[Cite as El Bey v. Mitchell,
2025-Ohio-4656.]
COURT OF APPEALS
LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STEVEN ABDUL-AZZIZ EL BEY, Case No. 2025 CA 00041
Plaintiff - Appellant Opinion & Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas
of Licking County,
THERESA ALEX MITCHELL, Case No. 2025 CV 00186
Defendant - Appellee Judgment: Affirmed
Date of Judgment: October 8, 2025
BEFORE: Andrew J. King; Robert G. Montgomery; David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: Steven Abdul-Azziz El Bey, fka Steven Lamar Smith, briefed the case
on his own behalf as Plaintiff-Appellant; Alfred Ray English, for Defendant-Appellee.
Gormley, J.
{¶1} Appellant Steven Abdul-Azziz El Bey appeals the judgment of the Court of
Common Pleas of Licking County granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee
Theresa Mitchell. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
The Key Facts
{¶2} In June 2010, El Bey conveyed to Mitchall all interest in real property located
at 314 10th Street in Newark, Ohio. The circumstances that gave rise to that transfer are
not at issue in this appeal. Even after the transfer, El Bey believed that he maintained his
interest in the property and that Mitchell could not sell it.
{¶3} In June 2024, El Bey filed a complaint to quiet title on the property. After
both El Bey and Mitchell had filed motions for summary judgment, El Bey moved to amend
his complaint to add claims for promissory estoppel, conversion, fraud, unjust enrichment,
and constructive trust. The trial court denied El Bey’s motion to amend the complaint,
granted Mitchell’s motion for summary judgment, and denied El Bey’s motion for summary
judgment. El Bey filed a notice of appeal but failed to timely file his brief, resulting in the
dismissal of his appeal by our court for want of prosecution.
{¶4} In February 2025, El Bey filed another complaint against Mitchell seeking
to quiet title for the same real property. He also asserted claims for promissory estoppel,
conversion, fraud, unjust enrichment, and constructive title. Mitchell promptly responded
by filing a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that El Bey’s second complaint
was barred by the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion. The trial court found that
El Bey’s complaint was indeed barred by the claim-preclusion doctrine, so that court
granted Mitchell’s motion for summary judgment. El Bey now appeals.
El Bey’s Second Complaint is Barred by the Claim-Preclusion Doctrine
{¶5} El Bey contends that the trial court erred in its claim-preclusion analysis
because, according to El Bey, he raised new claims in this action that were not raised in
his first lawsuit.
{¶6} Appellate courts review with fresh eyes a trial court’s decision on a motion
for summary judgment. Smathers v. Glass, 2022-Ohio-4595, ¶ 30 (“an appellate court
applies a de novo standard of review” when a summary-judgment decision is challenged).
In reviewing the trial court’s judgment in this case, we must conduct “an independent
review of the evidence without deference to the trial court’s findings.”
Id. In doing so, we
examine the evidence available in the record and determine whether summary judgment
is appropriate.
Id.
{¶7} Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment may be granted only after the trial
court determines that: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated;
(2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the
evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and — viewing the
evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary
judgment is made — that conclusion is adverse to that party. PNC Bank Natl. Assn. v.
Whitaker, 2025-Ohio-1078, ¶ 17 (5th Dist.), citing Temple v. Wean United, Inc.,
50 Ohio
St.2d 317, 327 (1977). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of
demonstrating that no issues of material fact exist for trial. Dresher v. Burt,
75 Ohio St.3d
280, 292 (1996). If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the nonmoving party then
has the reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.
Id. at 293.
{¶8} Mitchell argued in her summary-judgment motion that El Bey’s second
complaint raised claims that either were asserted in the prior action or could have been
asserted in that earlier case, and she alleged that any new claims in El Bey’s second
complaint arose out of the same transaction that was the subject matter of the previous
lawsuit. The trial court agreed and determined that Mitchell was entitled to judgment in
her favor as a matter of law.
{¶9} The doctrine of claim preclusion provides that “[a] valid, final judgment
rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out
of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.” Grava
v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379 (1995), syllabus. See also O’Nesti v. DeBartolo
Realty Corp.,
2007-Ohio-1102, ¶ 6 (“Claim preclusion prevents subsequent actions, by
the same parties or their privies, based upon any claim arising out of a transaction that
was the subject matter of a previous action”). Claim preclusion also bars an action in
which a claim “could have been litigated in the previous suit,” but, for whatever reason,
was not litigated.
Id.
{¶10} Claim preclusion is marked by four key elements: “‘(1) a prior final, valid
decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving
the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were
or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.’” Lycan v.
Cleveland, 2022-Ohio-4676, ¶ 23, quoting Hapgood v. Warren,
127 F.3d 490, 493 (6th
Cir. 1997).
{¶11} The first factor — whether there was a final and valid decision on the merits
— is met in this case. In the first action, the trial court granted summary judgment in
Mitchell’s favor. A judgment granting a motion for summary judgment operates as an
adjudication on the merits and has a preclusive effect on subsequent actions. See In re
Kreitzer, 489 B.R. 698, 709 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 2013) (when an issue is litigated and
determined on the merits through a summary-judgment motion, claim preclusion applies).
Though El Bey appealed after losing that first lawsuit, his failure to timely file a brief and
our court’s subsequent dismissal of that appeal had the effect of leaving in place as a
final and valid judgment the trial court’s ruling in the first lawsuit.
{¶12} The second claim-preclusion element focuses on whether the two actions
involved the same parties. The parties in El Bey’s first and second lawsuits were in fact
identical. He was the plaintiff in both actions and Mitchell was the only defendant in both.
{¶13} Under the third factor, we look to see whether the second action raised
claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action. El Bey asserted only a
claim to quiet title in the initial complaint in his first lawsuit. He later moved the trial court
for permission to amend that complaint in the first case to add claims for promissory
estoppel, conversion, fraud, unjust enrichment, and constructive trust. The trial court
denied that request. In the second lawsuit, El Bey’s complaint again asserted a claim to
quiet title and included claims for promissory estoppel, conversion, fraud, unjust
enrichment, and constructive trust.
{¶14} The last factor focuses on whether the second action arose out of the same
transaction or occurrence as the previous action. Both actions focused on the transfer of
real property located at 314 10th Street in Newark, Ohio. And notably, the allegations in
El Bey’s second complaint refer to events that occurred prior to the date when he filed his
first lawsuit.
{¶15} El Bey was required “to present every ground for relief in the first action[ ]
or be forever barred from asserting it.” Natl. Amusements, Inc. v. City of Springdale, 53
Ohio St.3d 60, 62 (1990). The trial court’s judgment in favor of Mitchell in the first action
serves as a bar to El Bey’s attempt to relitigate any claims asserted in that first lawsuit
and also bars his attempt to raise additional, yet related, claims in the second action.
{¶16} The elements of claim preclusion were met in this case, and the trial court
properly concluded that El Bey’s second lawsuit was barred by that doctrine. Mitchell
was entitled to judgment in her favor as a matter of law on El Bey’s second complaint.
{¶17} For the reasons explained above, the judgment of the Court of Common
Pleas of Licking County is affirmed. Costs are to be paid by Appellant Steven Abdul-
Azziz El Bey, who was formerly known as Steven L. Smith, and whose inmate number is
A-723-031 at the Allen-Oakwood Correctional Institution in Lima.
By: Gormley, J.;
King, P.J. and
Montgomery, J. concur.
