[Cite as State v. Bickerstaff,
2025-Ohio-4567.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. {48}L-25-00057
{48}L-25-00058
Appellee
Trial Court No. CR0202201841
CR0202201443
v.
Marc Bickerstaff DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: September 30, 2025
…
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and,
Lorrie J. Rendle, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Marc Bickerstaff, pro se.
…
MAYLE, J.
{¶ 1} The defendant-appellant, Marc Bickerstaff, appeals a February 21, 2025
order of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to withdraw his
guilty pleas in two consolidated cases, Nos. CR-2022-1443 and CR-2022-1841. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
I. Background
{¶ 2} In case No. CR-2022-1443, the State alleged that Bickerstaff robbed a
Huntington Bank branch and two 7-Eleven stores on or about March 11-12, 2022.
Following the incident, on March 22, 2022, Bickerstaff was indicted for one count of
robbery, a violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) and (B), a felony of the second degree; and
two counts of aggravated robbery, violations of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) and (C), each a
felony of the first degree. Each count also included a repeat offender specification
pursuant to R.C. 2941.149.
{¶ 3} On May 24, 2022, a few months after the first indictment, Bickerstaff was
once again indicted by a Lucas County Grand Jury for one count of robbery, a violation
of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) and (B), a felony of the second degree. In this case, Bickerstaff
was accused of robbing a Kroger store on May 10, 2022. This case was assigned case
No. CR-2022-1841.
{¶ 4} Originally, Bickerstaff pled not guilty to all charges. Although the cases
were not consolidated by a trial court order, comprehensive plea negotiations resulted in a
combined plea hearing on July 20, 2022. At that time, Bickerstaff changed his plea in
both cases. In case 1443, Bickerstaff pled guilty to one count of robbery, a violation of
R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) and (B), and two amended counts of the lesser-included offenses of
robbery, violations of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) and (B). In exchange, the state agreed to nolle
prosequi the three R.C. 2941.149 specifications at sentencing. In case 1841, Bickerstaff
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pled guilty to one count of the lesser-included offense of robbery, a violation of R.C.
2911.02(A)(3) and (B). Bickerstaff also agreed to pay restitution to Kroger.
{¶ 5} In a combined sentencing hearing on August 17, 2022, for case 1443, the
trial court ordered Bickerstaff to serve a mandatory minimum term of six years in prison
and a maximum indefinite term of nine years for each of the three offenses. These
sentences were to be served concurrently to one another. The trial court additionally
ordered Bickerstaff to pay restitution of $340 to Huntington Bank and of $160 to 7-
Eleven. In case 1841, the trial court ordered Bickerstaff to serve a three-year prison term
consecutively to his sentence in case 1443. The trial court additionally ordered
Bickerstaff to pay restitution of $2,028.95 to Kroger. As a result of both sentences,
Bickerstaff was to serve an aggregate prison term of minimum nine years with an
indefinite maximum of nine years.
{¶ 6} On June 5, 2023, this court granted Bickerstaff’s motion to file delayed
appeals in case 1443, assigned appellate case No. L-23-1147, and in case 1841, assigned
appellate case No. L-23-1013. This court subsequently consolidated both appeals. On
appeal, Bickerstaff raised one assignment of error regarding the trial court’s assignment
of consecutive sentences. Bickerstaff argued that he was non-violent and remorseful, and
only committed the offenses due to his ongoing drug addiction. We affirmed the trial
court’s judgments because Bickerstaff did not prove that the trial court's consecutive-
sentence findings were clearly and convincingly not supported by the record under R.C.
3.
2953.08(G)(2). State v. Bickerstaff, 2024-Ohio-871 (6th Dist.). Bickerstaff did not
appeal this decision.
{¶ 7} Following his direct appeal, on December 23, 2024, Bickerstaff filed a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court. In this motion, Bickerstaff argued
that he was unaware that his sentence included mandatory prison time and that he never
would have entered into a guilty plea had he known that he could not receive earned
credit, apply for judicial release, and was not amenable for community control during that
time.
