[Cite as State v. Bowles,
2025-Ohio-467.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
State of Ohio, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 24AP-428
v. : (C.P.C. No. 23CR-5183)
Miquel D. Bowles, : (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Defendant-Appellant. :
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on February 13, 2025
On brief: [Shayla D. Favor], Prosecuting Attorney, and
Darren M. Burgess for appellee.
On brief: Todd W. Barstow for appellant.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
MENTEL, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Miquel D. Bowles, appeals from a June 14, 2024
judgment entry of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to 36
months in prison following a guilty plea to obstructing justice in violation of R.C. 2921.32,
a felony of the third degree. Before this court is a counseled brief filed pursuant to Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} On October 6, 2023, a Franklin County Grand Jury indicted Bowles on one
count of obstructing justice, a felony of the third degree. On October 11, 2023, Bowles
entered a plea of not guilty and counsel was appointed in this matter. On October 13, 2023,
trial counsel for Bowles filed a request for discovery. Pursuant to Crim.R. 16, the state
provided Bowles with discovery materials on November 13, 2023. The state filed
No. 24AP-428 2
supplemental discovery on November 28, 2023, January 16, 2024, February 20, 2024,
May 17, 2024, and June 14, 2024.
{¶ 3} On May 17, 2024, Bowles, after being advised of his rights pursuant to
Crim.R. 11, entered a plea of guilty to obstructing justice in violation of R.C. 2921.32, a
felony of the third degree. According to the state’s recitation of facts, the Columbus Police
Department began investigating a missing person and the potential homicide of I.S. in
September 2023. (May 17, 2023 Tr. at 13.) I.S. was last seen on September 20, 2023 when
he got into a black car registered to Bowles. That same day, Bowles was dropped off at the
hospital in the same black car with a gunshot wound. (Tr. at 14.) On September 25, 2023,
the vehicle was “discovered in a field having been set on fire.” (Tr. at 13.) Law enforcement
met with Bowles on October 2, 2023. (Tr. at 14.) During the meeting, Bowles “denied being
in the car, he denied having any knowledge regarding [I.S.], and he also claimed to have no
knowledge of what happened to him or where his own shooting occurred.” (Tr. at 14.) I.S.
was found the next day and identified as a victim of a homicide. The state provided that all
of the foregoing events occurred in Franklin County, Ohio. Bowles, for the purposes of the
plea, accepted the facts as asserted by the state. (Tr. at 14.)
{¶ 4} As reflected on the plea form, Bowles acknowledged that the maximum
prison term allowed for the offense was 36 months and that there was no “jointly
recommended sentence.” (May 17, 2024 Entry.) The sentencing entry noted, “[t]he State
reserves the right to file additional charges out of this incident. This plea does not globally
resolve the transaction. Defendant has not been given any promises or consideration in
exchange for this plea. This plea is a non-negotiated plea.” (May 17, 2024 Entry.)
Thereupon, the trial court found Bowles guilty of obstructing justice and accepted his guilty
plea. The trial court ordered a presentencing investigation and scheduled the matter for a
sentencing hearing.
{¶ 5} At the June 14, 2024 sentencing hearing, the state argued that prison was
appropriate in this case as Bowles had prior juvenile convictions for discharge of a firearm,
a felony of the third degree; attempted felonious assault, a felony of the third degree; and
improper handling of a firearm, a felony of the fourth degree. The state noted that Bowles
was on active supervision at the time of this offense. (June 14, 2024 Tr. at 3.) Bowles’ trial
counsel stated that his client had already been confined in jail for a significant amount of
No. 24AP-428 3
time and GPS monitoring would not undermine the seriousness of the obstructing justice
conviction. Counsel stated that his client has acknowledged and taken full accountability
for his actions.
