[Cite as State v. Humphries,
2025-Ohio-455.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 113935
v. :
DAVID HUMPHRIES, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN
PART AND REMANDED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 13, 2023
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-23-682637-B
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Jonathan Block and Michael R. Wajda,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
Law office of Timothy Farrell Sweeney and Timothy F.
Sweeney, for appellant.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J.:
David Humphries (“Humphries”) appeals his convictions for
aggravated robbery, felonious assault and firearm offenses, with notices of prior
conviction and firearm specifications as well as his associated sentence of 12-15
years in prison. For the reasons that follow, we affirm Humphries’ convictions,
reverse his prison sentence and remand the case for the limited purpose of
resentencing Humphries in accordance with this opinion.
I. Facts and Procedural History
On July 10, 2023, Humphries and a codefendant were charged with 13
counts, including aggravated robbery, felonious assault and having weapons while
under disability in conjunction with an armed robbery of a pizza shop which
occurred on June 15, 2023 in Cleveland, Ohio. The various counts of the indictment
included firearm specifications, notices of prior conviction and repeat violent
offender specifications.
On April 16, 2024, Humphries pled guilty to the following: two counts
of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), first-degree felonies;
felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a second-degree felony; two
counts of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), second-degree
felonies; and having weapons while under disability in violation of R.C.
2923.13(A)(2), a third-degree felony. Humphries also pled guilty to one 54-month
firearm specification and five notices of prior conviction.
On April 22, 2024, the court held a sentencing hearing at which
Humphries made an oral motion to withdraw his guilty plea before the court
imposed his sentence. The court held a brief hearing regarding this motion and,
thereafter, denied the motion. The court sentenced Humpries to an indefinite term
of six-to-nine years in prison, pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law, for one of the
aggravated robbery convictions, 54 months in prison for the firearm specification
and one-and-one-half years in prison for having weapons while under disability, all
to run consecutively. The court also sentenced Humphries to concurrent prison
terms for the remaining convictions resulting in an aggregate prison term of 12-15
years.
Humphries appeals and raises the following assignments of error for
our review:
I. The trial court coerced Humphries into entering a guilty plea, and as
a result, his guilty plea was not voluntary.
II. The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow Humphries
to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing, and, in doing so, the
trial court denied Humphries’ rights to Due Process under the Ohio and
U.S. Constitutions.
III. The trial court’s advisements of and notifications to Humphries
about both postrelease control and the Reagan Tokes Law — which the
court provided during the sentencing hearing and in the sentencing
journal entry — were deficient and contrary to law, thereby mandating
resentencing.
IV. S.B. 201 (Reagan Tokes Law) violates the Sixth Amendment right
to trial by jury and Fourteenth Amendment due process and the
associated provisions of the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Sections 5, 10,
and 16.
II. Plea Hearing
After extensive pretrial hearings, six of which were held in open court
and on the record, this case was called for a jury trial on April 16, 2024. Humphries
elected to try the count of having weapons while under disability, as well as the
firearm, notices of prior conviction and repeat violent offender specifications to the
bench. Humphries had rejected the State’s plea offers six times on the record,
insisting that he wanted to go to trial. Immediately prior to the jury being called into
the courtroom, the following colloquy took place:
THE COURT: Well, look. The ultimate decision is yours, right? You
have to understand — I don’t know what all of the evidence is the State
is going to bring, but are you willing to accept responsibility for the
charges that have been offered as a plea bargain or negotiate a possible
resolve? Are you — do you want to do that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. But I also don’t want to go through the
process of me having to do a lot of time. I got a newborn child to think
about and everything, but like —
THE COURT: I understand that.
THE DEFENDANT: I maintain my innocence the whole time.
After further discussion on and off the record, defense counsel stated,
“Your Honor, I do believe at this time, after some moments to reflect, Mr.
Humphries does wish to take the deal.” The trial court responded as follows:
This is what I would like to do. I would like to bring the jury in and I
will swear them in to their oath. Have a little dialogue with them. Not
so much. I won’t read to them the indictment. I am going to spend
about 15 minutes, and then I will tell them they can have lunch early,
and then send them back to the jury pool, and then if at that time we
want to have conversations, we will do that on the record at that time
Mr. Humphries.
The court swore the jury, explained how Humphries was indicted by a
grand jury and defined various legal terms such as “probable cause” and “beyond a
reasonable doubt.” The court also read Humphries’ indictment to the jury and
conducted a voir dire before taking a break for lunch.
