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2025 Ohio 4675

State v. Ellis

Ohio Court of Appeals

Decided October 9, 2025

Ohio Court of Appeals · decided 2025-10-09

Murder; firearm; postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.23(A)(1); jurisdiction; untimely; Brady violation; exculpatory evidence; material; handgun; ballistic; report; undisclosed; reasonable probability; mere possibility; reasonable diligence; constitutional error; clear and convincing; guilty. Affirmed trial court's denial of appellant's petition for postconviction relief because the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the untimely petition. Appellant did not demonstrate a Brady violation where he had not shown a reasonable probability of a different outcome or that there was any failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence, and he offered nothing more than a mere possibility that the undisclosed evidence might have helped the defense. He otherwise failed to meet the requirements of R.C. 2953.23(A)(1).

Relies on Brady v. State of Maryland · United States v. Bagley · United States v. Agurs

Decided 2025-10-09

[Cite as State v. Ellis, 
2025-Ohio-4675
.]


                                COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                               EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                    :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,              :
                                                               No. 114788
                 v.                               :

LDDARYL ELLIS,                                    :

                 Defendant-Appellant.             :


                                 JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 9, 2025


            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                               Case No. CR-12-568532-A


                                            Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Anthony T. Miranda, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Patituce & Associates, LLC, Megan M. Patituce, and
                 Joseph C. Patituce, for appellant.


SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:

                    Appellant Lddaryl Ellis appeals the trial court’s decision denying his

petition for postconviction relief. Upon review, we affirm.
              In 2013, following a bench trial, appellant was found guilty of

discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises, involuntary manslaughter,

murder, aggravated riot, and multiple counts of felonious assault, all with attached

firearm specifications.1 The offenses stemmed from a gunfight, which involved two

shooting incidents occurring within a short time period, that happened on March 13,

2012, in the vicinity of East 95th Street in Cleveland. The victim, who had been

looking through her window at the gunfight, was struck and killed by a bullet that

entered her home. Several witnesses testified to seeing appellant with a gun in his

hand, which was believed to be a black semiautomatic handgun; to seeing appellant

shooting and/or hearing appellant and his companions shooting; and to observing

appellant’s location on East 95th Street. A detective testified that multiple shell

casings that were found in a direct line to the victim’s house were from a 9 mm

handgun. Those shell casings did not match any of the handguns recovered from

the other defendants. Another detective testified that a morgue pellet recovered

from the victim’s body matched the shell casings fired from the 9 mm handgun,

which handgun was never recovered. The morgue pellet contained “seven lands and

grooves with a right-hand-twist” that was unique to a Skyy 9 mm pistol. Other

testimony and evidence were provided.

              The trial court merged several counts for sentencing purposes and

imposed an aggregate sentence of 15 years to life imprisonment to be served after



      1 Appellant was acquitted on six other counts.
appellant served two consecutive three-year terms for firearm specifications, for a

total of 21 years to life. Appellant’s convictions, except for aggravated riot, were

affirmed on appeal in State v. Ellis, 
2014-Ohio-116
 (8th Dist.).2 Further review of

the evidence is set forth in that decision. See 
id.
 As this court observed in Ellis, three

witnesses placed a gun in appellant’s possession and “[w]e can also conclude from

the physical evidence collected that Ellis was in possession of a handgun on East

95th Street and that handgun resulted in [the victim’s] death.” Id. at ¶ 28-31.

               In March 2019, appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief

pursuant to R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a) and (b), and in April 2019, he filed an amended

petition. Following responsive briefing and the filing of supplemental authority, the

trial court denied appellant’s petition as untimely. This appeal followed.

               Appellant’s sole assignment of error claims the trial court erred in

denying his petition for postconviction relief as untimely.

               Our review of whether the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction

to entertain appellant’s petition for postconviction relief is de novo. See State v.

Johnson, 
2024-Ohio-134, ¶ 11
, citing State v. Bethel, 
2022-Ohio-783, ¶ 20
. Relative

to this matter, for the trial court to have subject-matter jurisdiction to consider an

untimely petition for postconviction relief, appellant had to show that he “‘was

unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must


      2  The aggravated riot conviction was ordered to be vacated because it was
uncontested that appellant participated in the shooting in the company of three other
gang members, but the charge of aggravated riot required four or more others. Ellis
at ¶ 33.
rely to present the claim for relief’” and show “‘by clear and convincing evidence that,

but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found the

petitioner guilty[.]’” Id. at ¶ 10, quoting R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a) and (b).

               As to the “unavoidably prevented” requirement, “[a] petitioner may

make the required showing either by establishing a violation under [Brady v.

Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83
 (1963)], or by demonstrating that he was previously unaware

of the evidence on which the petition relies and could not have discovered it by

exercising reasonable diligence.” 
Johnson at ¶ 18
. Pursuant to the United States

Supreme Court’s decision in Brady, “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence

favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is

material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith

of the prosecution.” Id. at 87. The Supreme Court of Ohio has observed that

“criminal defendants have no duty to ‘scavenge for hints of undisclosed Brady

material.’” 
Bethel at ¶ 24
, citing Banks v. Dretke, 
540 U.S. 668, 695
 (2004).

However, the Brady test “is stringent” and “‘[t]he mere possibility that an item of

undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the

outcome of the trial, does not establish “materiality” in the constitutional sense.’”