{¶ 6} At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court found prison
appropriate in this case as it was a homicide-related offense, Bowles was on supervision at
the time of the offense, and “when you were questioned, you were uncooperative, you lied
about the incident, you were part of the reason that the body was not found for about 13
days.” (Tr. at 15.) The trial court remarked Bowles’ actions have made a “lasting
psychological impact” on the family. (Tr. at 15.) In reaching this decision, the trial court
noted that it considered all the relevant sentencing factors as well as the principles and
purpose of sentencing. Ultimately, the trial court sentenced Bowles to 36 months in prison
with 257 days of jail-time credit. The trial court also held that, upon release from the
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, Bowles may be subject to post-release
control for a period of up to two years.
{¶ 7} Bowles filed a timely appeal on July 11, 2024.
II. ANDERS BRIEF
{¶ 8} Though Bowles filed a timely appeal from the judgment of the trial court,
appellate counsel has submitted an Anders brief on his behalf certifying that, having
conscientiously examined the record, the appeal was frivolous with no issues of arguable
merit. This court has set forth appellate counsel’s responsibility when filing an Anders brief
as follows:
In Anders, the United States Supreme Court held that if, after a conscientious
examination of the record, appellate counsel concludes that a defendant’s
case is wholly frivolous, counsel should so advise the court and request
permission to withdraw. Counsel must accompany the request to withdraw
with a brief outlining anything in the record that arguably could support the
defendant’s appeal. Counsel must also: (1) furnish the defendant with a copy
of the brief and request to withdraw; and (2) allow the defendant sufficient
time to raise any matters the defendant chooses.
(Internal citation omitted.) State v. Hudson, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-924, 2019-Ohio-
5136, ¶ 8; see also State v. Albert, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-504, 2019-Ohio-1012, ¶ 9.
{¶ 9} Appellate counsel has elected to file an Anders brief providing one potential
assignment of error for review. In accordance with Anders, counsel furnished a copy of the
No. 24AP-428 4
brief to Bowles, which included counsel’s request for permission to withdraw from the case.
Anders at 744. Since the filing of the Anders brief, we have afforded Bowles sufficient time
to file a supplemental brief. Bowles has not done so.
{¶ 10} When a defendant does not file a pro se brief in response to an Anders brief,
a reviewing court must still examine the potential assignment of error and the entire record
below to determine if the appeal lacks merit. Albert at ¶ 11, citing State v. A.H., 10th Dist.
No. 16AP-487, 2017-Ohio-7680, ¶ 18, citing State v. Cooper, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-511,
2009-Ohio-6275. “After full review of the proceedings below, if the appellate court finds
only frivolous issues on appeal, it then may proceed to address the merits of the case
without affording the defendant the assistance of counsel.” Hudson at ¶ 9. If, however, the
reviewing court finds that there are non-frivolous issues for appeal, the court must provide
Bowles the assistance of counsel to address those issues.
Id.
III. POTENTIAL ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
{¶ 11} Notwithstanding the Anders certification, counsel’s brief suggests a potential
assignment of error as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING BOWLES’ GUILTY PLEA
PURSUANT TO CRIMINAL RULE 11 AND ERRED IN SENTENCING
BOWLES.
{¶ 12} Our review of appellate counsel’s potential assignment of error reveals, in
fact, two distinct issues for review: (1) the trial court erred by accepting Bowles’ guilty plea
under Crim.R. 11 and (2) the trial court erred by imposing a 36-month sentence for
obstructing justice. While appellate counsel should have raised these potential issues as
two separate assignments of error, see App.R. 16(A)(3), in the interest of justice, we will
address each issue as best we can discern.
A. Guilty Plea
{¶ 13} Appellate counsel first contends that the trial court potentially violated
Crim.R. 11 by accepting Bowles’ guilty plea as it was not knowingly, voluntarily, or
intelligently made. We disagree.
{¶ 14} A trial court must comply with Crim.R. 11 when it accepts a guilty plea. State
v. Treadwell, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-304, 2020 Ohio App. LEXIS 1699, *6 (Apr. 30, 2020).
“Among other requirements, the rule requires a trial court to determine the defendant is
making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the
No. 24AP-428 5
maximum penalty involved, and to inform the defendant of and determine the defendant
understands the effect of the plea of guilty.”