{¶ 8} The trial court denied the motion in an order dated February 21, 2025. In
its denial, the trial court found that “[f]irst, [Bickerstaff] could have appealed these
issues, but did not. Second, the record indicates [Bickerstaff] is mistaken about the facts
upon which his instant motion relies. Third, the instant motion comes ~2 ½ years after he
was sentenced; he offers no explanation as to why only now he has become confused or
misled.” Bickerstaff appealed to this court presenting one assignment of error for our
review:
The trial court erred denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion to withdraw guilty
plea.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 9} Bickerstaff argues that the trial court should have granted his post-sentence
motion to withdraw guilty plea because his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, or
voluntary. He contends that the two plea agreement forms are confusing and that when he
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discussed this confusion with his trial counsel, counsel informed him that he would not
receive mandatory time on any of his charges. Furthermore, Bickerstaff takes issue with
the sentencing judgment entries’ “contradicting statements” explaining the possibilities
for how he can reduce his sentence. Bickerstaff argues that he would not have entered his
pleas if he knew that he had no possible avenue for earned credit or he would not be
amenable for judicial release or community control.
{¶ 10} Crim.R. 32.1 governs the withdrawal of a plea of guilty or no contest and
provides that such motion “may be made only before sentence is imposed” however, “a
trial court may grant a defendant's post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea to
‘correct a manifest injustice.’” State v. Straley, 2019-Ohio-5206, ¶ 13, citing Crim.R.
32.1. A “‘manifest injustice’ is a clear or openly unjust act, … and relates to a
fundamental flaw in the plea proceedings resulting in a miscarriage of justice.” (Citations
omitted.) Id. at ¶ 14. The term “has been variously defined, but it is clear that under such
standard, a postsentence withdrawal motion is allowable only in extraordinary cases.” Id.,
quoting State v. Smith,
49 Ohio St.2d 261, 264 (1977). A defendant who seeks to
withdraw a plea of guilty after the imposition of sentence has the burden of establishing
the existence of manifest injustice.
Id., citing Smith at paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 11} An appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion to withdraw
a plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Smith, at 264. The term “abuse of
discretion” implies that the court’s attitude is “unreasonable, arbitrary or
unconscionable.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 (1982).
5.
A. Bickerstaff’s Argument is Barred Under the Doctrine of Res Judicata
{¶ 12} Claims submitted in support of motions filed pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1 are
subject to the doctrine of res judicata. State v. Cain, 2021-Ohio-1841, ¶ 11 (6th Dist.),
citing State v. Davis,
2020-Ohio-4539, ¶ 25 (6th Dist.). Generally, res judicata bars a
defendant from raising claims in a Crim.R. 32.1 post-sentencing motion to withdraw a
guilty plea that he previously raised, or could have raised, on direct appeal. Straley, 2019-
Ohio-5205, ¶ 23, citing State v. Ketterer,
2010-Ohio-3831, ¶ 59.
{¶ 13} Beyond asserting that he did not find out that he was ineligible for earned
credible and early release until he arrived at his current institution and inquired into
programs that could impact his earned credit, Bickerstaff does not address the trial court’s
first finding that he could have appealed this issue during his direct appeal and failed to
do so. The State, however, contends that Bickerstaff’s arguments are barred under the
doctrine of res judicata. We agree.
{¶ 14} Bickerstaff did not argue on direct appeal that he should have been
permitted to withdraw his plea or that his plea was somehow invalid—instead he focused
on his consecutive sentences.1 While he now argues that he did not make a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea, his arguments rely exclusively on information made
1
The fact that Bickerstaff could have raised this issue but did not is made even more
apparent when reviewing the docketing statement submitted by Bickerstaff on January
23, 2023 for his direct appeal. In the probable issues for review section, Bickerstaff
included “[w]hether Appellant (sic) plea was voluntary, knowingly, and intelligently
made.”
6.
available to him in the plea and sentencing phases of his original case. As examined
more thoroughly in the substantive analysis below, there is nothing in the record to
suggest that Bickerstaff could not have raised this issue on direct appeal. As such, the
trial court properly concluded that Bickerstaff’s argument relating to the voluntariness of
his plea is barred by his failure to raise the issue in his direct appeal.
B. Bickerstaff Fails to Show That His Guilty Plea Was Not Knowingly, Intelligently,
and Voluntarily Made
{¶ 15} Even if Bickerstaff’s claim is not barred by res judicata, the record is clear
that the trial court correctly and adequately advised Bickerstaff that the offenses he was
pleading to required a mandatory prison sentence.