When court reconvened, defense counsel again stated that Humphries
was prepared to plead guilty according to the State’s plea offer. The court conducted
a Crim.R. 11 plea hearing, addressed Humphries and determined that he was
entering a guilty plea voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charges
and the maximum penalty involved including that he would be sentenced to prison.
The court further informed Humphries of, and determined that he understood, the
effect of his guilty plea and the constitutional rights he was waiving by entering it.
In other words, the court complied with Crim. R. 11(C) before accepting Humphries’
plea. It is important to note that, on appeal, Humphries is not challenging the
court’s compliance with Crim.R. 11 outside of his allegation that the court coerced
him into entering his guilty plea and, thus, his plea was not voluntary.
Humphries pled guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery, three
counts of felonious assault, one count of having weapons while under disability, five
notices-of-prior-conviction and a 54-month firearm specification. Particular to this
appeal, the court asked Humphries if he had any questions regarding his plea and
Humphries answered, “No.” Additionally, the court asked Humphries if “anyone
from [the] Court, the deputies, [the] bailiff, or myself threatened you, or forced you,
or promised you anything to have you change your plea?” Humpries responded,
“No.” The court found that Humphries entered his guilty pleas “knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily this morning.”
III. Law and Analysis
A. Guilty Pleas
1. Crim.R. 11 Plea Hearing
Pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2), the trial court
shall not accept a plea of guilty . . . without first addressing the
defendant personally . . . and . . . :
(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea
voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and
of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that the
defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of
community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.
(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the
defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no
contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may
proceed with judgment and sentence.
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant
understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights
to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s
favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant
cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
The Ohio Supreme Court summarized appellate review of compliance
with Crim.R. 11(C) as follows:
Properly understood, the questions to be answered are simply: (1) has
the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if
the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure
of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating
prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the
defendant met that burden?
State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 17. “If the plea was not made knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily, enforcement of that plea is unconstitutional.” Id. at
¶ 10.
A defendant demonstrates prejudice in the context of a Crim.R. 11
guilty plea by showing that he or she “would not have entered the plea but for the
incomplete explanation.” Dangler at ¶ 2. The Dangler Court further explained that
no demonstration of prejudice is required in two limited circumstances. First,
“[w]hen a trial court fails to explain the constitutional rights that a defendant waives
by pleading guilty or no contest, we presume that the plea was entered involuntarily
and unknowingly, and no showing of prejudice is required.”
Dangler at ¶ 14. We
note that a defendant’s constitutional rights concerning a guilty plea are found in
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and the nonconstitutional rights are found in Crim.R.
11(C)(2)(a) and (b). Second, “a trial court’s complete failure to comply with a portion
of Crim.R. 11(C) eliminates the defendant’s burden to show prejudice.” Id. at ¶ 15.
In his first assignment of error, Humphries argues that the “trial court
coerced [him] into entering a guilty plea, and as a result, his guilty plea was not
voluntary.” Specifically, Humphries further argues that the “trial court’s deep
involvement in obtaining [his] plea resulted, intentionally or unintentionally, in
undue coercion being employed against Humphries to an extent which rendered the
plea involuntary and unconstitutionally obtained.”
In 1962, the United States Supreme Court stated that a “guilty plea, if
induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the character of a voluntary act,
is void.” Machibroda v. U.S., 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962). In 1980, the Ohio Supreme
Court expanded on this notion:
A judge’s participation in the actual bargaining process presents a high
potential for coercion. The defendant often views the judge as the final
arbiter of his fate or at the very least the person in control of the
important environment of the courtroom. He may be led to believe that
this person considers him guilty of the crime without a chance of
proving otherwise. He may infer that he will not be given a fair
opportunity to present his case. Even if he wishes to go to trial, he may
perceive the trial as a hopeless and dangerous exercise in futility.
State v. Byrd, 63 Ohio St.2d 288, 292 (1980).
Recently, this court applied Byrd to a defendant’s challenge to the
voluntariness of his guilty plea. “Although strongly discouraged by the Ohio
Supreme Court, a trial judge’s participation in plea negotiations does not render a
defendant’s plea invalid per se under the Ohio and United States Constitutions.”
State v. Meadows, 2023-Ohio-1572, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), citing Byrd. The Meadows
Court reviewed the following statements made by the trial court to the defendant
regarding the defendant’s decision of whether to enter a guilty plea:
(1) “a jury’s not going to see it the same way you do. They just won’t”;
(2) “So your attorney would have to throw a no hitter here for there not
to be some possible prison time, possibly substantial time”; (3) “they
thought the jury would see it their way. And they didn’t”; and (4) “You
can go to a jury, but, you know, they’re not going to see it your way. I
can guarantee you that. All right?”
