magistrate’s opinion. The decision of the trial court was likewise supported
by some competent, credible evidence. As a result, it will not be reversed by this
Court.
{¶15} Having found no error prejudicial to Appellant in the particulars
argued, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Van Wert County, Domestic
Relations Division is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
WALDICK, P.J. and MILLER, J., concur.
/hls
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