[Cite as State v. Bruno,
2025-Ohio-4618.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MAHONING COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL N. BRUNO,
Defendant-Appellee.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Case No. 25 MA 0016
Criminal Appeal from the
Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio
Case No. 22 CR 562
BEFORE:
Mark A. Hanni, Cheryl L. Waite, Katelyn Dickey, Judges.
JUDGMENT:
Affirmed.
Atty. Lynn Maro, Mahoning County Prosecutor, and Atty. Ralph M. Rivera and Atty.
Kristie M. Weibling, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for Plaintiff-Appellee and
Atty. John P. Laczko, John P. Laczko, LLC, for Defendant-Appellant.
Dated: October 3, 2025
–2–
HANNI, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Michael N. Bruno, appeals from a Mahoning County
Court of Common Pleas judgment sentencing him to a total of 18 years to life in prison
after he pled guilty to unclassified felony murder with a firearm specification. Appellant,
a former law enforcement officer, shot his sleeping father 11 times.
{¶2} Appellant contends on appeal that he received the ineffective assistance of
counsel because counsel failed to adequately explore his not guilty by reason of insanity
defense (NGRI). He asserts that the trial court granted his counsel’s request for a NGRI
evaluation, but the record fails to show that the evaluation occurred or that the court
adjudicated the matter.
{¶3} Appellant submits that his subsequent guilty plea was invalid because his
counsel failed to follow up on the NGRI matters. He emphasizes his mental health issues,
including an initial finding of his incompetency. He also cites to our granting of his motion
for delayed appeal due in part to his mental health conditions. He also argues counsel
failed to explain prior to his guilty plea that he was facing a 15-year-to-life term and not
an 18-year term with a definite release date.
{¶4} For the following reasons, we hold that Appellant did not receive the
ineffective assistance of counsel. Defense counsel twice requested and the court ordered
a sanity evaluation, but the record fails to show that one was conducted. However, by
entering a guilty plea, Appellant impliedly withdrew his NGRI plea and relinquished any
right to challenge the lack of a sanity evaluation.
{¶5} On October 13, 2022, the Mahoning County Grand Jury indicted Appellant
on one count of unclassified felony aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A).
Appellant’s counsel entered a plea of not guilty and NGRI. The court accepted the pleas
and continued Appellant’s bond.
{¶6} On October 28, 2022, defense counsel filed a motion for competency and
sanity evaluations. The court ordered a forensic examination and checked the boxes for
both a competency to stand trial evaluation and a NGRI evaluation.
{¶7} On December 20, 2022, the trial court issued a judgment entry indicating
that it held a competency hearing and the parties stipulated to the competency report.
Case No. 25 MA 0016
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The psychologist opined in the report that Appellant was not competent to stand trial and
recommended sending Appellant to Heartland Behavioral Health Center to determine if
he could be restored to competency.
{¶8} At this hearing, defense counsel added that the court’s order would also
allow Dr. Jessica Hart, the psychologist who determined that Appellant was incompetent,
to evaluate Appellant for his NGRI plea. (2022 Comp. Hg. Tr., 3-4). The trial court
indicated that Appellant had to first be restored to competency. (2022 Comp. Hg., 4).
The court’s judgment entry ordered Appellant to Heartland and indicated that it would
review Appellant’s competency within 12 months.
{¶9} On June 12, 2023, the trial court held a competency hearing. (2023 Comp.
Hg.). The prosecution stated that the parties were prepared to stipulate to the findings of
Dr. James Pontau, a psychologist at Heartland, who opined that Appellant was now
competent to stand trial. (2023 Comp. Hg., 2).
{¶10} Appellant’s counsel stipulated to the findings and explained that he also filed
a NGRI plea and wanted a separate sanity evaluation. (2023 Comp. Hg., 2-3). The State
did not object, and the court granted the stipulation and ordered a sanity assessment.
(2023 Comp. Hg., 3). The trial court issued a judgment entry on June 13, 2023 noting the
stipulation.
{¶11} On June 20, 2023, the trial court issued an order for a NGRI examination
for Appellant. Appellant waived his speedy trial rights on August 11, 2023 and a warrant
for his removal from Heartland to the courthouse was issued.
{¶12} However, the next document in the record is the trial court’s September 22,
2023 judgment entry accepting Appellant’s guilty plea. Appellant pled guilty to murder
with the 3-year firearm specification and the State dismissed the aggravated murder count
with a 3-year firearm specification.