Meadows at ¶ 13. In Meadows, this court found that the trial court’s comments,
while not the “preferred practice,” were related to the differences regarding the
length of the prison term the defendant faced if he were found guilty as indicted
versus the length of the prison term he faced if he pled guilty to reduced charges. Id.
at ¶ 19, 20. See also State v. Jones,
2019-Ohio-2571 (8th Dist.), and State v.
Jabbaar,
2013-Ohio-1688 (8th Dist.) (both holding that the trial court’s comments
are not to be viewed in isolation, but rather we review the entirety of the record to
see if the trial court created or presented the plea offer and if the prosecutor had
input regarding the plea offer).
In this case, Humphries points to several comments that the trial court
made in the pretrials held on the record that, according to Humphries, coerced him
into entering a guilty plea. For example, Humphries argues that the “judge made
statements which would have led Humphries to believe the judge already considered
Humphries guilty of the crime, including because the co-defendant had already
admitted his guilt.” Our review of the transcript shows that the trial court stated the
following at one of the pretrials: “I don’t know [Humphries’] involvement in the
case. I really don’t. I only centered on [the codefendant] when I sentenced him and
I don’t know if there’s mitigating circumstances to say that [Humphries is] less
involved than [the codefendant] was.”
Humphries also argues that “[s]ome of the judge’s statements plainly
suggested to Humphries that the judge may not treat Humphries fairly if he chose
to go to trial and lost.” Our review of the record shows that the trial court stated the
following at the various pretrials: “I don’t have control over what the minimum
sentence is. The law says 54 months consecutive on two [firearm specifications],
and it could be more. Meaning I could find, looking at the law, that I could add a
third gun spec consecutive”; “Sometimes I have . . . multiple defendants and one
takes a plea and one doesn’t, and the sentences are vastly different”; and “You don’t
get to pick and choose your sentence today when we bring the jury in. You do get to
pick, and chose, and be involved in your sentence if you want to negotiate that with
the parties.”
Upon review, we find that the trial court’s statements and involvement
in Humphries’ guilty plea did not rise to the level of coercion. First, there is no
evidence in the record that the court had any role in creating the plea offer or
communicating it to Humphries. Rather, the court’s involvement was limited to
communicating to Humphries the differences in the sentencing ranges to which
Humphries would be exposed by pleading to reduced charges versus taking his case
to trial. By pleading guilty to reduced charges, Humphries would significantly
reduce his exposure to prison time and the trial court repeatedly informed
Humphries of this. The court also established that the armed robbery at issue was
captured on video and that the State intended to play this video for the jury if
Humphries’ case went to trial. At one point, the court stated that Humphries “is a
little more diligent in trying to hide his face” on the video, “but it’s clearly him.”
We cannot say that the evidence in the record shows that the court
coerced Humphries into entering a guilty plea following a full and fair Crim.R. 11(C)
hearing. Accordingly, Humphries’ first assignment of error is overruled.
2. Crim.R. 32.1 Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
In his second assignment of error, Humphries argues that the trial
court abused its discretion by denying his oral motion to withdraw his guilty plea
which was made immediately prior to sentencing in this case.
The withdrawal of a guilty plea is governed by Crim.R. 32.1, which
states: “A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . may be made only before sentence
is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside
the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.”
We review a trial court’s decision to deny a defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty
plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See, e.g., State v. Vinson, 2016-Ohio-
7604, ¶ 42, citing State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261 (1977), paragraph two of the
syllabus. An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in an
unwarranted way regarding a matter over which it has discretionary
authority. Johnson v. Abdullah,
2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35.
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a plea prior
to sentencing, but the “trial court must conduct a hearing to determine whether
there is a reasonable legitimate basis for the withdrawal of the plea.” State v. Xie,
62 Ohio St.3d 521, 526 (1992). A trial court’s denial of a presentence motion to
withdraw a guilty plea is not an abuse of discretion when the record reflects the
following:
(1) the defendant is represented by highly competent counsel; (2) the
accused was afforded a full hearing, pursuant to Crim.R. 11, before he
entered the plea; (3) after the motion to withdraw is filed, the accused
is given a complete and impartial hearing on the motion; and (4) the
court gives full and fair consideration to the plea withdrawal request.