State v. Jackson, 
57 Ohio St.3d 29, 33
 (1991), quoting United States v. Agurs, 
427 U.S. 97, 109-110
 (1976). “Brady requires a ‘reasonable probability’ of a different

outcome with the exculpatory evidence, that is, an undermined confidence in the

trial result obtained without the exculpatory evidence.” 
Jackson at 33
, citing United

States v. Bagley, 
473 U.S. 667, 682
 (1985).
              The record herein shows that the gunfight in this case occurred on

March 13, 2012. A police report noted that Jamar Ensley, who was associated with

the gunfight in this case, “had been mentioned in a CCW Arrest incident on April 26,

2012” along with two other individuals and that “[d]uring this incident[,] a SKYY

9 mm caliber pistol . . . was confiscated.” The report reflects that a ballistic

comparison request was submitted to the lab to have the confiscated Skyy 9 mm

pistol compared to the morgue pellet and casings recovered in the homicide

investigation. Appellant claims the prosecution failed to include evidence regarding

the ballistic testing and comparisons with that firearm during pretrial discovery.

              Following his conviction, appellant eventually obtained documents

on March 4, 2018, from the Cleveland Police Forensic Laboratory, which revealed

the lab had received and analyzed the Skyy 9 mm pistol that had been seized during

the April 2012 incident involving Ensley and two others. However, the ballistic

laboratory report that was prepared on September 7, 2012, by James Kooser, the

firearms examiner, indicates that a microscopic examination and comparison of the

morgue bullet to a test-fired bullet from the submitted Skyy 9 mm pistol revealed

“corresponding general rifling characteristics seven (7) lands and seven (7) grooves

with a right-hand twist but dissimilar barrel engraved striations.” Therefore, Kooser

concluded in the report that the submitted weapon “did not fire the morgue bullet.”

Kooser also concluded from his examination and testing that the submitted weapon

“did not fire the crime scene spent cartridge cases.” Additionally, in another
referenced report, Kooser found a spent crime-scene bullet that was submitted to be

of “no analytical value due to impact with a hard surface.”

               Nevertheless, appellant claims that he was unavoidably prevented

from discovery of the facts upon which his claim for relief relies. He argues that the

State withheld exculpatory evidence pertaining to the confiscated Skyy 9 mm pistol

and any scientific tests performed on that firearm. He argues that the dissimilarities

with the subject firearm were not expounded upon, and he claims that the State’s

failure to disclose the report deprived him of the full opportunity to cross-examine

Kooser on his conclusion and of the opportunity to obtain an expert to conduct an

independent analysis on behalf of the defense. He maintains that he has shown both

that a Brady violation occurred and that he was previously unaware of the evidence

on which his petition relies and could not have discovered it by exercising reasonable

diligence. He claims that after years of unsuccessful attempts to obtain information

in his case, which efforts are detailed in his petition, he obtained the evidence on

which his petition relies.

               The State concedes that a Skyy 9 mm pistol was seized upon a

carrying-concealed-weapons arrest incident involving Jamar Ensley and two other

individuals on April 26, 2012, which was more than a month after the gunfight that

occurred in this case in which witnesses observed Ellis with a firearm. The State also

acknowledges that a report was prepared confirming the weapon confiscated during

the April 2012 incident with Ensley was operable, but that it was concluded that this

weapon “did not fire” the morgue pellet in the underlying homicide because the
recovered Skyy 9 mm handgun contained “dissimilar barrel engraved striations.” As

argued by the State, “that someone else’s gun did not fire [the fatal bullet], or that

one of the bullets [from the crime scene] could not be forensically examined, does

nothing to change the weight of the evidence against Appellant.” The State further

argues that the defense was aware the Skyy 9 mm pistol was confiscated upon

Ensley’s arrest and submitted for forensic testing. The State claims the defense had

the opportunity to cross-examine Kooser and could have obtained the information

with reasonable diligence.

               Upon review, we find appellant has not demonstrated a Brady

violation.   Appellant offers nothing more than a mere possibility that the

undisclosed information might have helped the defense. The ballistic reports on

which appellant relies do not show anything inculpatory or exculpatory. The fact

that the confiscated weapon had seven land groves with a right-hand twist, which is

a common feature of Skyy 9 mm handguns, shows no connection to the murder

weapon in this case. In fact, the reports show that the confiscated weapon had

dissimilar striations and that it had no connection to the fatal bullet or crime-scene

bullets in this case. Appellant’s theory that the disclosure of the reports may have

led to different testing or conclusions is speculative, and he fails to show any

reasonable probability of a different outcome or that there was any failure to disclose

material exculpatory evidence. Simply put, the fact that Kooser’s reports indicate

that a dissimilar Skyy 9 mm pistol was confiscated during a subsequent incident

involving Ensley and two others has no bearing upon the evidence against appellant
in this case. It cannot be said that there is an undermined confidence in the trial

result or that a Brady violation occurred.

              Furthermore, even if appellant could demonstrate that he was

previously unaware of the evidence on which his petition relies and could not have

discovered it by exercising reasonable diligence, he fails to show by clear and

convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable

factfinder would have found him guilty as required under R.C. 2953.23(A)(1).

Indeed, the firearms examiner found that the “SKYY 9 mm caliber pistol did not fire

the morgue bullet” and, as this court previously determined, “the logical conclusion

from the evidence [presented at trial] is that the bullet that struck and ultimately

killed [the victim] was fired from the firearm that [appellant] was shooting . . . .”

Ellis, 
2014-Ohio-116, at ¶ 40
.

              Having reviewed the record and pertinent law, we conclude that the

trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to consider appellant’s untimely

petition for postconviction relief. We are not persuaded by any of appellant’s

arguments otherwise. His sole assignment of error is overruled.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.


______________________
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J., and
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR

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