[Cite as State v. Walker,
2025-Ohio-436.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ASHTABULA COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2024-A-0068
CITY OF CONNEAUT,
Plaintiff-Appellee, Criminal Appeal from the
Conneaut Municipal Court
- vs -
KENNETH REID WALKER, Trial Court No. 2024 CRB 00198
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION
Decided: February 10, 2025
Judgment: Affirmed
John D. Lewis, Law Director, City of Conneaut, 294 Main Street, Conneaut, OH 44030
(For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Margaret Brunarski, Ashtabula County Public Defender, and Michael J. Ledenko,
Assistant Public Defender, 22 East Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 44047 (For
Defendant-Appellant).
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Kenneth Reid Walker, appeals the judgment sentencing him to
90 days of confinement following his guilty plea to possession of drug abuse instruments.
We affirm.
{¶2} During a traffic stop in 2024, law enforcement officers arrested Walker on
an outstanding warrant. Upon searching Walker, officers discovered a hypodermic needle
and a bindle of suspected methamphetamine in Walker’s possession. Thereafter, Walker
was charged with possessing drug abuse instruments, a second-degree misdemeanor,
in violation of the city of Conneaut’s local ordinance 513.04. Following plea negotiations,
Walker agreed to plead guilty, and the prosecution agreed to recommend a sentence of
community control and court costs.
{¶3} At a pretrial, Walker entered his guilty plea, which the trial court accepted.
The court immediately proceeded to sentencing and imposed a 90-day term of
confinement.
{¶4} In his sole assigned error, Walker argues:
{¶5} “The trial court committed prejudicial error by sentencing Kenneth Walker
to a term of maximum imprisonment instead of adopting the recommendation for
community control sanctions.”
{¶6} “‘Misdemeanor sentencing lies within the discretion of the trial court and will
not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.’” State v. Takacs, 2023-Ohio-3302, ¶ 7
(11th Dist.), quoting State v. Hogya,
2023-Ohio-342, ¶ 14 (11th Dist.); State v. Hill,
70
Ohio St.3d 25, 29,
1994-Ohio-12 (“as a general rule, an appellate court will not review a
trial court’s exercise of discretion in sentencing when the sentence is authorized by
statute and is within the statutory limits”). “‘The term “abuse of discretion” is one of art,
connoting judgment exercised by a court which neither comports with reason, nor the
record.’” State v. Marcellino,
2019-Ohio-4837, ¶ 23 (11th Dist.), quoting State v.
Flanagan,
2015-Ohio-5528, ¶ 42 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Ferranto,
112 Ohio St. 667,
676-678 (1925).
{¶7} A trial court’s discretion with respect to misdemeanor sentencing is guided
by the overriding purposes of misdemeanor sentencing, which are to protect the public
from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender. R.C. 2929.21(A);
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R.C. 2929.22(A). “To achieve those purposes, the sentencing court shall consider the
impact of the offense upon the victim and the need for changing the offender’s behavior,
rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public,
or the victim and the public.” R.C. 2929.21(B) directs a trial court to impose a
misdemeanor sentence that is reasonably calculated to achieve the two overriding
purposes of misdemeanor sentencing “commensurate with and not demeaning to the
seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with
sentences imposed for similar offenses committed by similar offenders.” In addition, R.C.
2929.22(B)(1) sets forth a list of factors that the court must consider when determining an
appropriate sentence, including:
(a) The nature and circumstances of the offense or offenses;
(b) Whether the circumstances regarding the offender and the
offense or offenses indicate that the offender has a history of
persistent criminal activity and that the offender’s character
and condition reveal a substantial risk that the offender will
commit another offense;
(c) Whether the circumstances regarding the offender and the
offense or offenses indicate that the offender’s history,
character, and condition reveal a substantial risk that the
offender will be a danger to others and that the offender’s
conduct has been characterized by a pattern of repetitive,
compulsive, or aggressive behavior with heedless
indifference to the consequences;
(d) Whether the victim’s youth, age, disability, or other factor
made the victim particularly vulnerable to the offense or made
the impact of the offense more serious;
(e) Whether the offender is likely to commit future crimes in
general, in addition to the circumstances described in
divisions (B)(1)(b) and (c) of this section;
(f) Whether the offender has an emotional, mental, or physical
condition that is traceable to the offender’s service in the
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armed forces of the United States and that was a contributing
factor in the offender’s commission of the offense or offenses;
(g) The offender’s military service record.