1. The Plea Hearing and Agreement
{¶ 16} Beginning with the July 20, 2022 plea hearing, in accepting Bickerstaff’s
change of plea, the trial court took great lengths to ensure that he was capable of making
such a decision, and then explained the maximum penalties that Bickerstaff was facing
and how those penalties layered with each other. In response to the court’s questions,
Bickerstaff answered that he was not under the influence of any medication, drugs or
alcohol, that he was clearheaded, that he had never suffered from a mental illness, that he
was not threatened or been promised anything in exchange for taking the plea, that he had
gone over his questions with his attorney, and that he understood the effect of a guilty
plea was a complete admission to the charges.
{¶ 17} After confirming that Bickerstaff was proceeding voluntarily, the trial court
began inquiring about possible sentences which led to the following exchange:
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The court: Let’s go over the possible maximum penalties, okay. In each
of the second degree felony offenses that you’re pleading to
and there’s three of them, do you understand that you face a
maximum potential penalty of up to – of rather two, three, four,
five, six, seven or eight years, whatever number I pick in that
range is mandatory, and in addition you must serve an
additional 50 percent of the number that I choose as an
indefinite period attached to that case?
Bickerstaff: Yes, I do understand. Your Honor. (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 18} The court then went on to provide Bickerstaff with examples of maximum
penalties. During this time, the court repeatedly asked Bickerstaff if he understood and
had him engage in the calculation of his own potential sentences:
The court: You have three cases here, but I can only impose one indefinite
sentence on all three of them in case 22-1443. Do you
understand that?
Bickerstaff: Yes.
The court: So if I maxed you out on that case and I gave you eight years
on count one, eight years on count two, eight years on count
three, what’s eight times three?
Bickerstaff: That’s twenty-four.
The court: Now I can only give you one maximum indefinite sentence on
all three of those. So your maximum exposure would be not
only the twenty-four years but 50 percent of that eight. Fifty
percent of eight is four. Twenty-four plus four is twenty-eight.
Following me or do you want me to go through that?
Bickerstaff: That’s fine.
The court: Okay. So your maximum total exposure on that case is up to
twenty-eight years. If I max and stack everything, it’s up to
twenty-eight years. Okay. Twenty-four of the basic sentence,
stated sentence, plus the four-year indefinite tail.
Now on the other case it’s a little easier. Under 22-1841,
that’s the third degree felony, that’s punishable by up to sixty
8.
months, five years, in prison on that case. Do you understand
that?
Bickerstaff: Yes.
The Court: Okay. So if I were to combine them all and make them all
consecutive, that would be thirty-three potential years;
twenty-nine of which would be the underlying sentence, four
of which would be the indefinite part. Now that’s only if I
max them. I have to tell you what the maximum is…
{¶ 19} Following the hearing, Bickerstaff signed two plea agreement forms—one
for case 1443 and one for case 1841. Bickerstaff characterizes the two plea agreements
as contradictory. However, when looking at them in conjunction with the explanations
provided during the plea hearing, the two forms align with the expectations set by the
trial court.
{¶ 20} First, the plea form for case 1443 states: “I understand the MAXIMUM
penalties COULD be: a maximum indefinite prison term of 28 years of which 2,3, 4, 5,
6,7, or 8 year minimum term, plus an additional 50% of the term imposed is
mandatory, during which I am NOT eligible for judicial release or community control.
The maximum fine possible is $45,000 of which $-0- is mandatory.” (Emphasis in
original.)
{¶ 21} Next, the plea form for case 1841 states, “I understand the MAXIMUM
penalties COULD be: a maximum basic prison term of 60 months of which -0- is
mandatory, during which I am NOT eligible for judicial release or community control.
The maximum fine possible is $10,000.00 of which $-0- is mandatory.” (Emphasis in
original.)
9.
{¶ 22} Bickerstaff argues that the two forms contradict each other, however, case
1443 included the more serious charges against him, and because of that, as explained by
the trial court, required mandatory time while case 1841, the lesser-included charge, did
not. We find that the two forms do not contradict each other, rather they reflect the two
separate, yet related sentencing schemes faced by Bickerstaff in the two cases.