Id. This court has noted that the underlying
purpose of Crim.R. 11(C) is for a court to convey particular information to the defendant,
which would allow him to make a voluntary and intelligent decision as to whether to plead
guilty. State v. Pyfrom, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-590,
2017-Ohio-5599, ¶ 9, citing State v.
Gonzales, 6th Dist. No. WD-06-084,
2007-Ohio-3565, ¶ 16, citing State v. Ballard,
66 Ohio
St.2d 473, 479-80 (1981). Concerning constitutional rights, while a trial court must strictly
comply with the dictates of Crim.R. 11(C), it “need not use the exact language found in that
rule when informing a defendant of his constitutional rights, but rather must explain those
rights in a manner reasonably intelligible to the defendant.” (Internal quotation and
citation omitted.) Pyfrom at ¶ 9. With respect to non-constitutional rights, “scrupulous
adherence to Crim.R. 11(C) is not required; the trial court must substantially comply,
provided no prejudicial effect occurs before a guilty plea is accepted.”
Id. Substantial
compliance requires that, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant
subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights that he is waiving.
Id.
{¶ 15} After an independent review of the plea allocution and colloquy, we conclude
the trial court fully complied with the requirements of Crim.R. 11. The transcript reveals
that the trial court first asked Bowles his full name, age, level of education, whether he could
read and understand English, and whether he was under the influence of any alcohol or
drugs. The trial court notified Bowles that by entering the plea he was waiving his right to
a trial by jury, to have his guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt, to confront and crossexamine witnesses, to compulsory process of witnesses, and to remain silent. The trial
court went on to notify Bowles of the nature of the obstructing justice charge against him,
the maximum penalty of 36 months, and that he may be subject to post-release control
requirements. The trial court also engaged in a colloquy with Bowles regarding the signed
guilty plea form as well as whether Bowles was satisfied with his counsel’s representation.
Finally, the trial court informed Bowles that if he went to trial and was convicted, he would
have the option or opportunity to appeal his conviction. Bowles repeatedly indicated his
understanding of the change of plea and the proceedings, and he expressly waived the
various rights as explained by the trial court. Given the foregoing notifications and
No. 24AP-428 6
statements by Bowles, the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11, and Bowles’ plea was made
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
B. Sentence Contrary to Law
{¶ 16} Next, appellate counsel claims that the trial court potentially erred in its
imposition of a 36-month sentence for obstructing justice as the sentence was not
supported by the evidence and was contrary to law.
{¶ 17} An appellate court will not reverse the trial court’s sentencing decision unless
there is clear and convincing evidence that either the record does not support the sentence
or that the sentence was contrary to law. State v. Davidson, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-643, 2019-
Ohio-5320, ¶ 25, citing State v. Maxwell, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-341, 2019-Ohio-2191, ¶ 6,
citing State v. Chandler, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-895,
2005-Ohio-1961, ¶ 10. “Clear and
convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere
‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty as is required
‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the
trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” State v.
Marcum,
146 Ohio St.3d 516,
2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford,
161 Ohio St.
469 (1954). This court has held that a sentence is not “clearly and convincingly contrary to
law” when the record reflects that the trial court considered the purposes of felony
sentencing under R.C. 2929.11, weighed the seriousness and recidivism factors provided in
R.C. 2929.12, and imposed a sentence that fell within the statutory range. Hudson, 2019-
Ohio-5136 at ¶ 11, citing State v. Gore, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-686,
2016-Ohio-7667, ¶ 8.
{¶ 18} Bowles was convicted of obstructing justice in violation of R.C. 2921.32, a
felony of the third degree. Generally, felonies of the third-degree do not carry a
presumption of either prison or community control. State v. Garlough, 12th Dist. No.
CA2021-06-051, 2022-Ohio-1276, ¶ 29, citing R.C. 2929.13(C); State v. Back, 12th Dist. No.