State v. Hines, 2020-Ohio-663, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Peterseim,
68 Ohio
App.2d 211, 214 (8th Dist. 1980).
The court held a sentencing hearing in this case and, at the onset of
which, Humphries indicated that he would like to withdraw his plea. The court
responded by stating:
Mr. Humphries, we’re here today and buyer’s remorse is not a reason
for withdrawing your plea. So you would have to give me a reason of
what was done that you believe was not constitutionally protected.
I went through your constitutional rights. We had a jury ready to go, in
that box ready to go, so I have got to make sure we are not playing. Now
we’re here. If you don’t — I think I could get a jury up today. I think I
will do that right now if that’s what you want to do. I will go over
everyone in [the] courthouse, including my court administrator, to go
get that first jury right now because that’s not a game I’m playing.
We’re not going to walk out of here with a, hey, let’s get another date.
You tell me why you believe that your plea was against your
constitutional rights.
Humphries responded as follows: “I wasn’t in my right state of mind.
I was still grieving the loss of my little brother . . . .” The court asked the prosecutor
as well as Humphries’ defense counsel if “there was any reason either counsel
believed that Mr. Humphries was in distress or not in his right mind to understand
the change of plea?” Both counsel responded, “No, Your Honor.” The court stated
that Humphries did not raise the issue that he was grieving at any pretrials or at the
plea hearing. Humphries responded by saying, “Everything was a blur to me, sir.”
The court responded as follows:
Mr. Humphries, there’s certain guidelines and rules to follow with
respect to allowing the appropriate withdrawal of a guilty plea and I
believe that you meet none of those qualifications here today. I’m going
to deny your motion to withdraw your plea based on what you are
saying is maybe having grieving here in the courtroom, although that
wasn’t exhibited in any way over the loss of a family member clouding
your judgment at the time of your change of plea.
...
Again, motion to withdraw a plea under Criminal Rule 32.1, I’ll just
read a couple things: A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty can be made
before sentencing is imposed, so that was what he did on his own today.
And it would be to correct a manifest injustice after the Court had gone
through his colloquy plea or set aside that change of plea.
Mr. Humphries does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty
plea and I did conduct a hearing to determine whether there is any
reasonable or legitimate basis for a withdrawal of his plea and I do find
that there is no legitimate reason to allow him to withdraw that plea
and no reasonable reason to allow him to withdraw that plea.
In applying the Hines and Peterseim factors to this case, we find as
follows: Humphries was represented by “highly competent” defense counsel
throughout these proceedings in the trial court. The court stated to Humphries
during one of the pretrial proceedings, “[Y]our [sic] have two great attorneys sitting
to the right and left of you that are well-seasoned and have worked in this courtroom
and all 33 courtrooms . . . . You have three great lawyers sitting next to you and I am
not concerned at all that you are not going to be ably represented by those lawyers
here today and throughout the trial.”
Humphries was afforded a full Crim.R. 11 hearing before he entered
his guilty pleas. Humphries made an oral motion to withdraw his plea at the
beginning of his sentencing hearing and the court completely and impartially
allowed Humphries to state on the record why he wanted to withdraw his plea. The
court asked Humphries questions, had dialogue with Humphries and inquired of
defense counsel and the prosecutor as to their thoughts on Humphries’ reasons.
Lastly, the trial court gave full and fair consideration to Humphries’ request and
made a decision to deny the motion to withdraw the plea. Importantly, the court
found that Humphries’ reason — the death of Humphries’ brother had rendered
Humphries to be not in his “right state of mind — was not legitimate, particularly
because Humphries did not voice his alleged grief or state of mind at his plea
hearing, which was held six days prior to his plea-withdrawal request.”
We are aware that presentence motions to withdraw guilty pleas are
to be freely granted but this does not mean that defendants have an absolute right
to withdraw their pleas. See Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d at 526. We are also aware that, in
denying Humphries’ presentence request to withdraw his plea, the court mentioned
the phrase “manifest injustice,” which applies to postsentence motions to withdraw
guilty pleas. Our review of the transcript shows that, although the court mentioned
“manifest injustice,” it did not base its denial of Humphries’ oral motion on that
concept. The Hines and Peterseim factors are the proper standard under which we
determine whether the court abused its discretion when it denied Humphries’
motion. After reviewing the record before us, we find that the court did not abuse
its discretion here.
Accordingly, Humphries’ second assignment of error is overruled.