{¶8} Further, with respect to maximum sentences, R.C. 2929.22(C) provides:
A court may impose the longest jail term authorized under
section 2929.24 of the Revised Code only upon offenders who
commit the worst forms of the offense or upon offenders
whose conduct and response to prior sanctions for prior
offenses demonstrate that the imposition of the longest jail
term is necessary to deter the offender from committing a
future criminal offense.
“‘Although R.C. 2929.22(C), identifies the circumstances under which a maximum
sentence is permissible, it does not require the trial court to make any explicit findings.’”
State v. Fromknecht, 2023-Ohio-4604, ¶ 6 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Scott, 2023-Ohio-
476, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.). “‘[W]hen the misdemeanor offender’s sentence is within the statutory
limits and there is no affirmative indication on the record that the trial court failed to
consider the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.22, the reviewing court is to presume the trial
court considered the applicable statutory factors when it imposed the sentence.’”
Fromknecht at ¶ 6, quoting State v. Corradetti,
2022-Ohio-1279, ¶ 44 (11th Dist.); Scott
at ¶ 10.
{¶9} Here, at the hearing, following Walker’s plea, defense counsel indicated to
the court that he was unsure as to the nature of Walker’s other pending charges.
Thereafter, the trial court asked whether Walker or defense counsel could inform the court
of the nature of the pending charges in Ashtabula County. Walker replied, “[I]n the felony
court it’s possession of methamphetamine . . . [d]rug instruments.” After hearing from the
prosecution, the trial court stated:
Let me -- let me just say this, and, like, I really do ask the
defense attorney. Here I am, looking on the court -- the county
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court system, to try to find out what charges are pending
against Mr. Walker both at the county level and at the city
level. In all of my years of practice, I’ve never had to -- I’ve
never had a judge do that from the Bench and try to look for
and do a research while he’s about to impose a sentence,
because normally I, as the practicing attorney, would provide
that information to the Judge, and here I am, having to do that
research.
And I find that Mr. Walker has charges of Aggravated
Possession of Drugs, Case Number 2023 CR 59 -- this is at
the county level -- 2023-109, 2023-202, 2023-52. Apparently,
these five cases appear to be closed.
...
A capias was issued back on July 25th, 2024. Apparently,
these cases remain pending. They have not been disposed
of. They were apparently closed by the clerk’s office because
the capias was issued.
I'm giving the Defendant 90 days in jail. I’ll give him the
maximum sentence. And then I’m not going to impose a fine
and costs. If he wants -- if he or his attorney wants to seek a
modification of his sentence in this court so he can obtain
some kind of treatment, he can do that at some later time, but
at this point I’m giving him 90 days in jail, and there will be a
commitment to the Ashtabula County Jail.
{¶10} On appeal, Walker argues that the court failed to make any findings
regarding his conduct and responses to past sanctions that would warrant the maximum
sentence for a second-degree misdemeanor. Walker argues, “Instead, the court
complained about having to look up information that would have been part of a
presentence investigation report, which the court could have ordered.”
{¶11} Although the trial court pointedly admonished counsel for failing to provide
it with information pertaining to Walker’s other pending charges, it does not follow that the
trial court imposed the maximum sentence because it “[had] to look up information,” as
Walker suggests. Nothing in the record affirmatively indicates that the trial court failed to
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consider the appropriate sentencing factors. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial
court abused its discretion in imposing the maximum sentence.
{¶12} Walker’s sole assigned error lacks merit.
{¶13} The judgment is affirmed.
MATT LYNCH, J.,
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,
concur.
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