CA2015-03-037,
2015-Ohio-4447, ¶ 19. R.C. 2929.13(C) provides, outside explicit statutory
exceptions, “in determining whether to impose a prison term as a sanction for a felony of
the third degree … the sentencing court shall comply with the purposes and principles of
sentencing under section 2929.11 of the Revised Code and with section 2929.12 of the
Revised Code.”
No. 24AP-428 7
{¶ 19} As set forth in R.C. 2929.11(A), the “overriding purposes of felony sentencing
are [1] to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others, [2] to punish the
offender, and [3] to promote the effective rehabilitation of the offender using the minimum
sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an
unnecessary burden on state or local government resources.” To achieve these ends, the
sentencing court must consider “the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the
offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution
to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.” R.C. 2929.11(A). Moreover, a sentence
imposed for a felony must also be “commensurate with and not demeaning to the
seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with
sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.” R.C. 2929.11(B).
Regarding R.C. 2929.12, that statute “identifies a nonexclusive list of factors relating to the
seriousness of the offense and recidivism of the offender for the court to consider in
imposing a sentence to meet those objectives.” (Further citation omitted.) Davidson at
¶ 26.
{¶ 20} Though there is a mandatory duty to consider the relevant statutory factors
provided in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, the trial court is not required to go through each
factor on the record or to make specific findings explaining its analysis of the applicable
factors before imposing a sentence. Davidson at ¶ 27, citing State v. Caffey, 8th Dist. No.
101833, 2015-Ohio-1311, ¶ 15; see also State v. Holloman, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-875, 2008-
Ohio-2650, ¶ 18 (“It is well-settled that these two sections [R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12] do
not mandate judicial fact-finding.”). Thus, the trial court must only “consider” the statutory
factors and is not required to make specific findings on the record as to its consideration of
those factors, even if imposing a maximum sentence. State v. Pate, 8th Dist. No. 109758,
2021-Ohio-1089, ¶ 6.
{¶ 21} The record reflects that the trial court, after considering the principles and
purposes of felony sentencing and all the relevant sentencing factors, determined that a
term of 36 months in prison was appropriate. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court
explained that the 36-month sentence was warranted as Bowles was on supervision at the
time of the offense, it was a homicide-connected offense, and Bowles’ lies about the incident
was “part of the reason that the body was not found for about 13 days.” (June 14, 2024 Tr.
No. 24AP-428 8
at 14-15.) The trial court remarked that it was “one of the worst forms of the offense given
the lasting impact of your actions on the family.” (Tr. at 15.) Furthermore, the judgment
entry states in part that the court “considered the purposes and principles of sentencing set
forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12.” (June 14, 2024 Jgmt. Entry.)
This court has repeatedly held that the above language in the judgment entry “ ‘belies a
defendant’s claim that the trial court failed to consider the purposes and principles in
sentencing, pursuant to R.C. 2929.11(A), and the R.C. 2929.12 factors regarding recidivism
and the seriousness of the offense.’ ” Davidson at ¶ 28, quoting State v. Stubbs, 10th Dist.
No. 13AP-810, 2014-Ohio-3696, ¶ 14, citing State v. Foster, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-69, 2012-
Ohio-4129, ¶ 15; State v. Small, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-1175,
2010-Ohio-5324, ¶ 16. While the
trial court imposed a maximum sentence, it was not contrary to law as it fell within the
statutory range for the offense. Stubbs at ¶ 16. It is apparent that there is no clear and
convincing evidence that the 36-month sentence was not supported in the record or that it
was contrary to law.
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶ 22} Having reviewed the entire record, including but not limited to transcripts of
the plea and sentencing hearings, we conclude the trial court fully complied with the
requirements of Crim.R. 11. Moreover, we also find that the trial court’s sentence of 36
months in prison for obstructing justice was supported by the record and not contrary to
law. Thus, we find appellate counsel’s sole potential assignment of error lacks merit. After
our own independent review of the record, we cannot find any non-frivolous issues for
appeal and agree with appellate counsel that the issues raised in the Anders brief are not
meritorious. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common
Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
BEATTY BLUNT and BOGGS, JJ., concur.
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