B. Felony Sentencing
1. Standard of Review
We review felony sentences under the standard of review set forth in
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 21. Under R.C.
2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may increase, reduce or otherwise modify a
sentence or vacate a sentence and remand for resentencing if it “clearly and
convincingly” finds that (1) the record does not support the sentencing court’s
findings under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D), 2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) or 2929.20(I) or
(2) the sentence is “otherwise contrary to law.” A sentence is not clearly and
convincingly contrary to law “where the trial court considers the purposes and
principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 as well as the seriousness and recidivism
factors listed in R.C. 2929.12, properly applies postrelease control, and sentences a
defendant within the permissible statutory range.” State v. A.H.,
2013-Ohio-2525,
¶ 10 (8th Dist.).
2. Notifications During Sentencing Hearing Regarding
Postrelease Control and the Reagan Tokes Law
In his third assignment of error, Humphries argues that during the
sentencing hearing the “trial court’s advisements of and notifications to [him] about
both postrelease control and the Reagan Tokes law . . . were deficient and contrary
to law, thereby mandating resentencing.”
a. Postrelease Control Notification at Sentencing
Pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(f),
if the sentencing court determines at the sentencing hearing that a
prison term is necessary or required, the court shall . . . [n]otify the
offender that, if a period of supervision is imposed following the
offender’s release from prison, . . . and if the offender violates that
supervision or a condition of post-release control . . . the parole board
may impose a prison term, as part of the sentence, of up to one-half of
the definite prison term originally imposed upon the offender as the
offender’s stated prison term or up to one-half of the minimum prison
term originally imposed upon the offender as part of the offender’s
stated non-life felony indefinite prison term.
In State v. Bolan, 2024-Ohio-2640, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.), this court held that
“any sentence imposed without proper notice of postrelease control is contrary to
law.” See also State v. Grimes,
2017-Ohio-2927, ¶ 8-9. The Grimes Court further
held that the postrelease control notifications must also be incorporated into the
trial court’s sentencing journal entry. Id. at ¶ 8. In State v. Bates,
2022-Ohio-475,
¶ 11, the Ohio Supreme Court succinctly stated that the “trial court must advise the
offender at the sentencing hearing of the term of supervision, whether postrelease
control is discretionary or mandatory, and the consequences of violating postrelease
control.” The Bates Court further stated that the consequences of a postrelease
control violation include “imposing a prison term on the offender” that “‘shall not
exceed one-half’ of the stated prison term originally imposed.”
Id.
In this case, the court notified Humphries at his sentencing hearing
regarding postrelease control: “I indicated to you because you pled guilty to Count
1, a Felony of the 1st Degree, upon your release from incarceration you will have a
mandatory term of post-release control . . . . Two years is the mandatory and it could
be for up to five years.” However, the trial court did not notify Humphries at the
hearing about the consequences he would face if he violated postrelease control. We
note that the trial court’s April 22, 2024 sentencing journal entry states, in part, that
Humphries “has been advised that if [he] violates post-release control, the parole
board may impose a prison term as part of the sentence of up to half of the prison
term . . . . imposed upon the defendant . . . .”
The facts in this case are similar to the facts in Bolan. In Bolan, this
court found that “at no time during [the] sentencing hearing did the trial court
advise Bolan of the consequences he faced if he violated postrelease control.” Bolan
at ¶ 4. In State v. Gray,
2022-Ohio-939, ¶ 1 (8th Dist.), this court concluded that
the proper disposition on an appeal of a case in which the trial court did not properly
inform the defendant about postrelease control at the sentencing stage of the
proceedings is to “vacate the postrelease-control portion of [the defendant’s]
sentence and remand for resentencing hearing limited to the imposition of the
statutorily mandated period of postrelease control pursuant to R.C. 2967.28 . . . .”
We note that the State, in its appellate brief, focuses on the trial court’s
notifications to Humphries at his plea hearing. As stated throughout this opinion,
Humphries is challenging the trial court’s notifications to him at his sentencing
hearing. Humphries does not challenge the notification aspect of his plea hearing.