{¶13} The plea hearing transcript begins with defense counsel informing the court
that he had reviewed the plea agreement in its entirety with Appellant. (Plea Tr., 4).
Counsel represented that Appellant understood all his constitutional and statutory rights
and the waiver of those rights by pleading guilty. (Plea Tr., 4).
{¶14} The trial court then reviewed the entire plea agreement with Appellant in
open court. (Plea Tr., 5-7). The court asked Appellant if he understood the charges to
Case No. 25 MA 0016
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which he was pleading guilty, the maximum penalties he was facing, and the rights he
was entitled to but was waiving as a result of his guilty plea. (Plea Tr., 5-11). Appellant
stated he understood his rights and that he was giving up those rights by pleading guilty.
(Plea Tr., 10-11).
{¶15} The court asked Appellant to state his plea to the charges and Appellant
stated that he was guilty. (Plea Tr., 17).
{¶16} On September 25, 2023, the court held a sentencing hearing. The victim’s
sister made a statement and read a letter. (Sent. Tr., 3-10). Appellant stated at the
sentencing hearing that he was sorry and he made a horrible mistake. (Sent. Tr., 14).
He apologized to his aunt, family, friends, and his father. He also asked for forgiveness
from God. (Sent. Tr., 14).
{¶17} The court informed Appellant it had weighed the purposes and principles of
sentencing in terms of protecting the public from future crimes, punishing Appellant using
minimum sanctions that could accomplish those purposes. (Sent. Tr., 15). The court
indicated it considered incarceration, rehabilitation, and deterrence, the severity of the
offense, and the impact on the victim, his family, and the community. (Sent. Tr., 15). The
court found that Appellant was not amenable to community control and not placing him in
prison would demean the impact of his actions. (Sent. Tr., 15).
{¶18} The court sentenced Appellant to 15 years to life in prison on the murder
offense, with the possibility of parole after 15 years. (Sent. Tr., 16). The court further
sentenced Appellant to three years in prison for the firearm specification, which was
mandatory and consecutive to the murder offense, and which had to be served prior to
the sentence for the murder offense. (Sent. Tr., 16). Accordingly, the court sentenced
Appellant to 18 years to life in prison.
{¶19} On February 25, 2025, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. He asserts
the following sole assignment of error:
APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
AS GUARANTEED BY SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION AND THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
Case No. 25 MA 0016
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{¶20} Appellant acknowledges that his counsel requested a sanity evaluation and
the trial court ordered that evaluation under R.C. 2945.371. The docket and the record
include the trial court’s order that the Forensic Psychiatric Center of Northeast Ohio
complete a NGRI evaluation.
{¶21} Appellant observes that the docket and record fail to establish if the sanity
evaluation ever occurred or whether the court ever considered or adjudicated his sanity.
He emphasizes that his mental health was questioned throughout the proceedings and
he cites three instances where mental health issues were raised. He first notes his
counsel’s statement to the court that his mental health issues were well documented.
(Sent. Tr., 11). Appellant specifies a second time where his counsel stated he had mental
health issues as well as family issues. (Sent. Tr., 12). Appellant also cites his statement
at the sentencing hearing that “I was not in my right mental state of mind” when he
committed the crime. (Sent. Tr., 14).
{¶22} Appellant also cites to his motion for delayed appeal, where he stated that
he did not realize his sentence included life in prison and his counsel failed to adequately
explain this aspect of the plea agreement. He maintains that he believed he was facing
a term of 18 years in prison with a specific release date. Appellant cites our March 5,
2025 entry granting his motion for delayed appeal where we stated that his
“misunderstanding of the life in prison component of his sentence, combined with his
documented mental health concerns provides sufficient justification for the delay under
the circumstances of this case.” (J.E. Mar. 5, 2025).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
{¶23} A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing of both
deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687, (1984). If one prong of the Strickland test fails, the Court need not consider the
other. State v. Madrigal,
2000-Ohio-448, ¶ 15.
{¶24} To show deficient performance, the defendant must show that counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. State v. Bradley, 42
Ohio St.3d 136, 142 (1989), citing
Strickland at 687-689. Our review is highly deferential
to counsel's decisions because of the strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell
Case No. 25 MA 0016
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within the wide range of what would be considered reasonable professional assistance.
Id. There are “countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case.”
Id. To
show resulting prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.”
Strickland at 694.
{¶25} NGRI is an affirmative defense where the defense must prove that at the
time of the offense, the defendant “did not know, as a result of a severe mental disease
or defect, the wrongfulness of the person's acts.” State v. Edwards, 2023-Ohio-4173,
¶ 12 (12th Dist.), quoting R.C. 2901.01(A)(14) and 2901.05(A). R.C. 2945.371(A)
provides that the trial court may order an evaluation of a defendant’s mental condition at
the time of the commission of the offense if the defendant enters a NGRI plea. R.C.
2945.371 sets forth the requirements for the evaluation and R.C. 2945.371(H) in particular
requires the examiner to file a written report with the court under seal within 30 days of
entry of the court order for the evaluation.
{¶26} Appellant’s counsel entered a NGRI plea on Appellant’s behalf. He
requested a NGRI evaluation not only at the initial competency hearing, but also at the
competency restoration hearing. The trial court granted the requests and ordered a sanity
evaluation after both hearings.
{¶27} However, the record fails to show that a NGRI evaluation occurred. The
transcript of both competency hearings shows a discussion of the sanity evaluation. At
the second competency hearing, the parties stipulated to the findings of the competency
evaluation report that Appellant had been restored to competency. (Comp. Hg. June 12,
2023 Tr., 2-3). Appellant’s counsel then stated,
Having said that, I have previously filed a not guilty by reason of insanity
plea. We would ask that the Court not order that assessment, which as the
Court is well aware, that it’s a good standard than the competency standard
and it’s a separate report and a separate finding and we would ask that that
take place at this time.
(Comp. Hg. June 12, 2023 Tr., 3).
Case No. 25 MA 0016
–7–
{¶28} The transcript appears to incorrectly state that defense counsel asked the
court not to order the sanity assessment. The court asked if the State had any objection,
to which the State had none, and the court ordered “whatever assessment needs to be
done with respect to the not guilty by reason of insanity plea.” (Comp. Hg., June 12, 2023
Tr., 3). The court thereafter issued a written order for the sanity evaluation. However, no
further records or transcripts mention a sanity evaluation.
{¶29} Rather, the next record shows that a change of plea hearing occurred on
September 21, 2023 and Appellant entered a guilty plea to the Count Two murder charge
and the accompanying 3-year firearm specification. The court signed the plea agreement
after a plea colloquy, and issued a judgment entry on September 23, 2023 accepting
Appellant’s guilty plea and dismissing the aggravated murder charge and attached firearm
specification.
{¶30} We hold that by entering a valid guilty plea, Appellant waived any argument
concerning his NGRI evaluation or defense. In State v. Pennington, 2024-Ohio-2020,
¶ 17 (12th Dist.), the defendant asserted trial court error in accepting his guilty plea when
a NGRI evaluation was outstanding at the time of the plea and its status was not stated
on the record when his plea was accepted. Id. at ¶ 18.
{¶31} The Twelfth District held that even if the defendant was correct that the
NGRI evaluation had not been completed, he waived any challenge to his insanity
defense by entering a guilty plea. Id. at ¶ 20. The court cited a number of Ohio appellate
courts holding that a valid guilty plea by a defendant is an implied admission of sanity,
and is therefore a waiver of any challenge to a NGRI defense. Id., citing State v. Fore,
18 Ohio App.2d 264, 269, (4th Dist.1969); State v. Laury,
2018-Ohio-2944, ¶ 21 (5th
Dist.); State v. Mangus,
2008-Ohio-6210, ¶ 52 (7th Dist.); State v. Langenkamp, 2008-
Ohio-1136, ¶ 28 (3d Dist.); State v. Jackson,
2002-Ohio-2711, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.); State v.
Timmons,
2002-Ohio-1133 (5th Dist.).
{¶32} The Pennington court reviewed the record and found the sanity evaluation
present in the record and it had been provided to counsel well before the plea hearing.
Pennington at 19. The appellate court held that, in any event, the defendant waived a
challenge to the NGRI evaluation and defense because the trial court conducted a
thorough review of his rights with him and ensured that he understood his rights and
Case No. 25 MA 0016
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waiver of them upon entering a guilty plea. Id. The appellate court held that nothing in
the record suggested the defendant was not competent to enter a guilty plea or that he
did not understand the consequences of entering the plea. Id. at ¶ 21. The court held
that the valid guilty plea waived any argument on the NGRI defense even if it was not
formally withdrawn. Id. at ¶ 20.
{¶33} The Eleventh District Court of Appeals found similarly in State v. Crew,
2022-Ohio-752 (11th Dist.) One of Crew’s appellate arguments was that his trial counsel
was ineffective by failing to enter a NGRI on his behalf. Id. at ¶ 22. After two competency
evaluations which opined that he was competent to stand trial, Crew entered guilty pleas
to a number of charges in three different criminal cases. Id. at ¶ 8-9. At Crew’s plea
hearing, the trial court noted on the record that one of Crew’s competency evaluations
indicated that while he suffered from some mental health issues, he attempted to use fake
medical issues to his advantage. Id. at ¶ 30. The court further noted the competency
evaluation finding that Crew was malingering and lying throughout the interview so that
he would be viewed in a different light. Id.
{¶34} In holding that counsel did not render ineffective assistance for failing to
enter a NGRI plea, the Eleventh District cited cases concluding that a guilty plea waives
any arguments concerning a NGRI defense. Id. at ¶ 28, citing Fore, 18 Ohio App.2d at
264; Jackson,
2002-Ohio-2711, at ¶ 14, State v. Crawford,
1993 WL 64254, *3 (7th Dist.
March 5, 1993); State v. Denton,
1989 WL 159195 (2d Dist. Dec. 29, 1989). The court
further found that counsel was not ineffective as no basis appeared to exist for a NGRI
defense based on the competency report finding that Crew was malingering and lying
about his mental health issues.
{¶35} In State v. Stevens, 2022-Ohio-2, ¶ 23-24 (7th Dist.), we held that the
defendant’s guilty plea to murder, tampering with evidence, aggravated robbery, and
aggravated burglary waived any argument pertaining to a NGRI defense. Stevens had
undergone a sanity evaluation after his counsel entered a NGRI plea on his behalf. Id. at
¶ 3-4. The court thereafter held a plea hearing where Stevens indicated that he was
taking mental health medications, but was not receiving some of them while he was in
jail. Id. at ¶ 15. The court engaged Stevens in a colloquy concerning his constitutional
rights and non-constitutional rights and the waiver of rights upon pleading guilty. Id. at
Case No. 25 MA 0016
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¶ 15-19. Stevens indicated that he understood and he stated that he understood the
proceedings and nothing, including his medications, prevented him from understanding.
Id. at ¶ 15-16.
{¶36} On appeal, Stevens asserted that the trial court committed numerous errors
by accepting his guilty plea without ensuring that he wanted to enter that plea knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily. Id. at ¶ 21. He indicated that the court should have ensured
that he understood the withdrawal of his NGRI plea. Id. at ¶ 22. We held that a NGRI
plea need not be formally withdrawn as that defense is withdrawn by entering a guilty
plea, among other actions. Id. at ¶ 23, quoting and citing State v. Martin, 2016-Ohio-989,
¶ 38 (3d Dist.), citing e.g., State v. Harris,
2015-Ohio-166, ¶ 18; State v. Caudill,
48 Ohio
St.2d 342, 342-43 (1976); State v. Langenkamp,
2008-Ohio-1136, ¶ 28-29 (3d Dist.);
State v. McQueeney,
2002-Ohio-3731, ¶ 34 (12th Dist.).
{¶37} In the instant case, the plea hearing transcript shows that the assistant
prosecutor notified the court that the parties entered into a plea agreement whereby the
State agreed to dismiss the aggravated murder charge and attached firearm specification
and Appellant would plead guilty to the murder charge with the firearm specification. (Tr.
Plea Hg., 2). The prosecution stated that in exchange for Appellant’s guilty plea, it would
recommend a 15-to-life in prison sentence for murder, consecutive to mandatory time of
3 years in prison on the firearm specification. (Tr. Plea Hg., 2-3).
{¶38} Counsel for Appellant then addressed the court, explaining that he reviewed
the entire plea agreement with Appellant. (Tr. Plea Hg., 4). Counsel stated that he
believed Appellant understood all of his constitutional and statutory rights and his waiver
of rights by entering into the plea agreement. (Tr. Plea Hg., 4).
{¶39} The court then inquired of Appellant. The court informed Appellant that it
would review the entire plea agreement with Appellant and if he had any questions, he
could ask the court or his counsel and time would be given for him to do so. (Tr. Plea
Hg., 4). The court advised Appellant that its goal was to ensure that he entered his guilty
plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
{¶40} The court began with the face page of the plea agreement, explaining its
contents and that it listed the charges to which he was pleading guilty, that is, the Count
2 unclassified murder charge, and the attached firearm specification. (Tr. Plea Hg., 5).
Case No. 25 MA 0016
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The court informed Appellant that the 3-year firearm specification would be served prior
and consecutive to any sentence he would receive on the murder charge. (Tr. Plea Hg.,
5). The court asked if Appellant understood and he stated that he did. (Tr. Plea. Hg., 5).
{¶41} The court asked if Appellant understood that in exchange for his guilty plea
to the murder and firearm specification, the State would dismiss the other charges against
him. (Tr. Plea Hg., 5). Appellant stated that he understood. (Tr. Plea Hg., 5-6). The
court referred to the second page of the plea agreement and explained that it contained
the maximum penalties. (Tr. Plea Hg., 6). The court informed Appellant that the murder
charge to which he was pleading guilty had a term of 15-years-to-life in prison. (Tr. Plea
Hg., 6). The court asked Appellant if he understood and Appellant stated that he did. (Tr.
Plea Hg., 6). The court informed Appellant that prison was presumed necessary and was
mandatory upon his guilty plea and the court’s acceptance of the plea. (Tr. Plea Hg., 6).
When the court asked Appellant if he understood, Appellant stated, “yes, sir.” (Tr. Plea
Hg., 6). The court stated the maximum penalty for the attached firearm specification and
explained that it was presumed necessary and a mandatory term of 3 years which had to
be served prior to and consecutive to the sentence given on the murder charge. (Tr. Plea
Hg., 7). When asked if he understood, Appellant indicated that he did. (Tr. Plea Hg., 7).
{¶42} The court then specifically stated, “So, it’s actually kind of simple, again, in
that upon your plea of guilty today, at sentencing, you will have to be given a term of 18
years to life. That is a 15 to life on the murder, but before that can be served, three years
on the firearm.” When asked if he understood, Appellant responded, “[y]es, I understand.”
(Tr. Plea Hg., 7). The court then asked both the prosecution and defense counsel if they
had agreed to the State’s recommendation of a sentence of 15 years to life, plus the three
years on the firearm specification. (Tr. Plea Hg., 7). The prosecution indicated that no
other option was likely available and defense counsel agreed. (Tr. Plea Hg., 8). The
court explained that it wanted to clarify that this was the sentence. (Tr. Plea Hg., 8). The
court and defense counsel further noted that while Appellant had appellate rights, those
rights were limited by his guilty plea. (Tr. Plea Hg., 8-9). Appellant indicated that he
understood. (Tr. Plea Hg., 9).
Case No. 25 MA 0016
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{¶43} The court then reviewed the constitutional and statutory rights that Appellant
was waiving by entering a guilty plea. (Tr. Plea Hg., 9-12). The court explained Appellant
was entitled to have the State prove his guilt of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt,
he could cross-examine witnesses, subpoena witnesses and bring in his own evidence,
had the right to remain silent, the right to trial, the right to appeal, and the right to counsel.
(Tr. Plea Hg., 9-12). The court asked Appellant to acknowledge all of those rights and
the waiver of them by pleading guilty. (Tr. Plea Hg., 12). Appellant responded, “I
acknowledge that and I understand that completely, Your Honor.” (Tr. Plea Hg., 12).
{¶44} The court informed Appellant that he was not eligible for community control
and specifically indicated that page five of the plea agreement contained the post-release
control section, which did not apply. (Tr. Plea Hg., 12). The court went over Appellant’s
citizenship and then noted the signatures of all of the parties on the plea agreement. (Tr.
Plea Hg., 13). When asked if he signed the plea agreement, Appellant answered, “Yes,
I signed that. That’s my signature.” (Tr. Plea Hg., 13).
{¶45} The court asked if Appellant reviewed the entire plea agreement with
counsel and Appellant affirmed. (Tr. Plea Hg., 13). The court asked if Appellant felt he
understood the plea agreement after review with counsel. (Tr. Plea Hg., 13). Appellant
responded that he did. (Tr. Plea Hg., 13). Appellant also affirmed that he was able to
ask his counsel questions about the plea agreement and counsel answered those
questions to Appellant’s satisfaction. (Tr. Plea Hg., 14).
{¶46} The court noted that it assumed Appellant wished to proceed with his guilty
plea since he signed the plea agreement and it was before the court. (Tr. Plea Hg., 14).
When asked if that was a fair assumption, Appellant answered that it was. (Tr. Plea Hg.,
14). The court asked Appellant if he had any questions of the court or defense counsel,
and Appellant asked about the prison where he would be sentenced since he was a
former law enforcement officer. (Tr. Plea Hg., 14). The court informed Appellant that the
ODRC made that decision, but if it could do anything, it would make the ODRC aware of
Appellant’s concern. (Tr. Plea Hg., 15).
{¶47} The court informed Appellant that by pleading guilty, he was stating that he
understood the charges, no one threatened, forced, or promised him anything in
exchange for his guilty plea, he understood the consequences of changing his plea to
Case No. 25 MA 0016
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guilty, and that those consequences are mandatory and that it was his desire and intent
to do it of his own free will. (Tr. Plea Hg., 16). The court continued that if Appellant did
not want to plead guilty, he could maintain his not guilty plea and they could return to
court another day and proceed to a trial. (Tr. Plea Hg., 16-17).
{¶48} The court asked Appellant if he understood his choices, and Appellant
responded that he did. (Tr. Plea Hg., 17). The court asked Appellant again if anyone
promised him anything if he signed the plea agreement. (Tr. Plea Hg., 17). Appellant
responded no. (Tr. Plea Hg., 17). The court asked Appellant if he was threatened into
signing the plea agreement. (Tr. Plea Hg., 17). Appellant responded no. (Tr. Plea Hg.,
17). The court asked Appellant if he was pleading guilty or not guilty to Count Two
murder, an unclassified felony. (Tr. Plea Hg., 17). Appellant responded, “I plead guilty.”
(Tr. Plea Hg., 17). The court asked Appellant if he was pleading guilty or not guilty to the
attached firearm specification. (Tr. Plea Hg., 18). Appellant responded that he was guilty.
(Tr. Plea Hg., 18).
{¶49} The court thereafter indicated that it accepted Appellant’s guilty pleas and
found them knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. (Tr. Plea Hg., 18). The court
asked both the prosecution and the defense if there was anything else to discuss. (Tr.
Plea Hg., 19). Both parties responded no. (Tr. Plea Hg., 18).
{¶50} The plea transcript demonstrates that the trial court thoroughly reviewed the
plea agreement with Appellant, and reviewed Appellant’s constitutional and non-constitutional rights and waiver of those rights with a guilty plea. The parties stipulated
to the opinion in the competency report that Appellant was restored to competency.
Therefore, Appellant was competent to enter a guilty plea. There is no indication on the
record that Appellant lacked understanding of his rights or their waiver upon pleading
guilty, or that he was forced to enter a guilty plea.
{¶51} Appellant’s counsel made references to Appellant’s mental health issues at
sentencing. (Sent. Tr. 11-12). Further, Appellant apologized to his aunt, his family, and
his father. (Sent. Tr. 14). He stated that he “made a horrible mistake.” If I could rewind
the hands of time, I would have done things differently.” (Sent. Tr. 14). He then stated
that he was not in his “right mental state of mind” when he shot his father 11 times. (Sent.
Tr. 14).
Case No. 25 MA 0016
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{¶52} Since Appellant was competent when he entered his guilty plea, and he
entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea after a thorough colloquy with the
court, his guilty plea waived any argument concerning his NGRI defense, including the
lack of a sanity evaluation. Thus, Appellant’s counsel did not perform deficiently by failing
to follow up on the completion of a sanity evaluation for Appellant. Without deficient
performance, there is no need to address prejudice for an ineffective assistance of
counsel assertion.
{¶53} Accordingly, Appellant’s sole assignment of error lacks merit and is
overruled.
Waite, J., concurs.
Dickey, J., concurs.
Case No. 25 MA 0016
[Cite as State v. Bruno, 2025-Ohio-4618.]
For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignment of error is
overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the Court
of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be waived.
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
This document constitutes a final judgment entry.