2. The Sentencing Hearing and Judgment Entry
{¶ 23} Turning to his sentencing, Bickerstaff further argues that the Journal Entries
made clear that “the trial court never once notified [him] whether or not he was amenable
to community control or judicial release in case No. CR2022-1443” and that the entry
contradicts itself by providing notice that he may be eligible for a sentence reduction.
{¶ 24} Even if Bickerstaff finds the Journal Entries unclear or contradictory about
his eligibility for community control and/or judicial release, the trial court was incredibly
clear about his eligibility at the August 17, 2022 sentencing hearing. The court first
provided Bickerstaff with his sentences:
The court: On case 1443, defendant is subject or is sentenced, rather, to
minimum stated term of six years and a maximum indefinite term of
nine years. All of those are ordered to be served concurrently with
one another and all of them are mandatory under 2929.13(F)(6).
And in case 1841, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 36
months of imprisonment which shall be served consecutively to the
three concurrent robberies in 1443 as the defendant was awaiting
trial when the new offense was committed.
10.
{¶ 25} The court went on to explain how those sentences related to a potentially
reduced sentence:
The court: [Y]ou may be eligible to earn or to reduce your sentence at
least on the non-mandatory part in case 1841 by two different
methods. First, earned credit. You – which shall not exceed 8
percent of your total stated prison term. And the second way
is under earned reduction which incentivizes good behavior in
the penitentiary. For those individuals sentenced to an
indefinite term, it allows the prison to grant a reduction on non-mandatory again of between 5 and 15 percent for exceptional
conduct or adjustment to incarceration. If they recommend a
reduction, there’s a rebuttable presumption that I would grant
that and I’d have to have a hearing to determine whether to
grant it or not an that presumption can be rebutted. (Emphasis
added.)
{¶ 26} Later in the hearing, defense counsel clarified some of this with the
trial judge in the following exchange:
Defense: Judge, just for his knowledge, on 22-1841, would the court
Counsel consider a motion for judicial release at the appropriate time?
The court: The court will consider. I will make no guarantees about
granting it, but part of what I look at, Mr. Bickerstaff, when
you start that second sentence because the first sentence I’m
going to order to go first, the mandatory one and then I’m
going to order that the second one, the later one go second.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 27} Following this hearing, the court submitted two judgment entries—one in
case 1443 and one in case 1841. The relevant part of the entry in case 1443 includes the
following:
It is ORDERED that defendant serve a stated minimum prison term of 6 years
which is a mandatory term and a maximum indefinite prison term of 9 years
as to count 1, the defendant is to serve a stated minimum prison term of 6
years which is a mandatory term and a maximum indefinite prison term of 9
years as to count 2 and defendant to serve a stated minimum prison term of
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6 years which is a mandatory term and a maximum indefinite prison term of
9 years as to count 3. The sentences are ordered to be served concurrently to
each other but consecutive to case number 22-1841.
{¶ 28} In case 1841, the relevant language simply states that, “[i]t is ORDERED
that defendant serve a term of 36 months in prison… [T]his case to run consecutive with
case number 22-1443.”
{¶ 29} Although Bickerstaff claims that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily made because he would not have pled had he known that he was subject
to a mandatory sentence, the record does not support that assertion. During the plea and
sentencing phases, the trial court was clear that whatever minimum term Bickerstaff was
sentenced to in case 1443—which ultimately was six years to be served concurrently in
all three charges—would also be mandatory. Additionally, the trial court was clear that
the indefinite sentence and sentence imposed in case 1841 would not be mandatory and
would be served after the mandatory term of years. The trial then correctly explained the
ways that Bickerstaff could become eligible for a reduced sentence “at least on the non-
mandatory part in case 1841” given that the latter half of his sentence is non-mandatory.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 30} For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied Bickerstaff’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and as such,
we find Bickerstaff’s argument not well-taken.
12.
{¶ 31} Accordingly, we affirm the February 21, 2025 judgment of the Lucas
County Court of Common Pleas. Bickerstaff is ordered to pay any costs of this appeal
under App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Christine E. Mayle, J. ____________________________
JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, J.
____________________________
Charles E. Sulek, P.J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
____________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
13.
