[Cite as State v. Schneider,
2025-Ohio-4625.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
CASE NO. CA2025-05-044
Appellee, :
OPINION AND
vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY
10/6/2025
KEIRSTIN SCHNEIDER, :
Appellant. :
:
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. CR2024-12-1888
Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael Greer, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Christopher Bazeley, for appellant.
____________
OPINION
PIPER, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Keirstin Schneider, appeals the decision of the Butler County
Court of Common Pleas denying her request for intervention in lieu of conviction ("ILC")
Butler CA2025-05-044
upon finding she was not statutorily eligible for ILC. For the reasons outlined below, we
affirm the trial court's decision.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On January 22, 2025, the Butler County Grand Jury returned an indictment
charging Schneider with one count of fourth-degree felony failure to comply with an order
or signal of a police officer in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B). The charge arose after
Schneider was alleged to have taken law enforcement officers on a high-speed chase for
approximately 16 minutes. During this time, Schneider was alleged to have disregarded
numerous traffic lights, drove the wrong way on a one-way street, and reached speeds
more than 70 mph in a 35-mph speed zone.
{¶ 3} On February 10, 2025, Schneider filed a request for ILC. Following a
hearing, on April 7, 2025, the trial court issued a decision denying Schneider's request for
ILC. In so doing, the trial court stated:
Under R.C. 2951.041(B)(10), Defendant is not eligible for ILC.
She was charged with an offense that requires a driver's
license suspension. That renders her being disqualified from
operating a commercial motor vehicle because, per R.C.
4506.06, a temporary instruction permit cannot be issued to
her without a valid driver's license.
Upon the trial court denying Schneider's request for ILC, Schneider then entered a plea
of no contest to the indictment as charged and was found guilty.
{¶ 4} On May 5, 2025, the trial court held a sentencing hearing where it sentenced
Schneider to community control for a period of five years. Shortly thereafter, on May 13,
2025, Schneider filed a notice of appeal. Schneider's appeal was submitted to this court
for consideration on September 4, 2025. Schneider's appeal now properly before this
court for decision, Schneider has raised one assignment of error for review.
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Schneider's Single Assignment of Error
{¶ 5} THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT OVERRULED
SCHNEIDER'S MOTION FOR ILC.
{¶ 6} In her single assignment of error, Schneider argues the trial court erred by
finding she was not statutorily eligible for ILC because she could not, as a matter of law,
satisfy the condition set forth in R.C. 2951.041(B)(10). Schneider's argument lacks merit.
De Novo Standard of Review Applies
{¶ 7} "Generally, a trial court's decision relative to an offender's motion for ILC is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Seawell, 2020-Ohio-155, ¶ 5 (12th Dist.).
However, because a trial court's interpretation and application of the statutory eligibility
requirements for ILC presents a question of law, "[t]his court conducts a de novo review
of whether an accused is statutorily eligible for ILC." State v. Panzeca,
2020-Ohio-326, ¶
46 (12th Dist.). This means "we independently review the record and give no deference
to the court's interpretation of the ILC statute." State v. Lageson,
2019-Ohio-919, ¶ 12
(12th Dist.). Therefore, rather than an abuse of discretion standard, this court applies a
de novo standard of review when determining whether a trial court erred by finding the
accused was not statutorily eligible for ILC.
R.C. 2951.041(B) and the Statutory Eligibility Requirements for ILC
{¶ 8} R.C. 2951.041(B) sets forth the conditions that must be met before an
offender may be considered statutorily eligible for ILC. State v. Birch, 2012-Ohio-543, ¶
30 (12th Dist.). One of those conditions, R.C. 2951.041(B)(10), requires the offender not
be "charged with an offense that would result in the offender being disqualified" under
R.C. Chapter 4506 "from operating a commercial motor vehicle or would subject the
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Butler CA2025-05-044
offender to any other sanction under that chapter."
{¶ 9} Pursuant to R.C. 2921.331(E), a charge of fourth-degree felony failure to
comply with the order or signal of a police officer in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) includes
a requirement that the trial court suspend the offender's driver's license for a period of
three years to life. A person applying for a commercial driver's license temporary
instruction permit must hold a valid driver's license. R.C. 4506.06(A). A commercial
driver's license temporary instruction permit is a prerequisite for receiving "[a]n initial
issuance of a commercial driver's license when a skills test is required." R.C.
4506.06(A)(1). Consequently, given the plain language of the statutes involved, an
offender who has been charged with fourth-degree felony failure to comply with the order
or signal of a police officer in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) is not statutorily eligible for
ILC. This is because the offender cannot, as a matter of law, satisfy the condition set forth
in R.C. 2951.041(B)(10).
Schneider's Argument and Analysis
{¶ 10} Schneider argues that "qualifying circumstances exist" that justify the trial
court granting her request for ILC. However, as set forth above, an offender who has been
charged with fourth-degree felony failure to comply with the order or signal of a police
officer in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) is not statutorily eligible for ILC. This is because
the offender cannot, as a matter of law, satisfy the condition set forth in R.C.
2951.041(B)(10). That statute requires the offender not be "charged with an offense that
would result in the offender being disqualified" under R.C. Chapter 4506 "from operating
a commercial motor vehicle." Schneider was charged an offense that would result in her
being disqualified under R.C. Chapter 4506 from operating a commercial motor vehicle
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Butler CA2025-05-044
pursuant to R.C. 4506.06(A). Therefore, the trial court did not err by finding Schneider
was not statutorily eligible for ILC given that she could not, as a matter of law, satisfy the
condition set forth in R.C. 2951.041(B)(10).
{¶ 11} There is nothing "premature" or speculative about the trial court's decision
as Schneider suggested in her appellate brief. The trial court, just like this court on appeal,
applied the plain language of the statutes involved. In so doing, this court's main objective
was to give effect to the legislative intent behind the ILC statutory framework. State v.
Straley, 2014-Ohio-2139, ¶ 9. To accomplish this objective, we first looked at the
language of the statutes themselves. State v. Jordan,
2000-Ohio-225, ¶ 17. We then
applied the clear and unambiguous language of those statutes as written. State v.
Ashcraft,
2022-Ohio-4611, ¶ 7. Applying those statutes, the trial court had no choice but
to determine that Schneider was not statutorily eligible for ILC. To the extent Schneider
argues otherwise, such argument lacks merit.
Conclusion
{¶ 12} For the reasons outlined above, and having found no merit to any of the
arguments raised by Schneider, Schneider's single assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 13} Judgment affirmed.
BYRNE, P.J., and SIEBERT, J., concur.
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Butler CA2025-05-044
JUDGMENT ENTRY
The assignment of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the
order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby
is, affirmed.
It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Butler County Court of Common
Pleas for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and
Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Costs to be taxed in compliance with App.R. 24.
/s/ Matthew R. Byrne, Presiding Judge
/s/ Robin N. Piper, Judge
/s/ Melena S. Siebert, Judge
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