b. Reagan Tokes Law Notification at Sentencing
Pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c), when the trial court imposes a
“non-life felony indefinite prison term” under the Reagan Tokes Law, the court shall
notify the offender of the following at the sentencing hearing:
(i) That it is rebuttably presumed that the offender will be released from
service of the sentence on the expiration of the minimum prison term
imposed as part of the sentence or on the offender’s presumptive
earned early release date, as defined in section 2967.271 of the Revised
Code, whichever is earlier;
(ii) That the department of rehabilitation and correction may rebut the
presumption described in division (B)(2)(c)(i) of this section if, at a
hearing held under section 2967.271 of the Revised Code, the
department makes specified determinations regarding the offender’s
conduct while confined, the offender’s rehabilitation, the offender’s
threat to society, the offender’s restrictive housing, if any, while
confined, and the offender’s security classification;
(iii) That if, as described in division (B)(2)(c)(ii) of this section, the
department at the hearing makes the specified determinations and
rebuts the presumption, the department may maintain the offender’s
incarceration after the expiration of that minimum term or after that
presumptive earned early release date for the length of time the
department determines to be reasonable, subject to the limitation
specified in section 2967.271 of the Revised Code;
(iv) That the department may make the specified determinations and
maintain the offender’s incarceration under the provisions described in
divisions (B)(2)(c)(i) and (ii) of this section more than one time, subject
to the limitation specified in section 2967.271 of the Revised Code;
(v) That if the offender has not been released prior to the expiration of
the offender’s maximum prison term imposed as part of the sentence,
the offender must be released upon the expiration of that term.
In this case, Humphries argues that, at his sentencing hearing, the
trial court “misinformed [him] that he was not eligible for any of the ‘good time’
credit opportunities under Reagan Tokes.” To support this argument, Humphries
cites State v. Grays, 2023-Ohio-2482 (8th Dist.) (en banc). In Grays, this court
stated that the defendant was advised at his plea hearing that he would be “entitled
to earn a reduction on the minimum term” of his Reagan Tokes indefinite prison
sentence “in increments of 5 to 15 percent if [he] demonstrated exceptional conduct
or an adjustment to incarceration.” Id. at ¶ 6. Without setting forth the details of
the interplay between “earned reduction” of prison time and the Reagan Tokes Law,
we note that the issue in Grays concerned notifications to the defendant during his
Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy. Indeed, the Grays en banc decision resolved the following
question:
Does a trial court err during a Crim.R. 11 [plea] colloquy by advising a
defendant, who is subject to an indefinite prison term under the
Reagan Tokes Law, that he or she may earn a reduction on his or her
minimum prison term for exceptional conduct or an adjustment to
incarceration when the defendant is required to serve a mandatory
prison term pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(F)?
Id. at ¶ 10.
Upon review, we find that Humphries’ reliance on Grays when
challenging notifications during his sentencing hearing is misplaced, because Grays
does not concern a sentencing hearing. However, pursuant to R.C.
2929.19(B)(2)(c)(i), the trial court was required to notify Humphries at his
sentencing hearing that it is rebuttably presumed that he will be released from
prison on either the expiration of his minimum term imposed or “on the offender’s
presumptive earned early release date,” whichever is earlier. Furthermore, the trial
court was required under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c)(iv) to notify Humphries that his
incarceration may be maintained beyond the minimum date “more than one time.”
Our review of the record shows that the trial court did not advise
Humphries of all the mandatory notification provisions under R.C.
2929.19(B)(2)(c). Accordingly, Humphries’ third assignment of error is sustained,
and this matter is remanded to the trial court for resentencing for the limited
purpose of properly notifying Humphries concerning postrelease control and
pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c).
3. Constitutionality of Reagan Tokes Law
In Humphries’ fourth and final assignment of error, he argues that the
Reagan Tokes Law violates the United States Constitution and the Ohio
Constitution’s right to a jury trial and right to due process.
In State v. Hacker, 2023-Ohio-2535, the Ohio Supreme Court
addressed the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law. The Court rejected the
appellants’ claims that the provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law that allow the Ohio
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to maintain an offender’s
incarceration beyond the minimum prison term imposed by a trial court violated the
separation-of-powers doctrine, the right to a jury trial or procedural due process.
Id. at ¶ 1, 12-41.
This issue has been repeatedly addressed and Humphries’
constitutional arguments in this case do not present novel issues or any new theory
challenging the constitutional validity of any aspect of the Reagan Tokes Law left
unaddressed by the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Hacker; see also State v.
Delvallie, 2022-Ohio-470 (8th Dist.) (en banc). Accordingly, we reject Humphries’
constitutional challenges and overrule his fourth assignment of error.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Humphries’
convictions are affirmed and his sentence is reversed. This case is remanded to the
trial court for a resentencing hearing to include properly advising Humphries of the
consequences of violating postrelease control and properly notifying him as
mandated under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c).
It is ordered that appellant and appellee share costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., and
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR
